{ "id": 11078718, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KENNETH KENYON CROCKETT", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Crockett", "decision_date": "2000-05-16", "docket_number": "No. COA99-459", "first_page": "109", "last_page": "119", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "138 N.C. App. 109" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 913", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2534012 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E.2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573124 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 S.E.2d 635", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "637", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Long, 280 N.C. 633, 639, 187 S.E.2d 47, 50 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 N.C. App. 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553905 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Long, 280 N.C. 633, 639, 187 S.E.2d 47, 50 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/39/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 S.E.2d 789", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790125 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 S.E.2d 641", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648", "parenthetical": "citing 1 Kenneth S. Broun, Brandis & Broun on North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 161 (4th ed. 1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551053 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205", "parenthetical": "citing 1 Kenneth S. Broun, Brandis & Broun on North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 161 (4th ed. 1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 301", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867623 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2542427 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 810", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526556 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0810-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 L. Ed. 2d 779", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "527 U.S. 1026", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1248035, 1248550, 1248169, 1248458, 1248586, 1248015, 1248113, 1248500, 1248309, 1248056, 1248409, 1248252, 1248413, 1248223 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/527/1026-05", "/us/527/1026-08", "/us/527/1026-13", "/us/527/1026-01", "/us/527/1026-04", "/us/527/1026-07", "/us/527/1026-03", "/us/527/1026-14", "/us/527/1026-12", "/us/527/1026-11", "/us/527/1026-06", "/us/527/1026-02", "/us/527/1026-10", "/us/527/1026-09" ] }, { "cite": "508 S.E.2d 253", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571619 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 L. 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Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 1092", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11608801, 11608898, 11608771, 11609001, 11608874, 11609035, 11608845, 11608753, 11609074, 11608821, 11608725, 11608952, 11608924 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/1092-04", "/us/522/1092-08", "/us/522/1092-03", "/us/522/1092-11", "/us/522/1092-07", "/us/522/1092-12", "/us/522/1092-06", "/us/522/1092-02", "/us/522/1092-13", "/us/522/1092-05", "/us/522/1092-01", "/us/522/1092-10", "/us/522/1092-09" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 550", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139375 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308-9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "524 S.E.2d 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Cummings, 346 N.C. 291, 308-9, 488 S.E.2d 550, 560 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1092, 139 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1998)" }, { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155785 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Cummings, 346 N.C. 291, 308-9, 488 S.E.2d 550, 560 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1092, 139 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1998)" }, { "page": "262" }, { "page": "263" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714364 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "637" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626, 637, 340 S.E.2d 84, 91 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306215 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626, 637, 340 S.E.2d 84, 91 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 791", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793", "parenthetical": "quoting 1 Brandis on North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 91 (2d rev. ed. 1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4731290 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403", "parenthetical": "quoting 1 Brandis on North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 91 (2d rev. ed. 1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E.2d 64", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4729670, 4730118, 4726092, 4725548, 4724635 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0174-01", "/nc/320/0174-04", "/nc/320/0174-02", "/nc/320/0174-03", "/nc/320/0174-05" ] }, { "cite": "354 S.E.2d 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12169578 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7-8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 L. Ed. 2d 165", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "525 U.S. 887", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11114115, 11114250, 11114219, 11114060, 11114027, 11114190, 11113999, 11114288, 11114093, 11114162, 11113968, 11114325, 11114077, 11114367 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/525/0887-07", "/us/525/0887-11", "/us/525/0887-10", "/us/525/0887-04", "/us/525/0887-03", "/us/525/0887-09", "/us/525/0887-02", "/us/525/0887-12", "/us/525/0887-06", "/us/525/0887-08", "/us/525/0887-01", "/us/525/0887-13", "/us/525/0887-05", "/us/525/0887-14" ] }, { "cite": "505 S.E.2d 881", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659816, 1659784, 1659954, 1659861, 1659711 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0075-05", "/nc/348/0075-03", "/nc/348/0075-04", "/nc/348/0075-02", "/nc/348/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 S.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11653915 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0294-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 919, "char_count": 24358, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5943826020017235e-07, "percentile": 0.8189238059825109 }, "sha256": "e23410e7c29d69fb45dcbf32f8cb8204d4d23793ead38e08f0548d46e71388ac", "simhash": "1:8f3b7512b56c8376", "word_count": 4057 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:09:36.911228+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and HORTON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KENNETH KENYON CROCKETT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EAGLES, Chief Judge.\nThe defendant, Kenneth Kenyon Crockett, was convicted of two counts of statutory rape and four counts of \u201csexual activity by a custodian\u201d at the 14 September 1998 criminal session of Forsyth County Superior Court.\nThe evidence presented at trial indicated that the defendant worked as an employee of the Youth Opportunity Home in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. The home provides food, shelter, and adult supervision for abused, neglected juveniles.\nDefendant had consensual sex with a sixteen-year-old female resident named Candi Corvin on two occasions. The first occasion was in March 1996, shortly after Ms. Corvin began staying at the home. The second occasion was shortly after Ms. Corvin left the home. On this occasion, Ms. Corvin contacted the defendant when he was off-duty, using the pager number which he had previously given her. Defendant picked Ms. Corvin up and took her to a hotel where they had sex. Additionally, defendant had consensual sex with a fourteen-year-old female resident named Sandra Ware in November, 1995 and in January, 1996.\nThe rules of the home directed that staff were not to have sexual contact with the residents. Additionally, if a resident tried to communicate with a staff member when the employee was not on duty, the off-duty staff member was obliged to alert the on-duty staff member to the resident\u2019s need. Further, the rules forbade employees to give out their personal telephone numbers to residents.\nThe defendant was convicted of two charges of statutory rape and four charges of sexual activity by a custodian. Defendant appeals.\nWe first address whether the indictments for statutory rape are fatally defective. Defendant was charged and convicted of statutory rape in 97 CRS 20047 and 97 CRS 20048. In 97 CRS 20047, the defendant was convicted for having sex with fourteen-year-old Sandra Ware on 26 November 1995. On 26 November 1995, the date the defendant and Ms. Ware had sex, the statutory rape law in effect was N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2(a)(l). Under this law, the victim had to be under thirteen years of age for the defendant to be charged with statutory rape. Under an amended version of the statutory rape law, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A, defendants may be guilty of statutory rape if the victim is under fifteen years of age. However, this amended version did not become effective until 1 December 1995, five days after defendant had sex with the fourteen-year-old. The State concedes that the defendant\u2019s pre-December 1995 conviction for statutory rape with a fourteen-year-old cannot stand. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant\u2019s conviction in 97 CRS 20047 must be vacated.\nDefendant\u2019s convictions in 97 CRS 20047 and 97 CRS 20048 were consolidated for judgment. Defendant contends his conviction in 97 CRS 20048 is also invalid. The indictments for both counts charge that defendant committed statutory rape during the period from 22 November 1995 to 19 February 1996. Defendant contends that the indictments are impermissibly vague because they do not specify the exact date the offense was committed.\nAn indictment is sufficient if it sets out a time period during which the crime allegedly occurred. See State v. Hatfield, 128 N.C. App. 294, 299, 495 S.E.2d 163, 166, disc. review denied, 348 N.C. 75, 505 S.E.2d 881, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 887, 142 L. Ed. 2d 165 (1998). See also State v. Oliver, 85 N.C. App. 1, 7-8, 354 S.E.2d 527, 531, disc. review denied, 320 N.C. 174, 358 S.E.2d 64 (1987). In the case of 97 CRS 20048, the exact date that defendant had sex with Sandra Ware is immaterial because the evidence at trial showed that this offense occurred in January 1996 when the victim was fourteen. This satisfied the requirements of the amended statute, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A. Accordingly, we conclude that the conviction in 97 CRS 20048 should be affirmed. Because 97 CRS 20048 previously was consolidated for the purpose of judgment with 97 CRS 20047, we remand 97 CRS 20048 to the superior court for resentencing.\nNext we consider defendant\u2019s argument that he is entitled to a new trial on the remaining charges for \u201csexual activity by a custodian\u201d because the admission of evidence on the void statutory rape charge was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. We are not persuaded.\nThe State argues that the evidence of defendant\u2019s sexual activity with Ms. Ware in 1995 was relevant to establish intent, motive, knowledge, as well as defendant\u2019s scheme of involving himself with vulnerable, disturbed teenage girls at the home. According to the State, this evidence \u201cwas highly probative of an intent and design to prey on vulnerable young women.\u201d\nUnder N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401, \u201c \u2018[Relevant evidence\u2019 means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d Further, \u201cas a careful reading of Rule 404(b) clearly shows, evidence of other offenses is admissible so long as it is relevant to any fact or issue other than the character of the accused.\u201d State v. Weaver, 318 N.C. 400, 403, 348 S.E.2d 791, 793 (1986) (quoting 1 Brandis on North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 91 (2d rev. ed. 1982)). Even if the evidence may tend to show other crimes, or bad acts committed by the defendant, the evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) as long as it \u201cis relevant for some purpose other than to show that defendant has the propensity for the type of conduct for which he is being tried.\u201d State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 279, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990) (quoting State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626, 637, 340 S.E.2d 84, 91 (1986)). Here, the evidence is relevant to show defendant\u2019s intent, knowledge and plan. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant\u2019s argument is without merit; the defendant is not entitled to a new trial on the remaining charges.\nNext, we consider whether the trial court erred in concluding that there was no purposeful racial discrimination in the peremptory challenges exercised by the State. Here, the African American defendant was tried by an all-white jury. The prosecutor exercised three peremptory challenges. Two of the three excused were African Americans. Once the jury panel had been selected, defendant moved the trial court to strike the jury panel because, he argued, the prosecutor had challenged two jurors solely on the basis of race. After the prosecutor gave his reasons for the peremptory challenges, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion. The court stated, \u201csince there has been no prima facie case and since the State has shown nondiscriminatory reasons for the exercises in the preemptory [sic] challenges, the Court would conclude that the motion to discharge the twelve jurors selected on the grounds of racial discrimination in the jury selection should be and same is hereby denied.\u201d\nWhen analyzing a claim of racial discrimination based on the prosecution\u2019s use of peremptory challenges,\n(1) defendant must establish a prima facie case that the peremptory challenge was exercised on the basis of race, and if this showing is made; (2) the burden shifts to the prosecutor to offer a racially neutral explanation to rebut defendant\u2019s prima facie case; and (3) the trial court must determine whether defendant has proven purposeful discrimination.\nState v. Smith, 351 N.C. 251, 262, 524 S.E.2d 28, 37 (2000) (citing State v. Cummings, 346 N.C. 291, 308-9, 488 S.E.2d 550, 560 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1092, 139 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1998)). Here, the trial court concluded that the defendant had not made a prima facie showing that the peremptory challenges were exercised on the basis of race. Nevertheless, the court allowed the State to offer an explanation of its use of peremptory challenges. The prosecutor explained his peremptory challenge of Mr. Farris by stating that Mr. Farris had failed to disclose that he had previously been charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The prosecutor also explained that he did not think that Mr. Farris was being truthful in his answers to questions about other charges pending against him. The district attorney explained his challenge of Ms. Fletcher by stating that she was quiet, would not make eye contact with him, and gave only yes and no answers. The prosecutor also stated that Ms. Fletcher failed to disclose her involvement in an assault case at her home.\n\u201cWhere the trial court rules that a defendant has failed to make a prima facie showing, our review is limited to whether the trial court erred in finding that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing, even if the State offers reasons for its exercise of the peremptory challenges.\u201d Smith, 351 N.C. at 262, 524 S.E.2d at 37 (citing State v. Hoffman, 348 N.C. 548, 554, 500 S.E.2d 718, 722-23 (1998)). In determining whether a defendant has made a prima facie showing that the peremptory challenge was exercised on the basis of race, one of the factors for our consideration is whether the prosecution accepted other African American jurors. See Smith, 351 N.C. at 263, 524 S.E.2d at 37. Here, the prosecutor did accept an African American woman on the panel. However, this juror was later excused by the defendant. Another factor to review in evaluating the peremptory challenges is whether the prosecutor made racially motivated statements or asked racially motivated questions of black prospective jurors that raise an inference of discrimination. See State v. Gregory, 340 N.C. 365, 397-98, 459 S.E.2d 638, 656 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1108, 134 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1996). Our careful review of the trial transcript indicates that the district attorney made no comment tending to support an inference of racial discrimination.\nFinally, we note that the trial court\u2019s determination regarding peremptory challenges will be upheld unless the appellate court is convinced that the trial court\u2019s decision is clearly erroneous. See State v. White, 349 N.C. 535, 549, 508 S.E.2d 253, 262 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1026, 144 L. Ed. 2d 779 (1999). \u201cSince the trial court\u2019s findings as to purposeful discrimination depend in large measure on its evaluation of credibility, they are given great deference . ...\u201d Id. Here, the trial court found that \u201c[n]o showing has been made with regard to the questioning procedure of the State or any pattern of the State in exercising peremptory challenges solely to remove African Americans.\u201d We conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination and that there was no purposeful racial discrimination in the peremptory challenges exercised by the State.\nNext, we consider whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss the charge of sexual activity by a custodian in 97 CRS 20050. In 97 CRS 20050, defendant is charged with having sex with Candi Corvin on 23 April 1996 at a hotel. The defendant argues that the State failed to offer substantial evidence that Ms. Corvin was in the custody of the Youth Opportunity Home at the time of this incident. Additionally, defendant asserts that the State did not offer substantial evidence that the defendant was an employee of the Youth Opportunity Home at the time he and the victim engaged in sexual activity. The State counters by asserting that there was adequate evidence at trial to support the conclusion that (1) defendant engaged in a sexual act with a person over whom his employer had custody on 23 April 1996, and (2) defendant was an employee of the home at the time of this sexual act.\nWhere the defendant raises a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. See State v. Roddey, 110 N.C. App. 810, 813, 431 S.E.2d 245, 247 (1993). \u201cIf there is substantial evidence \u2014 whether direct, circumstantial, or both \u2014 to support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied.\u201d Id. (quoting State v. Small, 328 N.C. 175, 180, 400 S.E.2d 413, 415-16 (1991)).\nHere, the defendant relies on Ms. Corvin\u2019s testimony at trial indicating that she had sex with defendant in April after she had voluntarily left the Youth Opportunity Home. Records from the Youth Home show that Ms. Corvin left the home on 20 April 1996 and did not return. Ms. Corvin testified that she was living in an apartment complex at the time she called defendant. They met and had sex at a Holiday Inn on 23 April 1996.\nThe State argues that Ms. Corvin was still enrolled in the home and still in a custodial relationship with the defendant on the date of the incident. Some time after Ms. Corvin and defendant had sex the first time in March 1996, while Ms. Corvin was still living at the home, defendant gave her his pager number for her to call him \u201cany time I needed anything or anytime I just needed somebody to talk to.\u201d After Ms. Corvin ran away from the home, she testified, \u201cI wasn\u2019t very happy and there wasn\u2019t a lot of food available. So I paged him [defendant] to see if he could come and get me or help me or whatever.\u201d In response to her request for help, defendant bought her a meal at McDonald\u2019s and then took her to the hotel where he had sex with her. When the State asked Ms. Corvin whether she had placed trust in the defendant, she responded, \u201cYes. That was natural because he was a counselor. I thought I was- \u2014 he was suppose [sic] to \u2014 I thought I was suppose [sic] to be able to trust him.\u201d Ms. Corvin\u2019s testimony indicates that she believed she was in a custodial relationship with defendant on the date of their sexual encounter.\nAdditionally, employees from the home testified that Ms. Corvin was still a participant in their program as of 23 April 1996. Some of her belongings were at the home. Her bed was held open for her until 26 April 1996. Employees continued to make daily notes about Ms. Corvin after she ran away; she was listed in the home\u2019s records as a resident until 26 April 1996. Accordingly, we conclude that the State demonstrated sufficient evidence that Ms. Corvin was in the custody of the Youth Opportunity Home at the time of the 23 April 1996 encounter.\nWe turn to defendant\u2019s assertion that the State did not offer substantial evidence that defendant was an employee of the Youth Home at the time he and the victim engaged in sexual activity on 23 April 1996. Defendant argues that he was not employed by the home on the date of the incident. He relies on testimony from Mr. Beasley, the CEO of the Youth Home, that the defendant was terminated as a full time employee on 27 March 1996.\nHowever, Mr. Beasley also testified that defendant was working as a \u201ctemporary fill in\u201d employee after late March. He testified that the defendant worked the second and third shifts at the home between March 1996 and 20 April 1996. Additionally, the defendant worked at the home after the 23 April 1996 incident; he worked on 21 May 1996. Defendant was not terminated from his position as a \u201cfill in\u201d employee until August 1996. We conclude that the State demonstrated sufficient evidence that defendant was an employee of the Youth Opportunity Home at the time of the 23 April 1996 encounter. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of sexual activity by a custodian in 97 CRS 20050.\nNext we consider whether the trial court erred in permitting the impeachment of defendant\u2019s wife. At trial defendant\u2019s wife gave alibi testimony indicating that she and defendant celebrated their wedding anniversary by spending a few hours together at the Holiday Inn in late April 1996. On cross examination, the prosecutor asked Mrs. Crockett whether the defendant had ever pulled her hair out. She answered, \u201cno.\u201d The State later impeached Mrs. Crockett through the use of extrinsic evidence from a policeman, Officer Bowens. Over objection, Officer Bowens testified that he had gone to the defendant\u2019s home after Mrs. Crockett had called the police. He stated, \u201cMrs. Crockett admitted she bit him [defendant] on his hand, when he grabbed her face and pulled a small patch of hair from her head.\u201d\nA witness\u2019 prior inconsistent statements are admissible to shed light on the witness\u2019 credibility. See State v. Workman, 344 N.C. 482, 504, 476 S.E.2d 301, 313 (1996). \u201cWhen a prior inconsistent statement by a witness relates to material facts in the witness\u2019 testimony, the prior statement may be proved by extrinsic evidence.\u201d State v. Jones, 347 N.C. 193, 205, 491 S.E.2d 641, 648 (1997) (citing 1 Kenneth S. Broun, Brandis & Broun on North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 161 (4th ed. 1993)). Facts are material when they involve matters pertinent to the pending inquiry. See State v. Larrimore, 340 N.C. 119, 146, 456 S.E.2d 789, 803 (1995). However, when the facts are immaterial to the pending inquiry, \u201c[i]t is a general rule of evidence in North Carolina \u2018that answers made by a witness to collateral questions on cross-examination are conclusive, and that the party who draws out such answers will not be permitted to contradict them ....\u2019\u201d State v. Robinette, 39 N.C. App. 622, 625, 251 S.E.2d 635, 637 (1979) (quoting State v. Long, 280 N.C. 633, 639, 187 S.E.2d 47, 50 (1972)). Here, Mrs. Crockett\u2019s statement to Officer Bowen that defendant had pulled out a patch of hair is collateral to the main issues in the prosecution, and should not have been admitted.\nNevertheless, the defendant has failed to establish prejudice sufficient to constitute grounds for a new trial. \u201cA defendant is prejudiced . . . when there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial . . . .\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a). Officer Bowen\u2019s statement does not rise to this level; in light of the State\u2019s evidence as a whole, it could not have tilted the scales against the defendant. Here, the State produced the testimony of Candi Corvin and Sandra Ware describing the defendant\u2019s sexual encounters with them. This testimony was corroborated by the testimony of Pamela Stuart, a Department of Social Services employee, and by the testimony of Mickey Hutchens, a Winston-Salem police officer. In light of the extensive evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt, the trial court\u2019s admission of Officer Bowen\u2019s statement cannot be said to constitute prejudicial error. This assignment of error is overruled.\nFinally, we consider whether the trial court erred in finding as an aggravating factor for the statutory rape charges, 97 CRS 20047 and 97 CRS 20048, that \u201cdefendant took advantage of a position of trust or confidence.\u201d Defendant argues that the evidence that proved the aggravating factor was necessary to prove the custodial element of the joined offense of sexual activity by a custodian. Defendant concedes in his brief that his argument is not supported by current North Carolina law. Evidence used to prove an element of one offense may also be used to support an aggravating factor of a separate joined offense. See State v. Farlow, 336 N.C. 534, 444 S.E.2d 913 (1994). Accordingly, we conclude that defendant\u2019s argument lacks merit and overrule this assignment of error.\nFor the reasons stated above, we find no prejudicial error in defendant\u2019s convictions for sexual activity by a custodian. However, we vacate the judgment for statutory rape in 97 CRS 20047 and remand for resentencing in 97 CRS 20048.\nAffirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded.\nJudges McGEE and HORTON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "EAGLES, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Joyce S. Rutledge, for the State.", "Hough & Rabil, by S. Mark Rabil, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KENNETH KENYON CROCKETT\nNo. COA99-459\n(Filed 16 May 2000)\n1. Rape\u2014 statutory \u2014 conviction vacated \u2014 prior to amended statute\nDefendant\u2019s conviction for statutory rape in case 97 CRS 20047 must be vacated because defendant was convicted for having sex with a fourteen-year-old on 26 November 1995, five days prior to the effective date of the amended statute charging statutory rape if the victim is under fifteen, and the statutory rape law under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2(a)(l) in effect at the time of the crime stated the victim had to be under thirteen years of age.\n2. Rape\u2014 statutory \u2014 sufficiency of evidence \u2014 exact date immaterial\nAlthough defendant\u2019s conviction for statutory rape in case 97 CRS 20048 must be remanded for resentencing since it was consolidated for the purpose of judgment with a vacated conviction in 97 CRS 20047, the conviction in 97 CRS 20048 is affirmed because the indictment charging that defendant committed the offense during the period from 22 November 1995 to 19 February 1996 is sufficient and the exact date is immaterial because the evidence at trial showed the offense occurred in January 1996, when the victim was fourteen, thus satisfying the requirements of amended statute N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A.\n3. Evidence\u2014 other crimes \u2014 void statutory rape charge \u2014 intent \u2014 knowledge\u2014plan\nDefendant is not entitled to a new trial on the charges for sexual activity by a custodian, even though evidence was admitted on a void statutory rape charge, because the evidence was relevant under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 to show defendant\u2019s intent, knowledge, and plan.\n4. Jury\u2014 peremptory challenge \u2014 racial discrimination \u2014 failure to make prima facie showing\nThe trial court did not err in concluding that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that the State\u2019s use of its peremptory challenges was based on purposeful discrimination because: (1) the prosecutor explained his challenge of one potential black juror was based on his failure to disclose that he had previously been charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and the fact that the prosecutor thought the potential juror was not being truthful in his answers to questions about other charges pending against him; (2) the prosecutor explained his challenge of a second potential black juror was based on the fact that she was quiet, she would not make eye contact with the prosecutor, she gave only yes and no answers, and she failed to disclose her involvement in an assault case at her home; (3) the prosecutor did accept a black juror on the panel, but that juror was later excused by defendant; (4) the prosecutor made no comment tending to support an inference of racial discrimination; and (5) no showing was made of any pattern of the State in exercising peremptory challenges solely to remove black jurors.\n5. Sexual Offenses\u2014 sexual activity by a custodian \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of sexual activity by a custodian in 97 CRS 20050 because: (1) the victim\u2019s testimony revealed that she believed she was in a custodial relationship with defendant on the date of their sexual encounter; (2) employees from the Youth Opportunity Home testified that the victim was still a participant in their program on the date of the victim\u2019s sexual encounter with defendant; and (3) the State demonstrated sufficient evidence that defendant was an employee of the Youth Opportunity Home at that time.\n6. Evidence\u2014 impeachment \u2014 collateral issue \u2014 no prejudicial error\nAlthough the trial court erred in a prosecution for statutory rape and sexual activity by a custodian when it allowed the impeachment of defendant\u2019s wife through the use of extrinsic evidence from a policeman concerning the collateral issue of defendant pulling out a patch of his wife\u2019s hair, defendant has failed to establish prejudice in light of the extensive evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt.\n7. Sentencing\u2014 aggravating factor \u2014 statutory rape \u2014 sexual activity by a custodian \u2014 position of trust or confidence\nThe trial court did not err in finding as an aggravating factor for the statutory rape charges that defendant took advantage of a position of trust or confidence because evidence used to prove an element of the joined offense of sexual activity by a custodian could also be used to support an aggravating factor for the separate offense of statutory rape.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 13 October 1998 by Judge Thomas W. Ross in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 February 2000.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Joyce S. Rutledge, for the State.\nHough & Rabil, by S. Mark Rabil, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0109-01", "first_page_order": 139, "last_page_order": 149 }