{ "id": 11239616, "name": "VIRGIE M. SANDERS, Plaintiff v. AMERICAN SPIRIT INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Sanders v. American Spirit Insurance", "decision_date": "1999-10-05", "docket_number": "No. COA98-1247", "first_page": "178", "last_page": "186", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "135 N.C. App. 178" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529622 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 S.E.2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2551316 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 S.E.2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "749" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491345 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" }, { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4719040 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 868", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526846 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 S.E.2d 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 795905, 796004, 796039, 796018, 795995 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0666-05", "/nc/342/0666-03", "/nc/342/0666-01", "/nc/342/0666-04", "/nc/342/0666-02" ] }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 89", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 761", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11918014 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0761-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 S.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "784-85", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "784-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 131929 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 S.E.2d 146", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150" }, { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 N.C. App. 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11914855 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/123/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "762", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2492574 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 761", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "764", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "764" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2485985 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "479 S.E.2d 209", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53960 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 S.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "16" }, { "page": "17", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 N.C. App. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11913530 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/123/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" }, { "page": "282-83" }, { "page": "281", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "282" }, { "page": "281", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. App. 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915984 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" }, { "page": "456" }, { "page": "454" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/119/0444-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 773, "char_count": 17827, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.116836155254739e-07, "percentile": 0.7639904874762968 }, "sha256": "47fa485204471c904e3bd88033367a17103fdde3d462e03eac86c295b5c6a86b", "simhash": "1:8b6bf47286771cfa", "word_count": 2785 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:51:33.981101+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and HUNTER concur." ], "parties": [ "VIRGIE M. SANDERS, Plaintiff v. AMERICAN SPIRIT INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nPlaintiff appeals the trial court\u2019s grant of defendant\u2019s summary judgment motion proffered pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c)(1990) (defendant\u2019s motion). The sole issue for our determination is whether an automobile insurance policy issued by defendant (the policy) provides underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage to plaintiff for injuries sustained while a passenger in an automobile driven by defendant\u2019s named insured Joan Johnson (Johnson). We conclude the policy provides such coverage and that the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion.\nThe following pertinent facts and procedural history are undisputed: On 6 December 1995, plaintiff, a passenger in an automobile driven by Johnson, was injured when Johnson\u2019s vehicle collided -with an automobile operated by John Davenport (Davenport) on U.S. 70 in Wake County, North Carolina. Plaintiff, as an occupant of Johnson\u2019s vehicle, was insured under the policy issued by defendant to Johnson and her husband (Mr. Johnson).\nIn October 1997 and subsequent to settlement with Davenport\u2019s insurer, Travelers Insurance Company (Travelers), plaintiff initiated the instant action against defendant seeking UIM coverage for damages caused by Davenport\u2019s alleged negligence in excess of the amount tendered in settlement by Travelers. Defendant filed answer 18 December 1997, generally denying plaintiff\u2019s allegations and affirmatively defending upon grounds that Mr. Johnson had rejected UIM coverage under the policy.\nOn 2 March 1998, the parties agreed that UIM coverage under the policy was a condition precedent to plaintiff\u2019s recovery at trial and stipulated to severance of the issues so as to permit the trial court to determine preliminarily as a matter of law whether Mr. Johnson had effectively rejected UIM coverage under the policy. The parties thereupon filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On 22 June 1998, the court granted defendant\u2019s motion and plaintiff thereafter timely appealed.\nIn support of its motion, defendant proffered upon Mr. Johnson\u2019s rejection of Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Coverage and his selection of Uninsured Motorists Coverage under defendant\u2019s policy form F.39500A (defendant\u2019s form). Defendant\u2019s form provided:\nELECTION/REJECTION FORM UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE COMBINED UNINSURED/UNDERSINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE\nUninsured Motorists Coverage (UM) and Combined Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Coverage (UM/UIM) and coverage options are available to me. I understand that:\n1. the UM and UM/UIM limits shown for vehicles on this policy may not be added together to determine the total amount of coverage provided.\n2. UM and UM/UIM bodily injury limits up to $1,000,000 per person and $1,000,000 per accident are available.\n3. UM property damage limits up to the highest policy property damage liability limits are available. Coverage for property damage is applicable only to damages caused by uninsured motor vehicles.\n4. my selection or rejection of coverage will apply to any renewal, reinstatement, substitute, amended, altered, modified, transfer or replacement policy with this company, or affiliated company, unless a named insured makes a written request to the company to exercise a different option.\n5. my selection or rejection of coverage below is valid and binding on all insureds and vehicles under the policy, unless a named insured makes a written request to the company to exercise a different option.\n(CHOOSE ONLY ONE OF THE FOLLOWING)\n_ I choose to reject Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Coverage and select Uninsured Motorists Coverage at limits of:\nBodily Iniurv : Property Damage_\n_I choose Combined Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Coverage at limits of:\nBodily Injury_; Property Damage__\n_I choose to reject both Uninsured and Uninsured/ Underinsured Motorists Coverages.\nNamed\nInsured _\nSummary judgment is properly granted \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c).\nPlaintiff submits defendant was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law in that Mr. Johnson did not reject UIM coverage. Plaintiff argues defendant\u2019s form differed from that promulgated by the North Carolina Rate Bureau (the Rate Bureau form) and cites this Court\u2019s decision in Hendrickson v. Lee, 119 N.C. App. 444, 453, 459 S.E.2d 275, 280 (1995). Plaintiff\u2019s argument has merit.\nIn determining whether insurance coverage is provided by a particular automobile liability insurance policy, careful attention must be given to the type of coverage, the relevant statutory provisions, and the terms of the policy. Vasseur v. St. Paul Mutual Ins. Company, 123 N.C. App. 418, 420, 473 S.E.2d 15, 16, disc. review denied, 345 N.C. 183, 479 S.E.2d 209 (1996) (citations omitted). The instant case concerns UIM coverage and as such, the governing statute is the version of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1991), a section within the Financial Responsibility Act (the Act), in effect at the time the policy was issued. See id. at 420, 473 S.E.2d at 16. (G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) was thereafter, amended but the amendments in any event are irrelevant to the issue sub judice).\nThe Act is remedial in nature and must be liberally construed, id. at 421, 473 S.E.2d at 17 (citation omitted), in order to protect \u201cinnocent victims who may be injured by financially irresponsible motorists,\u201d Proctor v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 324 N.C. 221, 224, 376 S.E.2d 761, 763 (1989) (citation omitted). The purpose of the Act is \u201cbest served when the statute is interpreted to provide the innocent victim with the fullest possible protection,\u201d id. at 225, 376 S.E.2d at 764 (emphasis added), from the negligent acts of an under-insured motorist.\nThe applicable version of G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) herein outlines specific procedures under which UIM coverage may be rejected by a named insured and states in pertinent part:\n(b) [An] owner\u2019s policy of liability insurance:\n(4) Shall, in addition to the coverages set forth in subdivisions (2) and (3) of this subsection, provide underinsured motorist coverage, to be used only with a policy that is written at limits that exceed those prescribed by subdivision (2) of this section and that afford uninsured motorist coverage as provided by subdivision (3) of this subsection, in an amount not to be less than the financial responsibility amounts for bodily injury liability as set forth in G.S. 20-279.5 nor greater than one million dollars ($1,000,000) as selected by the policy owner. . . .\nThe coverage required under this subdivision shall not be applicable where any insured named in the policy rejects the coverage. An insured named in the policy may select different coverage limits as provided in this subdivision. Once the named insured exercises this option, the insurer is not required to offer the option in any renewal, reinstatement, substitute, amended, altered, modified, transfer, or replacement policy unless the named insured makes a written request to exercise a different option. The selection or rejection of underinsured motorist coverage by a named insured is valid and binding on all insureds and vehicles under the policy.\nIf the named insured rejects the coverage required under this subdivision, the insurer shall not be required to offer the coverage in any renewal, reinstatement, substitute, amended, altered, modified, transfer or replacement policy unless the named insured makes a written request for the coverge. Rejection of this coverage for policies issued after October 1, 1986, shall be made in writing by the named insured on a form promulgated by the North Carolina Rate Bureau and approved by the Commissioner of Insurance.\nG.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) (emphasis added).\nDefendant concedes its form executed by Mr. Johnson in purportedly rejecting UIM coverage was not approved by the Commissioner of Insurance nor identical in all respects to the Rate Bureau form. Indeed, comparison of the two forms reveals, inter alia, that defendant\u2019s form does not contain the term \u201ccombined\u201d in choices 1 and 3, the list of options under the Rate Bureau\u2019s form providing as follows:\n_ I choose to reject Combined, Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Coverage and select Uninsured Motorists Coverage at limits of:\nBodily Injury_; Property Damage_\n._ I choose Combined Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Coverage at limits of:\nBodily Injury_; Property Damage_\n_ I choose to reject both Uninsured and Combined Uninsured/ Underinsured Motorists Coverages.\n(emphasis added).\nAccording to plaintiff, the result of defendant\u2019s omission is that\nthe choices presented by Defendant\u2019s form allow selecting \u201cCombined/Unisured/ Underinsured Motorists Coverage\u201d at limits specified by the insured, [but not a concomitant] rejection of this specific type of available coverage\nas provided by the Bureau\u2019s form. Defendant counters that \u201cwhen viewed in the context of the entire form used by defendant, the phrase \u2018Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Coverage\u2019 in Choices 1 and 3 can only be taken to mean \u2018Combined Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Coverage.\u2019 \u201d As such, continues defendant, Mr. Johnson\u2019s rejection of UIM coverage was effective because defendant\u2019s form was in \u201csubstantial compliance\u201d with the Rate Bureau Form. We are not persuaded.\n[When] a statute [such as G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4)] is applicable to the terms of a policy of insurance, the provisions of that statute become part of the terms of the policy to the same extent as if they were written in [to] it, and if the terms of the policy conflict with the statute, the . . . statute will prevail.\nSutton v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 325 N.C. 259, 263, 382 S.E.2d 759, 762 (1989) (citations omitted).\nAccordingly, in Hendrickson, 119 N.C. App. 444, 459 S.E.2d 275, defendants therein unsuccessfully argued that rejection of UIM coverage could be accomplished by use of a form which \u201c \u2018substantially complied\u2019 with the statutory mandate.\u201d Id. at 457, 459 S.E.2d at 282-83. In Hendrickson, this Court pointedly observed that\nG.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) \u2022 \u2022 \u2022 provides] that rejection of UIM coverage \u201cshall\u201d be in writing and on \u201ca form promulgated by the Rate Bureau and approved by the Commissioner of Insurance\u201d [and] [t]he language \u201cshall\u201d as applied in Chapter 20 of the North Carolina Motor Vehicle Statutes, is \u201cmandatory\u201d and not merely \u201cformal\u201d and \u201cdirectory language.\u201d\nId. at 454, 459 S.E.2d at 281 (citations omitted).\nSimilarly, in Martin v. Continental Ins. Co., 123 N.C. App. 650, 474 S.E.2d 146 (1996), this Court addressed defendant insurer\u2019s contention that a purported rejection, not on the Rate Bureau form, nonetheless \u201cclearly and unambiguously rejected] . . . [UIM] coverage\u201d and was \u201cvalid and binding.\u201d Id. at 658, 474 S.E.2d at 150. We stated defendant\u2019s argument was \u201cbeside the point,\u201d id., by virtue of its failure to acknowledge that\n[i]n Hendrickson, this Court strictly enforced the requirement that UIM coverage may be rejected only \u201cin writing ... on a form promulgated by the North Carolina Rate Bureau and approved by the Commissioner of Insurance,\u201d ... in order to \u201cassure compensation of the innocent victims of uninsured or underinsured drivers\u201d \u2014 the primary purpose of the Act.\nId. (citations omitted).\nFinally, in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fortin, 350 N.C. 264, 513 S.E.2d 782 (1999), our Supreme Court reemphasized that\n[t]he language of [G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4)] is mandatory. An insurer is obligated to obtain the insured\u2019s selection or rejection of UM or UM/UIM coverage in writing and on a form promulgated by the Rate Bureau and approved by the Commissioner.\nId. at 269, 513 S.E.2d at 784-85 (emphasis added).\nNotwithstanding, defendant cites a circular letter mailed by the Rate Bureau to member companies as support for the position that \u201csubstantial compliance\u201d with G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) might effect rejection of UIM coverage. The letter provided that\nthe language [of the form] may not be changed or substantively amended, without prior approval....\nDefendant maintains that the \u201cfact, that the Rate Bureau stated that the language of its forms may not be \u2018changed or substantively amended\u2019 \u201d means the Rate Bureau \u201cwas using the word \u2018changed\u2019 in the sense [of] \u2018substantively amended.\u2019 \u201d However, this Court has previously explained that the disjunctive term \u201cor\u201d creates two separate clauses and, when used, it is \u201cincorrect to read the second part of [a] . . . definition as qualifying the first part.\u201d Wrenn v. Byrd, 120 N.C. App. 761, 766, 464 S.E.2d 89, 92, disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 666, 467 S.E.2d 738 (1995) (citation omitted).\nFinally, defendant concludes by pointing to Smith v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 72 N.C. App. 400, 324 S.E.2d 868, rev\u2019d on other grounds, 315 N.C. 262, 337 S.E.2d 569 (1985). Smith construed N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-310(f) (1978) which provided that an insurer \u201cshall\u201d provide notice containing specific information prescribed by the statute to cancel or refuse to renew automobile liability insurance policies. In Smith, this Court stated:\nall of the provisions of [G.S. \u00a7 20-310(f)] must be complied with before an insurer may refuse to renew an insurance policy pursuant to [G.S. \u00a7 20-310(e)(4).] Compliance means substantial compliance with [G.S. \u00a7 20-310] in order for an insurer to effectively cancel [or fail to renew] an automobile liability policy for nonpayment of premium.\nId. at 404, 324 S.E.2d at 871.\nAnalogizing to the case sub judice, defendant insists our approval of \u201csubstantial compliance\u201d with G.S. \u00a7 20-310(f) as adequate for an insurer to cancel or fail to renew an automobile liability policy for nonpayment of premium mandates ratification herein of \u201csubstantial compliance\u201d with G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4). We do not agree.\nWe first note that the opinion in Smith was issued at least ten years prior to the decisions in Hendrickson, Martin and State Farm cited above. Moreover, in Pearson v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 325 N.C. 246, 255, 382 S.E.2d 745, 749 (1989), also subsequent to Smith, our Supreme Court held that certain subsections of G.S. \u00a7 20-310(f) require strict compliance to comport with the purpose of the Financial Responsibility Act. The Court stated in Pearson:\nWe conclude, both as to stating the date and giving the statutorily required period of time, that the insurer must strictly comply with the statute. . . .\nFor the protection of both the motoring public and the insured, automobile insurance cancellation dates must be expressly and carefully specified with certainty. They should not be left to the possible vagaries of date calculations nor to the uncertainties which result when less than the statutorily prescribed period of time has been given.\nId. at 252-53, 382 S.E.2d at 748; see also Hales v. N.C. Insurance Guaranty Assn., 337 N.C. 329, 339, 445 S.E.2d 590, 597 (1994) (plaintiff insured\u2019s policy not canceled absent \u201cforecast of evidence tending to show that the Commissioner of Insurance had previously approved the form of the notice [, and] the notice did not state the date on which any cancellation or refusal to renew would become effective, a date which \u2018must be expressly and carefully specified with certainty\u2019 in order to comply with the requirements of [the statute]\u201d) (citations omitted). It is well established that this Court is required to follow decisions of our Supreme Court until that Court orders otherwise. See Dunn v. Pate, 334 N.C. 115, 118, 431 S.E.2d 178, 180 (1993) (citation omitted).\nIn sum, we conclude our Supreme Court\u2019s expressed preference for \u201ccertainty,\u201d Pearson, 325 N.C. at 253, 382 S.E.2d at 748, so as \u201cto provide . . . innocent victim[s injured by financially irresponsible motorists] with the fullest possible protection,\u201d Proctor, 324 N.C. at 225, 376 S.E.2d at 764, is best met by \u201cavoiding confusion and ambiguity through the use of a single standard and approved form,\u201d Hendrickson, 119 N.C. App. at 456, 459 S.E.2d at 282. We therefore reiterate that the language of G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) is \u201cmandatory,\u201d State Farm, 350 N.C. at 269, 513 S.E.2d at 784-85, and that \u201crejection of UIM coverage \u2018shall\u2019 be in writing and on \u2018a form promulgated by the Rate Bureau and approved by the Commissioner of Insurance,\u2019 \u201d Hendrickson, 119 N.C. App. at 454, 459 S.E.2d at 281 (emphasis added) (quoting G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4)). Defendant\u2019s form herein failed to meet this test, Mr. Johnson\u2019s purported rejection of UIM coverage thus was ineffective, and the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant must be reversed.\nReversed.\nJudges TIMMONS-GOODSON and HUNTER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Dean A. Shangler for plaintiff-appellant.", "Yates, McLamb & Weyher, L.L.P., by R. Scott Brown and Michael J. Byrne for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "VIRGIE M. SANDERS, Plaintiff v. AMERICAN SPIRIT INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant\nNo. COA98-1247\n(Filed 5 October 1999)\nInsurance\u2014 automobile \u2014 nnderinsured motorist coverage\u2014 summary judgment improper \u2014 need form promulgated by Rate Bureau and approval by Commissioner of Insurance\nThe trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment because the pertinent automobile insurance policy issued by defendant provides underinsured motorist coverage under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) to plaintiff for injuries sustained while a passenger in an automobile driven by defendant\u2019s named insured since rejection of underinsured motorist coverage is not accomplished unless it is in writing and on a form promulgated by the Rate Bureau and approved by the Commissioner of Insurance.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 22 June 1998 by Judge Knox V. Jenkins, Jr., in Johnston County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 May 1999.\nDean A. Shangler for plaintiff-appellant.\nYates, McLamb & Weyher, L.L.P., by R. Scott Brown and Michael J. Byrne for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0178-01", "first_page_order": 212, "last_page_order": 220 }