{ "id": 12121998, "name": "KAREN S. PATTERSON, Plaintiff v. PHILIP E. TAYLOR, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Patterson v. Taylor", "decision_date": "2000-09-05", "docket_number": "No. COA99-815", "first_page": "91", "last_page": "99", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "140 N.C. App. 91" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "194 S.E.2d 761", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "784", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568976 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "713-14", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11890143 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Or. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 107.169", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Or. Rev. Stat.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.M. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 40-4-9.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.M. Stat. Ann.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Mich. Comp. Laws \u00a7 722", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Mich. Comp. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ind. Code \u00a7 31-9-2-67", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ind. Code", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ga. Code Ann. \u00a7 19-9-6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ga. Code Ann.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Cal. Fam. Code \u00a7\u00a7 3002-3004", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Cal. Code", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 107", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 N.C. App. 648", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525489 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/98/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 S.E.2d 735", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 14", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566426 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 151", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 N.C. App. 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523122 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/102/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 384", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4719235, 4724236, 4726804, 4722549, 4725112 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0327-05", "/nc/313/0327-04", "/nc/313/0327-03", "/nc/313/0327-01", "/nc/313/0327-02" ] }, { "cite": "321 S.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "71 N.C. App. 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523718 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/71/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 497", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499", "parenthetical": "a separation agreement is a contract and is construed in accordance with the laws governing contracts" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526894 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438", "parenthetical": "a separation agreement is a contract and is construed in accordance with the laws governing contracts" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155908, 1155728, 1155792, 1155829, 1155896 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0642-01", "/nc/351/0642-04", "/nc/351/0642-02", "/nc/351/0642-05", "/nc/351/0642-03" ] }, { "cite": "89 S.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397-98" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "242 N.C. 707", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621919 ], "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709-10" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/242/0707-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 S.E.2d 798", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800", "parenthetical": "parties may \" 'bind themselves as they see fit' by a contract, unless the contract would violate the law or is contrary to public policy\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11239044 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225", "parenthetical": "parties may \" 'bind themselves as they see fit' by a contract, unless the contract would violate the law or is contrary to public policy\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0223-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 893, "char_count": 20186, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7662566703893204e-07, "percentile": 0.7107348729597749 }, "sha256": "626e7aa41769d432f596908d78aebb6e67dedb85871847d6fcffdd5a9b29d064", "simhash": "1:0f3ed4be1a019984", "word_count": 3225 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:18:32.795698+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge McGEE concurs.", "Judge GREENE dissents." ], "parties": [ "KAREN S. PATTERSON, Plaintiff v. PHILIP E. TAYLOR, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EDMUNDS, Judge.\nDefendant Philip E. Taylor appeals the trial court\u2019s judgment finding that plaintiff Karen S. Patterson did not violate their separation agreement and ordering defendant to pay alimony. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.\nPlaintiff and defendant were married on 14 February 1975. Three sons were born of the marriage. The parties separated on 16 March 1991 and later divorced. On 17 June 1991, plaintiff and defendant entered into a separation agreement (the agreement) in which they stated that \u201cboth parties are fit and proper persons to have care, custody and control of the minor children\u201d and that it was in the \u201cchildren\u2019s best interest that their custody be vested jointly in the parties.\u201d Pursuant to the agreement, plaintiff retained physical custody of the two younger children, while defendant retained physical custody of the eldest child. Defendant acknowledged under the agreement that plaintiff could move from North Carolina with the two children without interference from him. The agreement additionally provided that defendant would pay plaintiff alimony of $3,589 per month for 135 months, even if plaintiff re-married.\nPlaintiff and the two sons moved to Oklahoma in 1992. Defendant maintained contact with the children by visiting them and telephoning them or plaintiff weekly. In September 1994, plaintiff informed defendant that their youngest son, who was then twelve years old, had experimented with marijuana on one occasion. (The behavior of this child is key to the actions taken by the parties; to preserve his privacy, we will refer to him in this opinion as \u201cA.\u201d) Plaintiff added that \u201cA\u201d had told her that the other son in her custody had used LSD. Defendant responded with a letter to plaintiff expressing his concern that she was not treating the situation seriously and stating that he felt \u201cA\u201d should be removed from his current environment to defendant\u2019s residence in North Carolina. He ended the letter by writing:\nKnowing . . . you are still unwilling to give [\u201dA\u201d] a chance [in North Carolina], I can only insist that you respect my wishes on these following matters:\nI will expect you to keep me informed directly and to advise the children\u2019s therapist to send me frequent reports of problems and progress. I will be contacting Ken directly to request these reports; if he asks you, please confirm that I have joint custody of the children and he is required by law to provide appropriate requested information to me just as he does to you.\nI want you to send me copies of the drug testing you recently had performed on the boys. I want you to routinely (but at irregular and unexpected times) have drug testing repeated and have copies of those results sent to me also.\nYou must remember that I have joint custody of the children with you. My only interest lies in the desire to do what is best for all my children and my family.\nDefendant contacted \u201cA\u2019s\u201d therapist in January 1995 to discuss the child. The therapist spoke of adjustment problems \u201cA\u201d was experiencing at school but did not mention drug use. Plaintiff continued to have \u201cA\u201d randomly tested for drugs from October 1994 through the summer of 1995. Although invoices for these tests were sent to defendant, the invoices did not indicate the test results, and defendant \u201cassumed they were all negative.\u201d When \u201cA\u201d visited defendant in the summer of 1995, defendant had him tested and the results were negative.\nHowever, in September, October, and December 1995, \u201cA\u201d tested positive for marijuana. Plaintiff did not advise defendant of these test results, nor did she inform him when she enrolled \u201cA\u201d in a weekly drug-counseling program. In 1996, plaintiff had an agreement with \u201cA\u201d whereby he was grounded until he received a negative drug test, but he was tested only when he chose to be tested. Plaintiff paid for tests with negative results, while \u201cA\u201d paid for tests with positive results. Defendant had no knowledge of or involvement in this agreement because plaintiff had not informed him about \u201cA\u2019s\u201d positive drug tests. When plaintiff spoke with defendant in 1996 after receiving positive test results, she testified that defendant, in reference to the children, \u201cmight have vaguely said, \u2018How are they doing?\u2019 And I would say, \u2018Well, they\u2019re doing okay.\u2019 \u201d\n\u201cA\u201d apparently continued using drugs because plaintiff observed that he was \u201cgetting more and more listless and losing weight. . . not having a lot of get up and go, [and] bad grades at school.\u201d In December 1996, plaintiff decided to place \u201cA\u201d in a voluntary residential program approximately ninety miles from her home. The program was to last six to twelve months, although it could extend for a longer period. On 20 January 1997, plaintiff wrote defendant to inform him that she was ending her dual health insurance on the children, but she did not mention that \u201cA\u201d would be entering the rehabilitation program. \u201cA\u201d began the program on 4 February 1997, and on 14 February 1997, plaintiff informed defendant of \u201cA\u2019s\u201d problems and his whereabouts.\nDefendant visited \u201cA\u201d at the program in June 1997. However, after several unsuccessful attempts to contact \u201cA\u201d two months later, one of \u201cA\u2019s\u201d counselors informed defendant that \u201cA\u201d was no longer in the program. Convinced that plaintiff had breached the agreement, defendant stopped making alimony payments to plaintiff.\nPlaintiff filed suit seeking to collect alimony payments due under the agreement. Defendant answered, denying he had breached the agreement, and counterclaimed, demanding specific performance or recission of the agreement. Defendant alleged that plaintiff breached the agreement by deciding unilaterally to place \u201cA\u201d in a residential substance abuse program without informing him, then removing \u201cA\u201d without defendant\u2019s knowledge or consent.\nThe case was heard without a jury. The trial court found that plaintiff did not breach the agreement because it placed no \u201caffirmative obligation on . . . either party to provide medical records, or to consult with the other with regard to medical treatment, substance abuse treatment, and school decisions, or to obtain approval from the other for other decisions to be made in the child\u2019s life.\u201d The trial court also found \u201c[t]here is no evidence that plaintiff failed to provide to the defendant any information which he requested related to the child\u2019s health, education, or substance abuse.\u201d The trial court ordered defendant to make the overdue payments and to pay plaintiff\u2019s attorney fees. Defendant appeals.\nI.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred in failing to conclude that the agreement was integrated. Although the trial court did not make such a finding, counsel stipulated at the hearing below and at oral argument that the agreement was integrated. Therefore, we need not address this issue. Because the agreement is integrated, a party\u2019s breach of its provisions can relieve the non-breaching party from his or her alimony obligations. See Nisbet v. Nisbet, 102 N.C. App. 232, 402 S.E.2d 151 (1991).\nII.\nWe next address defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court erroneously failed to consider extrinsic evidence of the parties\u2019 intent as to the meaning of their children\u2019s custody at the time they executed the separation agreement. A marital separation agreement is subject to the same rules pertaining to enforcement as any other contract. See Moore v. Moore, 297 N.C. 14, 252 S.E.2d 735 (1979). When a trial judge sits without a jury, the court\u2019s findings of fact are binding on appeal if supported by any competent evidence in the record, but the court\u2019s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. See R.L. Coleman & Co. v. City of Asheville, 98 N.C. App. 648, 651, 392 S.E.2d 107, 108-09 (1990).\nThe key to this case is the meaning of the phrase \u201ccustody [] vested jointly in the parties\u201d in the context of the agreement. The agreement does not give a definition of the phrase, and both parties\u2019 briefs refer to this arrangement as \u201cjoint custody.\u201d Because the separate living arrangements for the children to which the parties agreed are not now contested, we assume that the phrase \u201ccustody [] vested jointly in the parties\u201d is used in the separation agreement to mean \u201cjoint legal custody,\u201d as opposed to \u201cjoint physical custody.\u201d As in the case sub judice, the bench and bar have proven adept at distinguishing in practice between physical custody and legal custody. Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to suggest to courts and attorneys that precision in the use of these terms in fashioning orders and agreements may avoid later confusion and obviate litigation.\nBecause there is no question about the physical custody of the children in the case at bar, the following discussion of \u201cjoint custody\u201d applies only to \u201cjoint legal custody.\u201d In addition, because the issue before us arises out of a voluntary separation agreement, our holding is limited to the interpretation of the term in such an agreement.\nOther states have defined \u201cjoint custody\u201d with varying degrees of specificity. See, e.g., Cal. Fam. Code \u00a7\u00a7 3002-3004 (West 1994); Ga. Code Ann. \u00a7 19-9-6 (1999); Ind. Code \u00a7 31-9-2-67 (1997); Mich. Comp. Laws \u00a7 722.26a (1992); N.M. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 40-4-9.1 (Michie 1999); Or. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 107.169 (1999). In contrast, North Carolina\u2019s governing statute refers to \u201cjoint custody\u201d but contains neither a definition of the term nor a distinction between \u201cjoint legal custody\u201d and \u201cjoint physical custody.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.2 (1999). (As noted above, where we use the term \u201cjoint custody\u201d in this opinion, we specifically mean \u201cjoint legal custody.\u201d) The statute is relatively unrestrictive, requiring a court ordering \u201cjoint custody\u201d to focus on the best interests and welfare of the child, but otherwise allowing the court substantial latitude in fashioning a \u201cjoint custody\u201d arrangement. We see no reason why parents entering a voluntary separation agreement should not have equal latitude. Therefore, parents entering such an agreement for \u201cjoint custody\u201d may include or omit conditions pertaining to the child\u2019s education, health care, religious training, and the like. In short, the parties to a voluntary separation agreement have considerable freedom to reach an agreement for \u201cjoint custody\u201d that takes into account various factors including the particularities of the relationships, the personalities involved, the bonds between family members, the needs of the parties, and any other appropriate features that together make each marriage and each family unique.\nA practical result of the freedom to draft individualized separation agreements and set up specialized conditions of \u201cjoint custody\u201d is that a corresponding responsibility is imposed on the parties to each agreement to allow for the possibility that matters initially \u201cunderstood\u201d between the parties may later become hotly contested issues. Moreover, the flexibility permitted those drafting custody agreements does not make the term \u201cjoint custody\u201d infinitely elastic. The election by the parties to include the term (or, as here, its equivalent) without further definition implies a relationship where each parent has a degree of control over, and a measure of responsibility for, the child\u2019s best interest and welfare. Cf. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 390 (7th ed. 1999) (defining \u201cjoint custody\u201d).\nNevertheless, in the absence of a controlling statutory definition or a definition in the voluntary agreement of the term \u201cjoint custody,\u201d difficulties may arise where the parties to a voluntary agreement use the term without detailing the means of its implementation. Defendant contends that the trial court should have considered extrinsic evidence as to the parties\u2019 intent at the time of the execution of the agreement when they agreed to \u201cjoint custody.\u201d Because of the many variables inherent in an action as complex in human terms as a separation or divorce, we agree with defendant that the bare term \u201cjoint custody\u201d in a separation agreement may be ambiguous where there is no additional specific language in the agreement to define \u201cjoint custody\u201d or to detail the pertinent duties and responsibilities of the parties. In such a case, the trial court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties at the time of the execution of the separation agreement setting up \u201cjoint custody.\u201d See Bicket v. McLean Securities, Inc., 124 N.C. App. 548, 552-53, 478 S.E.2d 518, 521 (1996).\nIn addition, a trial court seeking to determine the intent of the parties at the time a voluntary agreement was signed may also consider extrinsic evidence of the conduct of the parties as they carry out the agreement. Indeed, because actions speak louder than words, such evidence may be particularly persuasive; for instance, in the case at bar, the agreement was executed in 1991 and the parties lived under it for several years. \u201cIn contract law, where the language presents a question of doubtful meaning and the parties to a contract have, practically or otherwise, interpreted the contract, the courts will ordinarily adopt the construction the parties have given the contract ante litem motam.\u201d Davison v. Duke University, 282 N.C. 676, 713-14, 194 S.E.2d 761, 784 (1973) (citations omitted). However, even where a trial court concludes that extrinsic evidence of the parties\u2019 behavior implementing the agreement is probative of the parties\u2019 intent at the time of the execution of the agreement, the court is not free to consider such evidence to the exclusion of other probative and admissible evidence of the parties\u2019 intent when the agreement was executed. In other words, if a trial court considers extrinsic evidence pertaining to interpretation of an ambiguous term, it must consider all relevant and material evidence. It is then the responsibility of the trial court to determine the weight and credibility of that evidence.\nTurning now to the case at bar, the trial court correctly noted that the agreement is \u201csilent as to the affirmative obligation on behalf of either party to provide medical records, or to consult with the other with regard to medical treatment, substance abuse treatment, and school decisions, or to obtain approval from the other for other decisions to be made in the child\u2019s life.\u201d Such silence is not incompatible with \u201cjoint custody\u201d because as noted above, unless the parties agree to the contrary, each parent having joint custody pursuant to a voluntary agreement has rights and responsibilities in the child\u2019s upbringing, even if these rights and responsibilities are not defined in the agreement. Nevertheless, the term \u201cjoint custody\u201d is ambiguous because the parties\u2019 intent as to their responsibilities to communicate between themselves about the children was not specified in the agreement. The trial court considered only evidence pertaining to communication between the parties after the agreement was executed. Therefore, the trial court erred when it did not also consider all relevant and material extrinsic evidence of the parties\u2019 intent at the time the agreement was executed. On remand, the court shall permit the parties to present extrinsic evidence of their intent as to this issue at the time the agreement was executed. Once the court has considered the parties\u2019 understanding of \u201cjoint custody\u201d along with other admissible evidence, the court can determine the applicable duties and responsibilities of the parties. The court may then address the issue of whether plaintiff breached the separation agreement.\nThe trial court\u2019s holding that plaintiff did not breach the separation agreement is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudge McGEE concurs.\nJudge GREENE dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "EDMUNDS, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge Greene\ndissenting.\nThis case presents the single issue of whether the agreement between the parties, vesting child custody \u201cjointly in the parties,\u201d is ambiguous so as to permit the introduction of extrinsic evidence regarding the intent of the parties with respect to the agreement. I agree with the majority that the agreement is ambiguous and this case must, therefore, be reversed and remanded for the taking of evidence on the intent of the parties. I do not agree, however, that the inclusion of joint custody language in the agreement \u201cwithout further definition implies a relationship where each parent has a degree of control over, and a measure of responsibility for, the child\u2019s best interest and welfare.\u201d\nParties to a custody agreement have complete flexibility in defining the meaning of \u201cjoint custody\u201d as it is used in their agreement. See Lexington Ins. Co. v. Tires into Recycled Energy and Supplies, Inc., 136 N.C. App. 223, 225, 522 S.E.2d 798, 800 (1999) (parties may \u201c \u2018bind themselves as they see fit\u2019 by a contract, unless the contract would violate the law or is contrary to public policy\u201d) (quoting Hall v. Refining Co., 242 N.C. 707, 709-10, 89 S.E.2d 396, 397-98 (1955)), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 642,-S.E.2d-(2000). When custody of a child is determined pursuant to a custody agreement, any degree of control over or measure of responsibility for the child\u2019s best interests must be found in the specific language of the agreement or, in the case of an ambiguous agreement, when extrinsic evidence shows the parties intended some degree of control or responsibility to apply. See White v. Graham, 72 N.C. App. 436, 438, 325 S.E.2d 497, 499 (1985) (a separation agreement is a contract and is construed in accordance with the laws governing contracts).\nIn this case, the parties stated in their agreement that custody was to be vested \u201cjointly in the parties.\u201d Because the agreement is ambiguous as to the meaning of the joint custody language, I would remand this case to the trial court for the taking of extrinsic evidence regarding the parties\u2019 intended meaning of this language. The meaning of the language, however, must be construed based solely on the intent of the parties.\n. I acknowledge the general rule that when construing contracts, ordinary words are given their ordinary meaning unless an alternative meaning is provided. Biggers v. Evangelist, 71 N.C. App. 35, 42, 321 S.E.2d 524, 529 (1984), disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 327, 329 S.E.2d 384 (1985). This rule, however, has no application to the agreement in this case, as no ordinary meaning for the joint custody language used in the agreement exists. Indeed, if an ordinary meaning existed for the joint custody language used in the agreement, then the agreement would not be ambiguous.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge Greene" } ], "attorneys": [ "Hatfield & Hatfield, by Kathryn K. Hatfield, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Robinson & Rawing, L.L.P., by C. Ray Grantham, Jr., and Kristin M. Major, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KAREN S. PATTERSON, Plaintiff v. PHILIP E. TAYLOR, Defendant\nNo. COA99-815\n(Filed 5 September 2000)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 integrated separation agreement \u2014 already stipulated\nAlthough defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to conclude the parties\u2019 separation agreement was integrated, this issue does not need to be addressed because the parties\u2019 counsel stipulated at the hearing below and at oral argument that the agreement was integrated.\n2. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 separation agreement \u2014 joint custody \u2014 extrinsic evidence\nThe trial court erred by failing to consider extrinsic evidence of the parties\u2019 intent as to the meaning of their children\u2019s custody at the time they executed the separation agreement because: (1) the term \u201cjoint custody\u201d in the agreement is ambiguous based on the fact that the parties\u2019 intent as to their responsibilities to communicate between themselves about the children was not specified in the agreement; (2) the trial court considered only evidence pertaining to communication between the parties after the agreement was executed; and (3) the trial court should have considered all relevant and material extrinsic evidence of the parties\u2019 intent at the time the agreement was executed.\nJudge Greene dissenting.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 13 April 1999 by Judge Charles L. White in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 April 2000.\nHatfield & Hatfield, by Kathryn K. Hatfield, for plaintiff-appellee.\nRobinson & Rawing, L.L.P., by C. Ray Grantham, Jr., and Kristin M. Major, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0091-01", "first_page_order": 123, "last_page_order": 131 }