{ "id": 11146968, "name": "ALLEN J. WRIGHT, JR., Petitioner-Appellant v. BLUE RIDGE AREA AUTHORITY, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Wright v. Blue Ridge Area Authority", "decision_date": "1999-09-07", "docket_number": "No. COA98-1093", "first_page": "668", "last_page": "676", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "134 N.C. App. 668" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "470 S.E.2d 8", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"it is appropriate to assume the legislature is aware of any judicial construction of a statute\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798959 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"it is appropriate to assume the legislature is aware of any judicial construction of a statute\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 S.E.2d 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11920628 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 S.E.2d 725", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "only avenue for appeal by applicant for state employment alleging grievance against the State is to SPC under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-36.1 (1999)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790176 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "only avenue for appeal by applicant for state employment alleging grievance against the State is to SPC under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-36.1 (1999)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 873", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "875-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523046 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 S.E.2d 300", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790251 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 S.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 692", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550790, 2552554, 2552458, 2550486, 2551258 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0692-05", "/nc/337/0692-03", "/nc/337/0692-01", "/nc/337/0692-02", "/nc/337/0692-04" ] }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 683", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "684-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12130421 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 S.E.2d 61", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65", "parenthetical": "legislature presumed to have \"comprehended the import of the words its employed to express its intent\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12164708 ], "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77", "parenthetical": "legislature presumed to have \"comprehended the import of the words its employed to express its intent\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 S.E.2d 40", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" }, { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527319 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" }, { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 S.E.2d 715", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719" }, { "page": "719" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11648904 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178" }, { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 342", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345", "parenthetical": "\"[ijncor-rect statutory interpretation by an agency constitutes an error of law under G.S. 150B-51(b) and allows [appellate] court to apply a de novo review\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 N.C. App. 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525947 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464", "parenthetical": "\"[ijncor-rect statutory interpretation by an agency constitutes an error of law under G.S. 150B-51(b) and allows [appellate] court to apply a de novo review\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/91/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "25" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 88", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 N.C. App. 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525857 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/91/0428-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 790, "char_count": 18422, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2287672417912947e-07, "percentile": 0.6051596058303013 }, "sha256": "84ebb48490aed5c006e4238048c011708667c7fb78b5c5967f467f25d2782dd3", "simhash": "1:c7c0e12775367f6a", "word_count": 2942 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:28:46.713894+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge EDMUNDS concur." ], "parties": [ "ALLEN J. WRIGHT, JR., Petitioner-Appellant v. BLUE RIDGE AREA AUTHORITY, Respondent-Appellee" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nOn appeal, petitioner contends the trial court erred by affirming \u201cthe advisory decision of the State Personnel Commission [SPC] issued on June 16, 1997 and subsequently adopted by Respondent.\u201d We reverse the trial court.\nPertinent facts and procedural history include the following: Petitioner Allen J. Wright, Jr., a sixty-six year old, African-American armed services veteran, served in the Korean War between 1951 and 1953. He subsequently earned a Bachelor of Science degree in accounting and accumulated over thirty-four years of experience in the field of accounting.\nOn 15 February 1996, petitioner applied for and was denied an Accounting Tech III position with respondent Blue Ridge Area Authority. The position was offered to an individual with no military background.\nOn 3 June 1996, petitioner filed a Petition for Contested Case Hearing with the Office of Administrative Hearings alleging, inter alia, that respondent\u2019s denial of employment was based upon its failure to apply a Veteran\u2019s Preference (the Preference) to his application as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 128-15 (1999). In the parties\u2019 \u201cStipulation of Factual Issues\u201d contained in the record, respondent concedes it \u201cdoes not apply veteran\u2019s preferences in making employment decisions, including the decision to fill the position at issue in this case.\u201d\nPetitioner and respondent subsequently filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment and, on 22 October 1996, the Administrative Law Judge (the ALJ) granted partial summary judgment in favor of respondent, holding the Preference inapplicable \u201cto those persons covered by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-5(a)(2) (1999),\u201d including \u201cemployees of area authorities such as respondent.\u201d Subsequently, the ALJ issued a 20 December 1996 Recommend Decision dismissing all remaining issues. The SPC promulgated a Recommendation for Decision to Local Appointing Authority on 16 June 1997, recommending that respondent adopt the ALJ\u2019s findings and conclusions save for a single minor modification. On 30 June 1997, petitioner was notified by respondent that it had \u201cconcurred in the [SPC\u2019s] recommendation.\u201d\nOn 25 August 1997, petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Review seeking, inter alia, review by the trial court of the Preference issue. After hearing from both parties, the court entered judgment 5 June 1998, affirming the SPC\u2019s determination that respondent was \u201cnot obligated to afford Petitioner a Veteran\u2019s Preference in hiring.\u201d Petitioner appeals.\nThe sole issue presented for our determination is\nwhether local area mental health authorities are obligated to provide military veterans a preference under G.S. \u00a7 128-15 in considering their applications for employment.\nPetitioner maintains respondent is required to accord the Preference by logical construction of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-83 (1999), G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 126-5(a)(2) and 128-15, and by this Court\u2019s decision in Davis v. Vance County DSS, 91 N.C. App. 428, 372 S.E.2d 88 (1988).\nWe observe initially that judicial review of administrative agency decisions is governed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-51(b) (1995), whereby\nthe appellate court [must] determine whether the superior court utilized the appropriate scope of review and, if so, whether the superior court did so correctly.\nIn re Declaratory Ruling by N.C. Comm\u2019r of Ins., 134 N.C. App. 23, 25, 517 S.E.2d 134,-(1999) (citation omitted). Further,\n[t]he nature of the error asserted by the party seeking review dictates the appropriate manner of review: if the appellant contends the agency\u2019s decision was affected by a legal error, de novo review is required ....\nId. (citations omitted); see also Brooks Com\u2019r of Labor v. Rebarco, Inc., 91 N.C. App. 459, 464, 372 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1988) (\u201c[ijncor-rect statutory interpretation by an agency constitutes an error of law under G.S. 150B-51(b) and allows [appellate] court to apply a de novo review\u201d). In the case sub judice, it is apparent from the trial court\u2019s judgment that it applied the appropriate de novo scope of review, see Declaratory Ruling, 134 N.C. App. at 25, 517 S.E.2d at -, and we therefore proceed to examine the SPC\u2019s decision de novo in order to determine whether the trial court committed legal error, see id.\nIt is appropriate to commence with a complete review of all applicable statutes. While G.S. \u00a7 126-5(a) was amended effective 1 November 1998, the amendment did not substantially affect our decision herein.\nFirst, respondent is an area \u201cmental health, developmental disabilities, and substance abuse services,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 122C-101 (1996), authority, organized and operating under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 122C-116 (1996). As such, respondent is a \u201clocal political subdivision of the State,\u201d G.S. \u00a7 122C-116, which, \u201c[f]or the purpose of personnel administration,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 122C-154 (1996), is governed by the State Personnel System (the System) set out in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-1 et seq. (1999), unless otherwise provided, G.S. \u00a7 122C-154. The System is a mode of personnel administration applicable to State government and to \u201clocal employees paid entirely or in part from federal funds. . . .\u201d G.S. \u00a7 126-1.\nThe applicable version of G.S. \u00a7 126-5(a) (1995) includes the following as employees subject to the System:\n(1) All State employees not herein exempt, and\n(2) ... all employees of area mental health, mental retardation, substance abuse authorities, and to employees of local social services departments, public health departments, and local emergency management agencies that receive federal grant-in-aid funds; and the provision of this Chapter may apply to such other county employees as the several boards of county commissioners may from time to time determine.\nG.S. \u00a7 126-5(a)(l)&(2) (emphasis added).\nIn addition, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-80 (1999) grants the Preference to the foregoing employees as follows:\nIt shall be the policy of the State of North Carolina that, in appreciation for their service to this State and this country during a period of war, and in recognition of the time and advantage lost toward the pursuit of a civilian career, veterans shall be granted preference in employment for positions subject to the provisions of this Chapter with every State department, agency, and institution.\nHowever, G.S. \u00a7 126-83, entitled \u201cExceptions,\u201d operates to exclude certain employees within the System from the Preference:\nNotwithstanding G.S. 126-5, and notwithstanding provisions in that section that only certain Articles of this Chapter apply to some employees, this Article [establishing the Preference] applies to all persons covered by this Chapter [126] except those exempted by G.S. 126-5(c)(2), G.S. 126-5(c)(3), G.S. 126-5(c)(4), G.S. 126-5(cl), G.S. 126-5(c2), or G.S. 126-5(c3), but this Article does not apply [i.e., the Preference not granted] to those persons covered by G.S. 126-5(a)(2). G.S. 128-15 shall apply to those persons exempted from coverage of this Article, but shall not apply to any person covered by this Article.\nG.S. \u00a7 126-83 (emphasis added).\nFinally, in terms identical to G.S. \u00a7 126-80, G.S. \u00a7 128-15 accords the Preference to employees \u201cwith every State department, agency, and institution,\u201d id., as follows:\n(a) It shall be the policy of the State of North Carolina that, in appreciation for their service to this State and this country during a period of war, and in recognition of the time and advantage lost toward the pursuit of a civilian career, veterans shall be granted preference in employment with every State department, agency, and institution.\nG.S. \u00a7 128-15(a).\nIt is well established that \u201c[w]hen multiple statutes address a single matter or subject, they must be construed together, in pari mate-ria, to determine the legislature\u2019s intent.\u201d Taylor v. City of Lenoir, 129 N.C. App. 174, 178, 497 S.E.2d 715, 719 (1998). Statutes so construed must be harmonized, \u201cto give effect, if possible, to all provisions without destroying the meaning of the statutes involved.\u201d Whittington v. N.C. Dept. of Human Resources, 100 N.C. App. 603, 606, 398 S.E.2d 40, 42 (1990). In the case subjudice, we conclude that the provisions of G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 126-5(a)(2), 126-83 and 128-15, construed in pari materia,f accord the Preference to those employees identified in G.S. \u00a7 126-5(a)(2), but excluded under G.S. \u00a7 126-83, and described by G.S. \u00a7 126-83 as being covered under G.S. \u00a7 128-15.\nTo begin, respondent, an area mental health, mental retardation, substance abuse authority, is subject to the System as provided in G.S. \u00a7 126-5(a)(2). G.S. \u00a7 126-5(a)(2); see also G.S. \u00a7 122C-116 (personnel administration of area authorities governed by Chapter 126 unless otherwise provided). G.S. \u00a7 126-80 accords the Preference to veterans \u201cfor positions subject to the provisions of. . . Chapter [126, i.e., the System] with every State department, agency and institution.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 126-80. Taking into consideration only the foregoing sections, therefore, G.S. \u00a7 126-80 unambiguously mandates that those employers subject to G.S. \u00a7 126-5(a)(2), including respondent, must grant the Preference.\nHowever, G.S. \u00a7 126-83 designates two categories of employees \u201c[e]xcept[ed]\u201d from the Preference set forth in G.S. \u00a7 126-80. The first deals with employees falling within listed statutory sections, including G.S. \u00a7 126-5(c)(2), G.S. 126-5(c)(3), G.S. 126-5(c)(4), G.S. 126-5(cl), G.S. 126-5(c2), and G.S. 126-5(c3), see G.S. \u00a7 126-83, not applicable to the dispute herein.\nThe second category excepts \u201cthose persons covered by G.S. \u00a7 126-5(a)(2),\u201d G.S. \u00a7 126-83, including employees of \u201carea mental health, mental retardation, substance abuse authorities,\u201d G.S. \u00a7 126-5(a)(2), such as respondent. Thus, nothing else appearing at this point, respondent would not be required to grant the Preference in selecting employees.\nNonetheless, those persons excepted by G.S. \u00a7 126-83 from the (G.S. \u00a7 126-80) Preference are expressly designated as \u201cthose persons\u201d to whom G.S. \u00a7 128-15 \u201cshall apply\u201d:\nG.S. \u00a7 128-15 shall apply to those persons exempted from coverage of this Article, but shall not apply to any person covered by this Article.\nG.S. \u00a7 126-83.\nLastly, G.S. \u00a7 128-15 mandates that the Preference be afforded to employees of \u201cevery State department, agency, and institution.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 128-15. Notwithstanding, respondent insists the section is not applicable to it as an area mental health, mental retardation, substance abuse authority. We disagree.\nFirst, as opposed to the restrictive phrase \u201cState employee,\u201d G.S. \u00a7 128-15 utilizes more expansive terminology, i.e., employee of \u201cevery State department, agency, and institution.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 128-15. See State v. Baker, 229 N.C. 73, 77, 48 S.E.2d 61, 65 (1948) (legislature presumed to have \u201ccomprehended the import of the words its employed to express its intent\u201d). Further, as noted above, respondent is a \u201clocal political subdivision of the State,\u201d G.S. \u00a7 122C-116, and its employees are subject to the System, G.S. \u00a7 122C-154. Finally, this Court has previously viewed sub silentio an employee of an area mental health, mental retardation and substance abuse authority as a State employee who therefore must contest a dispute with the authority before the SPC. See Hill v. Morton, 115 N.C. App. 390, 391-93, 444 S.E.2d 683, 684-85, disc. review allowed, 337 N.C. 692, 448 S.E.2d 523 (1994), review improvidently allowed, 340 N.C. 355, 457 S.E.2d 300 (1995); see also Clay v. Employment Security Comm., 111 N.C. App. 599, 603, 432 S.E.2d 873, 875-76 (1993), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 340 N.C. 83, 457 S.E.2d 725 (1995) (only avenue for appeal by applicant for state employment alleging grievance against the State is to SPC under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-36.1 (1999)).\nIn sum, construing G.S. \u00a7 126-83 and G.S. \u00a7 128-15 in pari mate-ria and giving effect to all provisions thereof, see Taylor, 129 N.C. App. at 178, 497 S.E.2d at 719, and Whittington, 100 N.C. App. at 606, 398 S.E.2d at 42, we believe the intent of our General Assembly was to provide unambiguously, pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 126-83, that employees of the System designated in G.S. \u00a7 126-5(a)(2) are expressly excluded from the Preference afforded by G.S. \u00a7 126-80 but, if qualified under G.S. \u00a7 128-15, are entitled to the Preference thereunder applicable to all employees of State departments, agencies and institutions, specifically including G.S. \u00a7 126-5(a)(2) employees. See G.S. \u00a7 126-83. Accordingly, under G.S. \u00a7 126-83 and G.S. \u00a7 128-15, respondent must provide the Preference to applicants for employment meeting the veteran qualification.\nRespondent counters that G.S. \u00a7 126-5(a)(2) employees do not fall within the category of \u201cexempted\u201d employees subject to G.S. \u00a7 128-15. Respondent seeks to distinguish use of the word \u201cexempted\u201d in G.S. \u00a7 126-83 from the phrase \u201cdoes not apply\u201d in that section. According to respondent, G.S. \u00a7 126-5(a)(2) employees were not expressly deemed \u201cexempt\u201d within G.S. \u00a7 126-83 as were employees under the statutory sections specifically designated in G.S. \u00a7 126-83. We believe respondent\u2019s reading of G.S. \u00a7 126-83 is far too strained.\nWe note that the title \u201cExceptions\u201d was given to G.S. \u00a7 126-83 by our General Assembly, thus indicating its intended function of providing \u201cexceptions\u201d to the G.S. \u00a7 126-80 Preference. Thus, among the \u201cexceptions\u201d is that G.S. \u00a7 126-80 shall \u201cnot apply to those persons covered by G.S. 126-5(a)(2),\u201d G.S. \u00a7 126-83, and that G.S. \u00a7 128-15 \u201cshall apply to those persons exempted from coverage of [G.S. \u00a7 126-80],\u201d G.S. \u00a7 126-83. To adopt respondent\u2019s convoluted construction of G.S. \u00a7 126-83 would lead to misinterpretation of the specified operation of the section, that is, to set forth \u201cExceptions\u201d to the Preference granted in G.S. \u00a7 126-80.\nThe term \u201cexempted,\" as used in the last sentence of G.S. \u00a7 126-83, thus creates an overall \u201c[exception\u201d so as to allow receipt of the G.S. \u00a7 128-15 Preference by any employee excluded or exempted by G.S. \u00a7 126-83 from entitlement to the G.S. \u00a7 126-80 Preference. Simply stated, under G.S. \u00a7 126-83, the Preference provided in G.S. \u00a7 126-80 applies except as to those employees described or named in G.S. \u00a7 126-83, to whom the G.S. \u00a7 126-80 Preference \u201cshall not apply.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 126-83. As to these employees, the Preference provided in G.S. \u00a7 128-15 does \u201capply.\u201d\nBoth parties cite Davis v. Vance County Department of Social Services. The decision is the sole reported case interpreting G.S. \u00a7 128-15, and we agree with respondent\u2019s concession that our holding therein\nimplicitly and indirectly supports the conclusion that [] G.S. \u00a7 128-15 applies to employees covered under [] G.S. \u00a7 126-5(a)(2).\nIn Davis, the petitioner, a local employee subject to the System pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 126-5(a)(2), applied for promotion to a position requiring a four-year college degree. Davis, 91 N.C. App. at 429, 372 S.E.2d at 88-89. The petitioner was not selected by respondent, Vance County Department of Social Services (DSS), because he had not obtained a four-year degree and thereby lacked the minimum educational requirement for the position. Id. The petitioner instituted suit against DSS, asserting the G.S. \u00a7 128-15 Preference was applicable and that his military service might serve as an educational equivalent or substitute. Id. at 431, 372 S.E.2d at 90. This Court rejected the petitioner\u2019s argument in Davis, observing that\n[ajlthough the statute awards a 'preference rating of ten points to veterans who apply for employment with the State or any of its departments, it states nowhere that the minimum requirements specified for a position may be ignored. In fact, the statute specifically states that \u201c[a]ll the departments or institutions of the State, or their agencies, shall give preference in appointments and promotional appointments to qualified veteran applicants. ...\u201d\nId. (emphasis added).\nSignificantly, this Court did not rule that the Davis petitioner was ineligible for the Preference under G.S. \u00a7 128-15, but rather that the Preference did not serve to qualify him for a position he was otherwise unqualified to hold. Thus, this Court implicitly ruled that DSS, a local social services department covered under G.S. \u00a7 126-5(a)(2), was subject to the mandate of G.S. \u00a7 128-15.\nHowever, we note the scope of Davis is limited and that the case was decided prior to the 1991 revision of G.S. \u00a7 126-83, which added the last sentence explicitly applying G.S. \u00a7 128-15 to employees excepted thereunder from the G.S. \u00a7 126-80 Preference. The 1991 amendment to G.S. \u00a7 126-83 may be seen as a legislative clarification of Vance, i.e., to make explicit what had only been implied in the opinion. See Blackmon v. N.C. Dept. of Correction, 118 N.C. App. 666, 673, 457 S.E.2d 306, 310 (1995), aff'd, 343 N.C. 259, 470 S.E.2d 8 (1996) (\u201cit is appropriate to assume the legislature is aware of any judicial construction of a statute\u201d).\nIn any event, we hold the clear, unambiguous language of each pertinent statute establishes that G.S. \u00a7 126-83 makes the G.S. \u00a7 128-15 Preference applicable to local area authorities covered by G.S. \u00a7 126-5(a)(2). Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and this matter remanded to that court with instruction that it further remand to respondent, the Local Appointing Authority, see N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126~37(bl) (1999), for disposition not inconsistent with our opinion herein.\nReversed and remanded with instructions.\nChief Judge EAGLES and Judge EDMUNDS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ferguson, Stein, Wallas, Adkins, Gresham and Sumter, P.A., by John Gresham and S. Luke Largess, for petitioner-appellant.", "Matney and Associates, P.A., by David E. Matney, III., for respondent-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ALLEN J. WRIGHT, JR., Petitioner-Appellant v. BLUE RIDGE AREA AUTHORITY, Respondent-Appellee\nNo. COA98-1093\n(Filed 7 September 1999)\nVeterans\u2014 hiring preference \u2014 mental health, mental retardation, and substance abuse authorities\nThe trial court erred by affirming the advisory decision of the State Personnel Commission holding that local area mental health, mental retardation, and substance abuse authorities did not have to apply a veteran\u2019s preference to plaintiff-veteran\u2019s job application since the clear, unambiguous language of the pertinent statutes establishes that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-83 makes the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 128-15 preference applicable to local area authorities covered by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-5(a)(2).\nAppeal by petitioner from judgment entered 5 June 1998 by Judge Ronald K. Payne in Buncombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 April 1999.\nFerguson, Stein, Wallas, Adkins, Gresham and Sumter, P.A., by John Gresham and S. Luke Largess, for petitioner-appellant.\nMatney and Associates, P.A., by David E. Matney, III., for respondent-appellee." }, "file_name": "0668-01", "first_page_order": 700, "last_page_order": 708 }