{ "id": 11092059, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF JONATHAN THOMAS WRIGHT, Juvenile", "name_abbreviation": "In re Wright", "decision_date": "2000-03-21", "docket_number": "No. COA99-77", "first_page": "104", "last_page": "112", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "137 N.C. App. 104" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "296 S.E.2d 294", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560821 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 S.E.2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621023 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 122", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2527406 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 424", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 781", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2537090, 2535435, 2534187, 2537979, 2538428 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0781-03", "/nc/336/0781-02", "/nc/336/0781-05", "/nc/336/0781-01", "/nc/336/0781-04" ] }, { "cite": "441 S.E.2d 139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" }, { "page": "142" }, { "parenthetical": "\"[assignments of error ... in support of which no . . . authority [is] cited, will be taken as abandoned\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C.App. 734", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524447 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740" }, { "page": "740" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0734-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 S.E.2d 319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" }, { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11201845 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" }, { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "477 S.E.2d 182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11889278 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 L. Ed. 2d 783", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "525 U.S. 1111", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11215905, 11215426, 11216068, 11215368, 11216203, 11215982, 11216145, 11215729, 11215604, 11215829, 11215542, 11215222, 11215285, 11215485 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/525/1111-10", "/us/525/1111-04", "/us/525/1111-12", "/us/525/1111-03", "/us/525/1111-14", "/us/525/1111-11", "/us/525/1111-13", "/us/525/1111-08", "/us/525/1111-07", "/us/525/1111-09", "/us/525/1111-06", "/us/525/1111-01", "/us/525/1111-02", "/us/525/1111-05" ] }, { "cite": "502 S.E.2d 819", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "827" }, { "page": "827" }, { "page": "826", "parenthetical": "juvenile court deciding transfer \"does so with full knowledge of the dis-positional alternatives in the juvenile and adult systems. . . . [The court's] decision is also guided by the needs and limitations of the juvenile, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the juvenile's family.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659735 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601" }, { "page": "602" }, { "page": "600" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 S.E.2d 483", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" }, { "page": "484" }, { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 N.C. App. 614", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551017 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616" }, { "page": "616" }, { "page": "616" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/34/0614-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 763, "char_count": 16134, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0024925346323822e-07, "percentile": 0.5392739113361436 }, "sha256": "4f90da4aa7f5bc2e66e13968b92e67cd307b71a48c547bd0871314232c09d605", "simhash": "1:4b25d107862fdb3c", "word_count": 2680 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:42:18.277293+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges LEWIS and McGEE concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF JONATHAN THOMAS WRIGHT, Juvenile" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nJonathan T. Wright (Wright), juvenile, appeals the trial court\u2019s \u201cOrder Transferring Juvenile Case to Superior Court.\u201d We affirm.\nPertinent facts and procedural history include the following: A Juvenile Petition was filed 6 May 1998 in Wayne County District Court alleging that\nbetween the dates of March 1, 1998 and April 12, 1998 [Wright] unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did engage in a Sex Offense with [M.], a [male] child under the age of 13 years, in violation of [N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.4 (1999)].\nAt the time alleged, Wright was thirteen years old and M. was eight. Wright was taken into secure custody 12 May 1998, and a probable cause hearing was conducted 4 August 1998.\nAt the hearing, M. testified he \u201csuck[ed] on\u201d Wright\u2019s penis for \u201c[a]bout a minute\u201d because Wright \u201csaid he was going to beat me up.\u201d M. stated he believed this had happened four times previously, but \u201c[t]he only time I remember was the last time,\u201d immediately prior to Easter 1998. H. and J., two juvenile males who resided in the neighborhood and who knew both Wright and M., indicated they had witnessed the Easter incident and corroborated M.\u2019s testimony. In addition, J. testified Wright had stated he was also \u201cgoing [to] try to get [J.\u2019s] sister to do it.\u201d M.\u2019s mother and a Wayne County Sheriff\u2019s Department detective were additional witnesses for the State. Wright presented no evidence.\nThe trial court found probable cause on the charge of first degree sex offense and, upon motion by the State, conducted a second hearing on the issue of whether to transfer Wright\u2019s case to superior court for trial pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7A-608 and 7A-610 (1995) (repealed 1 July 1999). The statutes provided in pertinent part:\nThe court after notice, hearing, and a finding of probable cause may transfer jurisdiction over a juvenile to superior court if the juvenile was 13 years of age or older at the time the juvenile allegedly committed an offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult.\nG.S. \u00a7 7A-608.\nIf probable cause is found..., the prosecutor or the juvenile may move that the case be transferred to the superior court for trial as in the case of adults. The judge may proceed to determine whether the needs of the juvenile or the best interest of the State will be served by transfer of the case to superior court for trial as in the case of adults.\nG.S. \u00a7 7A-610(a).\nAt this latter phase of the proceedings, several witnesses testified on Wright\u2019s behalf. These included members of his church, a neighbor, his school guidance counselor, an employee of the detention center, and Dr. Kurt Luedtke (Dr. Luedtke), a court-appointed expert witness in forensic psychology.\nAccording to Dr. Luedtke, he performed an \u201cindependent forensic examination\u201d of Wright on 21 May 1998. Dr. Luedtke concluded \u201cthere [wa]s evidence of psychiatric disturbance and evidence that a prodomal psychotic state could be developing,\u201d but he did not believe Wright fit the North Carolina Department of Correction profile indicative of a \u201cchild rapist or non-violent sexual molester\u201d or of one who commits \u201caggravated sex crimes [or] sex perversion [crimes].\u201d\nDr. Luedtke\u2019s written report noted that Wright, prior to being placed in custody, was\nalong with other individuals that he had recruited,... planning to take over his school.... He had a weapon under his bed that his parents had discovered, namely a shotgun, and he had developed an elaborate plan for not only taking over the school by force, but also to possibly bomb it.\n... In his elaborate plan for wanting to \u201ctake over the school,\u201d he indicates that he did not necessarily want to hurt anybody, but just to scare them all. He also indicates that he did not care if he did kill anyone if they did not \u201cgo along\u201d and indicated that he would begin to kill hostages if the police did not go along with his plan.\nDr. Luedtke testified he viewed Wright\u2019s plan as \u201cmore fantasy than reality\u201d and as a \u201cdelusion.\u201d In Dr. Luedtke\u2019s opinion, Wright would not pose a risk to the community if accorded proper treatment, and Dr. Luedtke recommended Wright be \u201cplaced in a residential treatment environment\u201d rather than incarcerated.\nAt the close of the hearing, the trial court ordered transfer of the first degree sex offense charge to superior court for trial, finding that:\nthe needs of the juvenile or the best interest of the State, or both, will be served by transfer of the case to superior court. The reasons for transfer are: . . .\n1. the seriousness of the offense, and the fact the [j]uvenile used intimidation and force.\n2. under current juvenile law, a juvenile court would have no jurisdiction past 4 years. If the juvenile is found guilty in an adult court, that court can order treatment and have jurisdiction over him for many more years.\n3. the juvenile\u2019s history indicates prior violent aggressive tendencies. He had a plan for wanting to take over a school and indicated to Dr. Luedtke that he would kill anyone that did not go along with him.\n4. the public needs to be protected from this type of crime and the sex offenders that commit them.\n5. the State presented 3 eye-witnesses to the crime (the victim and 2 more).\nWright timely appealed.\nAmong numerous assignments of error directed at the transfer order, Wright first contends the trial court\u2019s third and fourth \u201creasons for transfer\u201d were not supported by the evidence adduced at the hearing.\n\u201cAny order of transfer [must] specify the reasons for transfer.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 7A-610(c). However,\n[t]he judge is not required to make findings of fact to support his conclusion that the needs of the juvenile or that the best interest of the State would be served by transferring the case to the [s]uperior [c]ourt division. It is only required that if he elects to order the transfer, he must state his reasons therefor.\nIn re Bunn, 34 N.C. App. 614, 616, 239 S.E.2d 483, 484 (1977). So long as the trial court has complied with G.S. \u00a7 7A-610(c), \u201cthe decision to transfer a juvenile\u2019s case to superior court lies solely within the sound discretion of the hearing judge,\u201d State v. Green, 348 N.C. 588, 601, 502 S.E.2d 819, 827 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1111, 142 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1999), and \u201cthat discretion is not subject to review in the absence of a showing of gross abuse,\u201d. Bunn, 34 N.C. App. at 616, 239 S.E.2d at 484.\nAs noted above, the trial court sub judice set forth its \u201creasons for transfer\u201d in ordering transfer to the superior court. Further, the court\u2019s reasons \u201care supported by evidence on the record from the transfer hearings accordingly, there is] sufficient support for the juvenile court judge\u2019s discretionary transfer decision ....\u201d Green, 348 N.C. at 602, 502 S.E.2d at 827. In short, Wright\u2019s first assignment of error is unfounded.\nWright next asserts the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider \u201cthe age or the maturity of the juvenile\u201d or his \u201ccondition and needs for treatment.\u201d In advancing this argument, Wright cites the following provision of the new juvenile code:\nIn the transfer hearing, the court shall determine whether the protection of the public and the needs of the juvenile will be served by the transfer of the case to superior court and shall consider the following factors:\n(1) The age of the juvenile;\n(2) The maturity of the juvenile;\n(3) The intellectual functioning of the juvenile; [and]\n(6) Facilities or programs available to the court. . . and the likelihood that the juvenile would benefit from treatment or rehabilitative efforts ....\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2203(b) (1999).\nHowever, the foregoing code section is applicable only to hearings related to acts committed on or after 1 July 1999, see 1998 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 202, \u00a7 37, and thus is not implicated herein. Moreover, Wright \u201ccites no statute or case which require[d, at the time of his hearing,] a district court judge to consider\u201d a juvenile\u2019s age, maturity, condition, or needs for treatment \u201cbefore making a transfer decision.\u201d State v. Green, 124 N.C. App. 269, 276, 477 S.E.2d 182, 185 (1996), aff\u2019d, 348 N.C. 588, 502 S.E.2d 819 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1111, 142 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1999); see also N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(5) (\u201c[assignments of error ... in support of which no . . . authority [is] cited, will be taken as abandoned\u201d).\nIn any event, assuming arguendo consideration of such factors was required, the record reflects that evidence on each was presented to the trial court. See Green, 348 N.C. at 600, 502 S.E.2d at 826 (juvenile court deciding transfer \u201cdoes so with full knowledge of the dis-positional alternatives in the juvenile and adult systems. . . . [The court\u2019s] decision is also guided by the needs and limitations of the juvenile, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the juvenile\u2019s family.\u201d)\nFor example, Wright acknowledges the trial court without doubt was aware of Wright\u2019s age. Further, all Wright\u2019s witnesses during the transfer hearing addressed his level of maturity, and Dr. Luedtke testified as to Wright\u2019s \u201ccondition and needs for treatment.\u201d The court also specifically commented that if Wright were \u201cfound guilty in an adult court, that court can order treatment,\u201d indicating the court\u2019s consideration of any need for treatment.\nTo conclude, we reiterate that transfer of a juvenile case to superior court is solely within the discretion of the trial court, Bunn, 34 N.C. App. at 616, 239 S.E.2d at 484, so long as the court has complied with G.S. \u00a7 7A-610(c). Such ruling \u201cwill not be reversed unless the decision was arbitrary,\u201d Albrecht v. Dorsett, 131 N.C. App. 502, 508, 508 S.E.2d 319, 323 (1998), or \u201clacked any basis in reason.\u201d Judkins v. Judkins, 113 N.C.App. 734, 740, 441 S.E.2d 139, 142, disc. review denied, 336 N.C. 781, 447 S.E.2d 424 (1994). We cannot say the trial court\u2019s transfer decision in the instant case was either arbitrary, Albrecht, 131 N.C. App. at 508, 508 S.E.2d at 323, or without any basis in reason, Judkins, 113 N.C.App. at 740, 441 S.E.2d at 142, and we therefore reject Wright\u2019s second assignment of error.\nNext, Wright insists the transfer statutes\nshould be construed to prohibit transfer of this juvenile to [superior [c]ourt, because his real age for the purposes of the statute is below the statutory threshold\nof thirteen, see G.S. \u00a7 7A-608. Wright does not claim a chronological age of less than thirteen at the time of the alleged offense, but rather maintains the evidence presented at the hearing\nshowed without contradiction that [he] was developmentally, socially, psychologically, and emotionally a child far younger than thirteen ....\nHowever, Wright cites no \u201cauthorities upon which the appellant relies,\u201d N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(5), for the novel proposition that the transfer statute should be interpreted to require determination of a juvenile\u2019s developmental, as opposed to chronological, age. Wright\u2019s final assignment of error is therefore deemed abandoned. Id. (\u201c[assignments of error ... in support of which no . . . authority [is] cited, will be taken as abandoned\u201d).\nNotwithstanding, we note that it is well established that\n[i]n interpreting a statute, it is presumed the General Assembly intended the words it used to have the meaning they have in ordinary speech. When the plain meaning of a statute is unambiguous, a court should go no further in interpreting the statute.\nNelson v. Battle Forest Friends Meeting, 335 N.C. 133, 136, 436 S.E.2d 122, 124 (1993) (citation omitted).\nTherefore, it must be presumed that, in allowing transfer to superior court of cases of juveniles who are \u201c13 years of age or older,\u201d G.S. \u00a7 7A-608, the General Assembly intended the \u201cordinary\u201d meaning of the words employed, i.e., that the cases of juveniles who have achieved the chronological age of thirteen years are subject to transfer. The statute contains no ambiguity nor any indication the General Assembly intended \u201c13 years of age or older\u201d to be construed as developmental or emotional age rather than chronological. Accordingly, we \u201cgo no further in interpreting the statute.\u201d Nelson, 335 N.C. at 136, 436 S.E.2d at 124.\nFinally, Wright argues that, if convicted of first degree sex offense in superior court, even the minimum punishment to which he might be subjected, see G.S. \u00a7 14-27.4(b) and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.17 (1999), would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. We do not address this assertion in that\n[t]he courts have no jurisdiction to determine matters purely speculative, enter anticipatory judgments, . . . deal with theoretical problems, give advisory opinions, . . . provide for contingencies which may hereafter arise, or give abstract opinions.\nLittle v. Trust Co., 252 N.C. 229, 243, 113 S.E.2d 689, 700 (1960).\nWright has been neither tried nor convicted of any crime, much less sentenced. The issue of punishment thus is not \u201cripe for review because it will arise, if at all, only if [Wright] receives [an adverse] verdict\u201d at trial and is then sentenced for the crime of first degree sex offense. Simmons v. C.W. Myers Trading Post, 307 N.C. 122, 123, 296 S.E.2d 294, 295 (1982).\nAffirmed.\nJudges LEWIS and McGEE concur.\n. These provisions were repealed effective 1 July 1999, see 1998 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 202, \u00a7\u00a7 5, 37, and replaced with a new juvenile code, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-100 et seq. (1999).", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Elizabeth L. Oxley, for the State.", "Barnes, Braswell & Haithcock, P.A., by Glenn A. Barfield, for juvenile-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF JONATHAN THOMAS WRIGHT, Juvenile\nNo. COA99-77\n(Filed 21 March 2000)\n1. Juveniles\u2014 transfer of case \u2014 reasons for transfer\nThe juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in transferring the defendant-juvenile\u2019s first-degree sexual offense case to superior court under N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7A-608 and 7A-610(a) (both statutes now replaced by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-100 et seq.), based on the findings that the juvenile\u2019s history indicates prior aggressive tendencies and the public needs to be protected from this type of crime and the sex offenders that commit them, because: (1) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-610(c) does not require the trial court to make findings of fact, but only to set forth its reasons for transfer; and (2) the trial court\u2019s reasons are supported by the evidence.\n2. Juveniles\u2014 transfer of case \u2014 factors considered \u2014 new statute inapplicable\nThe juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in transferring the defendant-juvenile\u2019s first-degree sexual offense case to superior court under N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7A-608 and 7A-610(a) (both statutes now replaced by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-100 et seq.), based on failing to consider \u201cthe age or the maturity of the juvenile\u201d or his \u201ccondition and needs for treatment\u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2203(b), because: (1) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2203(b) is not applicable to this case since it applies to hearings related to acts committed on or after 1 July 1999; (2) defendant cites no statute or case which required the judge to consider these factors at the time of his hearing; and (3) even if consideration of these factors was required, the record reflects that evidence on each factor was presented to the trial court.\n3. Juveniles\u2014 transfer of case \u2014 chronological age\nThe ordinary meaning of the words in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-608 reveals that the legislature intended for juveniles who have achieved the chronological age of thirteen years to be subject to the transfer of their case to superior court, and the determination is not based on the juvenile\u2019s developmental age.\n4. Constitutional Law\u2014 cruel and unusual punishment \u2014 possible conviction \u2014 purely speculative\nAlthough the juvenile court transferred defendant-juvenile\u2019s case to superior court and defendant argues that his possible conviction of first-degree sexual offense in superior court would constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the courts have no jurisdiction to determine purely speculative matters since the issue of punishment will arise, if at all, only if defendant receives an adverse verdict at trial and is then sentenced for the crime.\nAppeal by juvenile from order filed 4 August 1998 by Judge Rodney R. Goodman in Wayne County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 October 1999.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Elizabeth L. Oxley, for the State.\nBarnes, Braswell & Haithcock, P.A., by Glenn A. Barfield, for juvenile-appellant." }, "file_name": "0104-01", "first_page_order": 136, "last_page_order": 144 }