{ "id": 11240854, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL L. HATCHER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hatcher", "decision_date": "2000-02-01", "docket_number": "No. COA99-782", "first_page": "524", "last_page": "528", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "136 N.C. App. 524" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "273 S.E.2d 448", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567190, 8567224, 8567258, 8567163, 8567295 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0403-02", "/nc/301/0403-03", "/nc/301/0403-04", "/nc/301/0403-01", "/nc/301/0403-05" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 N.C. App. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550982 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/48/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 S.E.2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561289 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 724", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4720164 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4771715 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0230-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 459, "char_count": 8291, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.097712629889064e-07, "percentile": 0.9095785121063042 }, "sha256": "72e5514d7626340a267277d084904d8b5ca2b6128fe98bae191374f048f996f9", "simhash": "1:d76ae74476a3a7fa", "word_count": 1328 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:33:36.366510+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges LEWIS and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL L. HATCHER, Defendant-Appellant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "SMITH, Judge.\nDefendant was found guilty as charged of two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon. He was sentenced in the aggravated range to a minimum term of 108 months and the corresponding maximum of 139 months for each offense, to run consecutively.\nThe State presented evidence tending to show that on 5 January 1998 defendant and Anthony Eaton took at gunpoint a 1989 Toyota Tercel automobile and a wallet containing cash from Angel Prudente and jewelry from Delfino Laredo.\nDefendant\u2019s assignments of error are grouped into four questions for review. For the following reasons, we affirm defendant\u2019s convictions.\nFirst, defendant contends the court erred in restricting his cross examination of witnesses in violation of his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. He assigns as error the court\u2019s refusal to allow defendant to question (1) Prudente and Laredo regarding their immigration status, (2) Eaton regarding his history of carrying and discharging firearms, (3) Eaton regarding his sentencing to a lower category than appropriate, and (4) Eaton\u2019s attorney regarding what would happen to Eaton if he did not testify. He argues these questions were designed to show bias.\nThe right to cross examine a witness to expose the witness\u2019 bias is not unlimited. State v. Sams, 317 N.C. 230, 345 S.E.2d 179 (1986). \u201c[W]hile it is axiomatic that the cross-examiner should be allowed wide latitude, the trial judge has discretion to ban unduly repetitious and argumentative questions, as well as inquiry into matters of tenuous relevance.\u201d 1 Kenneth S. Broun, Brandis & Broun on North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 170 (5th ed. 1998). Moreover, the trial judge retains the discretion to prohibit cross examination that is intended to harass, annoy or humiliate a witness. State v. Mason, 315 N.C. 724, 340 S.E.2d 430 (1986). The trial judge\u2019s rulings in controlling cross examination will not be disturbed unless it is shown that the verdict was improperly influenced. State v. Woods, 307 N.C. 213, 297 S.E.2d 574 (1982).\nApplying these principles to the case at bar, we note that the immigration status of the two victims was of very tenuous, if any, relevance to their credibility. Although Eaton testified that his plea was not contingent upon testifying against defendant, he acknowledged on cross examination that the written plea agreement called for him to testify. Eaton acknowledged on direct examination and again on cross examination that he had two prior convictions of carrying a concealed weapon. He further admitted on cross examination that he received a sentence less severe than he should have for his prior record level. Given this testimony of similar import, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow further repetitious and cumulative cross examination into these matters. Moreover, the court\u2019s rulings could not have affected the verdict in view of the overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt.\nDefendant next assigns as error the court\u2019s denial of his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. He makes no argument except to acknowledge \u201cthe heavy burden\u201d placed on him to show the evidence was not sufficient and to request this Court to review the evidence \u201cto determine if it is insufficient as a matter of law.\u201d Because of defendant\u2019s failure to make any supporting argument or citation of authority, this assignment of error is considered abandoned. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(5).\nDefendant next contends the court erred in computing his prior record level points by assessing points for an offense to which he pled no contest and for which prayer for judgment was continued. \u201cA person has a prior conviction when, on the date a criminal judgment is entered, the person being sentenced has been previously convicted of a crime ....\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.il (7) (1997). \u201cFor the purpose of imposing sentence, a person has been convicted when he has been adjudged guilty or has entered a plea of guilty or no contest.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331(b) (1997). We have interpreted N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331(b) to mean that formal entry of judgment is not required in order to have a conviction. State v. Fuller, 48 N.C. App. 418, 268 S.E.2d 879, disc. review denied, 301 N.C. 403, 273 S.E.2d 448 (1980). Consequently, we conclude that defendant was convicted of the prior offense when he entered the plea of no contest even though no final judgment had been entered. This assignment of error is overruled.\nFinally, defendant contends the court erred by finding as a factor in aggravation of the sentences that the offenses were committed against the victims because of their race, color, religion, nationality or country of origin. He argues that this finding pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.16(d)(17) (1997) applies only when the defendant has some animus against the victim due to the victim\u2019s race or nationality. We disagree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.16 (d) (17) reads as follows: \u201cThe offense for which the defendant stands convicted was committed against a victim because of the victim\u2019s race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin.\u201d There is no language in the statute to suggest a limiting requirement that the defendant harbor animosity toward a race or ethnic group. The statute merely provides that the offense be committed against a victim \u201cbecause of the victim\u2019s race, color, religion, nationality or country of origin.\u201d Accordingly, a finding of this factor may be made any time the defendant targets a person for victimization because of his race or national origin. Here, Eaton testified that he and defendant selected Prudente and Laredo, two Hispanic men, as their victims because they thought Hispanics carry large sums of cash and are less likely to report crimes committed against them. This assignment of error is therefore overruled.\nIn defendant\u2019s trial and sentence we find no error.\nNo error.\nJudges LEWIS and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "SMITH, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Charles J. Murray, for the State.", "Donald K. Tisdale, Sr., for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL L. HATCHER, Defendant-Appellant\nNo. COA99-782\n(Filed 1 February 2000)\n1. Witnesses\u2014 cross-examination \u2014 credibility\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a prosecution for armed robbery by not allowing defendant to cross-examine the victims regarding their immigration status and an accomplice regarding his history of firearm use and his plea agreement. The immigration status of the victims was at best of tenuous relevance to their credibility, and, given other testimony of similar import concerning the accomplice, the court did not abuse its discretion by refusing further repetitious and cumulative cross-examination.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 brief \u2014 supporting authority or citation of authority\nAn assignment of error concerning the sufficiency of the evidence in a robbery prosecution was considered abandoned where defendant did not make any supporting argument or citation of authority.\n3. Sentencing\u2014 structured \u2014 prior record level points \u2014 pjc\nThe trial court did not err in its assessment of prior record points when sentencing defendant for armed robbery by assessing prior record level points for an offense to which he pled no contest and for which prayer for judgment was continued. Defendant was convicted of the prior offense when he entered the plea of no contest even though no final judgment had been entered.\n4. Sentencing\u2014 aggravating factor\u2014 ethnic group of victim\nThe trial court did not err when sentencing defendant for armed robbery by finding in aggravation that the offenses were committed against the victims because of their race, color, religion, or country of origin where defendant\u2019s accomplice testified that they selected two Hispanic men as their victims because they thought that Hispanics carried large sums of cash and were less likely to report crimes committed against them. There is no language in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16 (d)(17) to suggest a limiting requirement that the defendant harbor animosity toward a race or ethnic group.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 26 January 1999 by Judge W.' Douglas Albright in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 January 2000.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Charles J. Murray, for the State.\nDonald K. Tisdale, Sr., for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0524-01", "first_page_order": 558, "last_page_order": 562 }