{ "id": 9496862, "name": "SHIRLEY B. NORRIS and MURRAY NORRIS, Plaintiffs v. RAYMOND L. SATTLER, M.D., WILMINGTON NEUROSURGICAL ASSOCIATES, P.A., and CAPE FEAR MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC., Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Norris v. Sattler", "decision_date": "2000-08-01", "docket_number": "No. COA99-642", "first_page": "409", "last_page": "414", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "139 N.C. App. 409" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 355", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360", "parenthetical": "supervisory powers provided in art. IV, \u00a7 12(1) rarely utilized, but may be invoked \"to promote the expeditious administration of justice\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4773795 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263", "parenthetical": "supervisory powers provided in art. IV, \u00a7 12(1) rarely utilized, but may be invoked \"to promote the expeditious administration of justice\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 487", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" }, { "page": "520" }, { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527311 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 N.C. App. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521977 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/49/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 A.2d 720", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 597", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601, 603", "parenthetical": "order denying deposition of witness \"effectively preclude[d]\" defendant from introducing \"highly material\" evidence and therefore affected substantial right" }, { "page": "603" }, { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558843 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625, 629", "parenthetical": "order denying deposition of witness \"effectively preclude[d]\" defendant from introducing \"highly material\" evidence and therefore affected substantial right" }, { "page": "629" }, { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426", "parenthetical": "order compelling discovery appealable if order enforced by sanctions" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12168946 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554", "parenthetical": "order compelling discovery appealable if order enforced by sanctions" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4687618, 4688131, 4688077, 4686229, 4692124 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0669-04", "/nc/314/0669-01", "/nc/314/0669-03", "/nc/314/0669-02", "/nc/314/0669-05" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 N.C. App. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526458 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/75/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 665", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526444 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 S.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580" }, { "page": "579" }, { "page": "580", "parenthetical": "order compelling discovery of documents protected by statutory privilege affected substantial right" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155801 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" }, { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" }, { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12129791 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" }, { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E.2d 338", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572343 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 812", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "815" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8357716 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 56", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62", "parenthetical": "quoting J & B Slurry Seal Co. v. Mid-South Aviation, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 1, 6, 362 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1987)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11198692 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250", "parenthetical": "quoting J & B Slurry Seal Co. v. Mid-South Aviation, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 1, 6, 362 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1987)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "437 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "677" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520479 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23-24", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "23-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714861, 4717589, 4718136, 4718201, 4717178 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0183-03", "/nc/315/0183-05", "/nc/315/0183-02", "/nc/315/0183-04", "/nc/315/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 N.C. App. 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526659 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/75/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 440", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11889085 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 41", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47" }, { "page": "47" }, { "page": "44" }, { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5308491 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" }, { "page": "336" }, { "page": "335-36" }, { "page": "330" }, { "page": "330" }, { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0326-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 734, "char_count": 13162, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.936295612610449e-08, "percentile": 0.5365158354792113 }, "sha256": "36acb31874348a77a883dceaf30d7b07b18fed1862fc4a1ec3cbe5dc02dccdd6", "simhash": "1:8aab1d3f35bf0074", "word_count": 2081 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:40:43.899160+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges LEWIS and EDMUNDS concur." ], "parties": [ "SHIRLEY B. NORRIS and MURRAY NORRIS, Plaintiffs v. RAYMOND L. SATTLER, M.D., WILMINGTON NEUROSURGICAL ASSOCIATES, P.A., and CAPE FEAR MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC., Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nDefendant Cape Fear Memorial Hospital, Inc. (Cape Fear) appeals the trial court\u2019s order denying its \u201cMotion to Waive Privilege and Permit Contact with Treating Physician.\u201d Cape Fear\u2019s appeal is interlocutory and must be dismissed.\nPertinent facts and procedural history include the following: On 15 June 1995, plaintiffs Murray and Shirley B. Norris (Mr. and Mrs. Norris), husband and wife, filed suit against defendants Raymond Sattler, M.D. (Dr. Sattler), Wilmington Neurological Associates, P.A. (WNA), and Cape Fear. Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleged that Dr. Sattler, an employee of WNA, negligently performed neurosurgery on Mrs. Norris proximately causing her to become blind in her right eye and to suffer, inter alia, \u201cdiminished mental status . . . [and] emotional immobility.\u201d\nPlaintiffs further alleged Dr. Sattler was an agent of Cape Fear which, at the time of the operation upon Mrs. Norris, knew that Dr. Sattler suffered from \u201cphysical and/or mental illness\u201d such that he exhibited \u201cerratic, bizarre, dangerous, and life threatening behavior.\u201d Notwithstanding, the complaint continued, Cape Fear \u201callowed him to continue practicing at their facility\u201d and to perform the surgery at issue. Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages.\nCape Fear filed its answer 3 August 1995 and Dr. Sattler and WNA answered 14 August 1995, each of the three generally denying plaintiffs\u2019 claims. Dr. Sattler\u2019s deposition was taken 26 September 1996. On 30 July 1997, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed with prejudice their claims against Dr. Sattler and WNA.\nCape Fear thereafter filed a (22 December 1998) \u201cMotion to Waive Privilege and Permit Contact with Treating Physician\u201d seeking an order \u201cconfirming\u201d that the physician-patient privilege between Dr. Sattler and Mrs. Norris had been waived, and\npermitting [Cape Fear] to have such discussions with Dr. Sattler as [Cape Fear] deems necessary and appropriate to prepare for the trial of the case.\nCape Fear also filed a motion requesting that the court make findings of fact in support of its order. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(2) (1999). On 16 March 1999, the trial court entered an order (the Order) denying Cape Fear\u2019s motion, citing Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990) as \u201ccontrolling\u201d authority.\nCape Fear subsequently appealed in a timely manner. On 1 July 1999, plaintiffs moved to dismiss Cape Fear\u2019s appeal as interlocutory.\nIn Crist, our Supreme Court held that notwithstanding waiver of the physician-patient privilege by a patient, see N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8-53 (1999),\ndefense counsel may not interview plaintiff\u2019s nonparty treating physicians privately without plaintiff\u2019s express consent. Defendant instead must utilize the statutorily recognized methods of discovery enumerated in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 26 [(1999) (Rule 26)].\nCrist, 326 N.C. at 336, 389 S.E.2d at 47. Cape Fear maintains the case subjudice is distinguishable from Crist; however, it is unnecessary to address Cape Fear\u2019s argument in that we conclude plaintiffs\u2019 motion to dismiss the instant appeal should be allowed.\nAn order of the trial court\nis interlocutory if it is made during the pendency of an action and does not dispose of the case but requires further action by the trial court in order to finally determine the entire controversy. . . . There is generally no right to appeal an interlocutory order.\nHowerton v. Grace Hospital, Inc., 124 N.C. App. 199, 201, 476 S.E.2d 440, 442 (1996) (citations omitted). The rule prohibiting interlocutory appeals\nprevents] fragmentary, premature and unnecessary appeals by permitting the trial court to bring the case to final judgment before it is presented to the appellate courts.\nFraser v. Di Santi, 75 N.C. App. 654, 655, 331 S.E.2d 217, 218, disc. review denied, 315 N.C. 183, 337 S.E.2d 856 (1985).\nWithout doubt, the Order challenged herein is interlocutory as it does not fully dispose of the case. See Howerton, 124 N.C. App. at 201, 476 S.E.2d at 442. Interlocutory orders may be appealed only in two instances:\nfirst, where there has been a final determination of at least one claim, and the trial court certifies there is no just reason to delay the appeal, [N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(b) (1990) (Rule 54)]; and second, if delaying the appeal would prejudice a \u201csubstantial right.\u201d\nLiggett Group v. Sunas, 113 N.C. App. 19, 23-24, 437 S.E.2d 674, 677 (1993) (citations omitted).\nThere is no issue of the applicability of the first avenue of appeal herein. No final determination has been made as to any claims and the trial court did not certify the present appeal pursuant to Rule 54. See id.\nUnder the substantial right exception, see N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 l-277(a), 7A-27(d)(l) (1999), an otherwise interlocutory order may be appealed upon a showing by the appellant that: (1) the order affects a right that is indeed \u201csubstantial;\u201d and, (2) \u201cenforcement of that right, absent immediate appeal, [will] be \u2018lost, prejudiced, or be less than adequately protected by exception to entry of the interlocutory order.\u2019 \u201d First Atl. Mgmt. Corp. v. Dunlea Realty Co., 131 N.C. App. 242, 250, 507 S.E.2d 56, 62 (1998) (quoting J & B Slurry Seal Co. v. Mid-South Aviation, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 1, 6, 362 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1987)).\nOur courts have acknowledged that the substantial right test\nis more easily stated than applied [and] [i]t is usually necessary to resolve the question in each case by considering the particular facts of the case and the procedural context in which the order from which appeal is sought was entered.\nWaters v. Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 208, 240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978). In any event, \u201cit is the appellant\u2019s burden to present appropriate grounds for this Court\u2019s acceptance of an interlocutory appeal.\u201d Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 379, 444 S.E.2d 252, 253 (1994).\nThe Order is best categorized as a discovery order in that it prohibits Cape Fear from contact with Dr. Sattler other than through \u201cthe statutorily recognized methods of discovery enumerated in\u201d Rule 26. Crist, 326 N.C. at 336, 389 S.E.2d at 47. It is a well-established \u201cgeneral rule that interlocutory discovery orders are not ordinarily appeal-able prior to entry of a final judgment,\u201d Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 164, 522 S.E.2d 577, 580 (1999), as they do not affect a substantial right, id. at 163, 522 S.E.2d at 579.\nWe consider discovery . . . issues ... to be fragmentary and partial issues which, in the interest of judicial economy, should not be considered by this Court.\nHale v. Leisure, 100 N.C. App. 163, 167-68, 394 S.E.2d 665, 668 (1990).\nHowever, our courts have allowed review of such orders if a substantial right is indeed implicated. See Sharpe, 351 N.C. at 164, 522 S.E.2d at 580 (order compelling discovery of documents protected by statutory privilege affected substantial right); Shaw v. Williamson, 75 N.C. App. 604, 606, 331 S.E.2d 203, 204 (order compelling discovery of documents protected by constitutional right against self-incrimination affected substantial right), disc. review denied, 314 N.C. 669, 335 S.E.2d 496 (1985); Walker v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 84 N.C. App. 552, 554, 353 S.E.2d 425, 426 (1987) (order compelling discovery appealable if order enforced by sanctions); Tennessee-Carolina Trans. Co. v. Strict Corp., 291 N.C. 618, 625, 629, 231 S.E.2d 597, 601, 603 (1977) (order denying deposition of witness \u201ceffectively preclude[d]\u201d defendant from introducing \u201chighly material\u201d evidence and therefore affected substantial right).\nAccording to Cape Fear, the \u201csubstantial right\u201d involved herein \u201cis the right to prepare adequate defenses for trial with the critical witness in the case.\u201d Cape Fear insists the Order has placed it\nin the untenable position of having to defend the conduct of a physician without having the ability to meet with and discuss the case with that individual prior to trial.\nOn the contrary, while it is true that Cape Fear is prohibited from ex parte contact with Dr. Sattler, the Order in no way precludes Cape Fear from \u201cmeeting] with and discussing the case with\u201d Dr. Sattler in the context of the multi-varied discovery methods detailed in Rule 26. See Rule 26(a) (parties may obtain discovery by \u201cdepositions upon oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission\u201d). Further, the Order in no way precludes Cape Fear from discovering or introducing \u201chighly material\u201d evidence, as in Tennessee-Carolina Trans. Co., 291 N.C. at 629, 231 S.E.2d at 603.\nIn weighing the competing interests in light of analogous arguments in Crist, our Supreme Court observed that\n\u201cex parte interviews may be less expensive and time-consuming than formal discovery and may provide a party some means of equalizing tactical advantage . . . .\u201d\n[However,] considerations of patient privacy, the confidential relationship between doctor and patient, the adequacy of formal discovery devices, and the untenable position in which ex parte contacts place the nonparty treating physician supersede defendant\u2019s interest in a less expensive and more convenient method of discovery.\nCrist, 326 N.C. at 335-36, 389 S.E.2d at 46-47 (citing Nelson v. Lewis, 534 A.2d 720, 723 (N.H. 1987)).\nUnder the circumstances sub judice, therefore, we hold Cape Fear has not met its \u201cburden to present appropriate grounds,\u201d Jeffreys, 115 N.C. App. at 379, 444 S.E.2d at 253, for hearing the instant interlocutory appeal. Cape Fear has been unpersuasive in its assertion that the Order precluded it from preparing its defense with the critical witness, see Tennessee-Carolina Trans. Co., 291 N.C. at 629, 231 S.E.2d at 603, so as to deprive it of a substantial right, thereby justifying an immediate appeal, see Dworsky v. Insurance Co., 49 N.C. App. 446, 448, 271 S.E.2d 522, 523 (1980).\nNotwithstanding, Cape Fear interjects that our Supreme Court vacated, see Crist, 326 N.C. at 330, 389 S.E.2d at 44, and thus overruled, this Court\u2019s earlier Crist decision dismissing as interlocutory the defendant\u2019s appeal of a trial court\u2019s order prohibiting ex parte contact with the plaintiff\u2019s non-party treating physicians, see Crist v. Moffatt, 92 N.C. App. 520, 523, 374 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1988). In the Court of Appeals opinion, we held the order appealed from did not \u201cdeprive[] defendant of any right, substantial or otherwise.\u201d Id. at 520, 374 S.E.2d at 488.\nContrary to Cape Fear\u2019s assertion, however, the Supreme Court did not overrule our determination that a substantial right was not affected, but rather acknowledged the appeal was interlocutory and nonetheless elected to review the case pursuant to its discretionary powers \u201c \u2018to review upon appeal any decision of the courts below, upon any matter of law or legal inference,\u2019 \u201d Crist, 326 N.C. at 330, 389 S.E.2d at 44 (citing N.C. Const., art. IV, \u00a7 12(1)); see also Lea Company v. N.C. Bd. of Transportation, 317 N.C. 254, 263, 345 S.E.2d 355, 360 (1986) (supervisory powers provided in art. IV, \u00a7 12(1) rarely utilized, but may be invoked \u201cto promote the expeditious administration of justice\u201d). Ultimately, moreover, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court\u2019s order prohibiting ex parte contact with the plaintiff\u2019s non-party treating physicians. Crist, 326 N.C. at 337, 389 S.E.2d at 48.\nIn sum, because Cape Fear\u2019s appeal is interlocutory and Cape Fear has failed to show the Order affects a substantial right, plaintiffs\u2019 motion to dismiss the appeal must be allowed. See Liggett Group, 113 N.C. App. at 23-24, 437 S.E.2d at 677.\nAppeal dismissed.\nJudges LEWIS and EDMUNDS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Henson & Fuerst, P.A., by Thomas W. Henson, for plaintiffs-appellees.", "Harris, Shields, Creech & Ward, P.A., by Thomas E. Harris, R. Brittain Blackerby, and Mary V. Ringwalt, for defendant-appellant Cape Fear Memorial Hospital." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SHIRLEY B. NORRIS and MURRAY NORRIS, Plaintiffs v. RAYMOND L. SATTLER, M.D., WILMINGTON NEUROSURGICAL ASSOCIATES, P.A., and CAPE FEAR MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC., Defendants\nNo. COA99-642\n(Filed 1 August 2000)\nAppeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 interlocutory order \u2014 denial of ex parte contact with physician \u2014 no substantial right\nAn appeal was dismissed as interlocutory where plaintiffs filed an action alleging negligent neurosurgery; dismissed their claims against the doctor and practice, leaving the claim against defendant hospital; defendant filed a motion to permit contact with the treating physician; that motion was denied; and defendant appealed. Interlocutory discovery orders are not ordinarily appealable prior to final judgment, but review has been allowed if a substantial right is implicated. Here, while defendant is prohibited from ex parte contact, the order in no way precludes the multi-varied discovery methods of Rule 26 and defendant\u2019s assertion that the order precluded preparing its defense was not persuasive.\nAppeal by defendant Cape Fear Memorial Hospital from order entered 16 March 1999 by Judge W. Allen Cobb, Jr., in New Hanover County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 March 2000.\nHenson & Fuerst, P.A., by Thomas W. Henson, for plaintiffs-appellees.\nHarris, Shields, Creech & Ward, P.A., by Thomas E. Harris, R. Brittain Blackerby, and Mary V. Ringwalt, for defendant-appellant Cape Fear Memorial Hospital." }, "file_name": "0409-01", "first_page_order": 441, "last_page_order": 446 }