{
  "id": 9496659,
  "name": "LINDA NADDEO, ADMINISTRATRIX FOR THE ESTATE OF PATRICIA ANN TEEL, Plaintiff-Appellant v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee; ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee v. LISTON S. DARBY, Administrator of the Estate of Dwaine Lydell Darby; LINDA M NADDEO, Administrator for the Estate of Patricia Ann Teel; and KATHY DIXON, Administrator of the Estate of Jacqueline Melissa Mullis, Defendant-Appellants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Naddeo v. Allstate Insurance",
  "decision_date": "2000-08-01",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges GREENE and McGEE concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "LINDA NADDEO, ADMINISTRATRIX FOR THE ESTATE OF PATRICIA ANN TEEL, Plaintiff-Appellant v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee v. LISTON S. DARBY, Administrator of the Estate of Dwaine Lydell Darby; LINDA M NADDEO, Administrator for the Estate of Patricia Ann Teel; and KATHY DIXON, Administrator of the Estate of Jacqueline Melissa Mullis, Defendant-Appellants"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "EDMUNDS, Judge.\nThis dispute arises out of a single-car accident. During the evening of 30 April 1993, Dwaine Lydell Darby, Patricia Ann Teel, and Jacqueline Melissa Mullis were passengers in a vehicle driven by Otis Blount, who had consumed two pints of alcohol. After leaving a night club and heading toward a friend\u2019s house, at some time around midnight between 30 April and 1 May, the automobile left the roadway and struck a tree, killing all four occupants. Police received a report of the accident at 12:15 a.m. on 1 May 1993.\nOn 7 October 1994, Linda M. Naddeo (Naddeo), administratrix of the estate of passenger Teel, filed a complaint against, inter alia, Liston S. Darby (Darby), the administrator of the estate of Dwaine Darby, who owned the automobile. That suit, brought in Union County, was assigned civil number 94-CvS-1333.\nNaddeo\u2019s original complaint had alleged that the accident occurred at 12:15 a.m. on 1 May 1993. However, on 9 March 1995, Naddeo filed a motion to amend her complaint. This motion was granted, and Naddeo filed an amended complaint alleging that the time of the accident was \u201capproximately 11:00 p.m.\u201d on 30 April 1993.\nHaving received no response from Darby, Naddeo filed a motion for entry of default, and later for default judgment, which was entered on 21 August 1996. Upon entering default judgment, the trial court found that the allegations in the amended complaint were deemed admitted as a matter of law. Darby and his insurance carrier Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) moved to set aside the entry of default and default judgment on 11 November 1996. Although Allstate was not a named party to the suit, its actions as Darby\u2019s insurer were critical to the case. Allstate denied coverage, contending that the automobile policy issued to Darby (which plaintiff contended also covered Dwaine Darby) had been canceled at 12:01 a.m. on 1 May 1993.\nDarby\u2019s motion to set aside the default judgment was denied by order entered 28 February 1997. Darby appealed to this Court, which affirmed the ruling of the trial court, holding that (1) Allstate was aware of information that indicated that Darby\u2019s policy covered the accident, (2) Allstate\u2019s decision not to answer the complaint or defend the action constituted inexcusable neglect, and (3) Darby\u2019s own failure to follow up on the complaint after he turned it over to his attorney also constituted inexcusable neglect. See Estate of Teel v. Darby, 129 N.C. App. 604, 500 S.E.2d 759 (1998). No further appeal was taken.\nSubsequently, on 10 June 1998, Allstate brought suit against the estates of all the individuals killed in the accident. The complaint originally was filed in Mecklenburg County and assigned the civil number 98-CvS-8292, but later was transferred to Union County and assigned the number 98-CvS-1400. In this action, Allstate denied coverage of the claims and sought a declaratory judgment. On 21 December 1998, Naddeo filed a \u201cMotion to Dismiss, Answer, Special Defenses and Counterclaims,\u201d wherein she asserted \u201c[plaintiff\u2019s claims fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under North Carolina Rules of Court 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3) and 12(b)(6).\u201d Additionally, she denied all material allegations made by Allstate and asserted the defenses of issue preclusion, claim preclusion, and abatement. Finally, she counterclaimed seeking a \u201cdeclaratory judgment and adjudication concerning the rights and liabilities of Allstate to pay damages as entered in 94 CVS 01333,\u201d and asserting a claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices. Allstate answered Naddeo\u2019s counterclaim and made a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Thereafter, Naddeo made a motion for summary judgment. On the day of the summary judgment hearing, Allstate submitted an affidavit by a witness who purportedly observed Darby\u2019s vehicle being driven shortly before the accident at a time after midnight. After considering the affidavit over Naddeo\u2019s objection, the trial court denied Naddeo\u2019s motion in an amended order entered 16 February 1999.\nMeanwhile, because she had not received service and therefore was not immediately aware that Allstate had brought the action numbered 98-CvS-1400, Naddeo filed suit against Allstate on 24 June 1998 in an action assigned number 98-CvS-931, seeking a declaratory judgment ordering Allstate to pay pursuant to the judgment entered in 94-CvS-1333, as well as compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs, interest, and attorneys fees. Allstate answered and made a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6), 12(b)(1), and 12(b)(3). On 7 December 1998, Naddeo made a motion for summary judgment, and on 14 December 1998, Allstate made a motion to dismiss and/or abate, referencing its pending action in 98-CvS-1400. The trial court denied both parties\u2019 motions on 1 February 1999. Naddeo filed notices of appeal in both 98-CvS-1400 and 98-CvS-931 on 25 February 1999.\nI.\nWe note at the outset that the record on appeal fails to comply with N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(1), which requires that assignments (and cross-assignments) of error include \u201cclear and specific record or transcript references.\u201d Appellate judges find such references invaluable in directing the court\u2019s attention to the pertinent portions of the record demonstrating alleged error. Although failure to comply with the appellate rules subjects an appeal to dismissal, see Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 511 S.E.2d 298 (1999), for reasons of judicial economy, we elect to consider the appeal pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 2.\nII.\nDue to the interlocutory nature of the orders appealed, we must determine whether to consider the issues asserted on appeal. The orders from which Naddeo appeals are denials of motions for summary judgment in both 98-CvS-1400 and 98-CvS-931. \u201cAs a general rule, a moving party may not appeal the denial of a motion for summary judgment because ordinarily such an order does not affect a \u2018substantial right.\u2019 \u201d Bockweg v. Anderson, 333 N.C. 486, 490, 428 S.E.2d 157, 160 (1993) (citation omitted). In fact, \u201c[withholding appeal of denial of summary relief at the early stages of litigation in the trial court is generally favored.\u201d Country Club of Johnston County, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 135 N.C. App. 159, 161, 519 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1999) (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 352, -S.E.2d- (2000). However, interlocutory orders may be appealed in two instances:\nfirst, where there has been a final determination of at least one claim, and the trial court certifies there is no just reason to delay the appeal; and second, if delaying the appeal would prejudice a \u201csubstantial right.\u201d\nLiggett Group v. Sunas, 113 N.C. App. 19, 23-24, 437 S.E.2d 674, 677 (1993) (internal citations omitted).\nIn 98-CvS-931, the denial of Naddeo\u2019s motion for summary judgment is interlocutory, no claim has been determined, and the trial court has made no certification. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(b) (1999). Additionally, in that case, Naddeo is seeking \u201c[a] declaratory judgment ordering Allstate to pay Plaintiff for the damages granted, costs and interest in 94-CVS-01333\u201d as well as compensatory and punitive damages, costs, interest, and attorney\u2019s fees. Because no substantial right will be prejudiced by delaying the appeal until a final adjudication of the merits, Naddeo\u2019s appeal in this case is dismissed.\nIn 98-CvS-1400, Allstate seeks a declaratory judgment, raising policy defenses to liability. Naddeo answered, raised defenses, and counterclaimed, seeking declaratory judgment requiring Allstate to pay pursuant to the earlier suit (94-CvS-1333) and asserting a claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices. Although Naddeo moved unsuccessfully for summary judgment on all issues, her arguments on appeal relate solely to Allstate\u2019s claims and defenses. Accordingly, we do not address the denial of Naddeo\u2019s motion as it relates to her counterclaims. As to Allstate\u2019s claims and defenses, Naddeo asserts that they are barred by reason of issue or claim preclusion.\nOur Supreme Court has stated that the possibility of having to retry an issue already litigated can be a substantial right. See Green v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 603, 606, 290 S.E.2d 593, 595 (1982). Accordingly, \u201cthe denial of a motion for summary judgment based on the defense of res judicata may affect a substantial right, making the order immediately appealable.\u201d Bockweg, 333 N.C. at 491, 429 S.E.2d at 161 (citations omitted); cf. Community Bank v. Whitley, 116 N.C. App. 731, 449 S.E.2d 226 (1994) (dismissing appeal as interlocutory because facts of case would not lead to \u201cpossibility of inconsistent verdicts\u201d). With regard to Naddeo\u2019s motion for summary judgment as it pertains to Allstate\u2019s claims and defenses in 98-CvS-1400, because of the possibility of inconsistent verdicts, a substantial right may be affected. Accordingly, we will consider Naddeo\u2019s appeal in that case.\nFinally, as to Allstate\u2019s cross-assignment of error regarding denial of its motion to dismiss and/or abate in 98-CvS-931, the order appealed is interlocutory and does not affect a substantial right. See Myers v. Myers, 61 N.C. App. 748, 301 S.E.2d 522 (1983) (dismissing appeal of denial of \u201cplea in abatement\u201d as interlocutory).\nIII.\nTurning to the merits of Naddeo\u2019s appeal in 98-CvS-1400, Naddeo contends that \u201cAllstate, by refusing to defend the 1994 action and/or by appearing and raising coverage defenses, has waived its defenses in the current action,\u201d and that she was entitled to summary judgment because Allstate\u2019s claims and defenses were barred by the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion. Because all three arguments necessarily involve similar basic principles, we address them together.\nUnder the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion, \u201ca final judgment on the merits in a prior action will prevent a second suit based on the same cause of action between the same parties or those in privity with them.\u201d Thomas M. McInnis & Assoc., Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 428, 349 S.E.2d 552, 556 (1986). Similarly, \u201c \u2018[c]ollateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue decided previously in judicial or administrative proceedings provided the party against whom the prior decision was asserted enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in an earlier proceeding.\u2019 \u201d Rymer v. Estate of Sorrells, 127 N.C. App. 266, 268, 488 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1997) (quoting In re McNallen, 62 F.3d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted)). \u201cThus, while res judicata precludes a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies based on the same claim, collateral estoppel precludes the subsequent adjudication of a previously determined issue, even if the subsequent action is premised upon a different claim.\u201d Hales v. N.C. Insurance Guaranty Ass\u2019n, 337 N.C. 329, 333, 445 S.E.2d 590, 594 (1994) (citations omitted).\nWith regard to claims against an insured in which a default judgment is obtained in favor of the claimant,\nif an insurer had a right to defend the injury action against the insured, had timely notice of such action, and defends or elects not to defend, the judgment, in the absence of fraud or collusion, is binding upon the insurer as to issues which were or might have been litigated therein.\nLee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance 3d \u00a7 106:50 (1997) (citing Strickland v. Hughes, 273 N.C. 481, 160 S.E.2d 313 (1968)). The issue of Allstate\u2019s notice of the action has been settled, see Estate of Teel, 129 N.C. App. 604, 500 S.E.2d 759; therefore, the only question that remains is whether Allstate had a duty to defend Darby.\nBecause there is no statutory requirement that an insurance company provide its insured with a defense, see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21 (1999) (stating requirements for a motor vehicle liability policy), we must look to the policy language to determine Allstate\u2019s obligation. Part A of Allstate\u2019s policy states:\nWe will settle or defend, as we consider appropriate, any claim or suit asking for [bodily injury or property] damages. . . . Our duty to settle or defend ends when our limit of liability for this coverage has been exhausted. We have no duty to defend any suit or settle any claim for bodily injury or property damage not covered under this policy.\nThus, Allstate assumed the responsibility of settling or defending any claim against its insured, unless the claim is \u201cnot covered under this policy.\u201d\nNonetheless, Allstate contends \u201c[i]t has raised legitimate policy defenses . . . which take the payment of the underlying judgment outside of the terms of its policy.\u201d However, \u201cpleadings that disclose a mere possibility that the insured is liable (and that the potential liability is covered) suffice to impose a duty to defend upon the insurer.\u201d Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 691 fn. 2, 340 S.E.2d 374, 377 (1986) (emphasis added); see also Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Grady, 130 N.C. App. 292, 502 S.E.2d 648 (1998) (\u201cAn insurance company has a duty to defend its insured against suit, although the suit is groundless, if viewing the facts as alleged in the complaint and taking them as true, liability may be imposed upon the insured within the coverage of the insurance policy in question.\u201d); Indiana Lumbermen\u2019s Mutual Ins. Co. v. Champion, 80 N.C. App. 370, 343 S.E.2d 15 (1986) (\u201cThe obligation of a liability insurer to defend an action brought by an injured third party against the insured is absolute when the allegations of the complaint bring the claim within the coverage of the policy.\u201d). Additionally, \u201c[a]ny doubt as to coverage is to be resolved in favor of the insured.\u201d Bruce-Terminix Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 130 N.C. App. 729, 735, 504 S.E.2d 574, 578 (1998) (citation omitted).\nBased on evidence that (1) the original complaint provided general notice of the time of the accident involving the automobile owned by Dwaine Darby, (2) the amended complaint alleged that the fatal accident occurred \u201cat approximately 11:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time on April 30, 1993,\u201d and (3) Naddeo\u2019s attorney advised Allstate that the accident occurred on 30 April 1993, this Court held: \u201cAllstate was aware of information which would tend to indicate that the policy . . . provided coverage for the subject one-car accident.\u201d Estate of Teel, 129 N.C. App. at 610, 500 S.E.2d at 764. Therefore, the claim arguably was within the coverage of the policy, thus imposing upon Allstate a duty to defend. Due to the \u201cpossibility\u201d that the claim would be covered by the policy, Allstate\u2019s refusal to defend was unjustified. When it unjustifiably refused to provide a defense, Allstate \u201cobligated itself to pay the amount and costs of a reasonable settlement.\u201d Duke University v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 96 N.C. App. 635, 637, 386 S.E.2d 762, 763 (1990) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we hold that Allstate is precluded from asserting its policy defenses by its refusal to defend in 94-CvS-1333. See Ames v. Continental Casualty Co., 79 N.C. App. 530, 538, 340 S.E.2d 479, 485 (1986) (\u201cBy denying liability and refusing to defend claims covered by the insurance policy, the insurance company commits a breach of the policy contract and thereby waives the provisions defining the duties and obligations of the insured.\u201d).\nWe next consider seriatim the individual claims asserted by Allstate in its complaint in 98-CvS-1400. Allstate first sought a declaratory judgment regarding the issue of whether the accident occurred within the Allstate policy term. The default judgment in 94-CvS-1333 found as fact that the accident occurred \u201con the evening of April 30, 1993.\u201d Darby and Allstate\u2019s motion to set aside the default judgment was denied; Darby appealed to this Court but did not challenge the finding in the judgment regarding the time and date of the accident. Accordingly, that finding was conclusive on appeal and became the law of the case. Allstate, which is in privity with Darby, is foreclosed from relitigating the issue in any subsequent proceeding. See Weston v. Carolina Medicorp, Inc., 113 N.C. App. 415, 438 S.E.2d 751 (1994).\nNext, Allstate sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether under the policy the driver of the automobile was an \u201cinsured\u201d and the auto was \u201ccovered.\u201d Again, these defenses could have been raised in the adjudication of 94-CvS-1333 and have been waived by Allstate\u2019s decision not to defend that case. See Ames, 79 N.C. App. at 538, 340 S.E.2d at 485.\nAllstate also sought a declaratory judgment limiting its liability to the amounts of financial responsibility set forth in the Financial Responsibility Act ($25,000 per person/$50,000 per accident), see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.1(11) (1999), because of Darby\u2019s failure to comply with the policy terms and conditions. However, as we determined above, because it unjustifiably refused to provide a defense, Allstate has \u201cobligated itself to pay the amount and costs of a reasbnable settlement.\u201d Duke University, 96 N.C. App. at 637, 386 S.E.2d at 763. The trial court set a reasonable settlement at $250,000.\nFinally, Allstate contended that Darby \u201cfailed to comply with the terms and conditions of the Allstate policy by failing to promptly notify [Allstate] of any notices or legal papers received in connection with the subject accident and to cooperate with the investigation, settlement, or defense of any claim or suit arising from the accident.\u201d Although the record indicates that Darby\u2019s attorney did not forward the amended complaint to Allstate, this Court noted that Naddeo\u2019s attorney advised Allstate by letter that the accident occurred on 30 April 1993 and held that Allstate had actual notice and was aware of sufficient information tending to indicate that the policy covered the suit. See Estate of Teel, 129 N.C. App. at 610, 500 S.E.2d at 764. Consequently, the requirement that Allstate be notified of the suit was met. See Insurance Co. v. Construction Co., 303 N.C. 387, 279 S.E.2d 769 (1981); Couch on Insurance 3d \u00a7 106:18. Allstate was not prejudiced by failing to receive notice of the amended complaint directly from Darby.\nAccordingly, the trial court erred when it denied Naddeo\u2019s motion for summary judgment on all claims raised by Allstate.\nBecause we hold that the trial court should have granted Naddeo\u2019s motion for summary judgment as it pertained to claims and defenses raised by Allstate, we need not address her argument that the trial court improperly considered an affidavit presented by Allstate at the hearing.\nDismissed in part, reversed in part.\nJudges GREENE and McGEE concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "EDMUNDS, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Weaver, Bennett & Bland, P.A., by Michael David Bland, Howard M. Labiner, and Christopher M. Vann, for plaintiff/defendant-appellant Naddeo.",
      "Morris York Williams Surles & Barringer, L.L.P., by John P. Barringer and Christa C. Pratt, for defendant/plaintiff-appellee Allstate."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "LINDA NADDEO, ADMINISTRATRIX FOR THE ESTATE OF PATRICIA ANN TEEL, Plaintiff-Appellant v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee v. LISTON S. DARBY, Administrator of the Estate of Dwaine Lydell Darby; LINDA M NADDEO, Administrator for the Estate of Patricia Ann Teel; and KATHY DIXON, Administrator of the Estate of Jacqueline Melissa Mullis, Defendant-Appellants\nNo. COA99-629\n(Filed 1 August 2000)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 denial of summary judgment \u2014 interlocutory order \u2014 no substantial right\nPlaintiff-administratrix\u2019s appeal from the trial court\u2019s denial of her motion for summary judgment in case 98-CvS-931 where she sought a declaratory judgment requiring an automobile liability insurance company to pay plaintiff for damages granted, costs, interest, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney fees pursuant to the default judgment entered against the insured\u2019s estate in 94-CvS-1333 arising out of a single-car automobile accident is dismissed since it has not been certified by the trial court and plaintiff has not shown she will be deprived of a substantial right.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 interlocutory order\u2014 substantial right\nDefendant\u2019s appeal from the trial court\u2019s denial of her motion for summary judgment in case 98-CvS-1400 where an automobile liability insurance company sought a declaratory judgment in its effort to deny coverage of the claims and set forth defenses involving a single-car accident after entry of a default judgment against the insured\u2019s estate affects a substantial right and can be immediately appealed because of the possibility of inconsistent verdicts.\n3. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 interlocutory order \u2014 no substantial right\nAn insurance company\u2019s cross-assignment of error regarding denial of its motion to dismiss and/or abate in case 98-CvS-931 involving a single-car accident where plaintiff-administratrix sought a declaratory judgment requiring the insurance company to pay plaintiff for damages granted, costs, interest, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney fees pursuant to a default judgment previously entered against the insured\u2019s estate is an interlocutory order which does not affect a substantial right and is thus not immediately appealable.\n4. Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata\u2014 issues precluded\u2014 policy defenses \u2014 unjustifiable refusal to defend\nCollateral estoppel precludes an insurance company from asserting its policy defenses based on its refusal to defend in case 94-CvS-1333 involving a one-car accident where a default judgment was entered against the insured\u2019s estate because when the insurance company unjustifiably refused to provide a defense to its insured after receiving notice that the claim possibly would be covered by the policy, the insurance company obligated itself to pay the amount and costs of a reasonable settlement.\n5. Judgments\u2014 default \u2014 failure to challenge finding \u2014 law of case\nThe trial court erred by denying defendant-administratrix\u2019s motion for summary judgment in an action where an insurance company sought a declaratory judgment in its effort to deny coverage of claims and to set forth defenses involving a single-car accident after entry of default judgment against the insured\u2019s estate, based on the issue of whether the car accident occurred within the policy term, because: (1) the default judgment in case 94-CvS-1333 found as fact that the accident occurred during the policy term; (2) a motion to set aside the default judgment was denied; and (3) the appeal to the Court of Appeals did not challenge the finding in the judgment regarding the time and date of the accident, making it the law of the case.\n6. Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata\u2014 issues precluded\u2014 insured driver \u2014 covered automobile \u2014 unjustifiable refusal to defend\nThe trial court erred by denying defendant-administratrix\u2019s motion for summary judgment in an action where an insurance company sought a declaratory judgment in its effort to deny coverage of claims and to set forth defenses involving a single-car accident after entry of default judgment against the insured\u2019s estate, based on the issue of whether the driver of the automobile was an \u201cinsured\u201d and the auto was \u201ccovered\u201d under the insurance policy, because these defenses could have been raised in the adjudication of case 94-CvS-1333 where the default judgment was entered against the insured\u2019s estate, and therefore, the defenses have been waived by the insurance company\u2019s decision not to defend that case.\n7. Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata\u2014 issues precluded\u2014 financial responsibility \u2014 unjustifiable refusal to defend\nThe trial court erred by denying defendant-administratrix\u2019s motion for summary judgment in an action where an insurance company sought a declaratory judgment in its effort to deny coverage of claims and to set forth defenses involving a single-car accident after entry .of default judgment against the insured\u2019s estate, based on the issue of the insurance company\u2019s attempt to limit its liability to the amounts of financial responsibility set forth in the Financial Responsibility Act under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.1(11), because the insurance company has obligated itself to pay the amount and costs of a reasonable settlement based on its unjustifiable refusal to provide a defense in the prior action.\n8. Insurance\u2014 automobile \u2014 notice to insurer\nThe trial court erred by denying defendant-administratrix\u2019s motion for summary judgment in an action where an insurance company sought a declaratory judgment in its effort to deny coverage of claims and to set forth defenses involving a single-car accident after entry of default judgment against the insured\u2019s estate, based on the issue of the insurance company\u2019s failure to receive notice of the amended complaint directly from its insured, because the insurance company was not prejudiced based on the facts that: (1) the other party\u2019s attorney advised the insurance company by letter concerning when the accident occurred; and (2) the insurance company had actual notice and was aware of sufficient information tending to indicate that the insurance policy covered the suit.\nAppeal by plaintiff Linda Naddeo from judgment entered in 98-CvS-931 on 1 February 1999 and by defendant Linda Naddeo from judgment entered in 98-CvS-1400 on 16 February 1999 by Judge Russell Walker in Union County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 March 2000.\nWeaver, Bennett & Bland, P.A., by Michael David Bland, Howard M. Labiner, and Christopher M. Vann, for plaintiff/defendant-appellant Naddeo.\nMorris York Williams Surles & Barringer, L.L.P., by John P. Barringer and Christa C. Pratt, for defendant/plaintiff-appellee Allstate."
  },
  "file_name": "0311-01",
  "first_page_order": 343,
  "last_page_order": 353
}
