{ "id": 11080920, "name": "GRANVIL PEAGLER, Employee-Plaintiff v. TYSON FOODS, INC., Self Insured, Self Administered, Employer-Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Peagler v. Tyson Foods, Inc.", "decision_date": "2000-07-05", "docket_number": "No. COA99-618", "first_page": "593", "last_page": "605", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "138 N.C. App. 593" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "357 S.E.2d 670", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4728157 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 S.E.2d 254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 N.C. App. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549481 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/33/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 S.E.2d 165", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519554 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 S.E.2d 158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 589", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170193 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0589-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 S.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155858 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 S.E.2d 705", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11237233 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 792", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2492933, 2490126, 2490832, 2488406, 2492061 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0230-01", "/nc/325/0230-04", "/nc/325/0230-03", "/nc/325/0230-05", "/nc/325/0230-02" ] }, { "cite": "377 S.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527961 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 S.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205", "parenthetical": "citing Woolard v. N.C. Dept. of Transportation, 93 N.C. App. 214, 377 S.E.2d 267, cert. denied, 325 N.C. 230, 381 S.E.2d 792 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11240508 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Woolard v. N.C. Dept. of Transportation, 93 N.C. App. 214, 377 S.E.2d 267, cert. denied, 325 N.C. 230, 381 S.E.2d 792 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 623", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560289, 8560267, 8560333, 8560306, 8560243 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0196-03", "/nc/300/0196-02", "/nc/300/0196-05", "/nc/300/0196-04", "/nc/300/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 S.E.2d 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 N.C. App. 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548032 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/45/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155680, 1155937, 1155818, 1155563, 1155769 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0106-02", "/nc/351/0106-05", "/nc/351/0106-01", "/nc/351/0106-04", "/nc/351/0106-03" ] }, { "cite": "516 S.E.2d 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "898" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11142871 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 S.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 N.C. App. 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554545 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/8/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 S.E.2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 N.C. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570996 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/262/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 S.E.2d 268", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272-73" }, { "page": "272" }, { "page": "272-73" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 N.C. App. 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170012 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94-95" }, { "page": "94-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/52/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 S.E.2d 419", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11466277 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 S.E.2d 753", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "760" }, { "page": "759" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569848 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" }, { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" }, { "page": "392" }, { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559969 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167" }, { "page": "169" }, { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 S.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522", "parenthetical": "quoting Click v. Freight Carriers, 300 N.C. 164, 167, 265 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1980)" }, { "page": "522", "parenthetical": "quoting Click v. Freight Carriers, 300 N.C. 164, 167, 265 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. App. 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11215486 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29", "parenthetical": "quoting Click v. Freight Carriers, 300 N.C. 164, 167, 265 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1980)" }, { "page": "28", "parenthetical": "quoting Click v. Freight Carriers, 300 N.C. 164, 167, 265 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/133/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575582 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 S.E.2d 831", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "835", "parenthetical": "quoting Anderson v. Lincoln Construction Co., 265 N.C. 431, 434, 144 S.E.2d 272, 275 (1965)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11203821 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655", "parenthetical": "quoting Anderson v. Lincoln Construction Co., 265 N.C. 431, 434, 144 S.E.2d 272, 275 (1965)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11091829 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 S.E.2d 175", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571714, 571611 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0363-02", "/nc/349/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "503 S.E.2d 113", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11468190 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "445" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 S.E.2d 777", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780", "parenthetical": "quoting Shaw v. Smith and Jennings, Inc., 130 N.C. App. 442, 445, 503 S.E.2d 113, 116, disc. review denied, 349 N.C. 363, 525 S.E.2d 175 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11240405 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301", "parenthetical": "quoting Shaw v. Smith and Jennings, Inc., 130 N.C. App. 442, 445, 503 S.E.2d 113, 116, disc. review denied, 349 N.C. 363, 525 S.E.2d 175 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 S.E.2d 189", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571831 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 S.E.2d 857", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "862", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572007 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E.2d 101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565283 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132290, 132156, 132021, 132280, 132220 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0099-04", "/nc/350/0099-02", "/nc/350/0099-01", "/nc/350/0099-03", "/nc/350/0099-05" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 568", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11200178 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0383-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1034, "char_count": 27212, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.670701539891775e-07, "percentile": 0.9278776484652194 }, "sha256": "9e4655f9ba91b85c34ec4da2285c4ef7dd01304f6c199e52813140ad83a5cb62", "simhash": "1:2ba564ee2496161f", "word_count": 4311 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:09:36.911228+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and HUNTER concur." ], "parties": [ "GRANVIL PEAGLER, Employee-Plaintiff v. TYSON FOODS, INC., Self Insured, Self Administered, Employer-Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EAGLES, Chief Judge.\nDefendant Tyson Foods, Inc. appeals from an order of the Industrial Commission awarding the plaintiff workers\u2019 compensation benefits for a work-related injury which occurred on 28 April 1993.\nEvidence before the Commission included the following: Plaintiff Granvil Peagler began working for Defendant Tyson Foods in 1985. Mr. Peagler had dropped out of school after the third grade and was illiterate. At Tyson Foods, Mr. Peagler\u2019s job entailed washing out eighteen wheeler refrigeration trucks, checking the tire pressure and fuel level, and moving the trucks as needed. On 28 April 1993, plaintiff, age fifty six, was working during his shift when he had difficulty closing one of the rear doors on a refrigeration truck. Plaintiff stood on the bumper of the truck and struck the lock on the trailer door with his left hand, which immediately caused pain in his arm. Plaintiff went to the employer\u2019s medical department and bought two Tylenol tablets for the pain. The next morning, while at work, plaintiff experienced pain in his arm, shoulder, and chest. Plaintiff went to the medical department and told the personnel on duty that he needed to go see his doctor. He then left work to visit his family doctor, Dr. Willis.\nOver the next few days, plaintiff was examined by several different physicians. The doctors initially thought that plaintiff might have had a heart attack. However, after an MRI on 4 May 1993, the doctors concluded that plaintiff suffered from a herniated disc. The test indicated that plaintiff had \u201ccervical osteophytic spurring, mild disc stenosis, ... a disc herniation at the C4-5 level, . . . and disc protrusions/herniations noted at the C3-4, C5-6 and C6-7 levels.\u201d On 24 May 1993, Dr. Darden, an orthopedic surgeon, operated on plaintiff for \u201ca microscopic anterior cervical discotomy and fusion at C6-7, and a right anterior iliac crest bone graft.\u201d\nDefendant placed plaintiff on disability medical leave after this incident. Plaintiff\u2019s wife went to the benefits department to renew his leave each month. However, Mrs. Peagler did not inform the defendant-employer\u2019s benefit counselor that her husband\u2019s injury was work-related.\nPlaintiff filed a Notice of Accident on 14 April 1994 for the injury that occurred on 28 April 1993. Deputy Commissioner Mary M. Hoag concluded that the plaintiff sustained a compensable injury on 28 April 1993; that his failure to report his injury in a timely manner was excusable and defendants were not prejudiced by this delay; and that defendants were not entitled to a credit for the disability payments made to the plaintiff. The defendant appealed to the full Commission.\nThe full Commission affirmed the deputy commissioner\u2019s decision and ordered the defendant to pay plaintiff temporary total disability compensation, medical bills related to plaintiff\u2019s injury, and attorneys fees. The Industrial Commission\u2019s award is based on the following findings of fact:\n30. According to Dr. Darden, plaintiff\u2019s attempt to close the truck doors on 28 April 1993 could have caused plaintiff\u2019s neck, left arm and shoulder injuries. However, plaintiff\u2019s disc degeneration at C4-5, C5-6, and C7 was more likely than not normal wear and tear. The aging process causes degenerative disc disease and that trauma can cause it to be symptomatic.\n37. Plaintiff sustained an injury by way of specific traumatic injury of the work assigned on 28 April 1993. Plaintiffs problems related to his left arm, shoulder and neck, involving the herniation of a cervical disc at C6-7.\n39. ... There is no evidence of record that plaintiff is able to perform work of any kind or to earn wages of any kind. Moreover, there is no evidence of record that any job exists for which plaintiff is suited given his educational and physical limitations, age and experience.\nDefendant filed a motion for reconsideration on 5 February 1998, which the full Commission denied. Defendant appeals.\nOn appeal from an award of the Industrial Commission, the scope of our appellate review is limited to two questions: (1) whether the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence in the record; and (2) whether the findings of fact justify the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law. See Sanders v. Broyhill Furniture Indus., 131 N.C. App. 383, 387, 507 S.E.2d 568, 570 (1998), disc. review denied, 350 N.C. 99, 528 S.E.2d 367 (1999). This Court does not weigh the evidence; if there is any competent evidence which supports the Commission\u2019s findings, we are bound by their findings even though there may be evidence to the contrary. See Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 283 S.E.2d 101 (1981). Furthermore, it is well established that the Worker\u2019s Compensation Act \u201c \u2018should be liberally construed to the end that the benefits thereof should not be denied upon technical, narrow and strict interpretation.\u2019 \u201d Hall v. Chevrolet Co., 263 N.C. 569, 576, 139 S.E.2d 857, 862 (1965) (citations omitted).\nWe first consider whether the Industrial Commission erred in concluding that the plaintiff\u2019s medical condition and disability is the result of the 28 April 1993 incident. The defendant argues that the Commission erred in affirming the award of compensation because the plaintiff did not establish that his condition was caused by the work-related incident. In order for there to be a compensable claim for workers\u2019 compensation, there must be proof of a causal relationship between the injury and the employment. See Booker v. Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458, 475, 256 S.E.2d 189, 200 (1979). The injury is compensable if \u201c \u2018it is fairly traceable to the employment\u2019 or \u2018any reasonable relationship to the employment exists.\u2019 \u201d Rivera v. Trapp, 135 N.C. App. 296, 301, 519 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1999) (quoting Shaw v. Smith and Jennings, Inc., 130 N.C. App. 442, 445, 503 S.E.2d 113, 116, disc. review denied, 349 N.C. 363, 525 S.E.2d 175 (1998)). In evaluating the causation issue, \u201cthis Court can do no more than examine the record to determine whether any competent evidence exists to support the Commission\u2019s findings as to causation . . . .\u201d Young v. Hickory Business Furniture, 137 N.C. App. 51, 55, 527 S.E.2d 344, 348 (2000). \u201c[W]hen conflicting evidence is presented, \u2018the Commission\u2019s finding of causal connection between the accident and the disability is conclusive.\u2019 \u201d Bailey v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 131 N.C. App. 649, 655, 508 S.E.2d 831, 835 (1998) (quoting Anderson v. Lincoln Construction Co., 265 N.C. 431, 434, 144 S.E.2d 272, 275 (1965)).\nHere, expert medical testimony was required to establish causation. This Court has stated \u201cwhere the exact nature and probable genesis of a particular type of injury involves complicated medical questions far removed from the ordinary experience and knowledge of laymen, only an expert can give competent opinion evidence as to the cause of the injury.\u201d Porter v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., 133 N.C. App. 23, 29, 514 S.E.2d 517, 522 (1999) (quoting Click v. Freight Carriers, 300 N.C. 164, 167, 265 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1980)). In Click v. Freight Carriers, 300 N.C. 164, 265 S.E.2d 389 (1980), the Court determined that expert medical testimony was required to establish causation between a specific trauma and the rupture of the plaintiff\u2019s inverte-bral disc. Click, 300 N.C. at 169, 265 S.E.2d at 392. See also Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 325, 139 S.E.2d 753, 760 (1965).\n' Here, the plaintiff\u2019s doctor, Dr. Darden, testified that he examined the plaintiff on 11 May 1993 and operated on Mr. Peagler\u2019s herniated disc on 24 May 1993. On 1 June 1993, Mr. Peagler told Dr. Darden about the work-related incident involving the trailer door. When asked on direct examination whether the incident Mr. Peagler described could have caused Mr. Peagler\u2019s disc problems, Dr. Darden testified, \u201c[i]t could have.\u201d\nHowever, on cross examination, the following exchange took place:\nDefendant\u2019s Attorney: And isn\u2019t it true that with a herniated disc . . . this can have any number of causes, can\u2019t it?\nDoctor Darden: That\u2019s correct.\nQ: And you can herniate a disc by bending over to tie your shoe, right?\nA. That\u2019s correct.\nQ. Sneezing?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Even rolling over in bed you can herniate a disc; is that correct?\nA. That\u2019s theoretically possible.\nQ. So, really, from looking at the CAT scan or the MRI, there is no way to tell what the cause of the disc herniation is, is there?\nA. No.\nQ. And you can\u2019t be sure, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, what caused Mr. Peagler\u2019s disc herniation in his neck, can you?\nA. That\u2019s correct.\nQ. Now, with this MRI that was done, it says that he has a disc herniation in the lower back. You have no idea what caused that, do you?\nA. No.\nDefendant argues that the doctor\u2019s testimony, viewed as a whole, indicates that his opinion as to the cause of plaintiff\u2019s disc injury was based upon mere speculation.\nAt the outset, we note that the expert testimony need not show that the work incident caused the injury to a \u201creasonable degree of medical certainty.\u201d Cooke v. P.H. Glatfelter/Ecusta, 130 N.C. App. 220, 224, 502 S.E.2d 419, 422 (1998). Rather, the competent evidence must provide \u201csome evidence that the accident at least might have or could have produced the particular disability in question.\u201d Porter v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., 133 N.C. App. 23, 28, 514 S.E.2d 517, 522 (1999) (quoting Click v. Freight Carriers, 300 N.C. 164, 167, 265 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1980)).\nThis case is analogous to Buck v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 52 N.C. App. 88, 94-95, 278 S.E.2d 268, 272-73 (1981), where the plaintiff\u2019s doctor testified that the plaintiff\u2019s disc protrusion could have been caused by an accident at work. There, the doctor also testified that it was \u201cequally possible\u201d that \u201cthe defect was degenerative in nature.\u201d Id. at 94, 278 S.E.2d at 272. This Court upheld the award of workers compensation to plaintiff. The Court stated:\nIn Lockwood v. McCaskill, 262 N.C. 663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964), the Supreme Court held that an expert\u2019s opinion that a particular cause \u201ccould\u201d or \u201cmight\u201d have produced the result indicates that the result is capable of proceeding from the particular cause within the realm of reasonable probability. . . . [T]he Court [further] recognized that \u201c[a] result in a particular case may stem from a number of causes.\u201d 262 N.C. at 668, 138 S.E.2d at 545. All that is necessary is that expert express an opinion that a particular cause was capable of producing the injurious result. Id.\nBuck v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 52 N.C. App. 88, 94-95, 278 S.E.2d 268, 272-73 (1981).\nHere, Dr. Darden testified that the 28 April 1993 incident could have produced the plaintiffs disc injury. The doctor also testified that most people, as they age, experience asymptomatic degenerative disc changes. However, the doctor testified that specific trauma could cause the degenerative disc changes to become symptomatic, as here; the trauma experienced by Mr. Peagler on 28 April 1993 could have caused a herniated disc.\nThis is not a case where the record is devoid of a \u201cscintilla of medical evidence that plaintiffs ruptured disc, might, with reasonable probability, have resulted from the accident.\u201d Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 324, 139 S.E.2d 753, 759 (1965). Rather, Dr. Darden\u2019s expert testimony provides evidence that the work-related incident could have produced the particular disability in question. Here, Dr. Darden, like the doctor in Buck, did not testify that the work-related incident could not have caused the plaintiff\u2019s condition.\nMoreover, we note that Dr. Darden\u2019s testimony is corroborated by other testimony. The plaintiff testified that he had never had any problems with his back or neck before the night of 28 April 1993. He also testified that the onset of pain was simultaneous with the incident. The Industrial Commission found that \u201c [immediately after striking the latch with his hand, plaintiff felt pain and a tingling sensation in his left arm.\u201d This case is analogous to Soles v. Farm Equipment Co., 8 N.C. App. 658, 175 S.E.2d 339 (1970), where this Court analyzed the issue of causation and affirmed the award of workers\u2019 compensation benefits for the plaintiff\u2019s disc injury. There, the doctor testified that \u201cbending over or lifting objects can cause a disc\u201d injury. Id. at 660, 175 S.E.2d at 341. This testimony, combined with the testimony that the onset of pain was simultaneous with the work-related incident, was sufficient to establish causation.\nAdditionally, defendant argues that the competent evidence did not support the finding that the plaintiff was unable to perform work of any kind. Here, the Industrial Commission found that \u201cthere is no evidence of record that any job exists for which plaintiff is suited given his educational and physical limitations, age and experience.\u201d Dr. Darden testified that the plaintiff might have been able to return to a sedentary type of employment. However, the evidence also showed that the plaintiff, at the time of the injury, was fifty six years old, educated only through the third grade level, and illiterate. Aside from plaintiff\u2019s back and neck problems, he also suffers from diabetes. Defendant employer did not provide plaintiff with any vocational counseling or rehabilitation services. We conclude that the Industrial Commission did not err in concluding that the plaintiff was unable to work. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s assignment of error is without merit.\nNext, we consider whether the Commission erred by failing to make sufficient findings of fact to resolve all of the material issues raised by the evidence. In particular, the defendant argues that the Commission failed to make sufficient findings regarding the testimony of defendant\u2019s witnesses. This testimony included statements by defendant\u2019s co-workers that he did not report his work-related injury to them, statements by employees of the benefits department that plaintiff did not ask for workers\u2019 compensation benefits or report the work-related injury, and a statement by one co-worker indicating that the plaintiffs wife had said that, at one point, she thought that his injury was caused by his repair work at home.\nIn a workers\u2019 compensation case, the Industrial Commission is the finder of fact. \u201c[I]t is exclusively within the Commission\u2019s province to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence and the weight each is to receive.\u201d Lanning v. Fieldcrest-Cannon, Inc., 134 N.C. App. 53, 57, 516 S.E.2d 894, 898, disc. review allowed, 351 N.C. 106,- S.E.2d - (1999). In making these determinations, the Commission may not wholly disregard or ignore the competent evidence before it. See Harrell v. Stevens & Co., 45 N.C. App. 197, 262 S.E.2d 830, disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 196, 269 S.E.2d 623 (1980).\nHowever, \u201c[t]he Commission is not required ... to find facts as to all credible evidence. That requirement would place an unreasonable burden on the Commission. Instead the Commission must find those facts which are necessary to support its conclusions of law.\u201d London v. Snak Time Catering, Inc., 136 N.C. App. 473, 525 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2000) (citing Woolard v. N.C. Dept. of Transportation, 93 N.C. App. 214, 377 S.E.2d 267, cert. denied, 325 N.C. 230, 381 S.E.2d 792 (1989)).\nHere, there is no showing that the Commission ignored the testimony of defendant\u2019s witnesses. In its opinion and award, the Commission indicates that it \u201creviewed the prior Opinion and Award based upon the record of the proceedings before Deputy Commissioner Mary Hoag . ...\u201d This record included the testimony of defendant\u2019s witnesses. The Commission\u2019s findings of fact also indicate that it considered their testimony. The findings of fact show that the Commission realized that the plaintiff did not initially report his work-related injury to his co-workers or to the benefits department. The Industrial Commission found:\n33. Plaintiff\u2019s failure to report his injury to defendant in a timely manner is due to his lack of education, confusion resulting from the initial hospitalization for a possible heart attack, his lack of understanding of the causal relationship between the incident of hitting the truck door latch and the resulting injuries, and his reliance on his wife and Dr. Darden to notify defendant of the work-related injury.\n34. Plaintiff\u2019s [sic] did not inform defendant-employer\u2019s benefit counselor of her husband\u2019s work-related injury .... Mrs. Peagler was experiencing difficulty in getting the company health insurance department to pay plaintiff\u2019s medical bills.\n35. Betsy Maness, defendant-employer\u2019s agent, completed all plaintiff\u2019s forms for medical leave of absence, but had little experience with and did not understand workers\u2019 compensation claims. Ms. Maness never inquired as to whether plaintiff\u2019s injury was work-related, and always gave plaintiff and/or his wife the necessary forms for continuation of leave of absence when they appeared on the premises.\nFurther, the Commission\u2019s opinion and award clearly demonstrates that it accepted testimony that the injury was caused by the plaintiff\u2019s work-related incident and it thereby rejected the contrary testimony offered by one witness that the injury may have been caused by his repair work at home. Clearly the Commission considered all of the evidence before it; the Commission was not required to make an express finding that it did so. See Pittman v. International Paper Co., 132 N.C. App. 151, 510 S.E.2d 705, aff'd per curiam, 351 N.C. 42, 519 S.E.2d 524 (1999).\nNext we consider whether the Commission erred in concluding that the plaintiffs failure to give timely written notice of the accident was reasonable, and in concluding that the defendant was not prejudiced by the delay. Here, plaintiff was injured on 28 April 1993. The Form 18 was filed with the Industrial Commission on 14 April 1994. N.C.G.S. 97-22 states that no compensation shall be payable to an injured employee unless written notice is given within thirty days after the occurrence of the accident, \u201cunless reasonable excuse is made to the satisfaction of the Industrial Commission for not giving such notice and the Commission is satisfied that the employer has not been prejudiced thereby.\u201d Here, the Commission concluded that the plaintiff was reasonably excused from not giving written notice. The Commission concluded:\nPlaintiffs failure to timely report his injury to defendant is excusable due to his limited education, confusion resulting from the initial hospitalization for a possible heart attack, his lack of understanding of the causal relationship between the incident of hitting the truck door latch and the resulting injuries, and his reliance on his wife and Dr. Darden to notify defendant of the work-related injury.\nAdditionally, the Commission concluded \u201c[defendant was not unduly prejudiced by plaintiffs failure to timely file the Form 18 within thirty days after the injury.\u201d\n\u201cThe question of whether an employee has shown reasonable excuse depends on the reasonableness of his conduct under the circumstances.\u201d Lawton v. County of Durham, 85 N.C. App. 589, 592, 355 S.E.2d 158, 160 (1987). A reasonable excuse may be established where the employee does not initially know of the nature or probable compensable character of his injury. See id. Here, the evidence indicated that the plaintiff did not initially understand the nature or character of his injury. The evidence presented at the hearing indicated that plaintiff had a third grade education and was illiterate. The plaintiff testified that after he hit the truck door latch, he felt pain but he did not know what was wrong. The next day, plaintiff felt severe pain in his chest and arm. He testified, \u201cmy arm and shoulder and chest was hurting so bad I couldn\u2019t breathe.\u201d Plaintiff saw several doctors who initially thought that he may have suffered a heart attack. The plaintiff and his wife did not associate a possible heart attack with the work-related incident.\nAdditionally, plaintiff testified that he relied on his wife to communicate with his employer while he was undergoing medical treatment. Further, Mrs. Peagler handled all the paperwork relating to plaintiff\u2019s health condition because of her husband\u2019s illiteracy. Defendant\u2019s benefits employees gave Mrs. Peagler disability forms and never asked her whether her husband had experienced a work-related injury or whether this was a workers\u2019 compensation claim. The Commission clearly was satisfied that this evidence established a reasonable excuse.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-22 also requires that the Commission be satisfied that the employer has not been prejudiced by the delayed written notification. The burden is on the employer to show prejudice. See Jones v. Lowe\u2019s Companies, 103 N.C. App. 73, 404 S.E.2d 165 (1991). Even assuming defendant did not know about plaintiff\u2019s work injury, defendant presented no evidence that it was prejudiced in any way by plaintiff waiting to file his workers\u2019 compensation claim. See Sanders v. Broyhill Furniture Indus., 131 N.C. App. 383, 507 S.E.2d 568 (1998). Since the evidence is sufficient to support the Commission\u2019s findings that reasonable excuse for not giving the required written notice was shown, and that the employer was not prejudiced by the failure to give written notice, the findings are conclusive on appeal. See Key v. Woodcraft, Inc., 33 N.C. App. 310, 235 S.E.2d 254 (1977). This assignment of error is overruled.\nFinally, we consider whether the Commission erred in concluding that defendant was not entitled to a credit for disability payments to the plaintiff. Under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42:\nPayments made by the employer to the injured employee during the period of his disability, or to his dependents, which by the terms of this Article were not due and payable when made, may, subject to the approval of the Commission be deducted from the amount to be paid as compensation.\nThe rationale behind the statute is to encourage voluntary payments by the employer during the time of the worker\u2019s disability. See Foster v. Western-Electric Co., 320 N.C. 113, 357 S.E.2d 670 (1987).\nHere, the defendant\u2019s benefits employee, Betsy Manness, testified that plaintiff received two thousand five hundred and six dollars in disability compensation. She also testified that the disability compensation plan was entirely funded by the employer. The competent evidence in the record does not indicate that the employee contributed to this disability plan. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant is entitled to a credit for the disability benefits.\nWe therefore reverse the Industrial Commission on this issue and remand for entry of an Order which credits the defendants for disability payments made to the plaintiff.\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.\nJudges TIMMONS-GOODSON and HUNTER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "EAGLES, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "James S. Weidner, Jr. for plaintiff-appellee.", "Orbock Bowden Ruark & Dillard, PC, by Maureen Tierney Orbock, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GRANVIL PEAGLER, Employee-Plaintiff v. TYSON FOODS, INC., Self Insured, Self Administered, Employer-Defendant\nNo. COA99-618\n(Filed 5 July 2000)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 causation \u2014 work-related accident\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by concluding that plaintiff established his condition was caused by a work-related incident because: (1) a doctor testified that the 28 April 1993 incident at work could have produced plaintiff\u2019s disc injury, and all that is necessary is that an expert express an opinion that a particular cause was capable of producing the injurious result; and (2) the doctor\u2019s testimony is corroborated by other testimony, including plaintiff\u2019s testimony that he had never had any problems with his back or neck before the night of 28 April 1993 and his onset of pain was simultaneous with the incident.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 temporary total disability\u2014 diminished earning capacity \u2014 unable to perform work of any kind\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by awarding plaintiff-employee temporary total disability based on its conclusion that plaintiff was unable to perform work of any kind because: (1) at the time of injury to his back and neck, plaintiff was fifty-six years old, educated only through the third grade level and illiterate, and suffered from diabetes; and (2) defendant-employer did not provide plaintiff with any vocational counseling or rehabilitation services.\n3. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 witness credibility \u2014 determination by full Commission\nThe Industrial Commission did not fail to make sufficient findings of fact regarding the testimony of defendant-employer\u2019s witnesses in a workers\u2019 compensation case regarding plaintiff\u2019s failure to report the work-related injury and his wife\u2019s statement to one witness that the injury may have been caused by plaintiff\u2019s work at home, because: (1) there is no showing the Commission ignored the testimony of defendant\u2019s witnesses; (2) the findings of fact show the Commission realized that plaintiff did not initially report his work-related injury to his co-workers or to the benefits department; (3) the Commission\u2019s opinion and award reveals that it accepted the injury was caused by plaintiff\u2019s work-related incident and thereby rejected contrary testimony offered by one witness that the injury may have been caused by his repair work at home; and (4) the Commission considered all of the evidence before it, and it was not required to make an express finding that it did so.\n4. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 notice of accident \u2014 failure to give timely written notice \u2014 reasonable excuse \u2014 no prejudice\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by concluding that plaintiff\u2019s failure to give timely written notice of the accident was reasonable, and in concluding that defendant-employer was not prejudiced by the delay, because: (1) a reasonable excuse may be established where the employee does not initially know of the nature or probable com-pensable character of his injury, and the evidence indicated plaintiff did not initially understand the nature or character of his injury; (2) plaintiff relied on his wife to communicate with his employer while he was undergoing medical treatment, and defendant\u2019s benefits employees gave the wife disability forms without asking her whether her husband had experienced a work-related injury or whether this was a workers\u2019 compensation claim; and (3) defendant-employer did not meet its burden to present evidence to show how it was prejudiced by the delay. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-22.\n5. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 disability payments \u2014 employer\u2019s entitlement to a credit\nThe Industrial Commission erred in a workers\u2019 compensation case by concluding that defendant-employer was not entitled to a credit for disability payments to plaintiff-employee under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42, because: (1) plaintiff received $2,506 in disability compensation; (2) the disability compensation plan was entirely funded by the employer; and (3) the evidence does not indicate the employee contributed to this disability plan.\nAppeal by defendant from opinion and award of the full North Carolina Industrial Commission filed 7 January 1998. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 March 2000.\nJames S. Weidner, Jr. for plaintiff-appellee.\nOrbock Bowden Ruark & Dillard, PC, by Maureen Tierney Orbock, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0593-01", "first_page_order": 623, "last_page_order": 635 }