{ "id": 11147089, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KWAME JAMAL TEAGUE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Teague", "decision_date": "1999-09-07", "docket_number": "No. COA98-1176", "first_page": "702", "last_page": "709", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "134 N.C. App. 702" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "877" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527052 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 S.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 756", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2547016 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0756-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 309", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4715465 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 S.E.2d 370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4750010 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 681", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 139, 322 S.E.2d 370, 376 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526338 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 139, 322 S.E.2d 370, 376 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S.E.2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that comment may not be made regarding the failure of a defendant to testify in a criminal prosecution" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 N.C. 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626356 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that comment may not be made regarding the failure of a defendant to testify in a criminal prosecution" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/243/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 123", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127", "parenthetical": "holding the testimony that a defendant refused to allow a rape victim to view him immediately after his arrest near the crime scene was properly admitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522065 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243", "parenthetical": "holding the testimony that a defendant refused to allow a rape victim to view him immediately after his arrest near the crime scene was properly admitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 757", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12047531 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0757-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2517321 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 S.E.2d 202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867711 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 S.E.2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 N.C. App. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548979 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/41/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 S.E.2d 205", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 215", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4747067 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0215-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 452", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" }, { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564413 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0678-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291" }, { "page": "291" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571689 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" }, { "page": "142" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0118-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 734, "char_count": 14939, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.776793342541898e-07, "percentile": 0.8963684755366046 }, "sha256": "fef808f6a156d09b91c2742cd376ca5b9a846ccfac2935c4946f05d444c23e68", "simhash": "1:9723e46efe259c5a", "word_count": 2451 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:28:46.713894+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges JOHN and EDMUNDS concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KWAME JAMAL TEAGUE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nIn November 1995, a jury found that defendant Kwame Jamal Teague \u2014 along with Edward Lemons and Larry Leggett \u2014 kidnapped, robbed, and murdered Margaret Strickland and Bobby Stroud. The trial court sentenced the defendant to two life terms for the first-degree-murder convictions, two terms of fourteen years for the first-degree-kidnapping convictions, and two terms of twelve years for the armed-robbery convictions \u2014 all sentences to run consecutively.\nThe State\u2019s evidence at trial tended to show that on 22 January 1994 the gunshot bodies of Ms. Strickland and Mr. Stroud were found in a field located near Goldsboro, North Carolina. Investigating officers found shell casings and shoe impressions near the bodies. Thereafter, the investigators found at Leggett\u2019s and Lemons\u2019 house\u2014 located near the crime scene \u2014 a pair of shoes in Lemons\u2019 suitcase matching the imprints at the crime scene.\nOn 27 January 1994, the investigators located the vehicle that Ms. Strickland had borrowed from her mother two days prior to the discovery of the bodies. On a cassette tape in that vehicle, the investigators discovered the defendant\u2019s fingerprint.\nIn an interview with the investigators, the defendant admitted to helping plan and participating in the robbery of the victims. He stated that after the robbery, he urged the other men to leave the field; but instead, Lemons refused to leave and shot Mr. Stroud. He stated that he then ran away from the field.\nOn appeal, defendant does not dispute the sufficiency of the State\u2019s evidence; instead, he opposes several trial court rulings involving the State\u2019s jury voir dire and the admission of evidence. To the extent that the defendant has failed to comply with the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure in bringing this appeal, we exercise our discretion under Appellate Rule 2 and address the merits of the case.\nI. JURY VOIR DIKE\nIn North Carolina, our trial courts allow counsel wide latitude in examining jurors on voir dire; and, the extent and manner of the inquiry rests within the trial judge\u2019s discretion. See State v. Locklear, 349 N.C. 118, 142, 505 S.E.2d 277, 291 (1998). Thus, to successfully challenge the extent and manner that the trial judge allowed voir dire of jurors, the defendant must show an abuse of that discretion. See id.\nThe defendant argues that the State\u2019s voir dire questions as to (1) the absence of eyewitness testimony and (2) the victims\u2019 possible involvement with drugs, constituted \u201cstaking out\u201d questions which caused the jurors to pledge themselves to a future course of action.\nIn State v. Phillips, 300 N.C. 678, 268 S.E.2d 452 (1980), our Supreme Court held that during voir dire, counsel should not \u201cfish\u201d for answers to legal questions before the judge has instructed the jurors on applicable principles.\nCounsel should not engage in efforts to indoctrinate, visit with or establish \u2018rapport\u2019 with jurors. Jurors should not be asked what kind of verdict they would render under certain named circumstances.\nId. at 682, 268 S.E.2d at 455.\nIn this case, the prosecutor informed the prospective jurors that only the three people charged with the crimes know what happened to the victims. He stated that none of the three would testify against the others and therefore the State did not have any eyewitness testimony to offer. The defendant challenges the prosecutor\u2019s inquiry to the prospective jurors that:\nKnowing that and knowing that this is a serious case, a first degree murder case, do you feel like you have to say to yourself, well, the case is just too serious ... to decide based on circumstantial evidence and I would require more than circumstantial evidence to return a conviction of guilty of first degree murder.\nWe hold that these statements did not violate any of the rules enunciated in Phillips. See State v. Clark, 319 N.C. 215, 221, 353 S.E.2d 205, 208 (1987) (holding that the prosecuting attorney\u2019s question, which merely informed jurors that the State would rely on circumstantial evidence and asked them whether a lack of eyewitnesses would cause them problems, was not improperly argumentative or hypothetical, did not improperly \u201cprecondition\u201d jurors to believe there were no eyewitnesses, and was not designed to ask what kind of verdict the jury would render under certain named circumstances) (quoting Phillips, 300 N.C. at 682, 268 S.E.2d at 455). Rather, these statements properly (1) informed the jury that the State would be relying on circumstantial evidence and (2) inquired as to whether the lack of eyewitnesses would cause them problems.\nThe prosecutor also stated to the prospective jurors that there would be evidence that on the night of the crimes, the victims may have been looking for drugs. The defendant challenges the prosecutor\u2019s statement that:\nThe question for you to consider if that information should come out and I am certain it will and you hear that information, do you feel like that you will automatically turn off the rest of the case and predicate your verdict of not guilty solely upon the fact that these people were out looking for drugs involved in the drug environment and became victims as a result of that.\nWe hold that the prosecutor properly made this inquiry to determine the impartiality of jurors. See State v. Williams, 41 N.C. App. 287, 291-92, 254 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1979) (holding that the trial court did not err in permitting the district attorney to tell prospective jurors on voir dire that a proposed sale of marijuana was involved in the case to be tried when the attorney\u2019s statements were made to inquire as to whether any of them would be unfair and impartial for that reason).\nThe defendant next argues that the trial court improperly limited voir dire of a prospective juror in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 and 24 of the North Carolina Constitution. He asserts that the trial court erred in sustaining the State\u2019s objections to the following questions regarding the prospective juror\u2019s possible bias toward law enforcement officers:\nQ. Okay. Do you feel indebted in any way to these officers? Would you feel that way when they came into Court? If so, let us know?\nA. Well, I would tend to.\nMR. Jacobs: Object.\nThe Court: Sustained.\nQ. (Mr. Jones) Would you tend to, based on your relationship with these officers, be predisposed towards anything they might say?\nMr. Jacobs: Object.\nThe Court: Sustained.\nQ. Would you tend to give anymore weight to what these officers may say?\nA. I would trust them.\nQ. Do you think that will anyway predispose you toward a decision before you heard all the evidence?\nMr. Jacobs: Object. Object to the form of the question.\nThe Court: Sustained.\nQ. (Mr. Jones) Due to the fact that there are police officers involved in this case and this may apply to all of you, do you believe that a police officer\u2019s testimony is worthy of any more weight than a lay witness.\nMr. Jacobs: Object.\nThe Court: Sustained. Form of the question.\nThe record reveals that the trial court gave the defendant ample opportunity to inquire into the juror\u2019s potential bias in favor of law enforcement. See Locklear, 349 N.C. at 142, 505 S.E.2d at 291. In fact, the defense counsel continued to inquire into the possibility of the prospective juror\u2019s bias in favor of potential witnesses \u2014 who were members of law enforcement \u2014 following the State\u2019s objections to the questions at issue in this case. Notably, the trial court apparently sustained the objections based on the improper form of the questions because the trial court allowed the defense counsel to rephrase the questions. Furthermore, the defendant subsequently excused the prospective juror. See State v. Elliot, 344 N.C. 242, 266, 475 S.E.2d 202, 211 (1996).\nIn sum, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of trial court in the manner and extent to which he allowed voir dire of the prospective jurors.\nII. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE\n\u201c \u2018Relevant evidence\u2019 means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 (1992). With some exceptions, all relevant evidence is generally admissible. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 402 (1992). However, \u201c[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible.\u201d Id.\nThe defendant argues \u2014 and we agree \u2014 that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Lemon\u2019s robbery and attack of another person following the victims\u2019 deaths because that evidence was not relevant to the issue of the defendant\u2019s involvement with the victims\u2019 deaths.\nHowever, to prove prejudicial error \u201can appellant must show that there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error not been committed a different result would have been reached at trial.\u201d State v. Martin, 322 N.C. 229, 238-39, 367 S.E.2d 618, 623-24 (1988). In light of the substantive evidence against the defendant, we cannot hold that the result would have been different had the evidence surrounding Lemon\u2019s subsequent crime been excluded. Therefore, the resulting error constituted harmless error.\nSecondly, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that he refused to comply with a search warrant to obtain samples of his handwriting.\nHowever, the \u201cFifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination does not extend to physical characteristics such as handwriting and blood samples.\u201d See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed.2d 908 (1966). Thus, a defendant\u2019s refusal may be admissible and is not treated the same as a defendant\u2019s failure to testify. See State v. McNeil, 99 N.C. App. 235, 243, 393 S.E.2d 123, 127 (1990) (holding the testimony that a defendant refused to allow a rape victim to view him immediately after his arrest near the crime scene was properly admitted); cf. State v. Roberts, 243 N.C. 619, 91 S.E.2d 589 (1956) (holding that comment may not be made regarding the failure of a defendant to testify in a criminal prosecution). Given the relevancy of defendant\u2019s refusal to comply with the search warrant, the trial court\u2019s admission of this evidence was proper.\nFinally, the defendant contends that the forensic expert\u2019s testimony \u2014 that one of the victim\u2019s \u201cgunshot wounds to the head was consistent with an intent to cause death\u201d \u2014 was irrelevant and highly prejudicial. We disagree.\nExpert witness testimony is admissible if it will \u201c \u2018assist the jury to draw certain inferences from facts because the expert is better qualified\u2019 than the jury to form an opinion on the particular subject.\u201d State v. Fletcher, 92 N.C. App. 50, 56, 373 S.E.2d 681, 685 (1988) (quoting State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 139, 322 S.E.2d 370, 376 (1984)); see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 702 (1992). In fact, experts are permitted to give their opinion even though \u201cit embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.\" N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 704 (1992).\nAn expert, however, may not testify as to a legal standard that has been met. See State v. Ledford, 315 N.C. 599, 617, 340 S.E.2d 309, 321 (1986). Despite this rule, a medical expert is not precluded from testifying to his or her opinion that the defendant could not form a \u201cspecific intent to kill.\u201d See State v. Daniel, 333 N.C. 756, 429 S.E.2d 724 (1993). The reason is because the term \u201cspecific intent to kill\u201d is not a precise legal term with a definition which is not readily apparent. Id.\nHere the defendant challenges the expert\u2019s opinion testimony that one of the victim\u2019s \u201cgunshot wounds to the head was consistent with an intent to cause death.\u201d Under the facts present in this case, we find the term \u201cintent to cause death\u201d to be synonymous with the term \u201cspecific intent to kill.\u201d Thus, the term \u201cintent to cause death\u201d is not a precise legal term with a definition which is not readily apparent. Id. Consequently, the trial court\u2019s admission of the expert witness testimony was proper.\nEven assuming arguendo that the trial court\u2019s admission of the expert witness testimony constituted an error, such error was harmless because the State presented other substantive evidence supporting the conclusion that both victims\u2019 deaths were consistent with a specific intent to cause their death. See State v. Marshall, 92 N.C. App. 398, 404, 374 S.E.2d 874, 877 (1988).\nWe conclude that the defendant was given a fair trial, free of prejudicial error.\nNo prejudicial error.\nJudges JOHN and EDMUNDS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WYNN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Margaret Creasy Ciardellafor the defendant.", "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Ronald M. Marquette, Assistant Attorney General, for the State." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KWAME JAMAL TEAGUE\nNo. COA98-1176\n(Filed 7 September 1999)\n1. Jury\u2014 voir dire \u2014 circumstantial evidence \u2014 impartiality\nThe trial court did not err in a kidnapping, robbery, and murder case by allowing the State\u2019s voir dire questions informing the prospective jurors that: (1) only the three people charged with the crimes knew what happened to the victims and none would testify against the others, because these statements properly informed the jury that the State would be relying on circumstantial evidence and inquired as to whether the lack of eyewitnesses would cause the jurors any problems; and (2) there would be evidence that on the night of the crimes the victims may have been looking for drugs, because the statement was a proper inquiry to determine the impartiality of the jurors.\n2. Evidence\u2014 subsequent crime or act \u2014 accomplice\u2014harmless error\nAlthough the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant evidence of an accomplice\u2019s robbery and attack of another person following the kidnapping, robbery, and murder of the two victims, it was harmless error in light of the substantive evidence against defendant.\n3. Constitutional Law\u2014 self-incrimination \u2014 handwriting samples\nThe trial court did not err in admitting evidence that defendant refused to comply with a search warrant to obtain samples of his handwriting because the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination does not extend to physical characteristics such as handwriting and blood samples.\n4. Witnesses\u2014 expert testimony \u2014 intent to cause death\nThe trial court did not err in admitting the forensic expert\u2019s testimony that one of the victim\u2019s gunshot wounds to the head was consistent with an intent to cause death because \u201cintent to cause death\u201d is not a precise legal term with a definition that is not readily apparent. Even if it was error to admit the testimony, it was harmless in light of the other substantive evidence supporting the conclusion that both victims\u2019 deaths were consistent with a specific intent to cause their death.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 31 May 1996 by Judge Wiley Bowen, Superior Court, Wayne County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 August 1999.\nMargaret Creasy Ciardellafor the defendant.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Ronald M. Marquette, Assistant Attorney General, for the State." }, "file_name": "0702-01", "first_page_order": 734, "last_page_order": 741 }