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  "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: RODNEY McKOY, Juvenile IN THE MATTER OF: RONDELL McKOY, Juvenile",
  "name_abbreviation": "In re McKoy",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges GREENE and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "IN THE MATTER OF: RODNEY McKOY, Juvenile IN THE MATTER OF: RONDELL McKOY, Juvenile"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "WALKER, Judge.\nOn 27 October 1998, Rodney McKoy, age 8, and Rondell McKoy, age 7, (collectively \u201cthe juveniles\u201d) were adjudicated delinquent for willfully and wantonly injuring the personal property of another in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-160. After a dispositional hearing, the juveniles were placed on supervised probation for a period of twelve months with certain terms and conditions. One of the conditions was that probation would be renewed at the end of the twelve-month period if each juvenile had not paid $539.50 in restitution.\nThe State\u2019s evidence at the adjudicatory hearing tended to establish the following: On 6 August 1998, the juveniles were standing at the bus stop as Melissa Laird drove her 1989 Ford vehicle past them. Ms. Laird testified that she saw the two juveniles, who were standing with three other children at the bus stop, throw rocks toward her car. She then heard \u201cpow, pow, pow\u201d as the rocks hit her car. Ms. Laird immediately \u201cslammed on [her] brakes,\u201d turned the car around, and saw the juveniles run behind a house. She provided information to the authorities, who located the juveniles. Ms. Laird further testified that the paint on her car was \u201cchipped and scratched\u201d and the windshield was \u201cbusted in three or four spots,\u201d resulting in approximately $1,000.00 in damage.\nMilton Jackson, the juveniles\u2019 stepfather, testified on the juveniles\u2019 behalf, stating that he had questioned the juveniles regarding this incident and that they had both denied throwing rocks at the car. Mr. Jackson further testified that the juveniles are \u201cvery truthful\u201d and \u201cvery disciplined.\u201d During the adjudicatory hearing, juvenile Rodney McKoy admitted throwing rocks to try \u201cto hit the doggie\u201d but denied hitting Ms. Laird\u2019s car with rocks. He further testified that someone named \u201cTyrone\u201d hit the car with rocks. Juvenile Rondell McKoy testified that he did not pick up any rocks that day although his brother did. He also stated that it was \u201cTyrone\u201d who hit Ms. Laird\u2019s car with rocks, not his brother.\nThe juveniles contend that the juvenile court erred in: (1) ordering them each to pay $539.50 in restitution since it did not consider their best interests and needs as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-646; (2) ordering them each to pay $539.50 in restitution where they do not have the means and cannot reasonably acquire the means to pay this amount; (3) considering the ability of the juveniles\u2019 parents to pay the restitution; and (4) in finding the juveniles were delinquent for committing injury to personal property since the evidence was insufficient to show the juveniles acted wantonly and willfully.\nWe first address the juveniles\u2019 contentions that the juvenile court erred in ordering them each to pay $539.50 restitution since it did not consider their best interests and needs as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-646 (1995) (repealed 1 July 1999) and since they were without the means to make such restitution within twelve months. The juveniles cite to In re Berry, 33 N.C. App. 356, 235 S.E.2d 278 (1977), in which two juveniles were adjudicated delinquent for willfully and wantonly damaging real property and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $666.50 each as a condition of probation. On appeal, this Court stated:\n[A] requirement that a juvenile make restitution as a condition of probation must be supported by the record and appropriate findings of fact which demonstrate that the best interest of the juvenile will be promoted by the enforcement of the condition.\nId. at 360, 235 S.E.2d at 280-281. After examining the record, this Court found that the juvenile court had failed to make any findings from which it could be \u201cdetermined that such a condition is fair and reasonable, relates to the needs of the children, tends to promote the best interest of the children, or is in conformity with the avowed policy of the State in its relation to juveniles.\u201d Id. Thus, the record was insufficient to support the condition of probation requiring the juveniles to make restitution. Id.\nThe juveniles also cite to In re Register, 84 N.C. App. 336, 352 S.E.2d 889 (1987), a prior decision of this Court involving seventeen juveniles who had vandalized the victim\u2019s residence while she was away. In that case, only eight of the seventeen juveniles were selected for prosecution based on their or their parents\u2019 unwillingness or inability to pay $1,000.00 each in restitution to the victim. Id. On appeal, this Court stated:\nWe endorse the discriminate and prudent use of restitution in juvenile cases as provided in G.S. 7A-649, but compensation of victims should never become the only or paramount concern in the administration of juvenile justice.\nId. at 339, 352 S.E.2d at 891. This Court found that the juvenile judge did not follow the provisions of the juvenile code set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-646 since there was \u201cnothing in the record to indicate that the court heard and considered any evidence as to the most appropriate dispositional order in each case.\u201d Id. at 349-350, 352 S.E.2d at 896-897. Instead, the \u201coverriding concern\u201d of the juvenile court was \u201creimbursing the victim for her financial loss.\u201d Id. Thus, this Court held that the juvenile court erred in requiring the juveniles accused of vandalism to pay $1,000.00 each in restitution. Id.\nHere, the record reveals that during the dispositional hearing, the juvenile judge was concerned that the parents of the juveniles had not taken responsibility for payment of the damages. The juvenile judge observed that he would extend probation until each juvenile reached eighteen years of age unless restitution was made. Although the dis-positional order otherwise addresses the needs and best interest of each juvenile, the record does not reveal any findings which demonstrate that ordering each juvenile to pay $539.50 in restitution was in their best interest.\nFurthermore, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-649 provides that a judge may:\n(2) Require restitution, full or partial, payable within a 12-month period to any person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of the offense committed by the juvenile; . . . however, the judge shall not require the juvenile to make restitution if the juvenile satisfies the court that he does not have, and could not reasonably acquire, the means to make restitution.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-649(2) (1995) (repealed 1 July 1999); See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2506(4) (1999). Here, the juvenile judge determined that the juveniles, ages 7 and 8, were \u201cnot old enough\u201d to participate in the Lee County restitution program. The juvenile judge then found:\nThe only way that I can ever see any possibility of this lady getting her money, because of the age of these juveniles, and it\u2019s not going to be any time soon, is to put them on probation and just to keep extending it until the money is paid.\nWe note that on 1 October 1998, the Clerk of Superior Court determined that both juveniles were indigent, and counsel was appointed to represent them. See In re Edwards, 18 N.C. App. 469, 197 S.E.2d 87 (1973). Therefore, we conclude that there was insufficient evidence before the juvenile court that the juveniles had or could reasonably acquire the means to pay $539.50 each in restitution within twelve months, and thus, it was not in their best interest to require such. We do not suggest, however, that the juvenile court is prohibited from making an inquiry of a juvenile during the dispositional hearing in order to determine if the juvenile has the ability to make full or partial restitution within the twelve-month probationary period.\nThe juveniles next contend that the juvenile court erred in considering their parents\u2019 ability or willingness to pay the restitution. In her recommendation to the juvenile court, the intake counselor recommended as a condition of probation for each juvenile that the parents be responsible to make restitution to the victim. While the dispositional orders make no reference to the parents\u2019 obligation to pay restitution, the juvenile judge\u2019s comments during the dispositional hearing indicate that he considered the parents\u2019 ability or willingness to make restitution in ordering the juveniles to pay $539.50 each as a condition of probation. The juveniles rely on In re Register, 84 N.C. App. 336, 350, 352 S.E.2d 889, 897 (1987), in which this Court held:\n[T]he limit of the parents\u2019 civil liability for damage \u2018maliciously or willfully\u2019 done to property by a juvenile pursuant to G.S. 1-538.1, is not the proper criteria for determining the punishment to be imposed upon that juvenile found to be delinquent under G.S. 7A-649.\nThe State argues that In re Register is distinguishable but fails to cite any authority to support its argument that the parents\u2019 ability to pay restitution can be considered in determining a juvenile\u2019s disposition.\nWe note that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-649(2) (1995) (repealed 1 July 1999), set forth above, addresses only whether the juvenile has or could reasonably acquire the means to make restitution and does not address the parents\u2019 ability to pay. Furthermore, we also note that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-538.1 (1999) provides for parents to be held strictly liable for a victim\u2019s actual damages up to $2,000.00 where a minor maliciously or willfully injures such person or their property. In Insurance Co. v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 323, 130 S.E.2d 645, 650 (1963), our Supreme Court found:\nG.S. \u00a7 1-538.1, and similar statutes, appear to have been adopted not out of consideration for providing a restorative compensation for the victims of injurious or tortious conduct of children, but as an aid in the control of juvenile delinquency. ... Its rationale apparently is that parental indifference and failure to supervise the activities of children is one of the major causes of juvenile delinquency; that parental liability for harm done by children will stimulate attention and supervision; and that the total effect will be a reduction in the anti-social behavior of children.\nThus, we conclude that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-649(2) does not authorize the juvenile court to consider the parents\u2019 ability to pay restitution when ordering the juveniles to make restitution to the victim as a condition of probation.\nThe juveniles\u2019 last assignment of error is that the juvenile court erred in finding them delinquent for committing injury to property since there was insufficient evidence to show they acted \u201cwantonly and willfully.\u201d \u201cOrdinarily, wilful as used in criminal statutes means the wrongful doing of an act without justification or excuse, or the commission of an act purposely and deliberately in violation of the law.\u201d State v. Casey, 60 N.C. App. at 414, 416-417, 299 S.E.2d 235, 237, disc. review denied, 308 N.C. 192, 302 S.E.2d 245 (1983). The word \u201cwillful\u201d means \u201cvoluntary and intentional, but not necessarily malicious.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1593 (7th ed. 1999). \u201cConduct is wanton when [it is] in conscious and intentional disregard of and indifference to the rights and safety of others.\u201d Casey, 60 N.C. App. at 416-417, 299 S.E.2d at 237. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court\u2019s findings that the juveniles acted \u201cwantonly and willfully\u201d in damaging Ms. Laird\u2019s vehicle, and thus support the findings of delinquency.\nIn summary, the dispositional orders in No. 98 J 92 and No. 98 J 93 are modified by vacating the special condition of probation requiring the juveniles to make restitution by the payment of $539.50 each. Except as specifically modified, the dispositional orders are affirmed.\nVacated in part and affirmed in part.\nJudges GREENE and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WALKER, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Anna K. Baird, for the State.",
      "Tron D. Faulk for respondent-appellant Rodney McKoy; Yvonne K. Smith for respondent-appellant Rondell McKoy."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: RODNEY McKOY, Juvenile IN THE MATTER OF: RONDELL McKOY, Juvenile\nNo. COA99-691\n(Filed 16 May 2000)\n1. Juveniles\u2014 restitution \u2014 means to pay\nThe trial court erred by ordering juveniles to pay restitution for throwing rocks at a car where there was insufficient evidence that the juveniles had or could reasonably acquire the means to pay $539.50 each within twelve months.\n2. Juveniles\u2014 restitution \u2014 parents\u2019 ability to pay\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-649(2) does not authorize the juvenile court to consider the parents\u2019 ability to pay restitution when ordering juveniles to make restitution to the victim as a condition of probation.\n3. Juveniles\u2014 delinquency \u2014 wanton and willful conduct\nThere was sufficient evidence in a juvenile proceeding to support findings that the juveniles acted wantonly and willfully in damaging a vehicle, thus supporting findings of delinquency.\nAppeal by respondent juveniles from adjudicatory orders entered 27 October 1998 and dispositional orders entered 26 January 1999 by Judge Franklin F. Lanier in Lee County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 March 2000.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Anna K. Baird, for the State.\nTron D. Faulk for respondent-appellant Rodney McKoy; Yvonne K. Smith for respondent-appellant Rondell McKoy."
  },
  "file_name": "0143-01",
  "first_page_order": 173,
  "last_page_order": 178
}
