{ "id": 11092582, "name": "DEBORAH HUSSEY, Plaintiff v. JERRY W. SEAWELL, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Hussey v. Seawell", "decision_date": "2000-03-21", "docket_number": "No. COA99-487", "first_page": "172", "last_page": "176", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "137 N.C. App. 172" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "279 S.E.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563", "parenthetical": "directed verdict on contributory negligence proper only where plaintiff's negligence is established \"so clearly that no other reasonable inference or conclusion may be drawn\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574016 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468-69", "parenthetical": "directed verdict on contributory negligence proper only where plaintiff's negligence is established \"so clearly that no other reasonable inference or conclusion may be drawn\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 599", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571152 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369-70", "parenthetical": "same standard to be applied to both motions" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11888708 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131", "parenthetical": "same standard to be applied to both motions" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 S.E.2d 110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111", "parenthetical": "directed verdict not proper if there exists substantial evidence in support of claim" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.C. App. 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522160 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220", "parenthetical": "directed verdict not proper if there exists substantial evidence in support of claim" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155749, 1155941, 1155819, 1155794, 1155923 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0107-05", "/nc/351/0107-04", "/nc/351/0107-01", "/nc/351/0107-02", "/nc/351/0107-03" ] }, { "cite": "516 S.E.2d 643", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "646" }, { "page": "646" }, { "page": "646" }, { "page": "646" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11143479 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" }, { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "893" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571622 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0615-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 438, "char_count": 8400, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.431562169449949e-08, "percentile": 0.39734478728296513 }, "sha256": "af04877f0989b22f2ffebdf28b865afb3b629feebd848c4e8cd357e2b900d76d", "simhash": "1:a93b582b3e3c04f6", "word_count": 1393 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:42:18.277293+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges LEWIS and EDMUNDS concur." ], "parties": [ "DEBORAH HUSSEY, Plaintiff v. JERRY W. SEAWELL, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nJerry Wade Seawell (Defendant) appeals from the denial of his motion for a directed verdict at the close of all of the evidence, a judgment filed 17 September 1998 in favor of Deborah Faye Hussey (Plaintiff), and an order filed 8 October 1998 denying Defendant\u2019s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and alternatively Defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial.\nOn 12 December 1996, at Defendant\u2019s request, Plaintiff was moving two of Defendant\u2019s horses from one pasture to another. One of these horses was a \u201cspirited horse\u201d and had on previous occasions attempted to kick people. To make the transfer, Plaintiff and the horses had to pass through an iron tubing gate located on Defendant\u2019s property, and the gate was installed on posts with hinges. When the gate was first installed, the gate would remain open after it was swung open. Sometime after its installation, Defendant modified the hinges so the gate would not remain open after opening and instead would swing closed a short time after being opened.\nDefendant did not inform Plaintiff about the condition of the gate and did not inform her about the prior kicking incidents with one of the horses. Plaintiff approached the horses in the pasture, placed halters on them, and began leading them to the other pasture. As she approached the gate, she opened it, swung it back, and began leading the horses through the gate. Before the second horse cleared the passageway, the gate swung closed hitting this horse in the hindquarters. The horse \u201creared straight up in the air,\u201d taking Plaintiff into the air and trapping her between the two horses. She was kicked in the face by one of the horses, receiving injuries requiring several surgeries and leaving her with some partial paralysis.\nDefendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict was denied. The case was submitted to the jury on negligence and contributory negligence. The jury was instructed Plaintiff was an invitee on Defendant\u2019s land and Defendant had a duty to \u201ckeep the premises in a reasonably safe condition,\u201d and to warn Plaintiff \u201cof any hidden or concealed dangerous condition about which [Defendant] knows or, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have known.\u201d The instruction further provided that Defendant was not \u201crequired to warn of obvious dangers or conditions.\u201d\nThe jury found Defendant was negligent and Plaintiff was not contributorily negligent, and it entered a damage award of $60,000. Defendant\u2019s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and alternatively, for a new trial was denied.\nThe dispositive issue is whether there exists substantial evidence Defendant, a landowner, breached his standard of care to Plaintiff, a lawful visitor on his property.\nDefendant first submits this case must be judged by the law as it existed prior to Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615, 507 S.E.2d 882 (1998), because this case was tried prior to the decision in Nelson and consistent with the law as it existed prior to Nelson. We disagree. The teachings of Nelson are to be applied retrospectively, as well as prospectively, Nelson, 349 N.C. at 633, 507 S.E.2d at 893, and we must, therefore, review the issues raised in this appeal in that context.\nDefendant argues he had no duty to warn Plaintiff of the \u201cfree-swinging\u201d nature of the farm gate, because it did not present a \u201chazardous or dangerous condition.\u201d In any event, he contends, the condition of the gate was obvious to Plaintiff and, therefore, no warning was required.\nUnder Nelson, a landowner has a duty to any lawful visitor on his property \u201cto take reasonable precautions to ascertain the condition of [his] property and to either make it reasonably safe or give warnings as may be reasonably necessary to inform ... of any foreseeable danger.\u201d Lorinovich v. K Mart Corp., 134 N.C. App. 158, 161, 516 S.E.2d 643, 646, cert. denied, 351 N.C. 107, \u2014 S.E.2d-(1999). Whether the actions of the landowner are reasonable are to be judged against the conduct of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances. Id. at 161, 516 S.E.2d at 646. \u201c[T]here is no duty to protect a lawful visitor against dangers which are either known to him or so obvious and apparent that they reasonably may be expected to be discovered.\u201d Id. at 162, 516 S.E.2d at 646.\nIn this case, the evidence shows Defendant was aware the gate through which Plaintiff would have to pass with the horses would not remain open, one of the fenced horses had a \u201cspirited\u201d nature, and horses \u201ctend to spook\u201d if hit from behind. Under the circumstances, was the gate reasonably safe? A reasonable juror could accept the evidence as sufficient to support the conclusion it was not safe in light of the use Plaintiff was required to make of the gate. See Cobb v. Reitter, 105 N.C. App. 218, 220, 412 S.E.2d 110, 111 (1992) (directed verdict not proper if there exists substantial evidence in support of claim). If not safe, Defendant had a duty to warn Plaintiff of foreseeable danger, and a reasonable juror could accept the evidence in this case as sufficient to support the conclusion that the incident causing Plaintiff\u2019s injuries was foreseeable. It follows the trial court correctly denied both the motion for directed verdict and the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Jacobsen v. McMillan, 124 N.C. App. 128, 131, 476 S.E.2d 368, 369-70 (1996) (same standard to be applied to both motions).\nWe also reject Defendant\u2019s argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. The record does not reveal any abuse of the discretion by the trial court. Worthington v. Bynum, 305 N.C. 478, 482, 290 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1982).\nNo error.\nJudges LEWIS and EDMUNDS concur.\n. Defendant testified he knew if a horse gets hit by something, particularly a gate from behind, it will tend to spook or act up.\n. This duty to warn would not exist if the danger to Plaintiff was \u201cso obvious and apparent that [it] reasonably may be expected to be discovered\u201d by Plaintiff. Lorinovich, 134 N.C. App. at 162, 516 S.E.2d at 646. Defendant appears to suggest the evidence supports a determination as a matter of law that the danger to Plaintiff was \u201cobvious and apparent.\u201d That is not the case. Indeed, it is questionable whether there is any evidence to support an instruction on this issue. Plaintiff, however, did not object to the instruction, and, therefore, it was properly submitted to the jury.\n. In affirming the denial of these motions, we also reject Defendant\u2019s alternative argument that the evidence shows Plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Plaintiff\u2019s contributory negligence was a matter properly submitted to the jury. Norwood v. Sherwin Williams Co., 303 N.C. 462, 468-69, 279 S.E.2d 559, 563 (1981) (directed verdict on contributory negligence proper only where plaintiff\u2019s negligence is established \u201cso clearly that no other reasonable inference or conclusion may be drawn\u201d).", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Van Camp, Hayes & Meacham, P.A., by James R. Van Camp and Michael J. Newman, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Anderson, Johnson, Lawrence, Butler & Bock, L.L.R, by Steven C. Lawrence, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DEBORAH HUSSEY, Plaintiff v. JERRY W. SEAWELL, Defendant\nNo. COA99-487\n(Filed 21 March 2000)\nPremises Liability\u2014 lawful visitor \u2014 foreseeable danger\u2014 warnings required\nIn a negligence case in which plaintiff, a lawful visitor, was injured while moving two of defendant\u2019s horses from one pasture to another when a gate located on defendant\u2019s property swung closed hitting the second horse before it cleared the passageway, causing the horse to rear up and trapping plaintiff between the two horses where she was kicked in the face by one of the two horses, the trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motions for a directed verdict, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and for a new trial, because a reasonable juror could conclude the gate was not safe in light of the use plaintiff was required to make of it, and therefore, defendant had a duty to warn plaintiff of foreseeable danger, where the evidence shows that defendant knew that the gate would close on its own, one of the horses had a \u201cspirited\u201d nature, and horses would \u201ctend to spook\u201d if hit from behind.\nAppeal by defendant from verdict and judgment filed 18 September 1998 and from order filed 8 October 1998 by Judge James M. Webb in Moore County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 January 2000.\nVan Camp, Hayes & Meacham, P.A., by James R. Van Camp and Michael J. Newman, for plaintiff-appellee.\nAnderson, Johnson, Lawrence, Butler & Bock, L.L.R, by Steven C. Lawrence, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0172-01", "first_page_order": 204, "last_page_order": 208 }