{
  "id": 8549931,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM EARL SUTTON",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Sutton",
  "decision_date": "1972-05-24",
  "docket_number": "No. 723SC287",
  "first_page": "422",
  "last_page": "426",
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      "cite": "14 N.C. App. 422"
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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      "cite": "243 N.C. 100",
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    {
      "cite": "274 N.C. 409",
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    {
      "cite": "12 N.C. App. 558",
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    {
      "cite": "265 N.C. 380",
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:58:48.650385+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Britt and Hedrick concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM EARL SUTTON"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PARKER, Judge.\nWhile the money order involved in each 'case is sufficiently described in the first count in each bill of indictment, the second count in each bill refers only to \u201ca certain false, forged and counterfeited money order is as follows, that is to say: And did present and cash said money order. . . . \u201d No further description of the particular \u201ccounterfeited money order\u201d which defendant is charged with having uttered is contained in the second count in either bill. One may speculate that the reference to \u201csaid money order\u201d was intended to refer to the particular money order as described in the first count in each bill, but it is not even entirely clear that this is so. In any event \u201c[i]n an indictment containing several counts, each count should be complete in itself.\u201d State v. McKoy, 265 N.C. 380, 144 S.E. 2d 46; State v. Hackney, 12 N.C. App. 558, 183 S.E. 2d 785.\n\u201cIn all criminal prosecutions, every person charged with crime has the right to be informed of the accusation. ...\u201d Art. I, \u00a7 23, Constitution of North Carolina. To implement this basic constitutional right, our Supreme Court has many times held that an indictment \u201cto be good must allege lucidly and accurately all the essential elements of the offense endeavored to be charged. The purpose of such constitutional provisions is: (1) such certainty in the statement as will identify the offense with which the accused is sought to be charged; (2) to protect the accused from being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense; (3) to enable the accused to prepare for trial, and (4) to enable the court, on conviction or plea of nolo contendere or guilty to pronounce sentence according to the rights of the case.\u201d State v. Stokes, 274 N.C. 409, 163 S.E. 2d 770, and cases cited therein; State v. Able, 11 N.C. App. 141, 180 S.E. 2d 333.\nTested by these long established standards, we find the allegations contained in the second count in each bill of indictment insufficient. Since \u201c[i]t is an essential of jurisdiction that a criminal offense shall be sufficiently charged in a warrant or an indictment,\u201d State v. Strickland, 243 N.C. 100, 89 S.E. 2d 781, defendant\u2019s motion in arrest of judgment on the verdicts rendered on the second count in each bill of indictment must be allowed.\nAs to the charges contained in the first count in each bill of indictment, defendant\u2019s contention that there was a fatal variance between the charge and the State\u2019s proof is without merit. The first count in each bill expressly alleged that defendant, with intent to defraud, committed forgery by endorsing the name of William O. Marley on the money order involved. This charged an offense under the second sentence of G.S. 14-120, which provides in part as follows.\n\u201cIf any person . . . with intent to defraud . . . shall falsely make, forge or counterfeit any endorsement on any instrument described in the preceding section, whether such instrument be genuine or false, . . . the person so offending shall be guilty of a felony. ...\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe money orders here involved were instruments as described in G.S. 14-119. To convict of the felony of forging the endorsements thereon under the second sentence of G.S. 14-120, it was not necessary to allege or to prove forgery of the face of the money orders, which would have been separate felonies under G.S. 14-119. There was no variance between the allegations in the first count in each bill and the State\u2019s proof in support thereof. The State\u2019s proof was ample to support the verdicts.\nAppellant\u2019s assignments of error directed to the court\u2019s charge to the jury, most of which are based on his mistaken assumption that in the first count in each bill he was being charged under G.S. 14-119 rather than under the second sentence of G.S. 14-120, are also without merit. When the charge is considered as a whole, we find no prejudicial error.\nThe result is:\nAs to the charges attempted to be alleged in the second count in each bill of indictment, the judgment is\nArrested.\nAs to the judgments imposed on the verdicts finding defendant guilty of the charge contained in the first count in each bill of indictment, we find\nNo error.\nJudges Britt and Hedrick concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PARKER, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Robert Morgan by Associate Attorney Charles A. Lloyd for the State.",
      "Laurence S. Graham for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM EARL SUTTON\nNo. 723SC287\n(Filed 24 May 1972)\n1. Forgery \u00a7 2 \u2014 uttering \u2014 indictment \u2014 description of forged instrument\nThe second count of a bill of indictment was insufficient to charge the offense of uttering a forged money order where it referred only to \u201ca certain false, forged and counterfeited money order is as follows, that is to say: And did present and cash said money order,\u201d but contained no further description of the particular counterfeited money order which defendant is charged with having uttered.\n2. Indictment and Warrant \u00a7 8 \u2014 completeness of each count\nEach count in an indictment containing several counts must be complete in itself.\n3. Forgery \u00a7 2 \u2014 forgery of endorsement \u2014 proof\nTo convict defendant of the felony of forging the endorsement of a money order with intent to defraud in violation of the second sentence of G.S. 14-120, it was not necessary to allege or prove forgery of the face of the money order, which would have been a separate felony under G.S. 14-119.\nAppeal by defendant from Rouse, Judge, 6 December 1971 Session of Superior Court held in Pitt County.\nIn the first count in each of two separate bills of indictment, one being returned as a true bill in Case No. 71-Cr-7986 and the other as a true bill in Case No. 71-Cr-7987, defendant was charged with forging the endorsement of a money order with intent to defraud. In each case the first count in the bill of indictment particularly described the money order involved in that case. In Case No. 71-Cr-7986 the second count in the bill of indictment is as follows:\n\u201cAnd the Jurors Aforesaid, Upon Their Oath Aforesaid, Do Further Present, that the said William Earl Sutton afterward, to wit, on the day and year aforesaid, at and in the County aforesaid, wittingly and unlawfully and feloniously did utter and publish as true a certain false, forged and counterfeited money order is as follows, that is to say: And did present and cash said money order at Edwards Pharmacy, 207 S. Lee Street, Ayden, N. C., with intent to defraud, he, the said Edwards Pharmacy at the time he so uttered and published the said false, forged and counterfeited money order then and there well knowing the same to be false, forged and counterfeited against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State.\u201d\nIn Case No. 71-Cr-7987 the second count in the bill was substantially similar, except that it alleged defendant cashed \u201csaid money order at Braxton\u2019s Grocery (Dorothy Braxton), Grifton, N. C.\u201d The two cases were consolidated for trial and defendant pleaded not guilty to all charges.\nEvidence for the State indicated that certain blank money orders were missing from Johnson\u2019s Drug Company, Inc., in Jacksonville, N. C. The State\u2019s witnesses identified defendant as the person who cashed at separate stores in Pitt County two money orders bearing the same serial numbers as those missing from the Jacksonville store. These witnesses also testified that at the time defendant cashed each money order he represented himself to be the payee named in the money order, William 0. Marley, and endorsed the name \u201cWilliam 0. Marley\u201d on each money order. An F.B.I. handwriting expert testified that the endorsement on each money order was in defendant\u2019s handwriting. The defendant did not introduce evidence.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of all charges. Upon the verdicts on the forgery counts in each case, judgments were entered sentencing defendant to prison for not less than four nor more than five years in each case, the two sentences to run concurrently. Prayer for judgment was continued as to the uttering charge in each case. Defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Robert Morgan by Associate Attorney Charles A. Lloyd for the State.\nLaurence S. Graham for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0422-01",
  "first_page_order": 448,
  "last_page_order": 452
}