{ "id": 12123425, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MAURICE ILVENTO PARKER, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Parker", "decision_date": "2000-10-03", "docket_number": "No. COA99-759", "first_page": "169", "last_page": "183", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "140 N.C. App. 169" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "391 S.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174", "parenthetical": "holding evidence of marijuana possession established the chain of circumstances leading up to defendant's arrest for LSD possession, thus Rule 404(b) did not require its exclusion as evidence probative only of defendant's propensity to possess illegal drugs" }, { "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5305171 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548", "parenthetical": "holding evidence of marijuana possession established the chain of circumstances leading up to defendant's arrest for LSD possession, thus Rule 404(b) did not require its exclusion as evidence probative only of defendant's propensity to possess illegal drugs" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "480 S.E.2d 647", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53973 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 S.E.2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523896 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 S.E.2d 477", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132192, 132017, 132126, 132186, 132030 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0105-04", "/nc/350/0105-05", "/nc/350/0105-02", "/nc/350/0105-01", "/nc/350/0105-03" ] }, { "cite": "506 S.E.2d 283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11197996 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 736", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "742", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4697175 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10-11", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 S.E.2d 846", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "851" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11792010 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 644", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155865 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 S.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11468692 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "503 S.E.2d 101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" }, { "page": "106", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659841 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" }, { "page": "652-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 U.S. 805", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6219632 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "817" }, { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/497/0805-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155897, 1155835, 1155676, 1155647 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0117-02", "/nc/351/0117-03", "/nc/351/0117-04", "/nc/351/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" }, { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11144846 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" }, { "page": "386" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 S.E.2d 170", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding trial court's failure to impose permissive sanctions allowed by section 15A-910 was not abuse of discretion and did not prejudice defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2553626 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding trial court's failure to impose permissive sanctions allowed by section 15A-910 was not abuse of discretion and did not prejudice defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 S.E.2d 280", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527986 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 S.E.2d 93", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2551833 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Payne, 337 N.C. 505, 516, 448 S.E.2d 93, 99 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867676 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Payne, 337 N.C. 505, 516, 448 S.E.2d 93, 99 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566216 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 S.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567373 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "896 F.2d 815", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10535952 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826", "parenthetical": "holding criminal defendants have no general constitutional right to discovery" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/896/0815-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 U.S. 545", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6890 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549", "parenthetical": "holding \"[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case\" and \" 'the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded' \"" }, { "page": "42", "parenthetical": "holding \"[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case\" and \" 'the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/429/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 802", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523378 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 S.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "890-91", "parenthetical": "holding evidence concerning the death of defendant's first husband is admissible as long as it is also relevant for a purpose other than showing defendant's propensity to commit the offense charged" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2554614 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302-03", "parenthetical": "holding evidence concerning the death of defendant's first husband is admissible as long as it is also relevant for a purpose other than showing defendant's propensity to commit the offense charged" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 S.E.2d 822", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "824" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2514083 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" }, { "page": "56", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306215 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278-79" }, { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 791", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4731290 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 552", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572813 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 S.E.2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 N.C. App. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552500 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/40/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 S.E.2d 624", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628", "parenthetical": "holding a short-form indictment authorized by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-144 sufficient to charge first-degree murder on the basis of premeditation and deliberation" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798869 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472", "parenthetical": "holding a short-form indictment authorized by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-144 sufficient to charge first-degree murder on the basis of premeditation and deliberation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155877 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2119", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "526 U.S. 227", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11133049 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" }, { "page": "252" }, { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/526/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-144", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1350, "char_count": 34649, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.152636623421328e-07, "percentile": 0.9115755397322393 }, "sha256": "12d5002d5ccc479961e0953a461c5c76ea34039dd9fde3fc9d97783a1f3145ab", "simhash": "1:8221d42255e88ce8", "word_count": 5488 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:18:32.795698+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and MARTIN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MAURICE ILVENTO PARKER, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "SMITH, Judge.\nDefendant appeals a judgment imposing a life sentence following conviction by a jury of first-degree murder. We find no prejudicial error.\nOn 21 January 1993, shortly before 1:00 a.m., the Cumberland County Sheriff\u2019s department dispatched Deputy Regina Robinson-Hart (Deputy Robinson-Hart) to Hall Motor Company (HMC) in response to a reported shooting. HMC consisted of a car sales business and junkyard. Deputy Robinson-Hart found Vonnie Hall (victim), owner of HMC, dead in the driver\u2019s seat of his vehicle. Mike Hall (Hall), HMC sales manager, was seated in a company wrecker with his wife when the deputy arrived. A pathologist later determined victim died as a result of three gunshot wounds to the head.\nDefendant, a trooper with the North Carolina Highway Patrol, met victim in 1992, made frequent visits to HMC, and had numerous encounters with victim, Hall, and other HMC employees. When a break-in occurred at HMC on 10 January 1993, defendant joined victim, police investigators, and others at the scene. Police and HMC employees discovered that sales contracts, a receipt book, around 150 motor vehicle titles, and a shotgun had been taken from the building. Without the stolen contracts, receipt book, and titles, victim could not determine whether vehicles were missing from the premises.\nAfter a three-year homicide investigation, defendant was indicted for first-degree murder on 25 March 1996 and tried during the 29 September 1998 Criminal Session of Cumberland County Superior Court. The State\u2019s evidence indicated that defendant killed victim after victim threatened to alert authorities that defendant used forged signatures, false identities, and improperly notarized documents to sell cars defendant did not legally possess or own. Witnesses also related that defendant sold cars without a dealer\u2019s license and violated highway patrol policy prohibiting secondary employment.\nFollowing a verdict of guilty on the charge of first-degree murder, the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. Defendant appeals.\nDefendant first contends the short-form indictment used in this case and authorized by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-144 (1983) is unconstitutional in light of Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1999), because it failed to allege all essential elements of first-degree murder. We disagree.\nIn Jones, the United States Supreme Court was interpreting the federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2119 (1993), which provides for three levels of punishment depending on whether the victim was uninjured or slightly injured, seriously injured, or killed during the carjacking. According to the majority, this statute could be interpreted as one offense with three possible penalties or three separate offenses. The Court held: \u201c[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Id. at 243 n.6, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 326. To prevent trial courts from imposing a greater punishment without charging all of the essential elements in the indictment, the Court held the statute created three separate offenses that must be charged from the outset. Id. at 252, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 331.\nIn the instant case, the indictment provided:\nTHE JURORS FOR THE STATE UPON THEIR OATH PRESENT that on or about the 21st day of January, 1993, in the County named above the defendant named above unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did of malice aforethought kill and murder Vonnie Lee Hall. This act was in violation of North Carolina General Statutes Section 14-17.\nDefendant argues this indictment failed to allege either the essential elements of first-degree murder or the facts relied upon to increase the permissible range of punishment. In State v. Wallace, 351 N.C. 481, 528 S.E.2d 326 (2000), the North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed an indictment containing nearly identical language to that of the indictment sub judice, and the Court, considering the United States Supreme Court\u2019s ruling in Jones, held the indictment was sufficient to charge first-degree murder. The Wallace Court noted it had \u201cconsistently held indictments based on [G.S. \u00a7 15-144 to be] in compliance with both the North Carolina and United States Constitutions.\u201d Id. at 504-05, 528 S.E.2d at 341 (citations omitted). \u201cIn light of our overwhelming case law approving the use of short-form indictments and the lack of a federal mandate to change that determination, we decline to do so.\u201d Id. at 508, 528 S.E.2d at 343; see, e.g., State v. Kilpatrick, 343 N.C. 466, 472, 471 S.E.2d 624, 628 (1996) (holding a short-form indictment authorized by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-144 sufficient to charge first-degree murder on the basis of premeditation and deliberation). Because \u201cit is not [the Court of Appeals\u2019] prerogative to overrule or ignore . . . written decisions of our Supreme Court,\u201d Kinlaw v. Long Mfg., 40 N.C. App. 641, 643, 253 S.E.2d 629, 630, rev\u2019d on other grounds, 298 N.C. 494, 259 S.E.2d 552 (1979), we are bound to follow the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Wallace. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next contends evidence of defendant\u2019s alleged crimes, wrongs, and acts was admitted in violation of the Rules of Evidence and defendant\u2019s due process rights. Under Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence,\n[ejvidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (1999). \u201c[E]vidence of other offenses is admissible so long as it is relevant to any fact or issue other than the character of the accused.\u201d State v. Weaver, 318 N.C. 400, 403, 348 S.E.2d 791, 793 (1986) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Relevant evidence is \u201cevidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 (1999) (emphasis added). Thus, Rule 404(b) is \u201ca clear general rule of inclusion of relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by a defendant, subject to but one exception requiring its exclusion if its only probative value is to show that the defendant has the propensity or disposition to commit an offense of the nature of the crime charged.\u201d State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278-79, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990).\nDefendant contends the State failed to show that defendant\u2019s alleged wrongful conduct demonstrated and was logically connected to his motive for murder or was otherwise admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b). Quoting State v. Jones, 322 N.C. 585, 588, 369 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1988), defendant correctly argues \u201c \u2018the admissibility of evidence of a prior crime must be closely scrutinized since this type of evidence may put before the jury crimes or bad acts allegedly committed by the defendant for which he has neither been indicted nor convicted.\u2019 \u201d While \u201cevidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (1999), we note exclusion of \u201cevidence under Rule 403 is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court. . . . Evidence which is probative of the State\u2019s case necessarily will have a prejudicial effect upon the defendant; the question is one of degree,\u201d Coffey, 326 N.C. at 281, 389 S.E.2d at 56 (citations omitted).\nWe do not believe the probative value of the evidence of misconduct in the case at bar is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Here, defendant\u2019s alleged wrongful acts were part of the chain of events explaining the motive, preparation, planning, and commission of the crime. See State v. Agee, 326 N.C. 542, 548, 391 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1990) (holding evidence of marijuana possession established the chain of circumstances leading up to defendant\u2019s arrest for LSD possession, thus Rule 404(b) did not require its exclusion as evidence probative only of defendant\u2019s propensity to possess illegal drugs). Evidence describing the chain of events is \u201c \u2018properly admitted if linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or [if it] forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury.\u2019 \u201d Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).\nIn the instant case, defendant contends, in part, that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of defendant\u2019s misconduct or violations of law through the testimony of David Martin (Martin), Joey Gardner (Gardner), Douglas Furmage (Furmage), Charles Maynor (Maynor), Lloyd Goodson (Goodson), William Mitrisin (Mitrisin), and other witnesses. We disagree.\nMartin\u2019s testimony concerning defendant\u2019s activities at the time of victim\u2019s murder was admitted to describe the chain of events surrounding the crime. Martin testified that, on the night of the murder, defendant came unexpectedly to Martin\u2019s home, told him he (defendant) had something he needed Martin to do, and asked him to ride in the floor of defendant\u2019s patrol car so that he would not be seen. Defendant drove to Hope Mills and told Martin to \u201cGet out, sneak through this yard here and go back up to the convenience store and I\u2019ll pick you up.\u201d After exiting the vehicle, Martin saw defendant\u2019s patrol car park next to another vehicle at HMC, heard gunshots from that area, looked again in that direction, and observed defendant\u2019s car still parked at HMC. Defendant picked Martin up at a nearby convenience store, suggested Martin\u2019s family would be harmed if Martin told others what had happened, and sped away from the scene. This description of defendant\u2019s behavior on the night of victim\u2019s death was relevant as evidence of the circumstances of the crime.\nLikewise, there was no error when the trial court allowed the State\u2019s witnesses to testify about defendant\u2019s car sales, because such evidence was a vital and natural part of the State\u2019s chronicle of the murder. Gardner, a Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) inspector, described proper title transfer procedures. Furmage, who frequently notarized titles for defendant, testified that he and defendant had violated or circumvented a number of these policies or laws. Maynor provided further evidence of this scheme when he testified that he sold a car to HMC without signing the title, his purported signature actually was signed by someone else, and he had never met defendant or the person (Furmage) who notarized the signature on defendant\u2019s behalf. As evidence of defendant\u2019s alleged scheme to violate motor vehicle registration laws and to avoid discovery thereof, such testimony formed an integral and natural part of the State\u2019s account of and motive for the murder. Therefore, this evidence was properly admitted.\nFinally, the trial court admitted additional evidence of misconduct for the purpose of completing the story of the crime. This evidence included the testimony of Goodson, a State Highway Patrol lieutenant, who testified he had conducted a search of defendant\u2019s patrol car and found licenses and registrations that should have been turned over to a magistrate under highway patrol policy. Mitrisin, a Fayetteville Police Department investigator, described his discovery that some information from these documents also appeared in car title transactions involving defendant. Each of these witnesses provided further evidence that defendant was involved in activities that were either illegal or prohibited by the State Highway Patrol, allowing the jury to infer that the possibility of victim informing authorities gave defendant a motive for the murder. Evidence of these details thus provides jurors with a complete understanding of the reason for the murder.\nIn addition to those witnesses mentioned above, defendant contends eighteen other witnesses were allowed to testify about unrelated misconduct in violation of Rule 404(b). We have reviewed the testimony of each witness, and in each instance, we conclude their statements were properly admitted under Rule 404(b) for purposes other than showing defendant\u2019s character and propensity to commit murder. See State v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278, 302-03, 406 S.E.2d 876, 890-91 (1991) (holding evidence concerning the death of defendant\u2019s first husband is admissible as long as it is also relevant for a purpose other than showing defendant\u2019s propensity to commit the offense charged). In fact, most of the witnesses testified to acts of misconduct similar to or duplicative of those already discussed.\nDefendant also contends evidence of misconduct the State intended to use at trial should have been disclosed prior to trial, because the lack of pre-trial notice \u201cdeprived [defendant] of the right to be informed of the accusation, to the effective assistance of counsel, and to due process of law including a fair opportunity to prepare and present his defense\u201d in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections Nineteen and Twenty-three, of the North Carolina Constitution. We disagree.\nThe extent to which a criminal defendant is entitled to pre-trial disclosure by the United States Constitution is well settled:\nWith the exception of evidence falling within the realm of the Brady rule, there is no general right to discovery in criminal cases under the United States Constitution, thus a state does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution when it fails to grant pretrial disclosure of material relevant to defense preparation but not exculpatory.\nState v. Cunningham, 108 N.C. App. 185, 195, 423 S.E.2d 802, 808 (1992) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 549, 51 L. Ed. 2d 30, 42 (1977) (holding \u201c[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case\u201d and \u201c \u2018the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded\u2019 \u201d); U.S. v. LaRouche, 896 F.2d 815, 826 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding criminal defendants have no general constitutional right to discovery). Further,\nnothing in our statutory discovery provisions would require the State to compel its witnesses to submit to any form of interview or questioning by the defense prior to trial; in fact, the State does not [] have to afford the defense pre-trial access to a list of its potential witnesses or copies of any statements they may have made.\nState v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 12, 292 S.E.2d 203, 214 (1982) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988).\nThe North Carolina Supreme Court has held that Rule 404(b) \u201c \u2018is not a discovery statute which requires the State to disclose such evidence as [the State] might introduce [under the rule].\u2019 \u201d State v. Ocasio, 344 N.C. 568, 576, 476 S.E.2d 281, 285 (1996) (quoting State v. Payne, 337 N.C. 505, 516, 448 S.E.2d 93, 99 (1994)). Instead, North Carolina law provides that \u201cno statement.. . made by a State witness or prospective State witness ... shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until that witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-903(f)(1) (1999).\nThere is no support for defendant\u2019s contention that further disclosure of Rule 404(b) evidence was required under North Carolina law. Thus, we hold that denial of pre-trial disclosure of Rule 404(b) evidence did not deprive defendant of a fair trial; this assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant also asserts the trial court should have excluded the testimony of HMC service manager Jerry Bell (Bell), because, according to defendant, the State deliberately misrepresented its intent to make its files available to defendant. We disagree.\nUnder North Carolina law governing sanctions for failure to disclose evidence, the trial court may\n(1) Order the party to permit the discovery or inspection, or\n(2) Grant a continuance or recess, or\n(3) Prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or\n(3a) Declare a mistrial, or\n(3b) Dismiss the charge, with or without prejudice, or\n(4) Enter other appropriate orders.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-910 (1999). We note \u201cthe sanctions it authorizes are not mandatory, but permissive, optional and subject to the sound discretion of the judge.\u201d State v. Hall, 93 N.C. App. 236, 237, 377 S.E.2d 280, 281 (1989) (citation omitted).\nDuring the 2 September 1998 motions hearing, an assistant district attorney declared, \u201cWe\u2019ve turned over everything that we have to [defendant\u2019s attorney]. . . . We have given him everything we have. ... I don\u2019t have any problem representing to the court that we have turned over everything that we do have, whether we are required to or not.\u201d Apparently, in this judicial district, pursuant to an open-file policy, the State disclosed its investigative file, which included officers\u2019 interview notes but not interviews conducted by counsel in preparation for trial. Thus, Bell\u2019s statement to police was disclosed to defendant, while an assistant district attorney\u2019s notes concerning Bell\u2019s account of an angry victim threatening to turn defendant over to superiors was not submitted for discovery. When the State sought to introduce this evidence at trial, defense counsel objected, protesting that defendant should have been given notice of Bell\u2019s expected testimony under the State\u2019s open-file policy. The State argued the evidence was work product, garnered in preparation for trial, and was not subject to disclosure under its policy. After considering the parties\u2019 assertions regarding their differing interpretations of the State\u2019s offer to disclose \u201ceverything\u201d it had, the trial court allowed Bell\u2019s testimony but ordered a recess before cross-examination to allow defendant to prepare to question the witness.\nAs sanctions for discovery are permissive and within the discretion of the trial judge, we must find abuse of discretion in order to reach a different result. See, e.g., State v. Bearthes, 329 N.C. 149, 405 S.E.2d 170 (1991) (holding trial court\u2019s failure to impose permissive sanctions allowed by section 15A-910 was not abuse of discretion and did not prejudice defendant). Under Bearthes, Hall, and section 15A-910, the trial court\u2019s order was appropriate and did not constitute abuse of discretion. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next argues the trial court should not have admitted the testimony of Mitrisin, a police investigator, relating a statement taken from HMC customer William Hammel (Hammel) before Hammel\u2019s death. We disagree.\nBefore the State called Mitrisin as a witness, Bell described the conversation he overheard at HMC one to two days before the murder. Bell testified he \u201cheard [victim] tell [defendant] that he wanted his titles to his cars or [victim was] going to [defendant\u2019s] superior or higher.\u201d On 23 July 1993, Hammel gave a similar statement to Mitrisin. Hammel\u2019s statement indicated that one or two days before the murder, he heard victim tell a trooper \u201cYou better get your act together or I\u2019m going to go to your supervisor.\u201d The State sought to introduce Hammel\u2019s statement through Mitrisin, because Hammel was unavailable to testify. '\nDefendant does not contest the trial court\u2019s ruling that Bell\u2019s testimony was admissible under Rule 803(3) as a statement of the victim\u2019s existing state of mind, intent, plan, motive, and design, and we agree that this evidence was properly admitted. Rather, defendant contends that, unlike Bell\u2019s testimony, Hammel\u2019s statement was impermissible hearsay and should not have been admitted through Mitrisin.\nAfter a lengthy voir dire, the trial court held that Hammel\u2019s statement was:\nindicative of the state of mind of the deceased, Vonnie Hall, and would indicate Vonnie Hall\u2019s expression of his intention, plan, etc., to contact the defendant\u2019s superiors. It is material and relevant. The Court finds that it is more probative on this issue than other evidence which the proponent has or could procure through reasonable efforts ....\nFurther, it is more probative in that there was not the longstanding relationship between the witness or the deceased Mr. [Hammel] and the witness Jerry Bell.... The Court further concludes that the best interest of justice will be served by the admission, that the probative value exceeds any prejudicial effect and concludes further that the statement should be admitted under [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 804(b)(5) (1999) (residual hearsay exception)].\n(Emphasis added.)\nIf we assume arguendo that Mitrisin\u2019s testimony was offered for the truth of the matter asserted, the trial court was presented with a classic case of \u201cdouble hearsay.\u201d Hearsay is a \u201cstatement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted\u201d and is inadmissible unless it is subject to a recognized exception. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 801 (1999). The first declarant was victim, who said \u201cYou better get your act together or I\u2019m going to go to your supervisor.\u201d The second declarant was Hammel, who overheard victim\u2019s comment and relayed victim\u2019s words in a statement to police officer Mitrisin. For Mitrisin\u2019s testimony of Hammel\u2019s statement to be admissible in evidence, both victim\u2019s and Hammel\u2019s statements must fall within an exception to the rule prohibiting hearsay. As to victim\u2019s initial statement, the trial court found, and defendant does not challenge, that it would be admissible under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803(3) (1999) (victim\u2019s state of mind). It is Hammel\u2019s statement to Mitrisin that defendant contends was inadmissible hearsay.\nThe State contends the trial court did not err because it \u201cruled that the statement was admissible pursuant to Rule 803(3), a ruling upon which the appellant has waived appellate review.\u201d While the initial statement by the trial court, i. e., \u201cMr. [Hammel] \u2019s statement would be indicative of the state of mind of the deceased, Vonnie Hall, and would indicate [victim]\u2019s expression of his intention, plan, etc., to contact the defendant\u2019s superiors,\u201d is susceptible to such an interpretation, a close look at the scenario facing the trial court reveals the court\u2019s intent to admit Hammel\u2019s statement under Rule 804(b)(5) and victim\u2019s statement under Rule 803(3). The statement introduced related directly to victim\u2019s state of mind, but not to Hammel\u2019s state of mind. Accordingly, the State\u2019s argument must fail. Rule 804 provides in pertinent part:\n(b) Hearsay Exceptions. \u2014 The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:\n(5) Other Exceptions. \u2014 A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it gives written notice stating his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant, to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of offering the statement to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 804(b)(5).\nDefendant contends (1) the statement was immaterial \u201cbecause Hammel never identified the person to whom [victim] was speaking as defendant,\u201d (2) Mitrisin\u2019s testimony of Hammel\u2019s statement was \u201cnot more probative than other evidence . . . because Jerry Bell gave' similar testimony,\u201d and (3) there were insufficient \u201ccircumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.\u201d After reviewing the record on appeal, we find evidence to support the trial court\u2019s assessment as to each of these particular findings, which in turn support the trial court\u2019s decision to allow the hearsay statements under the Rule 804(b)(5) catchall exception. See State v. Pretty, 134 N.C. App. 379, 385, 517 S.E.2d 677, 682, disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 117, S.E.2d (1999).\nNonetheless, we further address the issue of whether the admission of Mitrisin\u2019s testimony violated defendant\u2019s constitutional right of confrontation. The residual or \u201ccatch-all\u201d hearsay exception of Rule 804(b)(5) is not a \u201cfirmly-rooted\u201d exception. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817, 111 L. Ed. 2d 638, 653 (1990); State v. Jackson, 348 N.C. 644, 653, 503 S.E.2d 101, 106 (1998). Accordingly, \u201c[t]he Confrontation Clauses in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I Section 23 of the North Carolina Constitution prohibit the State from introducing hearsay evidence in a criminal trial unless the State: 1) demonstrates the necessity for using such testimony, and 2) establishes \u2018the inherent trustworthiness of the original declaration.\u2019 \u201d State v. Waddell, 130 N.C. App. 488, 494, 504 S.E.2d 84, 88 (1998) (citation omitted), modified on other grounds and aff\u2019d, 351 N.C. 413, 527 S.E.2d 644 (2000). The trial court\u2019s ruling in this regard will not be disturbed on appeal unless the findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence or the law is applied erroneously. See State v. Hurst, 127 N.C. App. 54, 59, 487 S.E.2d 846, 851 (1997).\n\u201c \u2018Necessity\u2019 in this context is not limited to a showing of unavailability, such as when the declarant is dead, out of the jurisdiction, or insane. It also includes situations in which the court \u2018cannot expect, again, or at this time, to get evidence of the same value from the same or other sources.\u2019 \u201d Jackson, 348 N.C. at 652-53, 503 S.E.2d at 106 (citations omitted). In the case at bar, not only was Hammel dead, the trial court specifically held that his statement was more trustworthy than Bell\u2019s statement (which was practically identical) because of Bell\u2019s close relationship with victim. Accordingly, the \u201cnecessity\u201d element was met.\nAs to the trustworthiness element:\nIn evaluating whether the hearsay testimony meets the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, the trial court should consider the following factors:\n(1) assurances of the declarant\u2019s personal knowledge of the underlying event, (2) the declarant\u2019s motivation to speak the truth or otherwise, (3) whether the declarant has ever recanted the statement, and (4) the practical availability of the declarant at trial for meaning of cross examination.\nPretty, 134 N.C. App. at 386, 517 S.E.2d at 683 (quoting State v. Triplett, 316 N.C. 1, 10-11, 340 S.E.2d 736, 742 (1986) (citation omitted)). In this case, the trial court held:\n[T]here is no evidence that this individual has ever recanted the statement. He has been interviewed one time. That the individual did not seek out Mr. Mitrisin, although he was apparently willing to speak to Mr. Mitrisin when he was contacted.\nFurther note in finding substantial guarantees of trustworthiness that he made it to Mr. Mitrisin apparently . . . knowing that Mr. Mitrisin was an investigator for the law enforcement agency investigating the death of Vonnie Hall. He has never recanted it. The Court would find that he appeared to be motivated to speak the truth.\nThe trial court properly considered each of the trustworthiness elements, and the record supports the trial court\u2019s findings. Defendant\u2019s confrontation rights were not violated.\nFurthermore, assuming arguendo that Mitrisin\u2019s testimony concerning Hammel\u2019s statement was inadmissible, we discern no prejudice to defendant. When one witness\u2019s testimony is properly admitted, erroneous admission of repetitive or cumulative subsequent testimony is not necessarily prejudicial. In State v. Washington, this Court found admission of testimony under the residual hearsay exception violated defendant\u2019s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, because the trial court failed to make particularized findings that the statements possessed circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. 131 N.C. App. 156, 164, 506 S.E.2d 283, 288 (1998), disc. review denied, 350 N.C. 105, 533 S.E.2d 477 (1999). Nevertheless, we held \u201cthe trial court\u2019s error could not have prejudiced defendant,\u201d because this testimony was \u201calmost entirely repetitive of the testimony of [other witnesses], all of which was properly admitted. For this reason, the admission of the testimony. . ., though error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Id.; see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(b) (1999).\nIn the instant case, Hammel\u2019s statement regarding the circumstances and content of Hall\u2019s conversation with defendant was nearly identical to Bell\u2019s prior testimony. Therefore, we conclude that admission of Hammel\u2019s statement, even if error (and we do not believe it was), was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\nDefendant next contends the trial court erroneously overruled his objections to testimony by Martin and Furmage; however, defendant has waived appellate review with respect to these arguments. Under N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1), the party seeking review must have made \u201ca timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context.\u201d Defendant made only general objections to the witnesses\u2019 testimony, and this Court has held \u201ca general objection, if overruled, is ordinarily not effective on appeal.\u201d State v. Hamilton, 77 N.C. App. 506, 509, 335 S.E.2d 506, 508 (1985) (citations omitted).\nDefendant\u2019s contention that the trial court erred by limiting the cross-examination of two witnesses is without merit. \u201c[T]he scope of cross-examination rests largely within the trial court\u2019s discretion and is not ground for reversal unless the cross-examination is shown to have improperly influenced the verdict.\u201d State v. Woods, 345 N.C. 294, 307, 480 S.E.2d 647, 653 (1997). In light of the evidence presented at trial, defendant has failed to demonstrate the trial court erred. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIn addition to those assignments of error discussed herein, we have reviewed the remaining assignments of error that were properly assigned as error and preserved in defendant\u2019s brief and find them to be without merit.\nNo prejudicial error.\nJudges WYNN and MARTIN concur.\n. Although the trial court\u2019s language to the parties indicated its intent to admit the evidence as an exception to the rule prohibiting hearsay, prior to Mitrisin taking the stand, the trial court instructed the jury:\nLadies and gentlemen, this evidence again is being offered and received solely for the purpose of showing that the defendant had a motive for the commission of the offense charged in this case. If you believe the evidence, again you may consider it but only for that limited purpose for which it is offered.\n(Emphasis added.) Accordingly, it appears from this limiting instruction that the trial court did not intend for the evidence to be admitted for its truth.", "type": "majority", "author": "SMITH, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by H. Alan Pell, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "Paul M. Green for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MAURICE ILVENTO PARKER, Defendant\nNo. COA99-759\n(Filed 3 October 2000)\n1. Homicide\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 short-form indictment\nThe short-form indictment for first-degree murder is constitutional.\n2. Evidence\u2014 other acts of misconduct \u2014 admissible\nAdmission of other acts of misconduct was not erroneous in a first-degree murder prosecution where the evidence was relevant to the circumstances of the crime, formed a natural part of the State\u2019s account of the motive, completed the story of the crime, and the probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b).\n3. Discovery\u2014 criminal \u2014 other act of misconduct\nThe denial of pretrial disclosure of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) evidence did not deprive a first-degree murder defendant of a fair trial. Under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903(f)(l), no statement made by a State\u2019s witness or prospective witness is required to be disclosed until after that witness has testified on direct examination.\n4. Discovery\u2014 criminal \u2014 open files\nThere was no abuse of discretion in a first-degree murder prosecution where an assistant district attorney stated that everything had been turned over to defendant; the State disclosed its investigative file pursuant to an open file policy; the investigative file included officers\u2019 interview notes but not interviews conducted by counsel in preparation for trial; and the court allowed the specific testimony at issue, but ordered a recess before cross-examination.\n5. Evidence\u2014 hearsay \u2014 victim\u2019s conversation with defendant \u2014 deceased witness\u2019s statement\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution (and any error was harmless) in the admission of an officer\u2019s testimony relating the statement of an unavailable witness concerning a conversation between the victim and defendant before the murder. The victim\u2019s initial statement was admissible under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803(3) as showing the victim\u2019s state of mind and the statement to the officer was admissible under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 804(b)(5), the residual exception, because the witness was dead and the trial court properly considered each of the trustworthiness elements. There was no prejudice even if the witness\u2019s statement was inadmissible because it was nearly identical to prior testimony.\n6. Appeal and Error\u2014 general objection \u2014 appellate review waived\nDefendant waived appellate review of the overruling of his objections to testimony by two witnesses in a first-degree murder prosecution by making only a general objection.\n7. Witnesses\u2014 cross-examination \u2014 discretion of trial judge\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a first-degree murder prosecution by limiting the cross-examination of two witnesses.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 13 October 1998 by Judge D. Jack Hooks, Jr. in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 May 2000.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by H. Alan Pell, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nPaul M. Green for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0169-01", "first_page_order": 201, "last_page_order": 215 }