{ "id": 8547102, "name": "ALICE JEANNIE HAWLEY CLOUSE v. CHAIRTOWN MOTORS, INC.", "name_abbreviation": "Clouse v. Chairtown Motors, Inc.", "decision_date": "1972-03-29", "docket_number": "No. 7222SC136", "first_page": "117", "last_page": "119", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "14 N.C. App. 117" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "176 S.E. 2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561932 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 S.E. 2d 785", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "236 N.C. 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627599 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/236/0723-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 365, "char_count": 5720, "ocr_confidence": 0.566, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3864642212913987e-07, "percentile": 0.6415551640269375 }, "sha256": "2b44ba1083b1d1564bc8876a93be3aa6b277315a66b675acda4c499f8c25dc21", "simhash": "1:9b06cfb12f6716d1", "word_count": 969 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:58:48.650385+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Brock and Hedrick concur." ], "parties": [ "ALICE JEANNIE HAWLEY CLOUSE v. CHAIRTOWN MOTORS, INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "VAUGHN, Judge.\nRule 19 of the Rules of Practice in this Court requires, among other things, that \u201cevery pleading, motion, affidavit, or other document included in the record on appeal shall plainly show the date on which it was filed and, if verified, the date of the verification and the name of the person who verified it.\u201d The rule and the appeal is subject to dismissal.\nRule 6 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts requires that any motion shall state the rule number or numbers under which the movant is proceeding. Defendant\u2019s \u201cMotion to Strike\u201d which the court allowed presumably was that \u201cMotion\u201d appearing in the record at page 14 with no indication as to when it was filed or as to under which rule movant was proceeding. Ordinarily Rule 12(f) requires that a \u201cMotion to Strike\u201d be made before responding to a pleading.\nWe will treat defendant\u2019s motion as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) and, in our discretion, consider the appeal on its merits so as to determine the correctness of the order entered.\nThe question of recovery of punitive damages in an action for fraud was discussed in considerable detail in Swinton v. Realty Co., 236 N.C. 723, 73 S.E. 2d 785. In that case the Court said:\n\u201c . . . [I]t has been uniformly held with us that punitive damages may be awarded in the sound discretion of the jury and within reasonable limits, though the right to such an award does not follow as a conclusion of law because the jury has found an issue of fraud against the defendant. There must be an element of aggravation accompanying the tortious conduct which causes the injury. Smart money may not be included in the assessment of damages as a matter of course simply because of an actionable wrong, but only when there are some features of aggravation, as when the wrong is done willfully or under circumstances of rudeness, oppression, or in a manner which evinces a reckless and wanton disregard of the plaintiff\u2019s rights.\u201d\nThe Court then concluded:\n\u201c . . . [W]e think the rule is that the facts in each case must determine whether the fraudulent representations alleged were accompanied by such acts and conduct as to subject the wrongdoer to an assessment of additional damages, for the purpose of punishing him for what has been called his \u2018outrageous conduct.\u2019 \u201d\nIt is clear then that a claim for punitive damages in an action for fraud is a claim upon which relief may be granted. This being so, it was error to grant defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s claim for punitive damages. No insurmountable bar to recovery appears on the face of the complaint. The complaint contains a statement of the claim \u201csufficiently particular to give the court and the parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved\u201d so as to meet the requirements of Rule 8(a). A claim should not be dismissed unless it appears that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim. What facts, .if any, plaintiff may be able to prove are not known at this stage of the proceeding and the order entered constituted a premature attempt to dispose of the claim. See Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E. 2d 161, where Justice Sharp discusses the history and proper application of Rule 8(a).\nThe order from which plaintiff appealed is reversed.\nReversed.\nJudges Brock and Hedrick concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "VAUGHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "John Randolph Ingram for plaintiff appellant.", "Lambeth and Rogers by Charles F. Lambeth, Jr., for defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ALICE JEANNIE HAWLEY CLOUSE v. CHAIRTOWN MOTORS, INC.\nNo. 7222SC136\n(Filed 29 March 1972)\n1. Appeal and Error \u00a7 41\u2014 documents in record \u2014 dates filed\nAppeal is subject to dismissal for failure to comply with the requirement of Court of Appeals Rule 19 that each document included in the record on appeal plainly show the date on which it was filed and, if verified, the date of verification and the name of the person who verified it.\n2. Rules of Civil Procedure \u00a7 7\u2014 motions \u2014 rule number\nA motion must state the rule number or numbers under which the movant is proceeding. Rule 6 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts.\n3. Damages \u00a7 11; Fraud \u00a7 13\u2014 fraud in sale of automobile \u2014 punitive damages\nThe trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s claim for punitive damages in an action based on alleged fraud in the sale of an automobile.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Lwpton, Judge, 4 October 1971 Civil Session of Superior Court held in Davidson County.\nAction to recover actual and punitive damages for alleged fraud in the sale of an automobile by defendant to plaintiff. Among other things, plaintiff alleged: (1) that defendant falsely represented the automobile as being a demonstrator used only by factory representatives of Ford Motor Company, when, in fact, it had previously been owned by a car rental agency; (2) that the actual mileage the automobile had been operated was greater than that represented by defendant; and (3) that defendant falsely represented that the automobile had never been wrecked. Plaintiff alleged that defendant\u2019s false representations were made with intent to deceive plaintiff and that plaintiff was deceived and oppressed by the alleged actions and false statements of defendant. Defendant filed answer and counterclaim. On 4 October 1971 Judge Lupton signed an order granting a motion to strike paragraph 12 in the first, second and third causes of action. Each of the paragraphs which were ordered to be stricken contained allegations that plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages in the amount of $10,000.00. From the entry of the order, plaintiff appealed.\nJohn Randolph Ingram for plaintiff appellant.\nLambeth and Rogers by Charles F. Lambeth, Jr., for defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0117-01", "first_page_order": 143, "last_page_order": 145 }