{
  "id": 11242344,
  "name": "PHYLLIS DARBY, Plaintiff-Appellant v. HOYTE CLYDE DARBY, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Darby v. Darby",
  "decision_date": "1999-11-16",
  "docket_number": "No. COA98-1517",
  "first_page": "627",
  "last_page": "629",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "135 N.C. App. 627"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "250 S.E.2d 250",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1979,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "253",
          "parenthetical": "stating that \"where a literal interpretation of the language of a statute will lead to absurd results, or contravene the manifest purpose of the Legislature, as otherwise expressed, the reason and purpose of the law shall control and the strict letter thereof shall be disregarded\""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "296 N.C. 357",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8566069
      ],
      "year": 1979,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "361"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/296/0357-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 263,
    "char_count": 3258,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.735,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.666970501906556e-08,
      "percentile": 0.29330860602297665
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    "sha256": "b78b6c11798dc1729fee8c996612539b7693de7f1c44e7cba8f2ea7c6f98221d",
    "simhash": "1:f4a1c6a93afc4452",
    "word_count": 532
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:51:33.981101+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges JOHN and EDMUNDS concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "PHYLLIS DARBY, Plaintiff-Appellant v. HOYTE CLYDE DARBY, Defendant-Appellee"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nThe facts of this appeal are quite simple. The plaintiff-wife having been injured in an automobile driven by her husband, brought an action against him one day before the running of the three-year statute of limitations. The county sheriff served the complaint at the residence of the husband which was also the residence of the wife. For some reason, not apparent to us, the plaintiff-wife accepted service of her own complaint on behalf of her defendant-husband.\nHaving been informed by answer of the insurer for the defendant-husband that this was not an acceptable service, the plaintiff\u2019s attorney resorted to a substituted form of service by sending to the defendant-husband a certified copy of the complaint by registered mail. To complete what appears to be a bar exam type hypothetical, the plaintiff-wife accepted and signed the return receipt on the certified mail for her defendant-husband.\nThe obvious issue that flows from this factual fiasco is: Does North Carolina\u2019s service of process statute permit a wife who sues her husband to accept service of process for her husband when she lives in the same house as he does? We answer: No.\nUnder our statute, the manner of service of process may be by \u201cleaving copies thereof at the defendant\u2019s dwelling or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein.\u201d See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(l)(a) (1990). While the plaintiff wife in this case meets each of those criteria, we must afford our legislature the courtesy of understanding that there is an obvious exception to that rule \u2014 a plaintiff cannot accept service of her own complaint.\nWhile our legislature strives to write our laws in plain language, it cannot be expected to address every possible scenario that may be presented by the literal application of its words. Rather, the courts in reading our statutes must import common sense to the meaning of the legislature\u2019s words to avoid an absurdity. See Mazda Motors of America, Inc. v. Southwestern Motors, Inc., 296 N.C. 357, 361, 250 S.E.2d 250, 253 (1979) (stating that \u201cwhere a literal interpretation of the language of a statute will lead to absurd results, or contravene the manifest purpose of the Legislature, as otherwise expressed, the reason and purpose of the law shall control and the strict letter thereof shall be disregarded\u201d). Thus, we hold that the statute does not allow a plaintiff to accept \u2014 on the behalf of the defendant \u2014 service of her own complaint.\nAffirmed.\nJudges JOHN and EDMUNDS concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WYNN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Deaton & Biggers, P.L.L.C., by Lydia A. Hoza, for plaintiff - appellant.",
      "Hedrick, Eatman, Gardner & Kincheloe, L.L.P., by Allen Smith, for defendant-appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "PHYLLIS DARBY, Plaintiff-Appellant v. HOYTE CLYDE DARBY, Defendant-Appellee\nNo. COA98-1517\n(Filed 16 November 1999)\nProcess and Service\u2014 acceptance of service \u2014 action by wife against husband \u2014 acceptance by wife\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(l)(a) does not allow a wife who sues her husband to accept service of process for her husband when they live in the same house.\nAppeal by plaintiff-appellant from judgment entered 21 September 1998 by Judge Loto G. Caviness in Cleveland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 September 1999.\nDeaton & Biggers, P.L.L.C., by Lydia A. Hoza, for plaintiff - appellant.\nHedrick, Eatman, Gardner & Kincheloe, L.L.P., by Allen Smith, for defendant-appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0627-01",
  "first_page_order": 661,
  "last_page_order": 663
}