{ "id": 11144239, "name": "SOUTH MECKLENBURG PAINTING CONTRACTORS, INC., Plaintiff v. THE CUNNANE GROUP, INC., Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "South Mecklenburg Painting Contractors, Inc. v. Cunnane Group, Inc.", "decision_date": "1999-07-20", "docket_number": "No. COA98-881", "first_page": "307", "last_page": "315", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "134 N.C. App. 307" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "51 S.E.2d 477", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480", "parenthetical": "corporation may take property under a will during suspension" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 738", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12167948 ], "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "743", "parenthetical": "corporation may take property under a will during suspension" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 S.E.2d 52", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55", "parenthetical": "G.S. \u00a7 105-230 not intended to deprive corporation of its property or to penalize innocent third parties" }, { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. 648", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8612095 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "corporation under revenue suspension may bring lawsuit" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/232/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "834-35", "parenthetical": "corporation under revenue suspension may bring lawsuit" }, { "page": "834", "parenthetical": "corporation may defend action brought against it during period of suspension" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8598338 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259", "parenthetical": "corporation under revenue suspension may bring lawsuit" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/232/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 S.E.2d 273", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" }, { "page": "273-74", "parenthetical": "corporation had legal capacity to bring suit to enforce contract entered into before suspension, notwithstanding suspension of corporation's articles of incorporation prior to commencement of suit" }, { "page": "274", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 N.C. App. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8556609 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "716" }, { "page": "716" }, { "page": "716" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/11/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 S.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124" }, { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 N.C. 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8619678 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" }, { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/249/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 10, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31" }, { "parenthetical": "Emphasis added" }, { "page": "31" }, { "page": "31", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "32" }, { "page": "31" }, { "page": "31" }, { "page": "31" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522936 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412" }, { "page": "413" }, { "page": "413" }, { "page": "412-13" }, { "page": "413" }, { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 S.E.2d 280", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12136994 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "477 S.E.2d 150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867561 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 347", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11914135 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 648", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556426, 2559318, 2557847, 2557592, 2559291 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0737-03", "/nc/339/0737-05", "/nc/339/0737-04", "/nc/339/0737-01", "/nc/339/0737-02" ] }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525419 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8616869 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26", "parenthetical": "G.S. \u00a7 105-230 not intended to deprive corporation of its property or to penalize innocent third parties" }, { "page": "26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 S.E.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345", "parenthetical": "approving purchase and sale of property by suspended corporation" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 N.C. App. 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11303080 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299", "parenthetical": "approving purchase and sale of property by suspended corporation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/22/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 S.E.2d 73", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "corporation under revenue suspension may bring lawsuit" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 762, "char_count": 16708, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.241861021549235e-08, "percentile": 0.5109809490823596 }, "sha256": "083ff613fadfa08e6a8798b2b44b9195ec7bf20c0e73804a8b7551b2680485c9", "simhash": "1:9e3d06624d3cf1c4", "word_count": 2641 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:28:46.713894+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WALKER and McGEE concur." ], "parties": [ "SOUTH MECKLENBURG PAINTING CONTRACTORS, INC., Plaintiff v. THE CUNNANE GROUP, INC., Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nPlaintiff South Mecklenburg Painting Contractors, Inc. (SMPC), appeals the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Cunnane Group, Inc. (Cunnane). In the main, SMPC contends the court erred in ruling that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-230 (1997) and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 55-14-04 (1990) barred SMPC\u2019s action against Cunnane. We affirm the trial court.\nRelevant factual and procedural background includes the following: SMPC is \u201cin the business of supplying painting labor and materials to general contractors on commercial projects.\u201d Cunnane is a general contractor operating in Charlotte, North Carolina.\nOn 20 May 1997, representatives of SMPC and Cunnane met to discuss a painting contract for the Bonnie Briar Townhouses (the project), whereby SMPC would \u201cprovide labor and materials\u201d in exchange for agreed compensation. On 22 May 1997, a document was executed reflecting the parties\u2019 agreement and SMPC began purchasing materials and making preparations to commence work at the project. Thereafter, SMPC became aware that another painting contractor was painting the project.\nOn 21 August 1997, SMPC brought the instant action alleging breach of contract and breach of quasi contract, seeking inter alia, \u201cactual and consequential damages in a sum... exceeding] $10,000.\u201d Cunnane answered 27 October 1997 denying a contractual relationship with SMPC. Specifically, and as grounds for its subsequent 6 August 1998 motion for summary judgment, Cunnane asserted that because SMPC\u2019s \u201cArticles of Incorporation were under revenue suspension\u201d pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 105-230 at the time of the alleged contract, SMPC was without authority to conduct its normal business. SMPC\u2019s articles of incorporation had been suspended 1 October 1991 and administratively dissolved 9 March 1993 by the Secretary of State for failure to pay annual franchise fees. On 20 May 1998, the trial court granted Cunnane\u2019s motion as to all SMPC\u2019s claims and the latter timely appealed.\nSummary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits show no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (1990); Davis v. Town of Southern Pines, 116 N.C. App. 663, 665, 449 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1994), disc. review denied, 339 N.C. 737, 454 S.E.2d 648 (1995). A summary judgment movant bears the burden of showing that\n(1) an essential element of plaintiff\u2019s claim is nonexistent; (2) plaintiff cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of its claim; or (3) plaintiff cannot surmount an affirmative defense raised in bar of its claim.\nLyles v. City of Charlotte, 120 N.C. App. 96, 99, 461 S.E.2d 347, 350 (1995), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 344 N.C. 676, 477 S.E.2d 150 (1996). A court ruling upon a motion for summary judgment must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, accepting all its asserted facts as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor. See Kennedy v. Guilford Tech. Community College, 115 N.C. App. 581, 583, 448 S.E.2d 280, 281 (1994).\nSMPC first contends the trial court erred in\nits decision to grant [Cunnane\u2019s] motion for summary judgment on the sole basis that [SMPC\u2019s] corporate charter had been suspended and administratively dissolved ... for the period of time that [plaintiffs] causes of action against [defendant] accrued and [its] action ... commenced.\nWe do not agree.\nIt is well established that when a corporate charter has been suspended for failure to pay franchise taxes, the corporation under revenue suspension \u201closes its state-granted privileges.\u201d Pierce Concrete, Inc. v. Cannon Realty & Construction Co., 77 N.C. App. 411, 412, 335 S.E.2d 30, 31 (1985).\nG.S. \u00a7 105-230 provides in pertinent part:\nIf a corporation . . . fails to file any report or return or to pay any tax or fee required by this Subchapter for 90 days after it is due, the Secretary shall inform the Secretary of State of this failure. The Secretary of State shall suspend the articles of incorporation .... The powers, privileges, and franchises conferred upon the corporation ... by the articles of incorporation . . . terminate upon suspension.\nFurther, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-231 (1997) states:\nA person who exercises or by any act attempts to exercise any powers, privileges, or franchises under articles of incorporation ... after it has been suspended under G.S. \u00a7 105-230 shall pay a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) to be recovered in an action to be brought by the Secretary in the Superior Court of Wake County. Any act performed or attempted to be performed during the period of suspension is invalid and of no effect.\nId. (Emphasis added).\nAlthough the effect of G.S. \u00a7 105-230 is not absolute, see, e.g., Mica Industries v. Penland, 249 N.C. 602, 606, 107 S.E.2d 120, 124 (1959), Swimming Pool Co. v. Country Club, 11 N.C. App. 715, 716, 182 S.E.2d 273, 274 (1971), and Ionic Lodge v. Masons, 232 N.C. 252, 259, 59 S.E.2d 829, 834-35, rev\u2019d on other grounds, 232 N.C. 648, 62 S.E.2d 73 (1950) (corporation under revenue suspension may bring lawsuit); see also Parker v. Homes, Inc., 22 N.C. App. 297, 299, 206 S.E.2d 344, 345 (1974) (approving purchase and sale of property by suspended corporation) and Page v. Miller, 252 N.C. 23, 26, 113 S.E.2d 52, 55 (1960) (G.S. \u00a7 105-230 not intended to deprive corporation of its property or to penalize innocent third parties), it indisputably prevents a corporation from \u201ccontinuing to conduct [its] business as usual.\u201d Pierce Concrete, 77 N.C. App. at 413, 335 S.E.2d at 31.\nIn Pierce Concrete, this Court observed that the\nindividual defendant, to the extent he was involved, was acting in his capacity as president and agent of the corporation. His authority as agent of the corporation extended only to matters within the ordinary scope of the corporation\u2019s business. As discussed above, the suspended corporation had no statutory right to conduct as part of its ordinary business . . . [the] transactions which [occurred subsequent to its suspension].\nPierce Concrete, 77 N.C. App. at 413, 335 S.E.2d at 31 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). We then held that, in consequence of the suspension of the corporate charter, the individual defendant was liable for the indebtedness sued upon because\n[t]he law will not permit a corporate officer to create obligations in the name of the corporation, knowing the acts are without authority and invalid, and then be permitted to use the corporate name as shield against the creditors.\nId. at 414, 335 S.E.2d at 32.\nIn the case sub judice, the ordinary business of SMPC as alleged in its complaint included \u201csupplying painting labor and materials to general contractors on commercial projects.\u201d In addition, the parties do not dispute that SMPC\u2019s corporate charter had been suspended during the time it allegedly entered into the agreement to provide painting services to Cunnane. Accordingly, at the time of the alleged contract, SMPC had \u201clos[t] its state-granted privileges\u201d to conduct \u201c[its] business as usual.\u201d Pierce Concrete, 77 N.C. App. at 412-13, 335 S.E.2d at 31.\nMoreover, G.S. \u00a7 105-231 explicitly mandates that any \u201cact performed or attempted to be performed\u201d by SMPC \u201cduring [its] period of suspension is invalid and of no effect.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 105-231. Consequently, SMPC \u201chad no statutory right... as part of its ordinary business,\u201d Pierce Concrete, 77 N.C. App. at 413, 335 S.E.2d at 31, to enter into a contractual relationship with Cunnane.\nNotwithstanding, SMPC cites the holding in Mica, 249 N.C. 602, 107 S.E.2d 120, that \u201crevenue suspension does not end a corporation\u2019s capacity to sue.\u201d Therefore, SMPC concludes, the circumstance of revenue suspension would not operate to preclude its suit against Cunnane. Mica is distinguishable.\nThe corporation\u2019s suit in Mica was based upon transactions occurring while operation of the company was statutorily valid, see Mica, 249 N.C. 602, 107 S.E.2d 120 (corporation may bring action regarding transactions consummated before suspension), and a corporation may sue to enforce rights acquired prior to its suspension, see Swimming Pool, 11 N.C. App. at 716, 182 S.E.2d at 273-74 (corporation had legal capacity to bring suit to enforce contract entered into before suspension, notwithstanding suspension of corporation\u2019s articles of incorporation prior to commencement of suit), and Page, 252 N.C. at 26, 113 S.E.2d at 55 (corporation\u2019s transfer of property not invalid where judicial sale to corporation was confirmed but articles of incorporation suspended prior to corporation\u2019s assignment of its bid to judgment creditor and joining with creditor to convey the property, because G.S. \u00a7 105-230 was not intended to \u201cdeprive a corporation of its properties nor penalize innocent [third] parties\u201d).\nIn the instant case, however, SMPC sought to enforce contract rights allegedly acquired during a period of suspension. The present circumstance is thereby distinct from case-law grounded upon the rationale that suspension of a corporate charter\n\u201cwhile depriving the corporation of the power to engage in the ordinary business for which it has been chartered, [does not] take[] away . . . the incidental powers necessary to [the corporation\u2019s] survival [i.e.,] the power to protect its property in a court of law, either by assertion or defense of right.\u201d\nSwimming Pool, 11 N.C. App. at 716, 182 S.E.2d at 274 (citation omitted); see also Mica, 249 N.C. at 606, 107 S.E.2d at 124; Ionic Lodge, 232 N.C. at 259, 59 S.E.2d at 834 (corporation may defend action brought against it during period of suspension); Trust Co. v. School for Boys, 229 N.C. 738, 743, 51 S.E.2d 477, 480 (1949) (corporation may take property under a will during suspension). Although our courts have not specifically addressed the issue sub judice prior to the instant appeal, our reading of G.S. \u00a7 105-230 and G.S. \u00a7 105-231, as well as of the case-law cited above, compels the conclusion that a corporation may not bring suit to enforce a contract entered into during a period of revenue suspension.\nSMPC vigorously points to the reinstatement of its articles during the pendency of this action. We respectfully respond that such reinstatement is not relevant to our inquiry. Rather we conclude the statute and case law direct our focus to the circumstance that SMPC\u2019s suit against Cunnane was instituted to enforce a contract allegedly entered into while SMPC\u2019s articles of incorporation were suspended. We reiterate that once suspended, a corporation simply may not \u201cconduct . . . business as usual,\u201d Pierce Concrete, 77 N.C. App. at 413, 335 S.E.2d at 31, and \u201c[a]ny act performed or attempted to be performed during [a] period of suspension is invalid and of no effect.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 105-231.\nSMPC also argues that portions of the Business Corporation Act, N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 55-1-01 through 55-17-05 (1997), permit the instant action. SMPC specifically points to G.S. \u00a7 55-14-05 which provides in pertinent part:\nEffect of dissolution\n(a) A dissolved corporation continues its corporate existence but may not carry on any business except that appropriate to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs, including:\n(1) Collecting its assets;\n(2) Disposing of its properties that will not be distributed in kind to its shareholders;\n(3) Discharging or making provision for discharging its liabilities;\n(4) Distributing its remaining property among its shareholders according to their interests; and\n(5) Doing every other act necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs.\n(b) Dissolution of a corporation does not:\n(1) Transfer title to the corporation\u2019s property;\n(2) Prevent transfer of its shares or securities, although the authorization to dissolve may provide for closing the corporation\u2019s share transfer records;\n(3) Subject its directors or officers to standards of conduct different from those prescribed in Article 8;\n(4) Change quorum or voting requirements for its board of directors or shareholders; change provisions for selection, resignation, or removal of its directors or officers or both; or change provisions for amending its bylaws;\n(5) Prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against the corporation in its corporate name;\n(6) Abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against the corporation on the effective date of dissolution; or\n(7) Terminate the authority of the registered agent of the corporation.\nG.S. \u00a7 55-14-05.\nWe do not quarrel with SMPC\u2019s assertion that G.S. \u00a7 55-14-05 allows a corporation to \u201ccommence [] ... a proceeding by.. . the corporation in its corporate name.\u201d Id. However, the statute also mandates that a corporation \u201cmay not carry on any business except that appropriate to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs\u201d during the period of dissolution. Id. As SMPC\u2019s articles of incorporation were dissolved 9 March 1993, there remains no legal basis upon which to validate the alleged 22 May 1997 contract with Cunnane occurring during the period of SMPC\u2019s suspension and dissolution so as to permit suit upon the alleged contract. SMPC\u2019s reliance upon the Business Corporation Act is unavailing.\nFinally, SMPC contends the trial court committed reversible error in that there was no \u201cevidence of [SMPC\u2019s] actual intent or knowledge concerning the suspension or administrative dissolution [of its charter] in the record.\u201d However, plaintiff cites no authority in support of this contention and it is deemed abandoned. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(5) (\u201cassignments of error ... in support of which no reason or argument is stated or authority cited, will be taken as abandoned\u201d).\nIn sum, SMPC had no statutory authority to enter into a contractual relationship with Cunnane while the former\u2019s corporate charter was in a state of administrative suspension and dissolution. See G.S. \u00a7 105-231 (\u201c[a]ny act performed or attempted to be performed during [a] period of suspension is invalid and of no effect\u201d). Accordingly, there existed no basis upon which to allow SMPC to seek enforcement of the alleged contract, and the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Cunnane.\nAffirmed.\nJudges WALKER and McGEE concur.\n. Plaintiff does not contend on appeal that reinstatement of SMPC\u2019s charter related back to the date of its 9 March 1993 administrative dissolution so as to allow SMPC to enter into the alleged contract on 20 May 1997. We therefore do not address this argument save to note SMPC did not seek reinstatement of its charter within two years of dissolution thereof as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 55-14-22 (1997) (corporation administratively dissolved may apply for reinstatement within two years after effective date of dissolution and, if allowed, reinstatement \u201crelates back to and takes effect as of the effective date of the administrative dissolution\u201d).", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wilson & Bos, by Gerard A. Bos, for plaintiff-appellant.", "The Bishop Law Firm, P.A., by A. Todd Capitano, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SOUTH MECKLENBURG PAINTING CONTRACTORS, INC., Plaintiff v. THE CUNNANE GROUP, INC., Defendant\nNo. COA98-881\n(Filed 20 July 1999)\n1. Corporations\u2014 corporate charter \u2014 revenue suspension\u2014 action on contract entered during\nThe trial court correctly granted summary judgment for defendant in an action for breach of a contract entered during a time when plaintiffs corporate charter was suspended under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-230. Although the effect of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-230 is not absolute, it prevents a corporation from conducting business as usual; plaintiff had no statutory right to enter into a contractual relationship with defendant and may not bring suit to enforce a contract entered into during the period of revenue suspension. Reinstatement is not relevant.\n2. Corporations\u2014 corporate charter \u2014 revenue suspension\u2014 contract entered during \u2014 dissolution statute\nThe trial court correctly granted summary judgment for defendant in an action on a contract entered during a revenue suspension of the corporate charter where plaintiff argued that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 55-14-05 permits the action. That statute mandates that a corporation may not carry on any business except as appropriate to wind up and liquidate its affairs during the period of dissolution.\n3. Appeal and Error\u2014 authority not cited \u2014 contention abandoned\nA contention concerning the ability of a corporation to enter into a contract during a period in which its charter was suspended was deemed abandoned where no authority was cited.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 20 May 1998 by Judge Robert P. Johnston in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 March 1999.\nWilson & Bos, by Gerard A. Bos, for plaintiff-appellant.\nThe Bishop Law Firm, P.A., by A. Todd Capitano, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0307-01", "first_page_order": 339, "last_page_order": 347 }