{
  "id": 9497292,
  "name": "MILTON L. HARRISON, Employee-Plaintiff v. TOBACCO TRANSPORT, INC., Employer, NON-INSURED, Defendant, and/or CNA INSURANCE COMPANIES, Carrier; Defendants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Harrison v. Tobacco Transport, Inc.",
  "decision_date": "2000-08-15",
  "docket_number": "No. COA99-1058",
  "first_page": "561",
  "last_page": "571",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "139 N.C. App. 561"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "522 S.E.2d 118",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1999,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "135 N.C. App. 772",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        11243047
      ],
      "year": 1999,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/135/0772-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "397 S.E.2d 358",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1990,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "100 N.C. App. 584",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8527253
      ],
      "year": 1990,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/100/0584-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "516 S.E.2d 169",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1999,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "133 N.C. App. 594",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        11220859
      ],
      "year": 1999,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/133/0594-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-94",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "weight": 2,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "(b)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "528 S.E.2d 633",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2000,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "635"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "137 N.C. App. 461",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        11094063
      ],
      "year": 2000,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "465"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/137/0461-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1999,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "470 S.E.2d 30",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1996,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "343 N.C. 279",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        798871
      ],
      "year": 1996,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/343/0279-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "351 N.C. 350",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        1155840,
        1155802,
        1155946,
        1155926
      ],
      "year": 2000,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/351/0350-04",
        "/nc/351/0350-01",
        "/nc/351/0350-03",
        "/nc/351/0350-02"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "518 S.E.2d 814",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1999,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "816-17",
          "parenthetical": "citations omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "135 N.C. App. 92",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        11239160
      ],
      "year": 1999,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "95",
          "parenthetical": "citations omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/135/0092-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "655 S.W.2d 34",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        9925952
      ],
      "year": 1983,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/sw2d/655/0034-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "502 S.E.2d 648",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1998,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "130 N.C. App. 292",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        11466929
      ],
      "year": 1998,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/130/0292-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "526 S.E.2d 463",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2000,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "466",
          "parenthetical": "citation omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "351 N.C. 424",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        1155922
      ],
      "year": 2000,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "428",
          "parenthetical": "citation omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/351/0424-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "526 S.E.2d 671",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2000,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "137 N.C. App. 61",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        11091873
      ],
      "year": 2000,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/137/0061-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "528 S.E.2d 397",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2000,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "137 N.C. App. 480",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        11094153
      ],
      "year": 2000,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/137/0480-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 751,
    "char_count": 22486,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.757,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 2.930116106940972e-07,
      "percentile": 0.8472779687155506
    },
    "sha256": "a5475e504f4d99017f1acca38c8c3d9458f1c3747622c2928d522f9da6425f99",
    "simhash": "1:e422e7c3c74d7c9a",
    "word_count": 3480
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:40:43.899160+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges WYNN and McGEE concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "MILTON L. HARRISON, Employee-Plaintiff v. TOBACCO TRANSPORT, INC., Employer, NON-INSURED, Defendant, and/or CNA INSURANCE COMPANIES, Carrier; Defendants"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MARTIN, Judge.\nIn October 1994 plaintiff Milton L. Harrison (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) was employed by defendant Tobacco Transport, Inc. (\u201cTobacco Transport\u201d) for the unloading of tobacco bales from trucks. On 10 October 1994 plaintiff was unloading a truck for Tobacco Transport in Kinston, North Carolina, when he fell approximately 20 feet onto a concrete surface, sustaining serious injuries. Plaintiff has incurred substantial expenses for medical treatment and has been unable to work since the date of the accident.\nTobacco Transport is a Kentucky corporation with its principal place of business in Milltown, Kentucky. Plaintiff was hired in North Carolina to perform work for Tobacco Transport by Freddy Todd, a Tobacco Transport supervisor. Plaintiff testified that he sometimes worked for Mr. Todd, and that he did not know the name of Mr. Todd\u2019s employer or that the employer was located in Kentucky. Plaintiff resided in North Carolina, was hired in North Carolina, performed his work for Tobacco Transport in this State, and was injured here. Plaintiff never performed work for Tobacco Transport in Kentucky; indeed, he testified that he had never traveled outside of North Carolina.\nPlaintiff filed this workers\u2019 compensation claim in North Carolina on 20 May 1996. At the time of plaintiff\u2019s accident, Tobacco Transport carried workers\u2019 compensation insurance under a policy issued by defendant CNA Insurance Companies (\u201cCNA\u201d). With respect to coverage for injuries sustained outside of Kentucky, the policy contains the following relevant provisions:\n\u201cInformation Page\u201d\nITEM 3.A. Workers\u2019 Compensation Insurance: Part One of the policy applies to Workers\u2019 Compensation Law of the states listed here:\n16-Kentucky\nC. Other States Insurance: Part Three of the Policy applies to the states, if any, listed here:\n[none listed]\n\u201cPart Three \u2014 -Other States Insurance\u201d\nA. How This Insurance Applies\n1. This other states insurance applies only if one or more states are shown in Item 3.C. of the Information Page.\nThe policy also contains an endorsement amending the \u201cOther States Insurance\u201d provision. The endorsement provides as follows:\n2. If you begin work in any one of those states after the effective date of the policy and are not insured or are not self-insured for such work, all provisions of the policy will apply as though that state were listed in Item 3.A. of the Information Page.\n4. If you have work on the effective date of this policy in any state not listed in Item 3. A. of the Information Page, coverage will not be afforded for that state unless we are notified within thirty days.\nAll parties have stipulated that plaintiff sustained a compensable injury on 10 October 1994. CNA, however, declined coverage, contending its policy does not provide coverage for injuries sustained by Tobacco Transport\u2019s workers employed in North Carolina. On 30 April 1998, the deputy commissioner issued an opinion and award in favor of CNA, and on 16 April 1999 the Full Commission affirmed, concluding that the policy did not provide Tobacco Transport with coverage in North Carolina. The Commission dismissed CNA from the action, ordered Tobacco Transport to pay compensation and reasonable medical expenses to plaintiff, and, in addition, to pay plaintiff\u2019s reasonable attorney\u2019s fees and a fine in the amount of $50.00 per day each day past 10 October 1994 for its failure to provide workers\u2019 compensation insurance in North Carolina. Tobacco Transport appeals.\nBy its five assignments of error, Tobacco Transport contends the Commission erred in ruling that the CNA policy does not provide coverage for its North Carolina operations, in dismissing CNA as a party, in requiring Tobacco Transport to pay plaintiffs attorney\u2019s fees; and in imposing a fine against Tobacco Transport for its failure to provide plaintiff with workers\u2019 compensation benefits. We affirm.\nThe standard of appellate review of decisions of the Industrial Commission consists of a determination of whether the Full Commission\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, and whether its conclusions of law are supported by those findings. Calloway v. Memorial Mission Hosp., 137 N.C. App. 480, 528 S.E.2d 397 (2000). \u201cUnder the first inquiry, the findings of fact are conclusive on appeal so long as they are supported by any competent evidence, even if other evidence would support contrary findings.\u201d Id.) see also Lewis v. Sonoco Products Co., 137 N.C. App. 61, 526 S.E.2d 671 (2000).\nI.\nTobacco Transport assigns error to the Commission\u2019s determination that the CNA policy does not provide coverage for plaintiff\u2019s North Carolina injuries. Specifically, Tobacco Transport argues that the Commission should have applied Kentucky\u2019s \u201cfull coverage\u201d statute to conclude that plaintiff\u2019s injuries were covered by the CNA policy, but that in any event, the plain language of the amendatory endorsement to the \u201cOther States Insurance\u201d provision of the policy clearly extends coverage to North Carolina.\nTobacco Transport first argues that because plaintiff was employed by Tobacco Transport and was working on its payroll with the knowledge and consent of Tobacco Transport\u2019s president, Kentucky\u2019s full coverage statute applies to mandate coverage for plaintiff\u2019s injuries. \u201cWith insurance contracts the principle of lex loci contractus mandates that the substantive law of the state where the last act to make a binding contract occurred, usually delivery of the policy, controls the interpretation of the contract.\u201d Fortune Ins. Co. v. Owens, 351 N.C. 424, 428, 526 S.E.2d 463, 466 (2000) (citation omitted).\nThe full coverage provision of Kentucky\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Act provides that \u201c[e]very policy or contract of workers\u2019 compensation insurance under this chapter, issued or delivered in this state, shall cover the entire liability of the employer for compensation to each employee subject to this chapter . . . K.R.S. 342.375 (1998). While the CNA policy was indeed issued to Tobacco Transport in Kentucky, Tobacco Transport\u2019s argument ignores the plain language of this provision that requires an employee to be \u201csubject to this chapter\u201d in order for the full coverage provision to apply. Whether an employee working in another state is subject to Kentucky\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, and thus, the full coverage provision, is determined by the following provisions set forth in section 342.670 of the Kentucky Act:\n(1) If an employee, while working outside the territorial limits of this state, suffers an injury on account of which he . . . would have been entitled to the benefits provided by this chapter had that injury occurred within this state, that employee . . . shall be entitled to the benefits provided by this chapter, if at the time of the injury:\n(a) His employment is principally localized in this state, or\n(b) He is working under a contract of hire made in this state in employment not principally localized in any state, or\n(c) He is working under a contract of hire made in this state in employment principally localized in another state whose workers\u2019 compensation law is not applicable to his employer, or\n(d) He is working under a contract of hire made in this state for employment outside the United States and Canada.\nK.R.S. 342.670 (1998).\nIn the present case, plaintiff\u2019s employment with Tobacco Transport was not localized in Kentucky; plaintiff had never been to Kentucky, nor did plaintiff know that he was working for a Kentucky corporation. Rather, plaintiff\u2019s contract of hire was entered into in North Carolina, and all of plaintiff\u2019s employment duties with Tobacco Transport were executed in North Carolina. Under the plain language of K.R.S. 342.670, plaintiff\u2019s injuries are not \u201csubject to this chapter\u201d containing Kentucky\u2019s full coverage provision, and the Commission therefore did not err in failing to apply Kentucky law.\nTobacco Transport also argues that, applying North Carolina rules of contract interpretation, the plain language of the CNA policy provides coverage for plaintiff\u2019s injuries; alternatively, it contends the policy language is ambiguous, requiring that the policy be interpreted in favor of providing coverage. Both North Carolina and Kentucky apply the principle of construction that where the language of an insurance policy is clear and unambiguous, the language must be accorded its plain meaning. See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Grady, 130 N.C. App. 292, 502 S.E.2d 648 (1998); Pierce v. West American Ins. Co., 655 S.W.2d 34 (1983). \u201cAmbiguity in the terms of the policy is not established simply because the parties contend for differing meanings to be given to the language. Non-technical words are to be given their meaning in ordinary speech unless it is clear that the parties intended the words to have a specific technical meaning.\u201d Allstate Ins. Co. v. Runyun Chatterton, 135 N.C. App. 92, 95, 518 S.E.2d 814, 816-17 (1999) (citations omitted), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 350, -S.E.2d-(2000).\nIn the present case, the Commission found that the relevant policy provisions are not ambiguous and must be accorded their plain and ordinary meaning. The Commission found that under section 3.C. of the Information Page, the policy clearly states that the \u201cOther States Insurance\u201d provision applies only to those states listed under section 3.C., which, in Tobacco Transport\u2019s policy, listed no states. The Commission also found that subparagraph 1 of the \u201cOther States Insurance\u201d provision clearly states that the provision only applies if one or more states are listed under section 3.C.\nWith respect to the effect of the amendatory endorsement to the \u201cOther States Insurance\u201d provision, the Commission found that, under subparagraph 2 as amended, had Tobacco Transport begun work after the effective date of the policy in any of \u201cthose states\u201d listed under section 3.C., the policy would have covered injuries sustained in \u201cthose states.\u201d However, because no states were listed under section 3.C., the Commission found that the policy could not cover North Carolina. The Commission declined to adopt Tobacco Transport\u2019s interpretation that \u201cthose states\u201d refers to the list of states to which the amendatory endorsement applies, but rather, found that the phrase clearly refers to those states listed under section 3.C.\nRegarding the amended subparagraph 4, the Commission found that, if Tobacco Transport had worked in North Carolina on 1 December 1993, the effective date of the policy, coverage would have existed for plaintiff\u2019s injuries so long as Tobacco Transport had notified CNA within 30 days of its North Carolina operations. However, the Commission found that Tobacco Transport was not working in North Carolina on 1 December 1993. The Commission concluded that the CNA policy provides coverage for Kentucky only.\nWhile the Commission\u2019s findings regarding the interpretation of the policy language are mixed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and thus fully reviewable, see Royster v. Culp, Inc., 343 N.C. 279, 470 S.E.2d 30 (1996), we nevertheless agree with the Commission\u2019s interpretation of the policy language, and hold that it supports the conclusion of law that on 10 October 1994 Tobacco Transport was not covered for workers\u2019 compensation insurance in North Carolina. We agree with the Commission that the language of subparagraph 1 of the \u201cOther States Insurance\u201d provision unambiguously states that the provision applies \u201conly if one or more states are shown in item 3.C. of the Information Page.\u201d This subparagraph was not altered by the amendatory endorsement, and no states were listed under section 3.C.\nWe further agree with the Commission that the plain language of subparagraph 2 of \u201cOther States Insurance,\u201d as amended, appears to refer to \u201cthose states\u201d listed under section 3.C. of the policy, where no states were listed. Moreover, for amended subparagraph 4 to apply to North Carolina, the language unambiguously requires that Tobacco Transport must have worked in North Carolina on the effective date of the policy, and that it have notified CNA of such work within 30 days of that date. The Commission found, and the evidence supports the finding that Tobacco Transport did not meet these requirements.\nThe plain language of the policy provides competent evidence sufficient to uphold the Commission\u2019s determination that the CNA policy did not provide workers\u2019 compensation insurance to Tobacco Transport in North Carolina. Thus, CNA was properly dismissed as a party to this action.\nII.\nTobacco Transport next assigns error to the Commission\u2019s award of attorney\u2019s fees to plaintiff. Under G.S. \u00a7 97-88.1, the Commission may award attorney\u2019s fees if it determines that \u201cany hearing has been brought, prosecuted, or defended without reasonable ground.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1 (1999). In addition, the Commission may award fees where the party instituting the proceeding has reasonable grounds to do so, if as a result of the proceeding, the party is ordered to make or continue making benefit payments to the injured worker. Lewis v. Sonoco Products Co. at 69, 526 S.E.2d at 676. \u201cThe decision of whether to make such an award, and the amount of the award, is in the discretion of the Commission, and its award or denial of an award will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.\u201d Id. at 71, 526 S.E.2d at 677 (citation omitted). An abuse of discretion results only where a decision is \u201cmanifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d Long v. Harris, 137 N.C. App. 461, 465, 528 S.E.2d 633, 635 (2000).\nIn the present case, the Commission found as follows:\n21. Defendant-employer has defended this case on unreasonable grounds. Although there was a genuine issue as to whether defendant-carrier was on the risk, defendant-employer is responsible for plaintiffs work injury. Defendant-employer has not raised credible evidence to dispute the nature and extent of plaintiffs compensable injury. Plaintiff should not go without any workers\u2019 compensation benefits while defendants litigate the coverage issue. Defendant-employer\u2019s failure to pay plaintiff the benefits to which he is entitled, pending resolution of the coverage dispute, constitutes unfounded litigiousness, entitling plaintiff to reasonable attorney\u2019s fees.\nBased on this finding, the Commission concluded that \u201c[p]laintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney fees for defendant-employer\u2019s unreasonable defense of plaintiffs injury by accident. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1.\u201d\nWe do not believe the Commission\u2019s award of attorney\u2019s fees was \u201cmanifestly unsupported by reason,\u201d or \u201cso arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d It is undisputed that plaintiff suffered a compensable injury in 1994, compensation for which is the ultimate responsibility of the employer under North Carolina\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation laws. Tobacco Transport\u2019s refusal to compensate plaintiff pending the outcome of its litigation with CNA with respect to coverage has, for approximately six years, prevented plaintiff from receiving the full amount of compensation to which he is entitled under the laws of this State. Under these circumstances, we hold the Commission\u2019s award of attorney\u2019s fees was neither arbitrary nor unreasoned. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIII.\nTobacco Transport also assigns error to the Commission\u2019s assessment of a fine against it in the amount of $50.00 per each day past 10 October 1994. The order was based on the following findings:\n19. As of 10 October 1994, defendant-employer had failed to secure workers\u2019 compensation insurance for accidents in the State of North Carolina. Plaintiff\u2019s accident on that date occurred in Kinston, North Carolina; plaintiff is a North Carolina resident; defendant-employer has a North Carolina registered office address of 1042 Washington Street, Raleigh, North Carolina and employed three (3) or more employees in North Carolina in 1994.\n20. On 10 October 1994, defendant-employer was engaged in interstate commerce through its business of transporting of tobacco, yet only contracted and paid for workers\u2019 compensation insurance for accidents arising under Kentucky law. Therefore, defendant-employer is subject to the penalty provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-94.\nBased on these findings, the Commission concluded that Tobacco Transport is subject to the penalty provision of G.S. \u00a7 97-94.\nG.S. \u00a7 97-94 provides, in pertinent part:\n(b) Any employer required to secure the payment of compensation under this Article who refuses or neglects to secure such compensation shall be punished by a penalty of one dollar ($1.00) for each employee, but not less that fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100.00) for each day of such refusal or neglect, and until the same ceases; and he shall be liable during the continuance of such refusal or neglect to an employee either for compensation under this Article or at law at the election of the injured employee.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-94(b).\nSince we have affirmed the Commission\u2019s ruling that the CNA policy does not provide coverage for plaintiff\u2019s North Carolina injuries, the Commission correctly determined that Tobacco Transport had failed to procure necessary insurance for its North Carolina operations, and thus, that Tobacco Transport is in violation of G.S. \u00a7 97-94. Its order assessing the fine is affirmed.\nIV.\nBy purported cross-assignments of error, plaintiff attempts to argue that the Commission erred both in concluding that the CNA policy did not cover plaintiff\u2019s North Carolina injuries, and in failing to assess a 10% late payment penalty against Tobacco Transport pursuant to G.S. \u00a7\u2022 9748(g). N.C.R. App. P. 10(d) provides that \u201can appellee may cross-assign as error any action or omission of the trial court. . . which deprived the appellee of an alternative basis in law for supporting the judgment. . . from which appeal has been taken.\u201d Neither of plaintiffs cross-assignments of error, if sustained, would provide an alternative basis for upholding the order and award of the Commission. In order to properly present the alleged errors for appellate review, plaintiff should have filed a cross-appeal. See Atlantic Veneer Corp. v. Robbins, 133 N.C. App. 594, 516 S.E.2d 169 (1999); Cox v. Robert C. Rhein Interest, Inc., 100 N.C. App. 584, 397 S.E.2d 358 (1990). Plaintiff has failed to do so, and we therefore do not consider his arguments. See Mann Contractors, Inc. v. Flair with Goldsmith Consultants-II, Inc., 135 N.C. App. 772, 522 S.E.2d 118 (1999).\nAffirmed.\nJudges WYNN and McGEE concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MARTIN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Stephen N. Camak for plaintiff-appellee.",
      "Maupin Taylor & Ellis, P.A., by M. Keith Kapp and Kevin W. Benedict, for defendant-appellant Tobacco Transport, Inc.",
      "Teague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by Thomas M. Clare and Tracey L. Jones, for defendant-appellee CNA Insurance."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "MILTON L. HARRISON, Employee-Plaintiff v. TOBACCO TRANSPORT, INC., Employer, NON-INSURED, Defendant, and/or CNA INSURANCE COMPANIES, Carrier; Defendants\nNo. COA99-1058\n(Filed 15 August 2000)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 Kentucky policy \u2014 Kentucky law \u2014 no North Carolina coverage\nThe Industrial Commission did not err by not applying Kentucky law to determine whether a workers\u2019 compensation insurance policy provided coverage for plaintiff\u2019s injury where defendant-employer was a Kentucky corporation with its principal place of business in Kentucky, plaintiff was hired in North Carolina by a supervisor for defendant, plaintiff testified that he sometimes worked for the supervisor but did not know the name of the supervisor\u2019s employer or that the employer was located in Kentucky, and plaintiff resided in North Carolina, performed his work here, was injured here, and never traveled outside of North Carolina. Although defendant argued that Kentucky\u2019s full coverage statute applied, plaintiffs injuries were not \u201csubject to this chapter\u201d under the plain language of that statute.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 Kentucky policy \u2014 language of policy \u2014 no North Carolina policy\nA workers\u2019 compensation insurance carrier was properly dismissed from a workers\u2019 compensation proceeding where the plain language of the policy provided competent evidence sufficient to uphold the Commission\u2019s determination that the policy did not provide workers\u2019 compensation insurance to defendant in North Carolina. No states were listed where required for coverage by the plain language of the \u201cOther States Insurance\u201d provision; that subparagraph was not altered by an amendatory endorsement; the amended version also referred to the section in which no other states were listed; and defendant did not meet the requirements for the amended subparagraph to apply.\n3. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 attorney fees \u2014 employer\u2019s dispute with insurer \u2014 refusal to compensate\nThe Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion in a workers\u2019 compensation action by awarding attorney fees where it was undisputed that plaintiff suffered a compensable injury in 1994; compensation for that injury is the ultimate responsibility of the employer, defendant; and defendant\u2019s refusal to compensate plaintiff pending the outcome of its litigation with the insurer prevented plaintiff from receiving the full amount of his compensation for about six years.\n4. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 Kentucky policy \u2014 no North Carolina coverage \u2014 employer fined\nThe Industrial Commission did not err by assessing a fine against defendant where it had been determined in the same workers\u2019 compensation action that a Kentucky policy did not provide worker\u2019s compensation insurance for plaintiff\u2019s North Carolina injuries. Defendant failed to procure necessary insurance for its North Carolina operations and thus violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-94.\n5. Appeal and Error\u2014 cross-assignment of error \u2014 issues not providing alternate basis for judgment \u2014 not considered\nA workers\u2019 compensation plaintiffs cross-assignments of error concerning a Kentucky insurance policy which did not provide North Carolina coverage and the failure to assess a late payment penalty were not preserved for appeal where they would not have provided an alternative basis in law for upholding the order and award of the Industrial Commission. Plaintiff should have filed a cross-appeal.\nAppeal by defendant Tobacco Transport, Inc., from opinion and award entered 16 April 1999 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 May 2000.\nStephen N. Camak for plaintiff-appellee.\nMaupin Taylor & Ellis, P.A., by M. Keith Kapp and Kevin W. Benedict, for defendant-appellant Tobacco Transport, Inc.\nTeague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by Thomas M. Clare and Tracey L. Jones, for defendant-appellee CNA Insurance."
  },
  "file_name": "0561-01",
  "first_page_order": 593,
  "last_page_order": 603
}
