{ "id": 9496065, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. REBECCA BAILEY DYE, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Dye", "decision_date": "2000-07-18", "docket_number": "No. COA98-1593", "first_page": "148", "last_page": "153", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "139 N.C. App. 148" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 122", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124" }, { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2527406 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" }, { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373", "parenthetical": "\"criminal contempts are crimes, and accordingly, the accused is entitled to the benefits of all constitutional safeguards\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4720906 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435", "parenthetical": "\"criminal contempts are crimes, and accordingly, the accused is entitled to the benefits of all constitutional safeguards\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 859", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11079314 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "679 A.2d 217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 11320187, 463574 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" }, { "page": "222" }, { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/679/0217-01", "/pa/544/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 L. Ed. 2d 556", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" }, { "page": "568" }, { "page": "586", "parenthetical": "\"interests of the defendant are of paramount concern\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "509 U.S. 688", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696" }, { "page": "696" }, { "page": "724" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707" }, { "page": "707" }, { "page": "707", "parenthetical": "ambiguous verdict construed in favor of defendant" }, { "page": "707", "parenthetical": "if substantive offenses are the \"same . . . double jeopardy attaches and the subsequent prosecution is barred\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4717320 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" }, { "page": "452" }, { "page": "451" }, { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 S.E.2d 111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "116" }, { "page": "116" }, { "page": "117" }, { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11241843 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" }, { "page": "529" }, { "page": "527" }, { "page": "527" }, { "page": "528" }, { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0519-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 598, "char_count": 11999, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.093516304538404e-08, "percentile": 0.3803806708421997 }, "sha256": "2f1b90722d0aba49565c8874201d344d6a9169c31eb6dd3c1764b6dac5e242b7", "simhash": "1:81b47d6084962150", "word_count": 1948 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:40:43.899160+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges LEWIS and McGEE concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. REBECCA BAILEY DYE, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nDefendant appeals judgment entered upon conviction by a jury of domestic criminal trespass. We vacate the judgment.\nThe State\u2019s evidence at trial tended to show the following: Defendant and Carey James Dye (Mr. Dye) divorced 14 December 1987. The two entered into a 20 February 1995 civil consent order (the Order) providing in pertinent part that \u201c[defendant shall not come to the residence of [Mr. Dye].\"\nOn 24 July 1996, defendant knocked on the front door of Mr. Dye\u2019s residence. The door was opened by the couple\u2019s child, William Dye (William), who was living with Mr. Dye. William testified defendant began screaming and directing profanity against him, his father, and other family members. William related he \u201crepeatedly\u201d told defendant \u201cshe wasn\u2019t supposed to be there, [and] she needed to go away.\u201d When defendant failed to comply, William closed the door and telephoned the police and his father. As a result, on 26 July 1996, Mr. Dye filed a motion seeking that defendant be held in criminal contempt for violation of the Order.\nOn 10 May 1997, defendant again returned to Mr. Dye\u2019s residence, knocked on the door, and began screaming and cursing at William when he opened it. Based upon this occurrence, Mr. Dye filed a second contempt motion 21 May 1997. Both motions were heard 27 May 1997 in Guilford County District Court (the contempt proceeding). On 16 June 1997, the trial court ruled defendant had \u201cviolated the . . . Order of February 20, 1995 . . . [and wa]s in criminal contempt. . . for going to the residence of [Mr. Dye].\u201d Defendant was committed to the Guilford County jail for 30 days.\nIn addition to his 21 May 1997 contempt motions, Mr. Dye also obtained a warrant charging defendant with domestic criminal trespass in connection with the 10 May 1997 incident. Defendant moved to dismiss 18 May 1998, which motion was denied by the trial court 8 July 1998. Defendant was convicted of the charge by a jury on 19 August 1998 and sentenced to 45 days imprisonment. Defendant appeals.\nDefendant contends the trial court erred in denying her 18 May 1998 motion to dismiss, asserting prosecution of the criminal charge violated the \u201cFifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause.\u201d Based upon this Court\u2019s decision in State v. Gilley, 135 N.C. App. 519, 530, 522 S.E.2d 111, 118 (1999), we agree.\nIt is well established that the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution (the Double Jeopardy Clause) protects against, inter alia, a \u201csecond prosecution for the same offense after [a prior] conviction,\u201d State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 451, 340 S.E.2d 701, 707 (1986), including a nonsummary criminal contempt adjudication, United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696, 125 L. Ed. 2d 556, 568 (1993), as occurred in the case sub judice.\nIn Gilley, this Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits subsequent prosecution of a substantive criminal offense following an adjudication of criminal contempt based upon violation of a court order forbidding commission of acts constituting such substantive offense. Gilley, 135 N.C. App. at 529, 522 S.E.2d at 118. Guided by the majority opinion in Dixon, 509 U.S. at 696, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 568, we stated there must be a comparison of\n\u201cthe elements of the offense actually deemed to have been violated in th[e] contempt proceeding against the elements of the substantive criminal offense(s),\u201d\nGilley, 135 N.C. App. at 527, 522 S.E.2d at 116 (quoting Commonwealth v. Yerby, 679 A.2d 217, 222 (Pa. 1996)), \u201crather than comparison of the general literal elements of contempt with elements of the subsequent substantive criminal offense,\u201d id. If the substantive elements of the offenses are the same, or if one is a lesser included offense of the other, double jeopardy attaches and the subsequent prosecution is barred. State v. McAllister, 138 N.C. App. 252, 255, 530 S.E.2d 859, (2000). Such \u201capproach follows the position of at least five justices in Dixon, and best ensures protection of \u2018the core values of the Double Jeopardy Clause.\u2019 \u201d Gilley, 135 N.C. App. at 527, 522 S.E.2d at 116 (quoting Gardner, 315 N.C. at 452, 340 S.E.2d at 707).\nAt the contempt proceeding, both motions filed by Mr. Dye were considered and the court set out the following pertinent findings of fact in its order:\n9. On July 24, 1996, Defendant presented herself at the front door of [Mr. Dye\u2019s] residence and knocked on the door. The parties\u2019 child . . . who . . . lives at the residence with [Mr. Dye], gave evidence in open Court of Defendant screaming and cursing in a hysterical manner at the door of the residence on July 24, 1996.\n10. On May 10, 1997, the minor child . . . also saw Defendant approach the residence where he and [Mr. Dye] live, knock upon the door and begin screaming and using profanity against him and other members of his family.\nThe court thereupon adjudicated defendant as being in criminal contempt for \u201cgoing to the residence\u201d of Mr. Dye in violation of the Order.\nAt her subsequent jury trial on 19 August 1998, defendant was convicted of domestic criminal trespass based upon the 10 May 1997 incident. The issue thus becomes whether defendant\u2019s previous \u201cconviction\u201d in the criminal contempt proceeding barred her subsequent prosecution in the trial court.\nWe note initially that the instant record contains no transcript of the contempt proceeding, and the court\u2019s resultant 16 June 1997 contempt order recites only the conclusion that \u201c[t]he defendant is in criminal contempt... for going to the residence of [Mr. Dye].\u201d This determination followed detailed findings of fact relating to both the 24 July 1996 and the 10 May 1997 trespass, only the latter of which served as the offense date for the criminal trespasses charge.\nNonetheless, any ambiguity surrounding the trespass date serving as basis for the criminal contempt adjudication, in light of \u201cthe terseness of the contempt judgment,\u201d Gilley, 135 N.C. App. at 528, 522 S.E.2d at 117, \u201cmust be construed in favor of defendant,\u201d id.; see Dixon, 509 U.S. at 724, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 586 (\u201cinterests of the defendant are of paramount concern\u201d), and O\u2019Briant v. O\u2019Briant, 313 N.C. 432, 435, 329 S.E.2d 370, 373 (1985) (\u201ccriminal contempts are crimes, and accordingly, the accused is entitled to the benefits of all constitutional safeguards\u201d), and see Gardner, 315 N.C. at 451, 340 S.E.2d at 707 (ambiguous verdict construed in favor of defendant). We therefore must consider defendant to have been adjudicated in contempt based upon the 10 May 1997 incident which resulted in the domestic criminal trespass conviction.\nUnder N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-134.3 (1993), the essential elements of domestic criminal trespass include:\nentering] after being forbidden to do so or remaining] after being ordered to leave by the lawful occupant, upon the premises occupied by a present or former spouse. . . .\nG.S. \u00a7 14-134.3(a). The Order mandated that defendant \u201cshall not come to\u201d the residence of her former spouse, Mr. Dye.\nIn interpreting statutory language, \u201cit is presumed the General Assembly intended the words it used to have the meaning they have in ordinary speech,\u201d Nelson v. Battle Forest Friends Meeting, 335 N.C. 133, 136, 436 S.E.2d 122, 124 (1993), and when the plain meaning is unambiguous, a court should go no further in interpreting the statute than its ordinary meaning, id. Giving the statutory element of \u201center[ing] . . . upon\u201d its ordinary meaning, see id., we conclude that the statutory language is equivalent to the phrase \u201cshall not come to\u201d contained in the Consent Order.\nWe are cognizant of the holding in Gilley that:\nas to the offense of domestic criminal trespass, G.S. \u00a7 14-134.3, the [protective] order directed defendant to \u201cstay away\u201d from the marital residence, while the statute forbids a person from \u201centering] . . . the premises occupied by a . . . former spouse.\u201d\nUnlike the broad and general \u201cstay away from\u201d terminology rejected in Gilley, however, the phrase \u201cshall not come to the residence\u201d at issue herein, considered in terms of \u201cordinary speech,\u201d Nelson, 335 N.C. at 136, 436 S.E.2d at 124, is specifically akin to the statutory prohibition of \u201center[ing]\u201d upon forbidden premises.\n\u201cEnter\u201d has been defined as:\nto go or come into a material place-, to make a. physical entrance or penetration; to pass into the interior of; ingress; to cause to be admitted; to come into or upon. . . .\nWebster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 756 (1966) (emphasis added). Similarly, \u201ccome\u201d has been defined as \u201cto move toward or enter; to approach or reach; to arrive at a particular place,\u201d id. at 453, \u201cto present oneself,\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 242, and the term \u201cto\u201d has been construed as \u201cmovement toward; contact; close against,\u201d Webster\u2019s at 2401. On the other hand, \u201cstay\u201d has been defined as \u201cto halt an advance; remain,\u201d id. at 2231, and the word \u201caway\u201d as \u201cfrom this or that place,\u201d id. at 152.\nProhibitions against \u201centerfing]\u201d or \u201ccom[ing] to\u201d a residence would therefore effectively be violated upon actual entrance onto or physical contact with designated premises. However, an order containing the directive to \u201cstay away\u201d from a residence might arguably be violated by travel on a public street passing in front of the residence, or entry into the neighborhood or even the town wherein the residence is located. By contrast, the prohibition forbidding one to '\u201center[]\u201d or \u201ccome to\u201d certain premises does not lend itself to such uncertainties, because the scope is expressly limited to a \u201cphysical entrance\u201d upon the actual \u201cmaterial\u201d premises. See Webster\u2019s at 756.\nIn short, we hold the phrase \u201cshall not come to the residence\u201d contained in the Order is equivalent to the domestic criminal trespass element of \u201centering] . . . upon the premises,\u201d G.S. \u00a7 14-134.3(a), for purposes of double jeopardy. Accordingly, \u201cthe elements of the offense actually deemed to have been violated in th[e] contempt proceeding,\u201d Yerby, 679 A.2d at 222, i.e., defendant\u2019s \u201ccoming to\u201d the residence of Mr. Dye on 10 May 1997 in violation of the Order, meet the essential legal elements of domestic criminal trespass under G.S. \u00a7 14-134.3(a), i.e., entering upon Mr. Dye\u2019s premises on 10 May 1997 after having been forbidden to do so. Under the circumstances of the instant case, therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause constituted a bar to defendant\u2019s subsequent prosecution upon the domestic criminal trespass charge, see Gardner, 315 N.C. at 452, 340 S.E.2d at 707 (if substantive offenses are the \u201csame . . . double jeopardy attaches and the subsequent prosecution is barred\u201d), and her conviction must be vacated, see Gilley, 135 N.C. App. at 526, 522 S.E.2d at 115, and Yerby, 679 A.2d at 221.\nIn light of the foregoing, we decline to address defendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error.\nJudgment vacated.\nJudges LEWIS and McGEE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F Easley, by Associate Attorney General Mary Penny Thompson, for the State.", "W. Steven Allen, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. REBECCA BAILEY DYE, Defendant\nNo. COA98-1593\n(Filed 18 July 2000)\nConstitutional Law\u2014 double jeopardy \u2014 domestic criminal trespass \u2014 criminal contempt\nThe trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of domestic criminal trespass after she was already convicted of criminal contempt because: (1) the double jeopardy clause prohibits subsequent prosecution of a substantive criminal offense following an adjudication of criminal contempt based upon violation of a court order forbidding commission of acts constituting such substantive offense; and (2) the elements of the offense actually deemed to have been violated in the contempt proceeding, defendant\u2019s \u201ccoming to\u201d the residence of her ex-husband in violation of a court order, met the essential legal elements of domestic criminal trespass under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-134.3(a).\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 19 August 1998 by Judge Catherine C. Eagles in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 October 1999.\nAttorney General Michael F Easley, by Associate Attorney General Mary Penny Thompson, for the State.\nW. Steven Allen, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0148-01", "first_page_order": 180, "last_page_order": 185 }