{ "id": 11242058, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TROY ALJIERNON BATTLE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Battle", "decision_date": "2000-03-07", "docket_number": "No. COA99-184", "first_page": "781", "last_page": "787", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "136 N.C. App. 781" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "159 S.E.2d 334", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574583 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 S.E.2d 688", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8611815 ], "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 757", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Coach Co. v. Burrell, 241 N.C. 432, 436, 85 S.E.2d 688, 692 (1955)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 795950 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Coach Co. v. Burrell, 241 N.C. 432, 436, 85 S.E.2d 688, 692 (1955)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 S.E.2d 473", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477", "parenthetical": "quoting Coach Co. v. Burrell, 241 N.C. 432, 436, 85 S.E.2d 688, 692 (1955)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11918298 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345", "parenthetical": "quoting Coach Co. v. Burrell, 241 N.C. 432, 436, 85 S.E.2d 688, 692 (1955)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 U.S. 545", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1524686 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" }, { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/380/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286", "parenthetical": "quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62, 66 (1965)" }, { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571662 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498", "parenthetical": "quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62, 66 (1965)" }, { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 S.E.2d 845", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2553185 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 825", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2540129, 2545026, 2541124, 2543314, 2539254 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0335-03", "/nc/328/0335-01", "/nc/328/0335-04", "/nc/328/0335-02", "/nc/328/0335-05" ] }, { "cite": "395 S.E.2d 434", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526572 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 564", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782964 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281", "parenthetical": "quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5313316 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417", "parenthetical": "quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 740", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "744" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549919 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 S.E.2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "844" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522147 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0477-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 589, "char_count": 11280, "ocr_confidence": 0.733, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.533566534861709e-08, "percentile": 0.3489701523138994 }, "sha256": "a7a2ca477aec72829184d6f9ecf49699e53e3f02536320207ff6fdd90f43c67c", "simhash": "1:190bc140734de41a", "word_count": 1912 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:33:36.366510+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges JOHN and McGEE concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TROY ALJIERNON BATTLE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Judge.\nTroy Aljiernon Battle (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from his conviction for trafficking in cocaine by transportation. We grant defendant a new trial on the basis that the trial court should have heard and ruled on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nThe State\u2019s evidence at trial indicated that on 29 August 1997, Rocky Mount Police Officers Anthony Styles and James Carlton were on patrol and observed a blue minivan whose left brake light was not functioning properly. Officers Styles and Carlton activated their blue light and pulled the vehicle over. After the vehicle stopped, Officer Styles approached the driver\u2019s side of the vehicle and Officer Carlton approached the passenger side. Officer Styles testified that he asked defendant, who was driving the vehicle, to produce his driver\u2019s license and vehicle registration. Defendant replied that he did not have a driver\u2019s license. At that point, Officer Styles asked defendant to exit the vehicle and defendant complied. Officer Styles proceeded to search defendant for weapons, and testified that he did so because he intended to place defendant under arrest for driving without a license. While being searched, defendant then fled from the scene and Officer Styles pursued him.\nAt that point, Officer Carlton testified that he ordered Percival Gallimore (\u201cGallimore\u201d), who was seated in the front passenger seat, out of the van and placed him in handcuffs. He then asked David Lewis (\u201cLewis\u201d), who was seated in the rear, to exit the vehicle. Officer Carlton testified that Lewis attempted to dash out of the van on the driver\u2019s side. Officer Carlton grabbed Lewis\u2019 right arm and Lewis pushed him away. Officer Carlton then jumped across the passenger seat of the van and grabbed Lewis. They scuffled onto the floor of the driver\u2019s side of the van and out onto the ground. While on the ground, Officer Carlton was able to get Lewis under control and then place him in handcuffs. Officer Carlton then conducted a search of the van, whereupon he found a package of cocaine on the driver\u2019s side just in front of the driver\u2019s seat.\nDefendant was subsequently apprehended and he, along with Gallimore and Lewis, was indicted on 13 July 1998 for trafficking in cocaine by possession and trafficking in cocaine by transportation. Defendant\u2019s case was tried at the 25 August 1998 criminal session of Edgecombe County Superior Court. Defendant made a motion for continuance on the day his trial began on the grounds that he had just found out that his co-defendants would not testify on his behalf, and he needed time to call additional witnesses listed on his witness list. The trial court denied his motion. Defendant was subsequently convicted of trafficking in cocaine by transportation and sentenced to a minimum of 70 months and a maximum of 84 months imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of $100,000.00.\nDefendant appeals on the basis that he was denied his right to due process afforded him by the United States Constitution by the trial court\u2019s refusal to hear his motion for suppression of evidence. We agree.\nIt is uncontroverted that a search warrant was not obtained prior to the search and seizure which produced the State\u2019s physical evidence in the present case. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures of \u201cpersons, houses, papers, and effects.\u201d U.S. Const. amend. TV. \u201cThe United States Supreme Court has stated that searches and seizures conducted outside the judicial process are per se unreasonable, subject to only a few specific, well delineated exceptions.\u201d State v. Sanders, 112 N.C. App. 477, 480, 435 S.E.2d 842, 844 (1993). Our Supreme Court has held that under the exclusionary rule, \u201c[w]hen evidence is obtained as the result of illegal police conduct, not only should that evidence be suppressed, but all evidence that is the \u2018fruit\u2019 of that unlawful conduct should be suppressed.\u201d State v. Pope, 333 N.C. 106, 113-14, 423 S.E.2d 740, 744 (1992).\nOur statutory rule regarding a motion to suppress before and during trial provides, in pertinent part:\n(a) In superior court, the defendant may move to suppress evidence only prior to trial unless the defendant did not have reasonable opportunity to make the motion before trial or unless a motion to suppress is allowed during trial under subsection (b) or (c).\n(b) A motion to suppress may be made for the first time during trial when the State has failed to notify the defendant\u2019s counsel or, if he has none, the defendant, sooner than 20 working days before trial, of its intention to use the evidence, and the evidence is:\n(2) Evidence obtained by virtue of a search without a search warrant^]\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-975 (1999). The record does not reveal any evidence that the State gave defendant notice it intended to offer into evidence at trial the cocaine which was obtained without a search warrant. Also, the record does not indicate whether or not defendant had a reasonable opportunity to make a motion to suppress prior to trial. Thus, the record supports the conclusion that defendant was entitled to make his motion to suppress during trial.\nThe trial transcript in the present case shows that the defendant attempted to be heard on his motion to suppress at numerous times, first during the State\u2019s questioning of Officer Styles:\nQ. Okay. And you stated that the defendant, Troy Battle, complied with cutting the engine off?\nA. Correct, he did.\nMr. Svkes: Objection.\nThe Court: Overruled.\nQ. Okay. What happened then?\nMr. Svkes: Your Honor, I object and would like to be heard. And I have a motion to make at this time.\nThe Court,: Objection overruled.\nA. At that particular time, I asked him to step outside the vehicle.\nMr. Svkes: Your Honor, I\u2019d like to object again at this time, and I\u2019d like to be heard. I have a motion\u2014\nThe Court: The objection is overruled and your request is denied.\nMr. Svkes: May I preserve it and have the opportunity to be heard?\nThe Court: You can have a seat and let the State examine this witness. I overruled your objection.\nQ. Okay. Did Officer Carlton show you anything when you got back to the scene?\nA. Yes, sir, he did.\nQ. Okay. What is it that he showed you?\nMr. Svkes: Objection and I move to suppress.\nThe Court: Overruled.\nMr. Svkes: I\u2019d like to be heard, your Honor.\nThe Court: Your motion is denied.\nDefendant next attempted to be heard on his motion to suppress during Officer Carlton\u2019s testimony for the State:\nQ. Okay. And did you find anything in the van?\nA. Yes, I did.\nMr. Svkes: Objection.\nThe Court: Overruled.\nMr. Svkes: I\u2019d like to make a motion to suppress, your Honor. I\u2019d like to be heard under 18-975\u2014\nThe Court,: Motion is denied.\nDefendant next attempted to be heard during testimony of SBI Agent Jim Daniel:\nThe State: That would be the State\u2019s evidence.\nThe Court: Are you going to introduce your exhibits?\nThe State: Yes, sir.\nMr. Svkes: I object, your Honor.\nThe Court: Objection is overruled. If he wants to offer it, the court will receive it.\nMr. Svkes: I\u2019d like to move to suppress it and I\u2019d like to be heard.\nThe Court: The motion is denied.\nThus, it is evident that although defendant attempted several times to make his motion to suppress, the trial court denied it without giving defendant the opportunity to even fully state his grounds or the basis for the motion.\nThe requirement of \u201c \u2018procedural due process applies only to the deprivation of interests encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s protection of liberty and property....\u2019 \u201d Howell v. Town of Carolina Beach, 106 N.C. App. 410, 417, 417 S.E.2d 277, 281 (1992) (quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972)). \u201cDue process of law requires that no one shall be condemned in his person or property without notice and an opportunity to be heard in his defense.\u201d State v. Moore, 100 N.C. App. 217, 223, 395 S.E.2d 434, 437 (1990), disc. review denied as to additional issues, 328 N.C. 335, 402 S.E.2d 825, rev\u2019d on other grounds, 329 N.C. 245, 404 S.E.2d 845 (1991). The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard \u201c \u2018at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.\u2019 \u201d State v. Thompson, 349 N.C. 483, 498, 508 S.E.2d 277, 286 (1998) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62, 66 (1965)). \u201c \u2018It is elementary and fundamental that every person is entitled to his day in court to assert his own rights or to defend against their infringement.\u2019 \u201d Goodwin v. Walls, 118 N.C. App. 341, 345, 455 S.E.2d 473, 477, review allowed, 342 N.C. 419, 461 S.E.2d 757 (1995) (quoting Coach Co. v. Burrell, 241 N.C. 432, 436, 85 S.E.2d 688, 692 (1955)). \u201cIt is basic to due process that a defendant in a criminal action be allowed to offer testimony.\u201d State v. Pike, 273 N.C. 102, 107, 159 S.E.2d 334, 338 (1968). The trial court must give defendant an opportunity to offer evidence and present his version of the search and seizure or to contradict, amplify, or explain the testimony offered by the State on voir dire. Id.\nBased on the foregoing, we hold that due process requires that defendant should have been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on his motion to suppress \u201c \u2018at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.\u2019 \u201d State v. Thompson, 349 N.C. at 498, 508 S.E.2d at 286. The trial court here barely allowed defendant to state his motion and denied defendant any opportunity to state his grounds or present evidence in support of his motion. Defendant was not only denied his constitutional rights, but also his statutory right to make a motion to suppress under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-975. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial. Due to our holding, we need not reach defendant\u2019s additional assignments of error.\nNew trial.\nJudges JOHN and McGEE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Thomas D. Zweigart, for the State.", "Etheridge, Sykes & Britt, L.L.P., by Raymond M. Sykes, Jr., for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TROY ALJIERNON BATTLE\nNo. COA99-184\n(Filed 7 March 2000)\nConstitutional Law\u2014 procedural due process \u2014 motion to suppress \u2014 opportunity to be heard\nThe trial court\u2019s failure to allow defendant to be heard on a motion to suppress cocaine seized without a warrant violated defendant\u2019s right to due process and his right under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-975 to make a motion to suppress evidence, and defendant is entitled to a new trial on a charge of trafficking in cocaine by transportation where: (1) the record does not reveal that the State gave defendant notice it intended to offer the cocaine into evidence at trial; (2) the record does not indicate whether defendant had a reasonable opportunity to make a motion to suppress prior to trial, and this supports the conclusion that defendant was entitled to make his motion to suppress during trial; and (3) defendant attempted to be heard on his motion to suppress numerous times during trial, but the trial court denied defendant the opportunity to state his grounds or present evidence in support of his motion.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 28 August 1998 by Judge Frank R. Brown in Edgecombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 January 2000.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Thomas D. Zweigart, for the State.\nEtheridge, Sykes & Britt, L.L.P., by Raymond M. Sykes, Jr., for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0781-01", "first_page_order": 815, "last_page_order": 821 }