{ "id": 11239532, "name": "THE COUNTRY CLUB OF JOHNSTON COUNTY, INC., Plaintiff v. UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Country Club of Johnston County, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.", "decision_date": "1999-10-05", "docket_number": "No. COA98-1419", "first_page": "159", "last_page": "168", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "135 N.C. App. 159" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "511 S.E.2d 298", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299-300", "parenthetical": "\"Rule 2 relates to the residual power of our appellate courts ... , in exceptional circumstances, ... to prevent injustice which appears manifest to the Court and only in such instances\" (emphasis added)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 131998 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66", "parenthetical": "\"Rule 2 relates to the residual power of our appellate courts ... , in exceptional circumstances, ... to prevent injustice which appears manifest to the Court and only in such instances\" (emphasis added)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11145576 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 S.E.2d 175", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2516968, 2520329, 2519273, 2521292, 2519452 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0667-03", "/nc/338/0667-01", "/nc/338/0667-04", "/nc/338/0667-02", "/nc/338/0667-05" ] }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 226", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525591 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 S.E.2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 N.C. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523200 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/66/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 S.E.2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530443, 2532332, 2530396, 2531257, 2532508 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0621-03", "/nc/334/0621-02", "/nc/334/0621-05", "/nc/334/0621-04", "/nc/334/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 S.E.2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692" }, { "page": "692" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525976 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" }, { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" }, { "page": "161", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2546781 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" }, { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11146921 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2483734 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408", "parenthetical": "plaintiff's appeal of grant of defendant's partial summary judgment motion allowed even though interlocutory because inconsistent verdicts possible" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571111 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439", "parenthetical": "plaintiff's appeal of grant of defendant's partial summary judgment motion allowed even though interlocutory because inconsistent verdicts possible" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 S.E.2d 148", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2505409, 2504968, 2504747, 2505141, 2504699 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0345-01", "/nc/332/0345-02", "/nc/332/0345-05", "/nc/332/0345-04", "/nc/332/0345-03" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5313291 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 S.E.2d 332", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. App. 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917406 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/119/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 593", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596" }, { "page": "596" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572803 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608" }, { "page": "608" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 772", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 488", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" }, { "page": "492" }, { "page": "492" }, { "page": "492", "parenthetical": "while dismissal of plaintiffs claims was immediately appealable, denial of defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's remaining claim was not immediately appealable \"since there ha[d] been no final disposition whatsoever of that claim\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527773 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26" }, { "page": "26" }, { "page": "26" }, { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 724", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11147227 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 908", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "911", "parenthetical": "denial of motion to dismiss generally does not deprive movant of any substantial right" }, { "page": "911", "parenthetical": "denial of Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss \"merely serves to continue the action then pending [and no] final judgment is involved\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575088 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355", "parenthetical": "denial of motion to dismiss generally does not deprive movant of any substantial right" }, { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 S.E.2d 119", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.C. App. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525482 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/90/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 812", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "815" }, { "page": "817", "parenthetical": "appeal allowed of grant of defendant's summary judgment motion dismissing plaintiff's claim, but leaving defendant's counterclaim intact, because of possible inconsistent verdicts" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8357716 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" }, { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 56", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62", "parenthetical": "quoting J & B Slurry Seal Co. v. Mid-South Aviation, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 1, 6, 362 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1987)" }, { "page": "62", "parenthetical": "appeal of grant of defendant's partial summary judgment motion proper even though interlocutory because of potential inconsistent verdicts" }, { "page": "62", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11198692 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250", "parenthetical": "quoting J & B Slurry Seal Co. v. Mid-South Aviation, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 1, 6, 362 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1987)" }, { "page": "251" }, { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" }, { "page": "380" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12129791 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" }, { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "437 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "677" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520479 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23-24", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629835 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714861, 4717589, 4718136, 4718201, 4717178 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0183-03", "/nc/315/0183-05", "/nc/315/0183-02", "/nc/315/0183-04", "/nc/315/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 N.C. App. 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526659 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/75/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E.2d 338", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" }, { "page": "343" }, { "page": "343" }, { "page": "344" }, { "page": "344" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572343 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" }, { "page": "208" }, { "page": "208" }, { "page": "209" }, { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 440", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11889085 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "492 S.E.2d 38", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "USF&G II" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551140, 551241, 551058, 551257, 551261 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "USF&G II" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0141-04", "/nc/347/0141-03", "/nc/347/0141-05", "/nc/347/0141-02", "/nc/347/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 S.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "weight": 5, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "USF&G I" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793056, 793186, 793211, 793107, 793243 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "USF&G I" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0656-02", "/nc/341/0656-05", "/nc/341/0656-03", "/nc/341/0656-01", "/nc/341/0656-04" ] }, { "cite": "458 S.E.2d 734", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736-38", "parenthetical": "USF&G I" }, { "page": "740" }, { "page": "741" }, { "page": "740" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. App. 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915281 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367-70", "parenthetical": "USF&G I" }, { "page": "374" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/119/0365-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 946, "char_count": 20919, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.191198675216419e-07, "percentile": 0.9401712223376729 }, "sha256": "17af2693a16981dadeef602374fdc3845af6382360378eda7850aaf2698640fe", "simhash": "1:0b2957fe3467245c", "word_count": 3481 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:51:33.981101+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and EDMUNDS concur." ], "parties": [ "THE COUNTRY CLUB OF JOHNSTON COUNTY, INC., Plaintiff v. UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nDefendant United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company (USF&G) purports to appeal the trial court\u2019s order denying its motion to dismiss pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) (1990) (Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6)). Defendant\u2019s appeal is interlocutory and must be dismissed.\nIn view of our disposition and the extensive factual rendition in the first of now three appeals to this Court by the parties, see U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Country Club of Johnston County, 119 N.C. App. 365, 367-70, 458 S.E.2d 734, 736-38, disc. review denied, 341 N.C. 656, 462 S.E.2d 527 (1995) (USF&G I), and U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Country Club of Johnston Co., 126 N.C. App. 633, 491 S.E.2d 569 (unpublished opinion), disc. review denied, 347 N.C. 141, 492 S.E.2d 38 (1997) (USF&G II), lengthy exposition of the underlying facts is unnecessary herein. Pertinent procedural and factual history is as follows:\nAfter consuming several alcoholic drinks at the premises of plaintiff Country Club of Johnston County (the Club) on 18 October 1991, a member of the Club was operating an automobile involved in a fatal collision. On the date of the collision, USF&G insured the Club under a master insurance policy (the policy) including commercial general liability coverage. Suit was instituted in May 1993 against both the member and the Club in Wake County Superior Court. See Sanders et al. v. Upton, 93 CVS 4415 (Sanders). USF&G defended Sanders on behalf of the Club under a reservation of rights regarding coverage by the policy and subsequently brokered a settlement.\nDuring the settlement phase of Sanders, USF&G filed a declaratory judgment action seeking judicial determination that it was not obligated to defend or afford coverage to the Club under the policy because of an alcohol liability exclusion (alcohol exclusion) therein related to serving of alcohol by the Club. The Club filed answer and counterclaim, asserting coverage \u201cunder the [p]olicy ... and all attendant circumstances.\u201d In that suit, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of USF&G and the Club thereafter voluntarily dismissed its counterclaim and appealed.\nTwo separate opinions were subsequently rendered by this Court. The first provided that the policy excluded coverage, but, upon noting that \u201c[t]he doctrines of waiver and estoppel may . . . apply to disallow [USF&G] from denying coverage,\u201d USF&G I, 119 N.C. App. at 374, 458 S.E.2d at 740, remanded to the trial court for resolution of those issues, id. at 375, 458 S.E.2d at 741.\nFollowing remand, USF&G appealed the trial court\u2019s grant of the Club\u2019s subsequent summary judgment motion, contending, inter alia, that\n(I) USF&G did not, as a matter of law, waive the liquor liability exclusion; [and that] (II) USF&G is not, as a matter of law, estopped from asserting the liquor liability exclusion.\nUSF&G II, 126 N.C. App. 633, 491 S.E.2d 569. In our second opinion involving the parties, we affirmed the trial court\u2019s ruling that, by virtue of its actions and those of its agents, USF&G had waived its right to rely upon the alcohol exclusion, and \u201cconclude [d that] USF&G\u2019s remaining contentions [we]re wholly without merit.\u201d Id.\nOn 23 January 1995, prior to our decision in USF&G I, the Club instituted the instant proceeding against USF&G alleging, in an amended complaint, bad faith, tortious breach of contract, unfair claim settlement practices, and unfair and deceptive trade acts or practices. The case lay dormant while the appeals in USF&G I and USF&G II were pending. However, USF&G filed Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss 5 November 1997, which motions were denied by the trial court 3 September 1998. USF&G filed timely notice of appeal, and the Club moved to dismiss the appeal as interlocutory 15 March 1999.\nAn order of the trial court\nis interlocutory if it is made during the pendency of an action and does not dispose of the case but requires further action by the trial court in order to finally determine the entire controversy. . . . There is generally no right to appeal an interlocutory order.\nHowerton v. Grace Hospital, Inc., 124 N.C. App. 199, 201, 476 S.E.2d 440, 442 (1996) (citations omitted).\nWithholding appeal of denial of summary relief at the early stages of litigation in the trial court is generally favored. See Waters v. Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 209, 240 S.E.2d 338, 344 (1978) (upon denial of early appeal, the \u201ctrial court and the parties will be given an opportunity to develop more fully the facts in . . . dispute and to put the merits of the claim in bolder relief\u2019; delayed appeal \u201cw[ill] give the reviewing court a more complete picture, factually and legally, of the entire controversy between the parties\u201d). Indeed, the rule prohibiting interlocutory appeals\nprevents] fragmentary, premature and unnecessary appeals by permitting the trial court to bring the case to final judgment before it is presented to the appellate courts.\nFraser v. Di Santi, 75 N.C. App. 654, 655, 331 S.E.2d 217, 218, disc. review denied, 315 N.C. 183, 337 S.E.2d 856 (1985) (citation omitted).\nAs our Supreme Court has noted,\n[t]here is no more effective way to procrastinate the administration of justice than that of bringing cases to an appellate court piecemeal through the medium of successive appeals from intermediate orders.\nVeazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 363, 57 S.E.2d 377, 382 (1950).\nNotwithstanding, interlocutory orders may be appealed in two instances:\nfirst, where there has been a final determination of at least one claim, and the trial court certifies there is no just reason to delay the appeal, [N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 64(b) (1990) (Rule 54(b))]; and second, if delaying the appeal would prejudice a \u201csubstantial right.\u201d\nLiggett Group v. Sunas, 113 N.C. App. 19, 23-24, 437 S.E.2d 674, 677 (1993) (citations omitted). In either instance, \u201cit is the appellant\u2019s burden to present appropriate grounds for this Court\u2019s acceptance of an interlocutory appeal,\u201d Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 379, 444 S.E.2d 252, 253 (1994), and \u201cnot the duty of this Court to construct arguments for or find support for appellant\u2019s right to appeal,\u201d id. at 380, 444 S.E.2d at 254.\nIn the case sub judice, the trial court\u2019s order denying USF&G\u2019s motion to dismiss is interlocutory in that it \u201cdoes not dispose of the case but requires further action by the trial court in order to finally determine the entire controversy.\u201d Howerton, 124 N.C. App. at 201, 476 S.E.2d at 442. Moreover, as in Liggett, \u201cthe court below made no certification [under Rule 54(b) and] the first avenue of appeal is closed\u201d to USF&G. Liggett, 113 N.C. App. at 24, 437 S.E.2d at 677.\nUnder the second \u201cavenue,\u201d the substantial right exception, see N.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-277(a) (1996) and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(d)(l) (1995), an otherwise interlocutory order may be appealed upon a showing by the appellant that: (1) the order affects a right that is indeed \u201csubstantial,\u201d and (2) \u201cenforcement of that right, absent immediate appeal, [will] be \u2018lost, prejudiced or be less than adequately protected by exception to entry of the interlocutory order.\u2019 \u201d First Atl. Mgmt. Corp. v. Dunlea Realty Co., 131 N.C. App. 242, 250, 507 S.E.2d 56, 62 (1998) (quoting J & B Slurry Seal Co. v. Mid-South Aviation, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 1, 6, 362 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1987)). Nonetheless, the substantial right test\nis more easily stated than applied [and] [i]t is usually necessary to resolve the question in each case by considering the particular facts of that case and the procedural context in which the order from which appeal is sought was entered.\nWaters, 294 N.C. at 208, 240 S.E.2d at 343.\nIn any event, it is well-settled that\n[d]enial of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is interlocutory . . ., as is the denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. . . . Neither affects a substantial right and neither is immediately appealable.\nBurlington Industries, Inc. v. Richmond County, 90 N.C. App. 577, 579, 369 S.E.2d 119, 121 (1988); see also State v. School, 299 N.C. 351, 355, 261 S.E.2d 908, 911 (1980) (denial of motion to dismiss generally does not deprive movant of any substantial right).\nNotwithstanding, under the instant circumstances, see Waters, 294 N.C. at 208, 240 S.E.2d at 343, USF&G asserts implication of the substantial rights of avoidance of trial and appeal of denial of a dismissal motion grounded upon the defense of res judicata. We consider USF&G\u2019s arguments ad seriatim.\nThis Court recently reiterated the long-standing rule that \u201c[avoidance of trial is not a substantial right entitling a party to immediate appellate review.\u201d Anderson v. Atlantic Casualty Ins. Co., 134 N.C. App. 724, -, - S.E.2d -, - (1999) (citation omitted). However, where\na claim has been finally determined, delaying the appeal of that final determination will ordinarily affect a substantial right if there are overlapping factual issues between the claim determined and any claims which have not yet been determined,\nDavidson v. Knauff Ins. Agency, 93 N.C. App. 20, 26, 376 S.E.2d 488, 492, disc. review denied, 324 N.C. 577, 381 S.E.2d 772 (1989), thereby\ncreating the possibility that a party will be prejudiced by different juries in separate trials rendering inconsistent verdicts on the same factual issue.\nGreen v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 603, 608, 290 S.E.2d 593, 596 (1982).\nTherefore, to demonstrate that a second trial will affect a substantial right, USF&G must show, see Jeffreys, 115 N.C. App. at 379, 444 S.E.2d at 253, not only that one \u201cclaim has been finally determined,\u201d Davidson, 93 N.C. App. at 26, 376 S.E.2d at 492, and others remain \u201cwhich have not yet been determined,\u201d id., but that \u201c(1) the same factual issues would be present in both trials and (2) the possibility of inconsistent verdicts on those issues exists,\u201d N.C. Dept. of Transportation v. Page, 119 N.C. App. 730, 736, 460 S.E.2d 332, 335 (1995) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). USF&G is unable to meet this test.\nUSF&G purports to appeal the trial court\u2019s denial of its motion to dismiss. An order denying a motion to dismiss\ndo[es] not determine even one claim, but simply require[s] subsequent trial of the fact issues underlying that claim, [and is] generally not appealable.\nDavidson, 93 N.C. App. at 26, 376 S.E.2d at 492; see also School, 299 N.C. at 355, 261 S.E.2d at 911 (denial of Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss \u201cmerely serves to continue the action then pending [and no] final judgment is involved\u201d). Np final dismissal of claims or parties occurred in the trial court in the instant case; thus, there exists no possibility that, upon reversal of such dismissal, a second trial might produce an inconsistent verdict. See Davidson, 93 N.C. App. at 27, 376 S.E.2d at 492 (while dismissal of plaintiffs claims was immediately appealable, denial of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s remaining claim was not immediately appealable \u201csince there ha[d] been no final disposition whatsoever of that claim\u201d); cf. First Atl. Mgmt. Corp., 131 N.C. App. at 251, 507 S.E.2d at 62 (appeal of grant of defendant\u2019s partial summary judgment motion proper even though interlocutory because of potential inconsistent verdicts); Hoots v. Pryor, 106 N.C. App. 397, 402, 417 S.E.2d 269, 273, disc. review denied, 332 N.C. 345, 421 S.E.2d 148 (1992) (in case of multiple defendants, potential for inconsistent verdicts on issue of plaintiff\u2019s contributory negligence \u201cif . . . case were to be tried in . . . separate proceedings\u201d compels holding that \u201cplaintiffs\u2019 appeal of [the trial court\u2019s] order is not premature and should not be.dismissed\u201d); J & B Slurry Seal Co., 88 N.C. App. at 9, 362 S.E.2d at 817 (appeal allowed of grant of defendant\u2019s summary judgment motion dismissing plaintiff\u2019s claim, but leaving defendant\u2019s counterclaim intact, because of possible inconsistent verdicts); Bernick v. Jurden, 306 N.C. 435, 439, 293 S.E.2d 405, 408 (1982) (plaintiff\u2019s appeal of grant of defendant\u2019s partial summary judgment motion allowed even though interlocutory because inconsistent verdicts possible).\nInterestingly, USF&G both in its appellate brief and in oral argument to this Court, essentially advocated that we render an \u201cinconsistent\u201d opinion herein. In USF&G II, this Court affirmed the trial court\u2019s ruling that \u201cUSF&G ha[d] waived its right to rely on the [alcohol] exclusion,\u201d USF&G II, 126 N.C. App. 633, 491 S.E.2d 569, and held that USF&G\u2019s argument that it \u201c[wa]s not, as a matter of law, estopped from asserting the [alcohol] exclusion\u201d was \u201cwholly without merit,\u201d id. However, USF&G has continued to insist the policy afforded no coverage and that the Club therefore may not assert a bad faith claim.\nUSF&G first ignores the principle that a panel of this Court \u201cmay not overrule the decision of another panel on the same question in the same case.\u201d In the Matter of Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 36 (1989). We note in passing that this principle was previously reiterated in USF&G II. USF&G II, 126 N.C. App. 633, 491 S.E.2d 569 (this Court in USF&G I, by which decision the Court is now bound, \u201cconsidered, and found meritless, the exact argument USF&G attempts to re-assert in the present appeal \u2014 [that] the doctrines of waiver and estoppel cannot expand the scope of an insurance policy to include risks expressly excluded by the plain language of the policy\u201d).\nUSF&G also overlooks the estoppel effect of conduct comprising waiver. It is not that the conduct of USF&G and that of its agents has operated to write into the policy coverage previously excluded; rather, conduct comprising waiver has created a disability on the part of USF&G thereby precluding it from thereafter denying that such coverage is included within the policy.\nAs this Court explained in Chance v. Henderson, 134 N.C. App. 657, -, - S.E.2d -, - (1999) (citation omitted), estoppel effects a \u201cpersonal disability [upon] the party attacking the [court order]; it is not a function of the [order] itself.\u201d Accordingly, the defendant in Chance who by his conduct \u201cin essence ratified and affirmed [a court] Order [was thereafter] estopped from seeking to avoid its effect,\u201d id. Similarly, herein, USF&G, whose waiver of its right to rely on the alcohol exclusion in the policy has been judicially determined, see USF&G II, 126 N.C. App. 633, 491 S.E.2d 569, is thereby \u201cdisallow[ed] ... from denying coverage,\u201d USF&G I, 119 N.C. App. at 374, 458 S.E.2d at 740, under the policy on grounds of said exclusion.\nIn short, the issue in the instant case is no longer one of coverage, but rather USF&G\u2019s liability for alleged bad faith, tortious breach of contract, unfair claim settlement practices, or unfair and deceptive trade acts or practices in its handling of the Club\u2019s claim and the resulting litigation. There is no possibility of any verdict inconsistent with previous judicial determinations.\nUSF&G also argues that because it relies on the principles of res judicata and claim-splitting as barring the Club\u2019s lawsuit in the instant case, a substantial right is thereby affected and it is entitled to an immediate appeal of denial of its motions to dismiss which asserted those grounds. USF&G cites Bockweg v. Anderson, 333 N.C. 486, 428 S.E.2d 157 (1993) and Northwestern Financial Group v. County of Gaston, 110 N.C. App. 531, 430 S.E.2d 689, disc. review denied, 334 N.C. 621, 435 S.E.2d 337 (1993), as support. USF&G\u2019s reliance on Bockweg and Northwestern is unfounded.\nIn Bockweg, our Supreme Court held \u201cthat the denial of a motion for summary judgment based on the defense of res judicata may affect a substantial right\u201d because of the \u201cpossibility that a successful defendant. . . will twice have to defend against the same claim by the same plaintiff.\u201d Bockweg, 333 N.C. at 491, 428 S.E.2d at 161; accord, Northwestern, 110 N.C. App. at 536, 430 S.E.2d at 692.\nFirst, we do not read Bockweg as mandating in every instance immediate appeal of the denial of a summary judgment motion based upon the defense of res judicata. The opinion pointedly states reliance upon res judicata \u201cmay affect a substantial right.\u201d Bockweg, 333 N.C. at 491, 428 S.E.2d at 161 (emphasis added).\nIn addition, we note the reliance in Bockweg on the line of cases, see Green, 305 N.C. at 608, 290 S.E.2d at 596, and Patterson v. DAC Corp., 66 N.C. App. 110, 113, 310 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1984), noting that the potential for inconsistent verdicts in two trials affects a substantial right so as to permit immediate appeal of an otherwise interlocutory order. Indeed, this Court, in an opinion issued shortly after Bockweg, Community Bank v. Whitley, 116 N.C. App. 731, 449 S.E.2d 226, disc. review denied, 338 N.C. 667, 453 S.E.2d 175 (1994), interpreted the permissive language of Bockweg as allowing, under the substantial right exception, immediate appeal of the denial of a motion for summary judgment based, inter alia, upon defense of res judicata \u201cwhere a possibility of inconsistent verdicts exists if the case proceeds to trial.\u201d Id. at 733, 449 S.E.2d at 227 (emphasis added); see also Little v. Hamel, 134 N.C. App. 485, - S.E.2d - (1999) (appeal of denial of summary judgment motion based upon res judi-cata considered to affect substantial right where, although not directly noted by the Court, defendants had been absolved of liability in previous suit between the parties and faced possibility of inconsistent verdicts).\nIn short, denial of a motion for summary judgment based upon the defense of res judicata may involve a substantial right so as to permit immediate appeal only \u201cwhere a possibility of inconsistent verdicts exists if the case proceeds to trial.\u201d Community Bank, 116 N.C. App. at 733, 449 S.E.2d at 227. We have established that the current case presents no possibility of inconsistent verdicts.\nFinally, Bockweg involved appeal from denial of a summary judgment motion, whereas we are concerned herein with denial of a motion to dismiss. As earlier noted, withholding of appeal of summary relief at the early stages of trial court litigation is generally favored. See Waters, 294 N.C. at 209, 240 S.E.2d at 344.\nWe also note that the decision in Northwestern, relied upon by USF&G, supports our interpretation of Bockweg. In Northwestern, this Court observed there was no possibility of inconsistent verdicts, thus making the facts therein \u201cdistinguishable from those in Bockweg.\u201d Northwestern, 110 N.C. App. at 536, 430 S.E.2d at 692. We nonetheless \u201cchose[] to consider the merits of defendants\u2019 appeal.\u201d Id.; see N.C.R. App. R 2 (\u201c[t]o prevent manifest injustice to a party,\u201d appellate court \u201cmay . . . suspend or vary the requirements\u201d of the Rules of Appellate Procedure).\nSuffice it to state we do not perceive it as \u201cmanifest\u201d that injustice will result herein absent immediatte appeal. See Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 66, 511 S.E.2d 298, 299-300 (1999) (\u201cRule 2 relates to the residual power of our appellate courts ... , in exceptional circumstances, ... to prevent injustice which appears manifest to the Court and only in such instances\u201d (emphasis added)). Significantly, USF&G has failed to show that\nenforcement of [a substantial] right, absent immediate appeal, [will] be \u201clost, prejudiced or be less than adequately protected by exception to entry of the interlocutory order.\u201d\nFirst Atl. Mgmt. Corp., 131 N.C. App. at 250, 507 S.E.2d at 62 (citation omitted). On the contrary, USF&G\u2019s\nrights . . . are fully and adequately protected by an exception to the order which may then be assigned as error on appeal should final judgment in the case ultimately go against it.\nWaters, 294 N.C. at 208, 240 S.E.2d at 344.\nAppeal dismissed.\nJudges WYNN and EDMUNDS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Armstrong & Armstrong, P.A., by L. Lamar Armstrong, Jr., and W. Brian Howell, P.A., by W. Brian Howell, for plaintiff - appellee.", "Wilson & Iseman, L.L.P, by G. Gray Wilson and Elizabeth Horton, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE COUNTRY CLUB OF JOHNSTON COUNTY, INC., Plaintiff v. UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, Defendant\nNo. COA98-1419\n(Filed 5 October 1999)\nAppeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 denial of motions to dismiss \u2014 interlocutory\nAn appeal from the denial of motions to dismiss was dismissed as interlocutory where the order did not dispose of the case, the trial court made no certification, USF&G was unable to meet the substantial right exception in that there was no possibility of any verdict inconsistent with previous judicial determinations, immediate appeal is not mandated in every instance of the denial of a motion based upon res judicata, and manifest injustice will not result absent immediate appeal.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 2 September 1998 by Judge Robert L. Farmer in Johnston County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 August 1999.\nArmstrong & Armstrong, P.A., by L. Lamar Armstrong, Jr., and W. Brian Howell, P.A., by W. Brian Howell, for plaintiff - appellee.\nWilson & Iseman, L.L.P, by G. Gray Wilson and Elizabeth Horton, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0159-01", "first_page_order": 193, "last_page_order": 202 }