{ "id": 11242147, "name": "RAYMOND B. RUSSELL, Plaintiff v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Russell v. State Farm Insurance", "decision_date": "2000-03-07", "docket_number": "No. COA99-627", "first_page": "798", "last_page": "802", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "136 N.C. App. 798" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 461", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 709", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2489154, 2490532, 2489640, 2489906, 2487766 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0709-04", "/nc/325/0709-01", "/nc/325/0709-02", "/nc/325/0709-03", "/nc/325/0709-05" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 896", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "899" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519682 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 S.E.2d 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567731 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" }, { "page": "253-54" }, { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12129791 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" }, { "page": "379" }, { "page": "380" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 S.E.2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 N.C. App. 761", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527035 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "762" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/69/0761-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 836", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132224, 132168, 132164, 132319 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0836-03", "/nc/350/0836-02", "/nc/350/0836-04", "/nc/350/0836-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 S.E.2d 598", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11239820 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803", "parenthetical": "order denying motion for summary judgment interlocutory" }, { "page": "803" }, { "page": "803" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521434 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247", "parenthetical": "order denying motion for summary judgment interlocutory" }, { "page": "246-47" }, { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293", "parenthetical": "order compelling arbitration interlocutory" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 N.C. App. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527055 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285", "parenthetical": "order compelling arbitration interlocutory" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/68/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714861, 4717589, 4718136, 4718201, 4717178 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0183-03", "/nc/315/0183-05", "/nc/315/0183-02", "/nc/315/0183-04", "/nc/315/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 N.C. App. 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526659 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/75/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 440", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11889085 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 56", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59" }, { "page": "60" }, { "page": "60", "parenthetical": "denial of motion for summary judgment not appealable unless substantial right prejudiced" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11198692 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" }, { "page": "247" }, { "page": "246" }, { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0242-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 524, "char_count": 9262, "ocr_confidence": 0.734, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.75162560832936e-07, "percentile": 0.7086241321405224 }, "sha256": "15e519f016c6e3be2da638571a243f6ddd57209864a06c8953cd59442f26213b", "simhash": "1:17a4447f8e9f0d2c", "word_count": 1470 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:33:36.366510+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and HUNTER concur." ], "parties": [ "RAYMOND B. RUSSELL, Plaintiff v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nDefendant State Farm Insurance Company purports to appeal the trial court\u2019s order compelling arbitration and denying defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment. Defendant\u2019s appeal is interlocutory and must be dismissed.\nIn view of our disposition, lengthy exposition of the underlying facts is unnecessary. We note plaintiff Raymond B. Russell was injured in a motor vehicle accident (the accident) 6 September 1995 while operating a motorcycle insured by defendant under a policy containing uninsured motorist coverage (the policy). Plaintiff maintains the accident was caused by a second, unidentified vehicle which fled the scene, while defendant contends plaintiff \u201cslid in loose gravel . . . and was involved in a single vehicle accident.\u201d\nPlaintiff subsequently notified defendant of the accident and his resultant personal injury, requesting compensation under Part C of the policy, \u201cUninsured Motorists Coverage,\u201d which dealt with collisions caused, inter alia, by \u201ca hit and run vehicle.\u201d The policy provided that\n[a] person seeking Uninsured Motorists Coverage must. . . :\n1. Promptly notify police if a hit and run driver is involved.\nPlaintiff concedes he\ndid not report this accident to a police officer because following the accident he was taken immediately from the scene to the hospital where he spent some time due to. the injuries sustained.\nDefendant denied coverage 14 March 1997.\nPlaintiff thereafter requested arbitration pursuant to the following provision of the policy:\nIf we and an insured do not agree:\n1. Whether that person is legally entitled to recover compensatory damages from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle; or\n2. As to the amount of such damages;\nthe insured may demand to settle the dispute by arbitration.\nHowever, defendant rejected plaintiff\u2019s request for arbitration, and plaintiff filed the instant declaratory judgment action 16 February 1998, praying that the trial court \u201cremov[e] this action to binding arbitration.\u201d In its answer, defendant asserted that\nplaintiff must commence a civil action against [defendant] to determine whether there is uninsured motorist coverage before it can resort to the arbitration provision,\nand that plaintiffs failure to notify police of the accident violated provisions of the policy which constituted \u201ca condition precedent to making an uninsured motorists claim\u201d against defendant.\nDefendant moved for summary judgment 6 January 1999. The trial court rendered its decision 4 March 1999, ordering\nthat all issues raised herein shall be referred to arbitration . . . with the parties having the right to have a judgment upon any arbitration award entered in any court having jurisdiction. . . .\n.. . [P]laintiff\u2019s failure to report his accident to a law enforcement officer does not and will not bar his uninsured motorist claim against defendant and, therefore, defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment is denied as a matter of law.\nThese decisions constitute a final judgment as to the issues of arbitrability and the continued viability of plaintiffs uninsured motorist claim and there is no just cause or reason for delaying any appeal herefrom under Rule 54 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.\nDefendant timely appealed.\nAlthough not raised by the parties, we are obliged first to consider sua sporite whether defendant\u2019s appeal is properly before this Court. See First Atl. Mgmt. Corp. v. Dunlea Realty Co., 131 N.C. App. 242, 246, 507 S.E.2d 56, 59 (1998). An order of the trial court\nis interlocutory if it is made during the pendency of an action and does not dispose of the case but requires further action ... in order to finally determine the entire controversy. There is generally no right to appeal an interlocutory order.\nHowerton v. Grace Hospital, Inc., 124 N.C. App. 199, 201, 476 S.E.2d 440, 442 (1996) (citation omitted). The rule prohibiting interlocutory appeals\nprevents] fragmentary, premature and unnecessary appeals by permitting the trial court to bring the case to final judgment before it is presented to the appellate courts.\nFraser v. Di Santi, 75 N.C. App. 654, 655, 331 S.E.2d 217, 218, disc. review denied, 315 N.C. 183, 337 S.E.2d 856 (1985).\nAn order compelling arbitration and denying a motion for summary judgment, such as that entered in the instant case, is interlocutory and therefore not immediately appealable. See The Bluffs v. Wysocki, 68 N.C. App. 284, 285, 314 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1984) (order compelling arbitration interlocutory); Cagle v. Teachy, 111 N.C. App. 244, 247, 431 S.E.2d 801, 803 (1993) (order denying motion for summary judgment interlocutory).\nNotwithstanding, interlocutory orders may be appealed in two instances:\nFirst, a party may appeal where the trial court enters a final judgment with respect to one or more, but less than all of the parties or claims, and the court certifies the judgment as immediately appealable under Rule 54(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure [N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(b) (1999)].\nRomig v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 132 N.C. App. 682, 685, 513 S.E.2d 598, 600, disc. review denied, cert. denied, 350 N.C. 836,-S.E.2d-(1999). A party may also appeal an interlocutory order \u201cif it affects a substantial right and will work injury to the appellants if not corrected before final judgment.\u201d Perry v. Cullipher, 69 N.C. App. 761, 762, 318 S.E.2d 354, 356 (1984). Significantly, in either instance,\nit is the appellant\u2019s burden to present appropriate grounds for this Court\u2019s acceptance of an interlocutory appeal....\nJeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 379, 444 S.E.2d 252, 253 (1994).\nThe trial court in the instant case attempted to certify defendant\u2019s appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b).\nRule 54(b) certification by the trial court is reviewable by this Court on appeal in the first instance because the trial court\u2019s denomination of its decree \u201ca final... judgment does not make it so\u201d if it is not such a judgment.\nFirst Atl., 131 N.C. App. at 247, 507 S.E.2d at 60 (citing Industries, Inc. v. Insurance Co., 296 N.C. 486, 491, 251 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1979)).\nNotwithstanding the trial court\u2019s characterization, its order compelling arbitration and denying defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment cannot be classified a final judgment.\nA final judgment is one which disposes of the cause as to all the parties, leaving nothing to be determined between them ....\nCagle, 111 N.C. App. at 246-47, 431 S.E.2d at 803. An order compelling arbitration is not a final judgment, as by its terms it \u201cfails to resolve all issues between all parties,\u201d First Atl., 131 N.C. App. at 246, 507 S.E.2d at 60, but rather refers such issues to arbitration to be resolved. Similarly,\ndenial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment . . . even if the trial court has attempted to certify it for appeal under Rule 54(b).\nCagle, 111 N.C. App. at 247, 431 S.E.2d at 803. Accordingly, the trial court\u2019s order compelling arbitration and denying defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment \u201cdid not constitute a \u2018final\u2019 judgment and is . . . not appealable pursuant to Rule 54(b).\u201d Id.\nAs the first avenue of appeal of an interlocutory order was foreclosed, defendant likewise\ndid not . . . have a right to appeal the order in this case unless the order affected a substantial right that would work injury to [defendant] if not corrected before appeal from final judgment.\nJeffreys, 115 N.C. App. at 379, 444 S.E.2d at 253-54; see also First Atl., 131 N.C. App. at 247, 507 S.E.2d at 60 (denial of motion for summary judgment not appealable unless substantial right prejudiced); N.C. Electric Membership Corp. v. Duke Power Co., 95 N.C. App. 123, 127, 381 S.E.2d 896, 899 (order compelling arbitration not appealable unless substantial right affected), disc. review denied, 325 N.C. 709, 388 S.E.2d 461 (1989).\nDefendant herein has\npresented neither argument nor citation to show this Court that [it] had the right to appeal the [trial court\u2019s] order .... It is not the duty of this Court to construct arguments for or find support for appellant\u2019s right to appeal from an interlocutory order; instead, the appellant has the burden of showing this Court that the order deprives the appellant of a substantial right. . . .\nJeffreys, 115 N.C. App. at 380, 444 S.E.2d at 254.\nBased on the precedent cited above, therefore, defendant\u2019s appeal must be dismissed.\nAppeal dismissed.\nJudges McGEE and HUNTER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Chandler, deBrun, Fink & Hayes, by Andrew Fink, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Kennedy, Covington, Lobdell & Hickman, L.L.P., by Wayne P. Huckel and Christopher L. Ekman, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RAYMOND B. RUSSELL, Plaintiff v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant\nNo. COA99-627\n(Filed 7 March 2000)\nAppeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 interlocutory order \u2014 certification erroneous\nThe trial court\u2019s attempt to grant Rule 54(b) certification based on its order compelling arbitration and denying defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment fails because the order is not a final judgment, and defendant has not shown the order deprives it of a substantial right.\nAppeal by defendant from order and judgment filed 4 March 1999 by Judge Oliver Noble in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 January 2000.\nChandler, deBrun, Fink & Hayes, by Andrew Fink, for plaintiff-appellee.\nKennedy, Covington, Lobdell & Hickman, L.L.P., by Wayne P. Huckel and Christopher L. Ekman, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0798-01", "first_page_order": 832, "last_page_order": 836 }