{ "id": 9497902, "name": "GEORGE E. GROVES, Plaintiff-Appellant v. THE TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, CHRISTINE DE SIMONE, ANDY GREEN, and PORCELANITE, INC., f/k/a P&M TILE, INC., f/k/a MANNINGTON CERAMIC TILE, INC., Defendant-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Groves v. Travelers Insurance", "decision_date": "2000-08-29", "docket_number": "No. COA99-831", "first_page": "795", "last_page": "802", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "139 N.C. App. 795" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 646", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 N.C. App. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551137 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/48/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 S.E.2d 22", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2499459 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567370 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 S.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528074 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "allowing plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521761 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "allowing plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-10.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "525 S.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155929 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 S.E.2d 175", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571530, 571635, 571670, 571480, 571481 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0529-05", "/nc/349/0529-02", "/nc/349/0529-03", "/nc/349/0529-04", "/nc/349/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 S.E.2d 808", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "810" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11197826 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 S.E.2d 347", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "some evidence of sexual battery, standing alone, not \"atrocious\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "105 N.C. App. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523809 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "some evidence of sexual battery, standing alone, not \"atrocious\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 854", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "adultery not extreme and outrageous conduct" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 849", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524409 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "adultery not extreme and outrageous conduct" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0849-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 74", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "alleged discharge for the purposes of deflecting responsibility for certain deaths and for retaliation of First Amendment rights not \"extreme and outrageous\" conduct" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11799643 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "alleged discharge for the purposes of deflecting responsibility for certain deaths and for retaliation of First Amendment rights not \"extreme and outrageous\" conduct" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "912 F. Supp. 187", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7804658 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "conduct not \"extreme and outrageous\" when the plaintiff alleged that he was given poor performance evaluations, denied promotions available to others, excluded from training, and finally terminated from his employment" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/912/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 F. Supp. 2d 556", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 637971 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "termination of employee who refused to return to work from leave under Family and Medical Leave Act not \"extreme and outrageous\" conduct" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/73/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E.2d 107", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12133609 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 S.E.2d 578", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528348 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "759 F. Supp. 293", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 4092972 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/759/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.C. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "354 S.E.2d 357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360", "parenthetical": "citing Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 79 N.C. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12169791 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257", "parenthetical": "citing Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 79 N.C. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 S.E.2d 308", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311", "parenthetical": "quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, \u00a7 46 cmt. d (1965)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "73 N.C. App. 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525414 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677", "parenthetical": "quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, \u00a7 46 cmt. d (1965)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/73/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 S.E.2d 843", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "848", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "98 N.C. App. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525347 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/98/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567370 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 S.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528074 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123", "parenthetical": "sexual advances and harassment and threats of bodily injury sufficient to maintain claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress" }, { "page": "123", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "123", "parenthetical": "characterizing such alleged conduct as \"unjustified under the circumstances\" but not \" 'extreme and outrageous' as to give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521761 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" }, { "page": "493-94" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0483-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 756, "char_count": 16292, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.7367445836778727e-07, "percentile": 0.8945513811809106 }, "sha256": "a05a2801f14d83ceeee9f99574f1c47e5e6475d47bfbee2f8cbdffbf4efe03a6", "simhash": "1:994b9ca8c457081e", "word_count": 2517 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:40:43.899160+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge GREENE concurs.", "Judge McGEE concurs in part and dissents in part." ], "parties": [ "GEORGE E. GROVES, Plaintiff-Appellant v. THE TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, CHRISTINE DE SIMONE, ANDY GREEN, and PORCELANITE, INC., f/k/a P&M TILE, INC., f/k/a MANNINGTON CERAMIC TILE, INC., Defendant-Appellees" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EDMUNDS, Judge.\nPlaintiff George E. Groves appeals the trial court\u2019s order granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants. We affirm in part and reverse in part.\nIn 1994, plaintiff was employed as the production manager by defendant Porcelanite, Inc. (Porcelanite). During plaintiffs employment, defendant The Travelers Insurance Company (Travelers) provided workers\u2019 compensation insurance to Porcelanite.\nOn 12 August 1994, plaintiff became disabled as the result of a shoulder injury. He alleged that the injury was compensable because it resulted from repetitive motion required by his job. Plaintiff sought treatment from Dr. Robert V. Sypher, Jr., who diagnosed plaintiff as suffering from impingement and a probable rotator cuff tear. Based on plaintiff\u2019s description of his job duties, Dr. Sypher was of the opinion that the injury likely was related to plaintiff\u2019s employment. Accordingly, plaintiff submitted a workers\u2019 compensation claim to Travelers, which, through its agent defendant Christine De Simone, denied liability.\nSometime prior to 28 March 1995, defendants prepared a video tape purporting to demonstrate the functions of plaintiff\u2019s job. The video failed to show all aspects of plaintiff\u2019s job and allegedly omitted some of the job functions plaintiff contended were the cause of his injury. Defendants forwarded the video to Dr. Sypher, who reviewed the tape and changed his opinion that plaintiff\u2019s condition was job-related. Dr. Sypher then wrote a letter to defendants informing them that it was his opinion that plaintiff\u2019s condition was a result of age-related degeneration.\nAfter a hearing on plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim, plaintiff, Porcelanite, and Travelers entered into an Agreement of Final Settlement and Release (Agreement). Pursuant to the Agreement, plaintiff agreed to dismiss his workers\u2019 compensation claim against Porcelanite and Travelers in return for a lump-sum payment of $13,000 plus payment of medical bills related to his injury.\nThereafter, on 30 March 1998, plaintiff brought suit against Travelers, De Simone, and Porcelanite alleging (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (2) bad faith, (3) unfair or deceptive trade practices, and (4) civil conspiracy. Defendants answered on 10 June 1998 and asserted as affirmative defenses the Agreement and the statute of limitations. Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on 2 July 1998. This motion was denied, but on 15 March 1999, defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Judgment on the Pleadings, citing Johnson v. First Union Corp., 131 N.C. App. 142, 504 S.E.2d 808 (1998), disc. review allowed, 349 N.C. 529, 526 S.E.2d 175, review dismissed as improvidently granted, 351 N.C. 339, 525 S.E.2d 171 (2000). On 28 April 1999, the trial court granted defendants\u2019 motion and entered judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff appeals.\nPlaintiff contends that his claims were outside of the exclusivity provision of the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act and that the trial court accordingly erred in granting defendants\u2019 motion. Section 97-10.1 of the Act states:\nIf the employee and the employer are subject to and have complied with the provisions of this Article, then the rights and remedies herein granted to the employee, his dependents, next of kin, or personal representative shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his dependents, next of kin, or representative as against the employer at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-10.1 (1999). Plaintiff contends that \u201c[i]n the case currently before this Court, the actions of the defendants as alleged do not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission because the acts did not occur within the course and scope of employment.\u201d We disagree. All of plaintiff\u2019s claims except for his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress are precluded by our holding in Johnson.\nIn Johnson, where the facts were virtually identical to those at bar, the plaintiffs allegedly suffered on-the-job injuries and filed claims with the Industrial Commission seeking workers\u2019 compensation benefits. Both plaintiffs initially were diagnosed as suffering from job-related repetitive motion disorders. Defendants then prepared a videotape portraying the physical requirements of the plaintiffs\u2019 jobs. After viewing the tape, the physician withdrew diagnoses that the plaintiffs\u2019 injuries were job-related. When the plaintiffs\u2019 claims were rejected by the Industrial Commission, they filed suit alleging fraud, bad faith, unfair and deceptive trade practices, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy, contending that the videotape was inaccurate and made with the intent of deceiving plaintiff\u2019s physician. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The plaintiffs appealed, and the defendants cross-appealed, arguing that while the trial court was correct in dismissing the suit, the dismissal should have been based upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We agreed with the defendants that all of the plaintiffs\u2019 claims were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission and affirmed the trial court\u2019s dismissal. See Johnson, 131 N.C. App. at 145, 504 S.E.2d at 810.\nPlaintiff in the case at bar also alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress. This Court has long held that such a claim lies outside the exclusivity provision of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. See Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 79 N.C. App. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116 (1986) (allowing plaintiff\u2019s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress). The issue was one of first impression before the Hogan Court, which addressed the question directly and discussed at length the policy considerations behind its holding. Hogan has since been followed by this Court. See Brown v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 93 N.C. App. 431, 378 S.E.2d 232 (1989). Accordingly, despite the suggestion in Johnson that such a claim is precluded, we address plaintiff\u2019s claim as to this issue.\nTo establish such a claim, plaintiff must have shown that defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that was intended to cause severe emotional distress, or were recklessly indifferent to the likelihood that such distress would result, and that severe distress did result from defendants\u2019 conduct. See Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 452, 276 S.E.2d 325, 335 (1981). In his complaint, plaintiff alleged:\n29. The defendants created the videotape and sent it to Dr. Sypher intentionally, which conduct was extreme and outrageous, with the intent to cause emotional distress to Groves, and said actions did, in fact, cause emotional distress to Groves.\n30. As a result of said conduct, Groves suffered frustration and severe emotional distress, for which he is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages, in an amount to be determined at trial.\nAlthough the level of proof required for such a claim is high, see Waddle v. Sparks, 331 N.C. 73, 84, 414 S.E.2d 22, 27-28 (1992), plaintiff has pled the elements of the tort. Under principles of notice pleading, a complaint is adequate if it gives a defendant sufficient notice of the nature and basis of the plaintiffs claim and allows the defendant to answer and prepare for trial. See Gilchrist, District Attorney v. Hurley, 48 N.C. App. 433, 269 S.E.2d 646 (1980). Therefore, the trial court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings as to plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part.\nJudge GREENE concurs.\nJudge McGEE concurs in part and dissents in part.", "type": "majority", "author": "EDMUNDS, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge McGee\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part.\nI agree with the majority that plaintiffs claims for bad faith, unfair or deceptive trade practices, and civil conspiracy fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission. I respectfully disagree that the trial court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings as to plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under the facts alleged by plaintiff.\nTo properly state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct and (2) such conduct was intended to cause, and in fact did cause, severe emotional distress. See Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 447, 276 S.E.2d 325, 332 (1981). Plaintiff has alleged a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress specifically asserting that defendants \u201ccreated the videotape and sent it to Dr. Sypher intentionally, which conduct was extreme and outrageous, with the intent to cause emotional distress to [plaintiff].\u201d\n\u201cThe determination of whether the conduct alleged\u201d is sufficiently \u201cextreme and outrageous enough to support such an action is a question of law for the trial judge.\u201d Lenins v. K-Mart Corp., 98 N.C. App. 590, 599, 391 S.E.2d 843, 848 (1990) (citation omitted). Conduct is extreme and outrageous when it is \u201c \u2018so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.\u2019 \u201d Briggs v. Rosenthal, 73 N.C. App. 672, 677, 327 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1985) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, \u00a7 46 cmt. d (1965)).\nIn this case, plaintiff essentially alleges that defendants prepared a videotape purporting to demonstrate the functions of plaintiffs job which failed to show all \u00e1spects of his job and allegedly omitted some of the job functions plaintiff contended were the cause of his injury. Defendants sent the videotape to plaintiffs physician, who reviewed the tape and changed his opinion that plaintiffs condition was job-related. While such alleged conduct might well be most objectionable, defendants\u2019 actions \u201cmay not be reasonably regarded as exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by a decent society so as to satisfy the first element of the tort, requiring a showing of extreme and outrageous conduct.\u201d Shreve v. Duke Power Co., 85 N.C. App. 253, 257, 354 S.E.2d 357, 360 (1987) (citing Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 79 N.C. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116 (1986)).\nPlaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed because the conduct alleged under this cause of action, even if true, does not rise to the level of behavior our courts previously have required. Assuming the allegations in plaintiff\u2019s claim to be true, these actions do not exceed all bounds usually tolerated by decent society. Our courts have appropriately held that allegations of actions by a defendant that rose to the level of \u201cextreme and outrageous\u201d conduct are actionable. See, e.g., Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 494, 340 S.E.2d at 123 (sexual advances and harassment and threats of bodily injury sufficient to maintain claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress). However, in other employment actions, our courts have been reluctant to find intentional infliction of emotional distress claims actionable. See, e.g., Haburjak v. Prudential Bache Securities, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 293 (W.D.N.C. 1991); Mull\u00eds v. The Pantry, Inc., 93 N.C. App. 591, 378 S.E.2d 578 (1989); McKnight v. Simpson\u2019s Beauty Supply, Inc., 86 N.C. App. 451, 358 S.E.2d 107 (1987). But see Brown v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 93 N.C. App. 431, 378 S.E.2d 232 (1989). The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is reserved for conduct that is \u201c \u2018utterly intolerable in a civilized community.\u2019 \u201d Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 493-94, 340 S.E.2d at 123 (citation omitted). Our Court in Hogan dismissed one plaintiff\u2019s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress despite the fact that she alleged her manager refused her request for pregnancy leave, directed her to carry heavy objects weighing more than ten pounds, cursed at her, and refused her request to leave work to visit a hospital. See id. at 494, 340 S.E.2d at 123 (characterizing such alleged conduct as \u201cunjustified under the circumstances\u201d but not \u201c \u2018extreme and outrageous\u2019 as to give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress\u201d).\nLike other cases in which our courts have found the alleged conduct fell short of establishing the tort, defendants\u2019 alleged actions do not rise to the level of conduct required to establish a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress and as a matter of law, are insufficient to state such a cause of action. See, e.g., Buser v. Southern Foodservice, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 556 (M.D.N.C. 1999) (termination of employee who refused to return to work from leave under Family and Medical Leave Act not \u201cextreme and outrageous\u201d conduct); Pardasani v. Rack Room Shoes Inc., 912 F. Supp. 187 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (conduct not \u201cextreme and outrageous\u201d when the plaintiff alleged that he was given poor performance evaluations, denied promotions available to others, excluded from training, and finally terminated from his employment); Dickens, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (physical abuse not sufficient); Lorbacher v. Housing Authority of the City of Raleigh, 127 N.C. App. 663, 493 S.E.2d 74 (1997) (alleged discharge for the purposes of deflecting responsibility for certain deaths and for retaliation of First Amendment rights not \u201cextreme and outrageous\u201d conduct); Poston v. Poston, 112 N.C. App. 849, 436 S.E.2d 854 (1993) (adultery not extreme and outrageous conduct); Wilson v. Bellamy, 105 N.C. App. 446, 414 S.E.2d 347 (1992) (some evidence of sexual battery, standing alone, not \u201catrocious\u201d). The totality of defendants\u2019 actions simply is not comparable to cases in which our courts have imposed liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress. For example, defendants\u2019 actions did not involve physical abuse as in Dickens, sexual harassment as in Hogan and Brown, or threats, obscene gestures, and cursing as in Wilson. The conduct that sustained claims in those cases far exceeds in outrageousness the conduct experienced by plaintiff in this case. Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiff\u2019s complaint does not identify conduct that can be considered extreme and outrageous, he has not alleged a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress; therefore, the trial court did not err in entering judgment in favor of defendants.\nI respectfully disagree and dissent in part.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "Judge McGee" } ], "attorneys": [ "Donaldson & Black, P.A., by Jay A. Gervasi, Jr., and Rachel Scott Decker, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, by Richard T. Rice and Garth A. Gersten, for defendant-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GEORGE E. GROVES, Plaintiff-Appellant v. THE TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, CHRISTINE DE SIMONE, ANDY GREEN, and PORCELANITE, INC., f/k/a P&M TILE, INC., f/k/a MANNINGTON CERAMIC TILE, INC., Defendant-Appellees\nNo. COA99-831\n(Filed 29 August 2000)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 exclusive jurisdiction \u2014 bad faith \u2014 unfair and deceptive trade practices \u2014 civil conspiracy\nThe trial court did not err by granting judgment on the pleadings as to plaintiff\u2019s claims for bad faith, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and civil conspiracy arising out of a refusal to pay a claim which arose from a workers\u2019 compensation claim involving an allegedly inaccurate videotape, because all of plaintiff\u2019s claims were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 no exclusive jurisdiction \u2014 intentional infliction of emotional distress\nThe trial court erred by granting judgment on the pleadings as to plaintiff\u2019s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of a refusal to pay a claim which arose from a workers\u2019 compensation claim involving an allegedly inaccurate videotape, because: (1) an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim lies outside the exclusivity provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act; and (2) plaintiff has pled the elements of the tort.\nJudge McGee concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 28 April 1999 by Judge Julius A. Rousseau, Jr., in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 April 2000.\nDonaldson & Black, P.A., by Jay A. Gervasi, Jr., and Rachel Scott Decker, for plaintiff-appellant.\nWomble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, by Richard T. Rice and Garth A. Gersten, for defendant-appellees." }, "file_name": "0795-01", "first_page_order": 827, "last_page_order": 834 }