{ "id": 11240832, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. REAVIOUS OKONE ROBINSON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Robinson", "decision_date": "2000-02-01", "docket_number": "No. COA99-343", "first_page": "520", "last_page": "524", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "136 N.C. App. 520" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "140 L.Ed.2d 473", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "523 U.S. 1024", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11511617, 11511362, 11511587, 11511493, 11511686, 11511560, 11511754, 11511659, 11511469, 11511728, 11511536, 11511441, 11511413, 11511389, 11511806 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/523/1024-10", "/us/523/1024-01", "/us/523/1024-09", "/us/523/1024-06", "/us/523/1024-12", "/us/523/1024-08", "/us/523/1024-14", "/us/523/1024-11", "/us/523/1024-05", "/us/523/1024-13", "/us/523/1024-07", "/us/523/1024-04", "/us/523/1024-03", "/us/523/1024-02", "/us/523/1024-15" ] }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53983 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 727", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736" }, { "page": "736" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2552812 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 L.Ed.2d 878", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 1096", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11610818, 11610434, 11610661, 11610951, 11610539, 11610860, 11610635, 11610607, 11610708, 11610905, 11610583, 11610744, 11610457, 11610492 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/1096-11", "/us/522/1096-01", "/us/522/1096-08", "/us/522/1096-14", "/us/522/1096-04", "/us/522/1096-12", "/us/522/1096-07", "/us/522/1096-06", "/us/522/1096-09", "/us/522/1096-13", "/us/522/1096-05", "/us/522/1096-10", "/us/522/1096-02", "/us/522/1096-03" ] }, { "cite": "490 S.E.2d 220", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551122 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 S.E.2d 819", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790103 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 S.E.2d 195", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 N.C. App. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555662 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/36/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 L.Ed.2d 977", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "501 U.S. 1208", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1108098, 1108452, 1107878, 1108071, 1108295, 1107944, 1107818, 1108107, 1107754, 1107981, 1107762, 1107702, 1107832, 1108346, 1108221 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/1208-10", "/us/501/1208-14", "/us/501/1208-01", "/us/501/1208-08", "/us/501/1208-03", "/us/501/1208-09", "/us/501/1208-05", "/us/501/1208-13", "/us/501/1208-12", "/us/501/1208-04", "/us/501/1208-02", "/us/501/1208-11", "/us/501/1208-07", "/us/501/1208-15", "/us/501/1208-06" ] }, { "cite": "399 S.E.2d 293", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538877 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 S.E.2d 837", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 N.C. 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625724 ], "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/248/0695-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 462, "char_count": 8339, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.094904139284837e-08, "percentile": 0.4674206874609292 }, "sha256": "a5e3d4f716807a6825771cb90c3751bfd59eff84d4df1639d6226cf0d3154d9b", "simhash": "1:86c91a5fe2e39f57", "word_count": 1362 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:33:36.366510+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and HORTON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. REAVIOUS OKONE ROBINSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Judge.\nDefendant, Reavious Okone Robinson, appeals from a judgment entered upon his conviction by a jury of robbery with a firearm. Defendant was tried jointly with Christopher Devon Duncan, who was also charged with robbery with a firearm based on the same facts.\nBriefly summarized, the evidence presented at trial tended to show that on 22 January 1997 defendant and Duncan entered the Quick One Food Mart and, after shopping for approximately 10 minutes, defendant approached the counter to purchase a bag of chips. When Youlim Tam, the clerk, opened the register to make change, Duncan held an object appearing to be a gun to Tam\u2019s shoulder and demanded money. Defendant and Duncan escaped with $280, part of which Duncan gave to defendant. Defendant also disposed of the weapon.\nDefendant offered no evidence at trial. Duncan testified in his own behalf and stated that defendant did not plan to commit the robbery and had no prior knowledge that Duncan was going to rob the store. During the State\u2019s cross-examination of Duncan, he was impeached by use of a statement which he had made to police after his arrest and in which he had implicated defendant in the robbery. Defendant\u2019s objection to the statement was overruled; he made no request for a limiting instruction as to the jury\u2019s proper use of Duncan\u2019s statement and none was given.\nWhen, at a joint trial, evidence is admitted against one defendant which is not admissible against a co-defendant and the co-defendant makes a general objection to the evidence, the court is required to give a limiting instruction to the jury. State v. Franklin, 248 N.C. 695, 104 S.E.2d 837 (1958); See also State v. Phillips, 328 N.C. 1, 399 S.E.2d 293, cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1208, 115 L.Ed.2d 977 (1991). Such instruction must distinguish the defendant(s) against whom the evidence is admissible from the defendant(s) against whom it is not admissible. Phillips, supra. The objecting defendant must make either a timely general objection or a specific request for a limiting jury instruction, but is not required to request a limiting instruction if he makes a general objection. State v. Pierce, 36 N.C. App. 770, 245 S.E.2d 195 (1978). It is the duty of the trial court to give a specific limiting instruction due to the inherent danger of confusing the jury with the admission of evidence applicable only to one of multiple defendants.\nIn the present case, Duncan testified that defendant was not involved in the robbery. The State cross-examined him with respect to his previous statement to law enforcement officers that defendant was involved with the robbery. On re-direct, Duncan explained that the law enforcement officers wanted him to implicate defendant in the commission of the crime, although defendant had played no part in the robbery. Duncan\u2019s prior statement was not admissible against defendant for any purpose. Franklin, supra. Thus, the trial court erred in failing to specifically instruct the jury that it could not consider Duncan\u2019s previous statement against defendant.\nHaving found error, we must now determine whether the error warrants a new trial for defendant. To be entitled to a new trial, defendant has the burden of showing the error prejudiced him in some way. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (1998); See also State v. Rush, 340 N.C. 174, 456 S.E.2d 819 (1995). The court may negate the effect of the error by giving a proper instruction. \u201cWhen the trial court instructs the jury not to consider incompetent evidence, any prejudice is ordinarily cured.\u201d State v. Adams, 347 N.C. 48, 68, 490 S.E.2d 220, 230 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1096, 139 L.Ed.2d 878 (1998) (citations omitted).\nA defendant is prejudiced by errors relating to rights arising other than under the Constitution of the United States when there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial out of which the appeal arises. The burden of showing such prejudice under this subsection is upon the defendant.\nA defendant may be convicted for a crime committed by another if the State proves the defendant acted \u201cin concert\u201d with the other to commit the crime. At the time this crime was committed, acting in concert required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was \u201cat the scene with another with whom he shares a common plan to commit the crime, although the other person does all the acts necessary to effect commission of the crime.\u201d State v. Blankenship, 337 N.C. 543, 557-58, 447 S.E.2d 727, 736 (1994), overruled by, State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 481 S.E.2d 44 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1024, 140 L.Ed.2d 473 (1998). In addition to the proof requirements associated with acting in concert, if the crime is a specific intent crime, such as robbery with a dangerous weapon, the defendant, like the actual perpetrator, must be shown to have the requisite specific intent. Id. \u201cThe specific intent may be proved by evidence tending to show that the specific intent crime was a part of the common plan.\u201d Id. at 558, 447 S.E.2d at 736. \u201cAlthough a common plan for all crimes committed may exist at the outset of the criminal enterprise, its scope is not invariable; and it may evolve according to the course of events.\u201d Id.\nIn determining whether a reasonable possibility exists that defendant would have been convicted in spite of the trial court\u2019s failure to give a proper limiting instruction, the focus of our inquiry is on the evidence supporting specific intent. The only direct evidence that defendant intended or planned to commit the robbery with Duncan came through Duncan\u2019s extra-judicial statement which was used to attack his credibility during his cross-examination.\nThe State argues, however, that sufficient circumstances exist to show defendant\u2019s knowledge and intent. Defendant and Duncan went to the Quick One Food Mart together; they perused the shelves in the store for several minutes before defendant approached the clerk to buy a drink and a bag of chips. When the clerk opened the cash register drawer to make change for defendant\u2019s purchase, Duncan placed a weapon against his shoulder and demanded money. Defendant walked out of the store ahead of Duncan. While these facts are sufficient to permit an inference that defendant was acting in concert with Duncan to rob the store, and thus to overcome defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, they do not compel a finding of guilt. Without the statements from Duncan describing defendant\u2019s involvement in the scheme, there is a reasonable possibility the outcome would have been different for defendant. Therefore, we must grant defendant a new trial.\nWe do not address defendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error as they may not arise upon retrial.\nNew trial.\nJudges TIMMONS-GOODSON and HORTON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General David L. Elliott, for the State.", "Carol L. Huffman for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. REAVIOUS OKONE ROBINSON\nNo. COA99-343\n(Filed 1 February 2000)\nAccomplices and Accessories\u2014 testimony of one against another \u2014 limiting instruction\nThe trial judge erred in a robbery prosecution by not giving a limiting instruction when a codefendant\u2019s testimony was introduced over defendant\u2019s objection. The court is required to give a limiting instruction when evidence is introduced at a joint trial against one defendant which is. not admissible against a codefen-dant and the codefendant makes a general objection to the evidence. The objecting defendant must make a timely objection or a specific request for a limiting instruction, but is not required to request a limiting instruction if he makes a general objection. The error was prejudicial because this statement, admitted on cross-examination to attack the witness\u2019s credibility, was the only evidence that defendant intended or planned to commit the robbery with the codefendant; the other circumstances argued by the State would permit an inference that defendant was acting in concert, but do not compel a finding of guilt and there is a reasonable possibility the outcome would have been different.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 5 November 1998 by Judge Sanford L. Steelman, Jr., in Union County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 January 2000.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General David L. Elliott, for the State.\nCarol L. Huffman for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0520-01", "first_page_order": 554, "last_page_order": 558 }