{ "id": 11079228, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM RASHAD LUCAS, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Lucas", "decision_date": "2000-06-06", "docket_number": "No. COA99-24", "first_page": "226", "last_page": "234", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "138 N.C. App. 226" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 661", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663", "parenthetical": "\"[f]elonious intent is an essential element of [first degree] burglary which the State must allege and prove\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575137 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380", "parenthetical": "\"[f]elonious intent is an essential element of [first degree] burglary which the State must allege and prove\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 S.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126", "parenthetical": "\"[k]idnapping is a specific intent crime\" and State must prove defendant \"unlawfully confined, restrained, or removed the victim for one of the specified purposes outlined in the statute\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525424 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348", "parenthetical": "\"[k]idnapping is a specific intent crime\" and State must prove defendant \"unlawfully confined, restrained, or removed the victim for one of the specified purposes outlined in the statute\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379", "parenthetical": "Blankenship rule applies to crimes committed 21 January 1995 (after 9 September 1994 Blankenship decision but prior to 10 February 1997 Barnes decision)" }, { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 640", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132055 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648", "parenthetical": "Blankenship rule applies to crimes committed 21 January 1995 (after 9 September 1994 Blankenship decision but prior to 10 February 1997 Barnes decision)" }, { "page": "648" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 S.E.2d 189", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571576, 571621, 571590 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0374-01", "/nc/349/0374-03", "/nc/349/0374-02" ] }, { "cite": "503 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11467567 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363-64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E.2d 774", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777", "parenthetical": "\"distinction between aiding and abetting and acting in concert... is of little significance\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575714 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656", "parenthetical": "\"distinction between aiding and abetting and acting in concert... is of little significance\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 177", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 900", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11525121, 11525092, 11524582, 11524807, 11524710, 11525031, 11524847, 11524689, 11524884, 11524761, 11524635, 11524924, 11524734, 11524959 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/0900-14", "/us/522/0900-13", "/us/522/0900-01", "/us/522/0900-07", "/us/522/0900-04", "/us/522/0900-12", "/us/522/0900-08", "/us/522/0900-03", "/us/522/0900-09", "/us/522/0900-06", "/us/522/0900-02", "/us/522/0900-10", "/us/522/0900-05", "/us/522/0900-11" ] }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413-14" }, { "page": "413-14", "parenthetical": "requirement of actual or constructive presence to prove crime under aiding and abetting theory abrogated" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53878 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676" }, { "page": "676" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 S.E.2d 150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" }, { "page": "157", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "157", "parenthetical": "instruction relating defendant \"should have known\" or had \"reasonable grounds to believe\" another was going to commit murder failed to satisfy Blankenship because it \"d[id] not convey the concept of specific intent necessary for aiding and abetting a first-degree murder\"" }, { "page": "158" }, { "page": "157-58", "parenthetical": "under plain error review, \"[i]t is a rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction where no objection has been made in the trial court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2559246 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558" }, { "page": "558" }, { "page": "558" }, { "page": "558" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 S.E.2d 720", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724", "parenthetical": "citing Blankenship, 337 N.C. at 558, 447 S.E.2d at 736" }, { "page": "724" }, { "page": "724" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132300 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292", "parenthetical": "citing Blankenship, 337 N.C. at 558, 447 S.E.2d at 736" }, { "page": "292" }, { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 625", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633" }, { "page": "633" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571096 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" }, { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 S.E.2d 641", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647" }, { "page": "647" }, { "page": "647" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563971 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" }, { "page": "284" }, { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 S.E.2d 46", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49" }, { "page": "49" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2509076 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "753" }, { "page": "753" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 L. Ed. 2d 473", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "523 U.S. 1024", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11511617, 11511362, 11511587, 11511493, 11511686, 11511560, 11511754, 11511659, 11511469, 11511728, 11511536, 11511441, 11511413, 11511389, 11511806 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/523/1024-10", "/us/523/1024-01", "/us/523/1024-09", "/us/523/1024-06", "/us/523/1024-12", "/us/523/1024-08", "/us/523/1024-14", "/us/523/1024-11", "/us/523/1024-05", "/us/523/1024-13", "/us/523/1024-07", "/us/523/1024-04", "/us/523/1024-03", "/us/523/1024-02", "/us/523/1024-15" ] }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 134", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 876", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11511102, 11511204, 11511428, 11511460, 11511173, 11511400, 11511145, 11511335, 11511085, 11511376, 11511122, 11511256, 11511068, 11511356 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/0876-03", "/us/522/0876-07", "/us/522/0876-13", "/us/522/0876-14", "/us/522/0876-06", "/us/522/0876-12", "/us/522/0876-05", "/us/522/0876-09", "/us/522/0876-02", "/us/522/0876-11", "/us/522/0876-04", "/us/522/0876-08", "/us/522/0876-01", "/us/522/0876-10" ] }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53983 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 727", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736" }, { "page": "736", "parenthetical": "jury instructions which failed to include requirement that each defendant prosecuted under acting in concert theory must have possessed the requisite intent to commit the charged specific intent crime deemed erroneous" }, { "page": "734-38", "parenthetical": "specific intent required to satisfy intent element of first-degree murder on acting in concert theory" }, { "page": "736", "parenthetical": "\"instructions permitting] defendant to be convicted of [first degree murder] when he himself did not inflict the fatal wounds, did not share a common purpose to murder . . . and had no specific intent to kill the victims when the fatal wounds were inflicted\" constituted error" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2552812 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558" }, { "page": "558" }, { "page": "557-62" }, { "page": "557" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0543-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 857, "char_count": 18940, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.07556580693429e-07, "percentile": 0.7583434401001757 }, "sha256": "3686ce84dc2220cd276dd0320f0a4ba1003be24fc88db4b75d4b21fe1c22f0a7", "simhash": "1:5326c4a2c43f1853", "word_count": 3040 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:09:36.911228+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge HUNTER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM RASHAD LUCAS, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nDefendant appeals judgments entered upon convictions by a jury of second-degree kidnapping, first-degree burglary and possession of a weapon of mass destruction. We award a new trial as to the kidnapping and burglary offenses.\nThe State\u2019s evidence at trial tended to show the following: On 18 January 1997, Dale McLean (McLean), his girlfriend Gwendolyn Morrison (Morrison), his ten year old daughter Chasity, and his six year old son Junior, were together at McLean\u2019s trailer home (the trailer) in Harnett County. At approximately 8:00 p.m., McLean heard a knock at the back door, looked out a window, and saw Jimmy Lawrence (Lawrence), Morrison\u2019s former boyfriend. Morrison stated she would \u201chandle it,\u201d and exited the trailer to speak with Lawrence. Lawrence insisted that Morrison come with him and, upon her refusal, pointed a nine millimeter pistol at her. Morrison glanced around and observed defendant standing silently near the trailer with a sawed-off shotgun resting across his stomach. Morrison told Lawrence she \u201cdidn\u2019t want no trouble\u201d and would get her clothes and leave with him.\nMorrison thereupon entered the trailer, but Lawrence \u201cbusted his way\u201d in as she closed the door and pushed past her. McLean, who had been in the bedroom, confronted Lawrence in the hallway. The latter pointed his pistol at McLean and pulled the trigger, but the weapon failed to discharge. On a second attempt, the gun fired and the shot struck McLean in the head. McLean fell to the floor and Lawrence continued to shoot at him from point-blank range.\nWhen Lawrence ceased firing, Morrison noticed defendant \u201cstanding in the door,\u201d holding the sawed-off shotgun. Lawrence threatened Morrison, indicating he would kill her if she refused to accompany him, and \u201cgrabbed [her] by the arm and took [her] out to [his] truck.\u201d According to Morrison, defendant, who was driving, chastised Lawrence, asserting Lawrence \u201cshould have killed her too because she\u2019s going to tell it.\u201d The group transferred into defendant\u2019s automobile at the residence of Lawrence\u2019s father. Defendant then drove to a local hotel and waited in the vehicle with Morrison while Lawrence registered.\nShortly after the three entered the room secured by Lawrence, the latter asked defendant to obtain some clothes for Morrison. As defendant left to comply, Morrison noted defendant\u2019s sawed-off shotgun remained on a bed. Within forty-five minutes, defendant returned with clothes for Morrison and departed a second time. Lawrence then sexually assaulted Morrison. Eventually, Lawrence vacated the hotel in the company of his father. Morrison telephoned her cousin, who picked Morrison up, and then notified police.\nIn her testimony, Chasity identified defendant as the man she had seen with Lawrence on 18 January 1997. Chasity indicated defendant had carried a \u201clong gun\u201d and was standing \u201chalf-inside and half-outside the door\u201d when Lawrence shot McLean. She also related that both men were wearing black pants, black coats and black baseball hats.\nChasity stated she telephoned McLean\u2019s mother, Eloise Swann (Swann). Swann testified she went to the trailer following the call and that Chasity told her, \u201cit was two men.\u201d In Chasity\u2019s statement to police at 9:20 p.m. on 18 January 1997, she reported that \u201cthe men came in and both had guns.\u201d\nIn a 3:30 p.m. statement to police on 19 January 1997, defendant initially maintained he had been riding around with a friend between 6:00 and 9:00 p.m. on the previous day. When Special Agent Sam Pennica told defendant Lawrence had implicated defendant, the latter modified his statement. Defendant then related he drove with Lawrence to an unfamiliar trailer on 18 January 1997, but that he \u201cdid not know . . . why Lawrence wanted to go to the trailer.\u201d Defendant insisted he possessed no weapon and was not aware Lawrence was carrying a gun. According to defendant, he stood near the trailer stairs while Lawrence entered and returned to the vehicle to wait for Lawrence upon hearing shots being fired. Defendant acknowledged that he drove Morrison and Lawrence to the home of Lawrence\u2019s father, but maintained he simply transported the pair to that location and thereafter spent the night at the residence of his girlfriend.\nAt trial, defendant testified that he rode with Lawrence in the latter\u2019s truck to pick up a female friend. He noticed Lawrence had a gun and placed his shotgun in the truck upon Lawrence\u2019s explanation that, \u201cyou never know. Anything can happen.\u201d Defendant stated he waited by the trailer steps while Lawrence entered and, upon hearing shots, looked into the doorway and saw Lawrence struggling with someone. Defendant thereupon ran to the truck and was soon joined by Morrison and Lawrence. Defendant complied with Lawrence\u2019s directive to drive to the home of Lawrence\u2019s father and change vehicles.\nLawrence then \u201cbegg[ed]\u201d defendant to locate a hotel. Defendant did so and waited in the vehicle with Morrison while Lawrence registered. Defendant agreed to Lawrence\u2019s request that defendant hide the nine millimeter pistol, but insisted he did not know what had happened to his shotgun. Defendant further testified he left the hotel, but that Lawrence paged him within three minutes and requested that he obtain clothes for Morrison. Defendant borrowed some clothes from his girlfriend, brought them to the hotel and returned to her residence, where he hid the nine-millimeter pistol.\nThe jury returned verdicts of guilty of second-degree kidnapping and first-degree burglary upon the theory of aiding and abetting, as well as guilty of possession of a weapon of mass destruction. The trial court entered judgment 24 February 1998 and imposed the following consecutive sentences:\n1) 97 CRS 1007 \u2014 Possession of a weapon of mass destruction: minimum of 16 months and maximum of 20 months imprisonment;\n2) 97 CRS 735 \u2014 Second degree kidnapping: minimum of 85 months and maximum of 99 months, including a 60 month firearm penalty enhancement;\n3) 97 CRS 1008 \u2014 Burglary in first degree: minimum of 124 months and maximum of 146 months, including a 60 month firearm penalty enhancement.\nDefendant appeals.\nInitially, we note defendant has advanced in his appellate brief only six of his thirty-two specified assignments of error: twenty-one, twenty-two, twenty-three, twenty-six, twenty-seven and twenty-nine. Accordingly, we do not address defendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(5) (assignments of error not set forth in an appellant\u2019s brief are deemed abandoned).\nIn his first argument, defendant attacks the trial court\u2019s rejection of his request at trial for a jury instruction, pursuant to State v. Blankenship, 337 N.C. 543, 447 S.E.2d 727 (1994), overruled by State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 481 S.E.2d 44 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 876, 139 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1997), and cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1024, 140 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1998), regarding specific intent relative to the charges of first degree burglary and second degree kidnapping. Defendant submitted in writing the following proposed jury instruction:\nThat the defendant... intended to commit (the felony). That is he had the specific intent to (name elements of felony). It is not sufficient that the State prove that [Lawrence] intentionally committed (the felony); rather the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] himself, had a specific intent to commit (the felony).\nThe trial court denied the request, and overruled defendant\u2019s objection to the following instruction:\nNow, as to aiding and abetting in the charge of burglary and first- or second-degree kidnapping, a person may be guilty of a crime although he personally does not do any of the acts necessary to constitute that crime. A person who aids and abets another to commit a crime is guilty of that crime.... [T]o find the Defendant guilty of another crime because of aiding and abetting the State must prove generally three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that the crime was committed by . . . Lawrence. Second, that the Defendant knowingly encouraged or aided [Lawrence] to commit that crime. And third, that the Defendant\u2019s actions or statements caused or contributed to the commission of the crime by [Lawrence].\n[A]s to burglary by aiding and abetting I charge that if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that. . . Lawrence committed burglary [which is defined as \u201cthe breaking and entering of the occupied dwelling house of another without his consent in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony, and in this case the felony of murder,\u201d] and that the Defendant was actually present at the time the crime was committed and that the Defendant knowingly encouraged or aided [Lawrence] to commit the crime and that in so doing the Defendant\u2019s actions or statements caused or contributed to the commission of the crime by [Lawrence], your duty would be to return a verdict of guilty of burglary by aiding and abetting.\nAs to second-degree kidnapping [which is defined as the \u201cunlawful confining, restraining or removal of a person from one place to another without the person\u2019s consent for the purpose of doing serious bodily harm or terrorizing that person\u201d] by aiding and abetting, I charge that if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the alleged date [Lawrence] committed second-degree kidnapping and that the Defendant was actually present at the time the crime was committed and that the Defendant knowingly encouraged and aided [Lawrence] to commit the crime and that in so doing the Defendant\u2019s actions or statements caused or contributed to the commission of the crime by [Lawrence].\nIt is well established that \u201c[w]hen a defendant makes a timely written request for an instruction that is correct in law and supported by the evidence,\u201d State v. Dodd, 330 N.C. 747, 753, 412 S.E.2d 46, 49 (1992), the trial court is required to relate \u201cthe substance of that instruction,\u201d id., and that failure to do so constitutes reversible error, State v. Spicer, 285 N.C. 274, 284, 204 S.E.2d 641, 647 (1974). However, when the trial court\u2019s charge \u201cadequately convey[s] the substance of defendant\u2019s proper request[,] no further instructions [a]re necessary.\u201d State v. Green, 305 N.C. 463, 477, 290 S.E.2d 625, 633 (1982).\nIn Blankenship, our Supreme Court held that\nwhen an accused is charged with acting in concert in relation to a specific-intent crime, the prosecution must prove, [and there must be an instruction relating,] that each individual defendant possessed the requisite mens rea to commit the specified crime.\nState v. Rivera, 350 N.C. 285, 292, 514 S.E.2d 720, 724 (1999) (citing Blankenship, 337 N.C. at 558, 447 S.E.2d at 736); see Blankenship, 337 N.C. at 558, 447 S.E.2d at 736 (jury instructions which failed to include requirement that each defendant prosecuted under acting in concert theory must have possessed the requisite intent to commit the charged specific intent crime deemed erroneous).\nOur Supreme Court subsequently applied the Blankenship rule to the theory of aiding and abetting in State v. Allen, 339 N.C. 545, 558, 453 S.E.2d 150, 157 (jury instruction relating defendant \u201cshould have known\u201d or had \u201creasonable grounds to believe\u201d another was going to commit murder failed to satisfy Blankenship rule because it \u201cd[id] not convey the concept of specific intent necessary for aiding and abetting a first-degree murder\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 676, 483 S.E.2d 396, 413-14, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997); see also State v. Williams, 299 N.C. 652, 656, 263 S.E.2d 774, 777 (1980) (\u201cdistinction between aiding and abetting and acting in concert... is of little significance\u201d (citations omitted)), and State v. Roope, 130 N.C. App. 356, 363-64, 503 S.E.2d 118, 124 (according to Blankenship rule, \u201c[ujnder either an acting in concert or an aiding and abetting theory, joint participants in a crime can be convicted only where each participant has the requisite mens rea for that crime\u201d), disc. review denied, 349 N.C. 374, 525 S.E.2d 189 (1998).\nAlthough subsequently overruling Blankenship in Barnes, our Supreme Court specifically indicated its decision was not to be applied retrospectively. Barnes, 345 N.C. at 234, 481 S.E.2d at 72. Because the crimes with which defendant was charged occurred 18 January 1997, prior to Barnes, Blankenship governs the case sub judice. See State v. Barrow, 350 N.C. 640, 648, 517 S.E.2d 374, 379 (1999) (Blankenship rule applies to crimes committed 21 January 1995 (after 9 September 1994 Blankenship decision but prior to 10 February 1997 Barnes decision)). Accordingly, defendant\u2019s conviction of a specific intent crime under an aiding and abetting theory would be improper unless the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he personally \u201cpossessed the requisite mens rea to commit the specified crime.\u201d Rivera, 350 N.C. at 292, 514 S.E.2d at 724.\nKidnapping and first degree burglary are specific intent crimes. See State v. Surrett, 109 N.C. App. 344, 348, 427 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1993) (\u201c[k]idnapping is a specific intent crime\u201d and State must prove defendant \u201cunlawfully confined, restrained, or removed the victim for one of the specified purposes outlined in the statute\u201d), and State v. Simpson, 299 N.C. 377, 380, 261 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1980) (\u201c[f]elonious intent is an essential element of [first degree] burglary which the State must allege and prove\u201d).\nDefendant argues the trial court\u2019s aiding and abetting instructions were erroneous in failing to require that the jury find he possessed the specific criminal intent for commission of first degree burglary and second degree kidnapping. As Blankenship governs the instant case, see Barrow, 350 N.C. at 648, 517 S.E.2d at 379, and Rivera, 350 N.C. at 292, 514 S.E.2d at 724, we must agree.\nTo be convicted as an aider and abettor,\none must . . . share the criminal intent with the principal, and render assistance or encouragement to him in the commission of the crime.\nAllen, 339 N.C. at 558, 453 S.E.2d at 157 (citation omitted); see Gaines, 345 N.C. at 676, 483 S.E.2d at 413-14 (requirement of actual or constructive presence to prove crime under aiding and abetting theory abrogated).\nUpon review of the challenged instructions sub judice, we conclude the trial court\u2019s use of the phrases \u201cknowingly encouraged and[/or] aided\u201d did not \u201cadequately convey\u201d the requisite specific intent concept as expressly requested by defendant in writing, see Green, 305 N.C. at 477, 290 S.E.2d at 633, and the trial court therefore committed reversible \u00e9rror in failing to relate the substance of defendant\u2019s requested instruction, see Spicer, 285 N.C. at 284, 204 S.E.2d at 647; see also Blankenship, 337 N.C. at 557-62, 447 S.E.2d at 734-38 (specific intent required to satisfy intent element of first-degree murder on acting in concert theory), and Allen, 339 N.C. at 558, 453 S.E.2d at 157 (instruction relating defendant \u201cshould have known\u201d or had \u201creasonable grounds to believe\u201d another was going to commit murder failed to satisfy Blankenship because it \u201cd[id] not convey the concept of specific intent necessary for aiding and abetting a first-degree murder\u201d).\nThe State counters that the trial court\u2019s inclusion in its jury charge of the phrase \u201cknowingly aided\u201d was approved in Allen as having given rise to a \u201cprobable interpretation\u201d by the jury that it was required to find \u201cthat defendant knowingly participated in the crime based on an intent to assist\u201d the perpetrator in committing it. Allen, 339 N.C. at 558, 453 S.E.2d at 158. However, the defendant therein had failed to proffer any specific requested instruction nor did he object to the court\u2019s charge to the jury, thereby requiring plain error review on appeal of the entire jury charge to determine whether the \u201cinstructional error . . . had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding of guilt.\u201d Id. at 558, 453 S.E.2d at 157-58 (under plain error review, \u201c[i]t is a rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction where no objection has been made in the trial court\u201d) (citations omitted).\nBy contrast, defendant in the case sub judice tendered written requested instructions delineating the requirement of specific intent for conviction based upon the theory of aiding and abetting, and interposed appropriate objections to the trial court\u2019s failure to so instruct the jury, thereby obviating plain error review. As opposed to a plain error analysis, our decision herein is governed by Spicer, wherein failure to relate the substance of \u201ca timely written request for an instruction that is correct in law and supported by the evidence,\u201d Dodd, 330 N.C. at 753, 412 S.E.2d at 49, was held to constitute reversible error, Spicer, 285 N.C. at 284, 204 S.E.2d at 647.\nIn short, the trial court erred in failing to include within its charge to the jury the substance of defendant\u2019s properly requested instruction. See id., and Blankenship, 337 N.C. at 557, 447 S.E.2d at 736 (\u201cinstructions permitting] defendant to be convicted of [first degree murder] when he himself did not inflict the fatal wounds, did not share a common purpose to murder . . . and had no specific intent to kill the victims when the fatal wounds were inflicted\u201d constituted error).\nIn light of our holding awarding defendant a new trial on the charges of first degree burglary and second degree kidnapping, we decline to discuss defendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error.\nNew trial.\nChief Judge EAGLES and Judge HUNTER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General K.D. Sturgis, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defender Danielle M. Carman, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM RASHAD LUCAS, Defendant\nNo. COA99-24\n(Filed 6 June 2000)\nAiding and Abetting\u2014 burglary \u2014 kidnapping\u2014Blankenship rule \u2014 specific intent\nSince the crimes with which defendant was charged occurred prior to the Barnes decision and Blankenship governs, the trial court committed reversible error by failing to include within its jury charge the substance of defendant\u2019s written instruction, requiring a showing of specific intent for the convictions of first-degree burglary and second-degree kidnapping, because: (1) defendant\u2019s conviction for a specific intent crime under an aiding and abetting theory would be improper unless the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he personally possessed the requisite mens rea to commit the specified crime; and (2) the trial court\u2019s use of the phrases \u201cknowingly encouraged and/or aided\u201d did not adequately convey the requisite specific intent concept as expressly requested by defendant in writing.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 24 February 1998 by Judge Wiley F. Bowen in Harnett County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 October 1999.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General K.D. Sturgis, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defender Danielle M. Carman, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0226-01", "first_page_order": 256, "last_page_order": 264 }