{ "id": 11144091, "name": "SHELL ISLAND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a North Carolina non-profit corporation, Plaintiff v. EUGENE B. TOMLINSON, Chairman North Carolina Coastal Resources Commission; NORTH CAROLINA COASTAL RESOURCES COMMISSION; DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, AND NATURAL RESOURCES FOR THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; and STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n v. Tomlinson", "decision_date": "1999-07-20", "docket_number": "No. COA98-1197", "first_page": "286", "last_page": "294", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "134 N.C. App. 286" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "281 S.E.2d 370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575162 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358631 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 S.E.2d 736", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 704", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4735713, 4731958 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0704-02", "/nc/318/0704-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 83", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4734194 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 S.E.2d 671", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675", "parenthetical": "citing Lemmerman v. Williams Oil Co., 318 N.C. 577, 350 S.E.2d 83, reh'g denied, 318 N.C. 704, 351 S.E.2d 736 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11237465 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241", "parenthetical": "citing Lemmerman v. Williams Oil Co., 318 N.C. 577, 350 S.E.2d 83, reh'g denied, 318 N.C. 704, 351 S.E.2d 736 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 U.S. 283", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11305055 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289" }, { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/455/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 U.S. 725", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1490200 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731-32" }, { "page": "665-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/436/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 S.E.2d 295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 731-32, 56 L.Ed.2d 658, 665-66 (1978)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139644 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 731-32, 56 L.Ed.2d 658, 665-66 (1978)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 S.E.2d 816", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "821" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 698", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11890512 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0698-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 S.E.2d 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "711" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527584 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 S.E.2d 66", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Crumpler v. Thornburg, 92 N.C. App. 719, 723, 375 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798856, 798796, 798807, 798845, 798911 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Crumpler v. Thornburg, 92 N.C. App. 719, 723, 375 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0304-02", "/nc/343/0304-03", "/nc/343/0304-04", "/nc/343/0304-05", "/nc/343/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "465 S.E.2d 565", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568", "parenthetical": "citing Crumpler v. Thornburg, 92 N.C. App. 719, 723, 375 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.C. App. 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917486 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394", "parenthetical": "citing Crumpler v. Thornburg, 92 N.C. App. 719, 723, 375 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/121/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 S.E.2d 917", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "920", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11198469 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 U.S. 1003", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1481136 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/505/1003-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 S.E.2d 548", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139620, 139372, 139535, 139646, 139327 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0280-03", "/nc/346/0280-01", "/nc/346/0280-04", "/nc/346/0280-05", "/nc/346/0280-02" ] }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333-34", "parenthetical": "citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 N.C. App. 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11867868 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385", "parenthetical": "citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/125/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571623, 571722, 571603, 571709, 571583 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0355-01", "/nc/349/0355-02", "/nc/349/0355-03", "/nc/349/0355-04", "/nc/349/0355-05" ] }, { "cite": "502 S.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11465277 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 S.E.2d 138", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139", "parenthetical": "citing Peoples, 296 N.C. at 147-48, 250 S.E.2d at 912" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 N.C. App. 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358052 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170-71", "parenthetical": "citing Peoples, 296 N.C. at 147-48, 250 S.E.2d at 912" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/87/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 S.E.2d 890", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "912" }, { "page": "912" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565310 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" }, { "page": "147-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "866", "parenthetical": "citing In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 147, 250 S.E.2d 890, 912 (1978)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556344 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370", "parenthetical": "citing In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 147, 250 S.E.2d 890, 912 (1978)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12169132 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0666-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 846, "char_count": 20166, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.489721334653485e-08, "percentile": 0.4859563240945708 }, "sha256": "4e6ad2c7623fc12ac750915fd46c861e3e7842f5c3662ca57e717d5be9c2e230", "simhash": "1:0b9dd0e3a72d0dfe", "word_count": 3161 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:28:46.713894+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GREENE and WYNN concur." ], "parties": [ "SHELL ISLAND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a North Carolina non-profit corporation, Plaintiff v. EUGENE B. TOMLINSON, Chairman North Carolina Coastal Resources Commission; NORTH CAROLINA COASTAL RESOURCES COMMISSION; DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, AND NATURAL RESOURCES FOR THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; and STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Judge.\nPlaintiff Shell Island Homeowners Association, Inc., is an association of all unit owners of the Shell Island Resort Hotel Condominium located at the north end of Wrightsville Beach, North Carolina, just south of Mason\u2019s Inlet. Plaintiff filed this action on 7 November 1996 against Eugene B. Tomlinson, Chairman of the North Carolina Coastal Resources Commission, the North Carolina Coastal Resources Commission (\u201cCRC\u201d), the Department of Environment, Health, and Natural Resources for the State of North Carolina (\u201cDEHNR\u201d), and the State of North Carolina (hereinafter collectively \u201cdefendants\u201d), challenging the constitutionality of regulations within the Coastal Area Management Act, G.S. \u00a7 113A-100, el seq., (\u201cCAMA\u201d) pertaining to the construction of erosion control structures, and claiming that defendants\u2019 denials of plaintiff\u2019s requests to build erosion control structures constitutes a taking of plaintiff\u2019s property without just compensation.\nThe facts pertinent to the issues on appeal are as follows. On 25 May 1985, the State of North Carolina, through a local permitting officer, issued a CAMA Minor Development Permit to plaintiff\u2019s predecessor for construction of the Shell Island hotel. However, issuance of the permit was based on an error in the location of the regulatory construction line on Wrightsville Beach, and the hotel, which exceeded development standards under CAMA\u2019s Inlet Hazard Areas of Environmental Concern, should not have been built at the permitted location. At the time the CAMA permit was issued, the CRC had already adopted regulations prohibiting the use of hardened erosion control structures on ocean and inlet beaches, and the hotel\u2019s CAMA permit specifically noted the restrictions on use of such structures:\nSince the hotel\u2019s construction, Mason\u2019s Inlet has migrated to the south, causing the shoreline around Shell Island to erode. On 25 September 1995 plaintiff applied for a CAMA Minor Development Permit to erect a steel sheetpile inlet migration barrier to protect its property from the waters of Mason\u2019s Inlet. The Division of Coastal Management (\u201cDCM\u201d) denied the permit, and on 27 October 1995 plaintiff applied to the CRC for a variance from the size limitations in the regulations pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 113A-120.1 and 15A NCAC 7J.0700, et seq. The CRC denied the variance request on 6 February 1996. On 12 June 1996 New Hanover County, as agent for plaintiff, applied for an emergency CAMA general permit to construct a temporary sandbag revetment on private property located adjacent to Mason\u2019s Inlet. The DCM denied the request, and again, on 5 August 1996 the CRC denied the county\u2019s request for a variance from the application of the erosion control structure regulations.\nOn 30 August 1996, New Hanover County and the Town of Wrightsville Beach, acting as agents for plaintiff, jointly submitted an emergency CAMA permit application to construct a slightly smaller sandbag revetment on private property. The redesigned revetment still exceeded dimensions allowed under the regulations, and the permit was denied. On 5 September 1996 a variance from the regulations was sought, and by final order dated 10 October 1996, the CRC denied the request. Plaintiff did not seek administrative review of any of the agency decisions denying permits or variances, but filed the present action in the Superior Court of New Hanover County on 7 November 1996 seeking (1) a declaration that the statutory remedy for a regulatory takings claim under CAMA, G.S. \u00a7 113A-123(b), is unconstitutionally vague and denies plaintiff due process; (2) alternatively, a judgment pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 113A-123(b) that the CRC\u2019s 5 August 1996 denial of plaintiff\u2019s variance request for construction of a sandbag revetment constitutes a taking without just compensation; and (3) a declaration that CAMA regulations pertaining to the construction of erosion control structures for the protection of private property are unconstitutional. On 6 January 1997, plaintiff amended its complaint to include a fourth claim for relief, alleging that the CRC\u2019s denial, on 10 October 1996, of the 5 September 1996 variance request was also a taking of plaintiff\u2019s property without just compensation.\nOn 20 December 1996, in response to defendants\u2019 consistent recommendations that plaintiff reduce the size and scope of its permit applications for a sandbag revetment such that the revetment would not, in effect, act like a permanent hardened structure prohibited by CRC rules, plaintiff submitted an emergency permit application for construction of a smaller and re-engineered revetment. This was the first CAMA permit application which proposed that the revetment be at least partially located on hotel property. Following denial of the permit by the DCM, plaintiff applied for a variance, and on 4 February 1997 the CRC granted plaintiff\u2019s variance request. Construction of the 410-foot sandbag revetment was completed on 17 September 1997 and currently protects the hotel. Under the terms of the CAMA permit the revetment must be removed in September 1999.\nOn 31 October 1997 defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that the granting of plaintiff\u2019s variance request has mooted plaintiffs claims. Plaintiff moved to consolidate this case with another action pending in the Superior Court of New Hanover County, case no. 98 CvS 38, in which plaintiff and others seek declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief from defendants. On 12 August 1998, the trial court entered an order denying plaintiffs motion to consolidate and granting defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss all of plaintiff\u2019s claims as moot. Plaintiff appeals.\nThe dispositive issue is whether the trial court erred by granting defendants\u2019 Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that plaintiff\u2019s claims are moot. Subject matter jurisdiction is a prerequisite for the exercise of judicial authority over any case or controversy. Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C. App. 666, 353 S.E.2d 673 (1987). \u201cWhenever during the course of litigation it develops that the relief sought has been granted or that the questions originally in controversy between the parties are no longer at issue, the case should be dismissed, for courts will not entertain an action merely to determine abstract propositions of law.\u201d Simeon v. Hardin, 339 N.C. 358, 370, 451 S.E.2d 858, 866 (1994) (citing In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 147, 250 S.E.2d 890, 912 (1978)). \u201cIf the issues before the court become moot at any time during the course of the proceedings, the usual response is to dismiss the action.\u201d Id. \u201cThe issue of mootness is not determined solely by examining facts in existence at the commencement of the action.\u201d North Carolina Press Ass\u2019n, Inc. v. Spangler, 87 N.C. App. 169, 170-71, 360 S.E.2d 138, 139 (1987) (citing Peoples, 296 N.C. at 147-48, 250 S.E.2d at 912).\nThe essence of the relief sought by plaintiff in this action is a determination that defendants\u2019 denials of plaintiff\u2019s requests for variances under G.S. \u00a7 113A-123(b) have effected a regulatory taking of plaintiff\u2019s property. Plaintiff\u2019s second and fourth claims for relief allege that the CRC\u2019s 5 August 1996 and 10 October 1996 denials of plaintiff\u2019s variance requests, respectively, deprive plaintiff of the practical use of its land, thereby constituting a taking. Plaintiff\u2019s first and third claims for relief seek declaratory rulings as to the constitutionality of the statute involved.\nThe action of the CRC on 4 February 1997, granting plaintiff\u2019s fourth variance request, renders moot the issues relating to the earlier variance requests. Plaintiff sought variances to construct an erosion control structure, plaintiff was granted permission to construct such a structure, and did in fact, complete construction of the revetment on 17 September 1997. Issuance of the variance provided plaintiff with the relief originally sought in the complaint.\nPlaintiff argues that the physical invasion of its property by inlet waters during the time period in which its variance requests were denied constitutes a compensable taking, a claim that was not mooted by the granting of the subsequent variance. Plaintiff makes this constitutional argument for the first time on appeal, however, and will not be allowed to do so. See Croker v. Yadkin, Inc., 130 N.C. App. 64, 502 S.E.2d 404, disc. review denied, 349 N.C. 355, \u2014 S.E.2d \u2014 (1998) (citation omitted) (where record does not affirmatively indicate constitutional issue was both raised and passed upon in the trial court, appellate court will not consider the claim for the first time on appeal). Here, in both its original and amended complaints, plaintiff based its claims of a compensable taking on defendants\u2019 denial of its variance requests. Plaintiff alleged that such denials restricted \u201cthe use of [plaintiff\u2019s property as to deprive it of the practical uses thereof.\u201d But, a compensable taking based on a theory of physical invasion is an altogether separate category of regulatory takings. See King By and Through Warren v. State, 125 N.C. App. 379, 385, 481 S.E.2d 330, 333-34, disc. review denied, 346 N.C. 280, 487 S.E.2d 548 (1997) (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992)) (\u201c[T]here are two separate categories of regulatory action that require a finding of a compensable taking: regulations that compel physical invasions of property and regulations that deny an owner all economically beneficial or productive use of property.\u201d). Neither plaintiffs original complaint nor its amended complaint allege facts sufficient to support a claim of taking by physical invasion. Because the issue was not before the trial court, we will not consider it on appeal. See Croker, supra.\nThe granting of a variance for, and subsequent construction of, the revetment, which is the relief sought in plaintiffs complaint, has rendered moot the substance of this action. The constitutional arguments contained in plaintiffs remaining claims for relief are hypothetical and abstract in the context of this dispute, and we therefore will not rule upon them. See Alford v. Davis, 131 N.C. App. 214, 218, 505 S.E.2d 917, 920 (1998) (citation omitted) (\u201cCourts have no jurisdiction to determine matters that are speculative, abstract, or moot, and they may not enter anticipatory judgments, or provide for contingencies which may arise thereafter.\u201d).\nPlaintiff argues, in the alternative, that its claims fall within two established exceptions to the doctrine of mootness. First, plaintiff argues that the claims fall within the exception to mootness commonly known as \u201ccapable of repetition yet evading review.\u201d An otherwise moot claim falls within this exception where \u201c(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.\u201d Ballard v. Weast, 121 N.C. App. 391, 394, 465 S.E.2d 565, 568, disc, review denied, 343 N.C. 304, 471 S.E.2d 66 (1996) (citing Crumpler v. Thornburg, 92 N.C. App. 719, 723, 375 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1989)). Plaintiff argues that the same controversy not only is likely to arise again, but did in fact arise again in the form of the related action with which it sought to consolidate this case.\nAssuming arguendo that the claims are capable of repetition, there is no evidence to suggest that plaintiffs grievances have evaded review. To the contrary, plaintiff has had ample opportunity to seek review of any of the denials of its permit requests through CAMA and the Administrative Procedure Act (\u201cAPA\u201d). Under CAMA \u00a7 113A-121.1, plaintiff could have, but did not, file for a contested case hearing under the APA, G.S. \u00a7 150B-23, within 20 days of any of the permit denials, thereby obtaining an administrative hearing in which a full record could have been developed to determine whether \u201cthe agency (1) exceeded its authority or jurisdiction, (2) acted erroneously, (3) failed to use proper procedure, (4) acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or (5) failed to act as required by law or rule.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-23. Moreover, plaintiff could have, but did not, seek relief by alleging a regulatory taking pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 113A-123(b). In addition, plaintiff could have, but did not, seek a hearing on its application for a variance pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 113A-120.1, instead choosing to accept the variance for, and complete construction of, the smaller revetment. Where plaintiff has failed to seek review of its claims, voluntarily accepted the variance, and simply filed an action in superior court over two years after the denial of the original permit, it may not now assert that its claims have evaded effective review.\nPlaintiff also argues that its claims fall within an exception to mootness \u201cwhich provides for review of cases where a defendant voluntarily ceases its illegal conduct during the pendency of the appeal.\u201d Thomas v. North Carolina Dept. of Human Resources, 124 N.C. App. 698, 706, 478 S.E.2d 816, 821 (1996), affirmed, 346 N.C. 268, 485 S.E.2d 295 (1997) (citing Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 731-32, 56 L.Ed.2d 658, 665-66 (1978)). \u201cIt is well settled that a defendant\u2019s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a... court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.\u201d Id. (quoting City of Mesquite v. Aladdin\u2019s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289, 71 L.Ed.2d 152, 159 (1982)).\nPlaintiff asserts that defendants\u2019 granting of the variance for the sandbag revetment constitutes a \u201cvoluntary cessation of the State\u2019s illegal practice of enforcing the hardened structure rule,\u201d enabling defendants to \u201ccease the offending practices in time to avoid meaningful review, and then be free to return to their old ways.\u201d It is clear, however, that rather than ceasing an illegal practice, defendants have continually and consistently enforced CAMA regulations with respect to erosion control structures, both before and throughout the duration of the present litigation. The trial court correctly dismissed plaintiff\u2019s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that all claims are moot.\nIn a separate assignment of error, plaintiff contends its fourth claim for relief was erroneously dismissed because defendants\u2019 motion neither specifically addressed the claim nor sought its dismissal. We disagree. Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss, filed 31 October 1997 after plaintiff had amended its complaint to add the fourth claim for relief, sought \u201cto dismiss the above-captioned action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that Plaintiff\u2019s claims are moot;\u201d defendants prayed for \u201can order dismissing Plaintiff\u2019s claims as moot.\u201d Clearly, the motion was addressed to all of the claims alleged in plaintiff\u2019s original and amended complaints. Moreover, \u201cthe question of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even on appeal.\u201d Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Calco Enter., 132 N.C. App. 237, 241, 511 S.E.2d 671, 675 (1999) (citing Lemmerman v. Williams Oil Co., 318 N.C. 577, 350 S.E.2d 83, reh\u2019g denied, 318 N.C. 704, 351 S.E.2d 736 (1986)). \u201c \u2018If a court finds at any stage of the proceedings that it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it must dismiss the case ....\u2019\u201d Id. (quoting McAllister v. Cone Mills Corp., 88 N.C. App. 577, 579, 364 S.E.2d 186, 188 (1988)). This assignment of error is overruled.\nFinally, our decision to affirm the order dismissing plaintiff\u2019s claims as moot renders it unnecessary to consider plaintiff\u2019s final argument directed to the denial of its motion to consolidate this action with the related action then pending in New Hanover County Superior Court. Even if the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion to consolidate was premature as contended by plaintiff, see Oxendine v. Catawba County Dept. of Social Services, 303 N.C. 699, 281 S.E.2d 370 (1981), no prejudice has resulted to plaintiff in view of our decision.\nThe trial court\u2019s order dismissing this action is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges GREENE and WYNN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Shanklin & McDaniel, L.L.P., by Kenneth A. Shanklin and Susan J. McDaniel, for plaintiff-ajppellant.", "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General J. Allen Jemigan and Special Deputy Attorney General Robin W. Smith, for defendant-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SHELL ISLAND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a North Carolina non-profit corporation, Plaintiff v. EUGENE B. TOMLINSON, Chairman North Carolina Coastal Resources Commission; NORTH CAROLINA COASTAL RESOURCES COMMISSION; DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, AND NATURAL RESOURCES FOR THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; and STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Defendants\nNo. COA98-1197\n(Filed 20 July 1999)\n1. Jurisdiction\u2014 subject matter \u2014 mootness\nThe trial court did not err by granting defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under N.C.G.S \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1) where the essence of the relief sought by plaintiff was a determination that the denial of plaintiff\u2019s requests for variances under N.C.G.S.\u00a7 113A-123(b) effected a regulatory taking of plaintiff\u2019s property, but the granting of plaintiff\u2019s fourth variance request rendered moot the issues relating to the earlier variance requests.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 argument first raised on appeal\nPlaintiff\u2019s argument that the physical invasion of its property by inlet waters constituted a taking was not considered where the argument was raised for the first time on appeal. Plaintiff based its claims on the denial of its variance requests; a compensable taking based on a theory of physical invasion is an altogether separate category of regulatory taking.\n3. Constitutional Law\u2014 arguments hypothetical and abstract \u2014 not considered\nPlaintiff\u2019s constitutional arguments relating to the denial of variances for hardened coastal erosion control structures were hypothetical and abstract in the context of the dispute and were not ruled upon.\n4. Appeal and Error\u2014 mootness \u2014 exception\u2014capable of repetition yet evading review\nThe trial court properly dismissed as moot claims arising from the denial of variances to coastal erosion regulations following the eventual granting of a variance where plaintiff argued that the claims fell within the exception to mootness commonly known as capable of repetition yet evading review. There was no evidence that plaintiffs grievances evaded review; to the contrary, plaintiff has had ample opportunity to seek review through CAMA and the APA.\n5. Appeal and Error\u2014 mootness \u2014 exception\u2014voluntary cessation of illegal conduct\nThe trial court properly dismissed as moot claims arising from the denial of variances to coastal erosion regulations where a variance was eventually granted and plaintiff argued that its claims fell within the exception to mootness for cases in which a defendant voluntarily ceases its illegal conduct during the pen-dency of the appeal. Rather than ceasing an illegal practice, defendants have continually and consistently enforced CAMA regulations with respect to erosion control structures.\n6. Jurisdiction\u2014 subject matter \u2014 claim included in general motion\nThe trial court did not err by dismissing a claim for relief added in an amendment where the dismissal was pursuant to a motion \u201cto dismiss the above captioned action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) . . . .\u201d The motion was addressed to all of the claims alleged in plaintiffs original and amended complaints; moreover, subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even on appeal.\n7. Civil Procedure\u2014 consolidation of actions \u2014 denial not prejudicial\nNo prejudice resulted to plaintiff from the allegedly premature denial of its motion to consolidate actions where the trial court properly dismissed the claims in this action as moot.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 12 August 1998 by Judge James D. Llewellyn in New Hanover County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 May 1999.\nShanklin & McDaniel, L.L.P., by Kenneth A. Shanklin and Susan J. McDaniel, for plaintiff-ajppellant.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General J. Allen Jemigan and Special Deputy Attorney General Robin W. Smith, for defendant-appellees." }, "file_name": "0286-01", "first_page_order": 318, "last_page_order": 326 }