{ "id": 12132139, "name": "WILLIAM HENRY ONUSKA and wife, CAROL ALICE ONUSKA, Petitioners v. GEORGE HENRY BARNWELL; GEORGE BARNWELL [now Estate of George Barnwell]; PATRICIA CONNER REDDEN; MAE CONNER and husband, HOMER CONNER; ROY BARNWELL; ESTATE OF KATHERINE L. CARLISLE, HILLIARD L. CARLISLE, JR., Executor; ODELL C. BARNWELL (Individually and as Trustee of the Odell C. Barnwell Revocable Trust Dated February 28, 1994) and wife, GLADYS EDMONDS BARNWELL; JACKIE A. HENDERSON; LOWELL E. JARRETT, JR. and JANICE LEE JARRETT (Individually and as Trustees Under Trust Dated September 9, 1988); and UNKNOWN RESPONDENTS, Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "Onuska v. Barnwell", "decision_date": "2000-11-21", "docket_number": "No. COA99-1076", "first_page": "590", "last_page": "594", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "140 N.C. App. 590" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-108", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 S.E.2d 772", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "784" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562278 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 S.E.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790148, 790250, 790092, 790159, 790137 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0110-04", "/nc/340/0110-02", "/nc/340/0110-03", "/nc/340/0110-01", "/nc/340/0110-05" ] }, { "cite": "453 S.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.C. App. 725", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526313 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/117/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E.2d 338", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572343 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 812", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "815", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8357716 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629835 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-276", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 1-273", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-399", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "repealed effective 1 January 2000" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 136-68", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 465, "char_count": 9160, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.5307352334220474e-08, "percentile": 0.3488940861030894 }, "sha256": "d31f0b930601de3c08474f4bfa8157fb4e09f6a73f30dd042f4c6b5001d34679", "simhash": "1:8b9406626be9a632", "word_count": 1482 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:18:32.795698+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GREENE and EDMUNDS concur." ], "parties": [ "WILLIAM HENRY ONUSKA and wife, CAROL ALICE ONUSKA, Petitioners v. GEORGE HENRY BARNWELL; GEORGE BARNWELL [now Estate of George Barnwell]; PATRICIA CONNER REDDEN; MAE CONNER and husband, HOMER CONNER; ROY BARNWELL; ESTATE OF KATHERINE L. CARLISLE, HILLIARD L. CARLISLE, JR., Executor; ODELL C. BARNWELL (Individually and as Trustee of the Odell C. Barnwell Revocable Trust Dated February 28, 1994) and wife, GLADYS EDMONDS BARNWELL; JACKIE A. HENDERSON; LOWELL E. JARRETT, JR. and JANICE LEE JARRETT (Individually and as Trustees Under Trust Dated September 9, 1988); and UNKNOWN RESPONDENTS, Respondents" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "SMITH, Judge.\nOn 25 June 1997 petitioners instituted a special proceeding before the Clerk of Superior Court for Henderson County to establish a cartway across the property of respondents pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 136-68 and 136-69 (1999). Respondents filed answers raising two issues: (1) respondents claimed petitioners were not \u201clandowners\u201d within the context of the pertinent statutes; and (2) respondents counterclaimed for trespass. The Clerk entered an order on 27 August 1998 transferring these two issues to the Superior Court civil docket of Henderson County for trial.\nWe note in passing that the 27 August 1998 order cites N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-399 (1996) (repealed effective 1 January 2000) as authority. Although this statute was in effect at that time, this citation appears to be incorrect, as G.S. \u00a7 1-399 required the transfer of an entire cause of action to the \u201ccivil issue docket\u201d where a party in a special proceeding \u201cplead[s] any equitable or other defense, or ask[s] any equitable or other relief in the pleadings.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 1-399. In fact, the order should have cited N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 1-273 and 1-276 (1996) (repealed effective 1 January 2000). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-273 provided that \u201cif issues of law and of fact, or of fact only, are raised before the clerk, the clerk shall transfer the case to the civil issue docket for trial of the issues.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 1-273 (emphasis added). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-276 further provided that when a special proceeding is transferred to the superior court for any reason, the judge may either determine the entire controversy or remand the cause to the clerk for further proceedings. See G.S. \u00a7 1-276.\nRespondents timely appealed the Clerk\u2019s 27 August 1998 order. The order was affirmed on appeal by the Superior Court on 10 February 1999, and respondents entered written exceptions to this order. On a motion of petitioners, the Superior Court entered an order on 3 May 1999 granting partial summary judgment in favor of petitioners on the first of the two issues, declaring that petitioners are owners of marketable fee simple title to the property at issue.\nRespondents purport to appeal from the 3 May 1999 order of the Superior Court granting partial summary judgment. Respondents also purport to appeal from the 10 February 1999 order of the Superior Court, affirming the 27 August 1998 order of the Clerk which transferred the two issues to the Superior Court docket. Petitioners have filed a motion to dismiss respondents\u2019 appeal as interlocutory. We conclude that respondents\u2019 appeal is interlocutory and must be dismissed.\n\u201cAn interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.\u201d Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950) (citation omitted). Respondents acknowledge the interlocutory nature of this appeal. However, respondents argue that the Superior Court\u2019s order granting partial summary judgment in favor of petitioners is properly before us because it affects a substantial right. We disagree.\nAn otherwise interlocutory order may be appealed where the order affects a \u201csubstantial right,\u201d and where, absent immediate appeal, \u201cthe enforcement of the substantial right [will] be lost, prejudiced or be less than adequately protected by exception to entry of the interlocutory order.\u201d J & B Slurry Seal Co. v. Mid-South Aviation, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 1, 6, 362 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1987) (citations omitted). Determination of whether this standard has been satisfied requires consideration of the particular facts of the case and the procedural context in which the order was entered. See Waters v. Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 208, 240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978).\nThe present case involves a special proceeding to establish a cartway pursuant to G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 136-68 and 136-69. The appropriate procedure for an appeal in a cartway proceeding is set forth in G.S. \u00a7 136-68, which provides that\n[f]rom any final order or judgment in [a special proceeding to establish a cartway], any interested party may appeal to the superior court for a jury trial de novo on all issues including the right to relief, the location of a cartway, tramway or railway, and the assessment of damages.\n(Emphasis added).\nA careful reading of this language leads us to conclude that dismissal of this appeal will not ultimately preclude respondents from addressing the issue of whether petitioners are \u201clandowners\u201d within the context of G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 136-68 and 136-69. If petitioners are granted the cartway they seek, respondents would be permitted to appeal to the Superior Court for a jury trial de novo on all the issues, and from a final judgment of the Superior Court respondents would be entitled to appeal to this Court. In the course of that appeal, respondents would be entitled to set forth their present argument that petitioners do not have a \u201cright to relief\u2019 because they are not \u201clandowners\u201d within the context of G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 136-68 and 136-69. See Davis v. Forsyth County, 117 N.C. App. 725, 453 S.E.2d 231 (on appeal to Superior Court from Clerk\u2019s final order in cartway proceeding, respondents entitled to move for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on grounds that County is not \u201cother person\u201d within context of G.S. \u00a7 136-69), disc. review denied, 340 N.C. 110, 456 S.E.2d 313 (1995). Therefore, the Superior Court\u2019s interlocutory order may not be appealed because it does not affect a substantial right that will be lost, prejudiced, or less than adequately protected absent immediate appeal.\nRespondents argue that the holding in Highway Commission v. Nuckles, 271 N.C. 1, 155 S.E.2d 772 (1967), controls the outcome in this case. We disagree. Nuckles involved a condemnation proceeding brought by the North Carolina State Highway Commission. Within the context of a condemnation proceeding, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-108 (1999) provides for a hearing to determine \u201cany and all issues raised by the pleadings other than the issue of damages, including, but not limited to, if controverted, questions of necessary and proper parties, title to the land, interest taken, and area taken.\u201d G.S. 136-108. One of the purposes of this statute is to resolve any issues concerning title or area taken prior to the jury trial on the issue of damages, which is why the Court in Nuckles determined that interlocutory orders from a condemnation hearing concerning title or area taken must be immediately appealed. See Nuckles, 271 N.C. at 14, 155 S.E.2d at 784. The result in Nuckles was simply a pragmatic means of ensuring that the specific objectives of G.S. \u00a7 136-108 would not be undermined.\nThe case at bar involves a cartway proceeding, not a condemnation proceeding. The statutes governing cartway proceedings, G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 136-68 and 136-69, do not include a provision similar to G.S. \u00a7 136-108 requiring a hearing to determine issues raised by the pleadings other than the issue of damages. Instead, G.S. \u00a7 136-68 expressly provides that appeals to Superior Court are available upon a final order or judgment and that all issues may be addressed on appeal. G.S. \u00a7 136-68.\nAppeal dismissed.\nJudges GREENE and EDMUNDS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "SMITH, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Mullinax & Alexander, by William M. Alexander Jr., for petitioners-appellees.", "Jackson & Jackson, by Phillip T. Jackson, and Stepp, Groce & Associates, by Edwin R. Groce, and Howe, Waters & Carpenter, P.A., by Walter G. Carpenter, and Samuel H. Fritschner, for respondents-appellants.", "Sue Ballard Gilliam, Guardian Ad Litem, for unknown respondents." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WILLIAM HENRY ONUSKA and wife, CAROL ALICE ONUSKA, Petitioners v. GEORGE HENRY BARNWELL; GEORGE BARNWELL [now Estate of George Barnwell]; PATRICIA CONNER REDDEN; MAE CONNER and husband, HOMER CONNER; ROY BARNWELL; ESTATE OF KATHERINE L. CARLISLE, HILLIARD L. CARLISLE, JR., Executor; ODELL C. BARNWELL (Individually and as Trustee of the Odell C. Barnwell Revocable Trust Dated February 28, 1994) and wife, GLADYS EDMONDS BARNWELL; JACKIE A. HENDERSON; LOWELL E. JARRETT, JR. and JANICE LEE JARRETT (Individually and as Trustees Under Trust Dated September 9, 1988); and UNKNOWN RESPONDENTS, Respondents\nNo. COA99-1076\n(Filed 21 November 2000)\nAppeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 grant of partial summary judgment \u2014 interlocutory order \u2014 no substantial right\nRespondents\u2019 appeal from the trial court\u2019s order granting partial summary judgment in favor of petitioners in a special proceeding to establish a cartway under N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 136-68 and 136-69 is dismissed since the order is interlocutory and not immediately appealable, because: (1) it does not affect a substantial right that will be lost, prejudiced, or less than adequately protected absent immediate appeal; and (2) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 136-68 expressly provides that appeals to superior court are available upon a final order or judgment, and that all issues may be addressed on appeal.\nAppeal by respondents from order entered 10 February 1999 by Judge Zoro J. Guice, Jr., and from order entered 3 May 1999 by Judge Robert P. Johnston, in Henderson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 August 2000.\nMullinax & Alexander, by William M. Alexander Jr., for petitioners-appellees.\nJackson & Jackson, by Phillip T. Jackson, and Stepp, Groce & Associates, by Edwin R. Groce, and Howe, Waters & Carpenter, P.A., by Walter G. Carpenter, and Samuel H. Fritschner, for respondents-appellants.\nSue Ballard Gilliam, Guardian Ad Litem, for unknown respondents." }, "file_name": "0590-01", "first_page_order": 622, "last_page_order": 626 }