{ "id": 12133942, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RODRIGUEZ FERGUSON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Ferguson", "decision_date": "2000-12-05", "docket_number": "No. COA99-1237", "first_page": "699", "last_page": "706", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "140 N.C. App. 699" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "251 S.E.2d 471", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566850, 8566924, 8566892, 8566959, 8567003 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0412-01", "/nc/296/0412-03", "/nc/296/0412-02", "/nc/296/0412-04", "/nc/296/0412-05" ] }, { "cite": "248 S.E.2d 456", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 N.C. App. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555451 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/38/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 S.E.2d 471", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2521426 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559773 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 57", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1990)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541929 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1990)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 S.E.2d 302", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132085 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 S.E.2d 853", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "869-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11466006 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "465 S.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796160, 796007, 796143, 796091, 795967 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0416-04", "/nc/342/0416-05", "/nc/342/0416-03", "/nc/342/0416-02", "/nc/342/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915738 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" }, { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139633 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163-64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 L. Ed. 2d 895", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "513 U.S. 1135", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1332513, 1333762, 1333317, 1330854, 1331561, 1332010, 1333466, 1335833, 1334928, 1334225, 1331538, 1335700, 1335894, 1330809, 1330874, 1331419 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/513/1135-09", "/us/513/1135-05", "/us/513/1135-08", "/us/513/1135-03", "/us/513/1135-15", "/us/513/1135-14", "/us/513/1135-04", "/us/513/1135-02", "/us/513/1135-12", "/us/513/1135-07", "/us/513/1135-11", "/us/513/1135-10", "/us/513/1135-16", "/us/513/1135-06", "/us/513/1135-01", "/us/513/1135-13" ] }, { "cite": "466 S.E.2d 298", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550074 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694660 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0359-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 774, "char_count": 18277, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.171253986963447e-07, "percentile": 0.8639318354081648 }, "sha256": "6ee1ce1e56dbaffddebe25471f946416eda26c2d55f4239f55fce5741669f181", "simhash": "1:1729580bb72cb4f0", "word_count": 2909 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:18:32.795698+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN and EDMUNDS concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RODRIGUEZ FERGUSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nRodriguez Ferguson (Defendant) appeals from judgments entered after a jury rendered verdicts finding him guilty of five counts of first-degree murder and one count of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury.\nOn the night of 31 December 1994, Defendant, who had been drinking all day, went to the Puppy Creek Family Fun Center (Puppy Creek) to rob Steve Locklear. After Defendant arrived at Puppy Creek, he shot five people: killing four and paralyzing a fifth victim. A few hours later in the early morning hours of 1 January 1995, Defendant and his brother Kendrick Ferguson (Ferguson) went to the Zodiac Club (the Zodiac) along with some other relatives. After Ferguson and Defendant arrived at the Zodiac, Ferguson got into an argument outside the Zodiac with Aaron Goode (Goode). After this argument terminated, Defendant and Ferguson were approached by James Morrison (Morrison), who was wearing a long trench coat and had his hand behind his back. Defendant and Morrison had a brief conversation about the whereabouts of Goode. After this conversation, Defendant fatally shot Morrison in the head.\nOn 2 January 1995, Defendant was taken into custody and charged with five counts of first-degree murder and one count of assault with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury. Defendant subsequently waived his Miranda rights and told Detective Bob Conerly (Conerly), of the Hoke County Sheriff\u2019s Department, he had \u201cshot them all.\u201d When questioned about Morrison\u2019s death, Defendant stated:\nI saw [Morrison coming] toward[] us and I heard a female voice say, \u2018he\u2019s got a gun.\u2019 ... I was standing by a tree . . . and talking and arguing and that is when I saw this guy running toward[] them and I. .. heard this girl say .. . that he had a gun and I just walked up to him and I shot him ....\nConerly asked Defendant \u201cwhat made you kill these people, was it something they said, something they did, or how they looked at you, what?\u201d Defendant responded, \u201c[a]ll I can say is that I was drunk.\u201d\nOn 18 July 1997, Ferguson agreed to a series of interviews with the State and to testify for the State at Defendant\u2019s trial. On 18 July 1997 and 24 September 1997, Kristy Newton (Newton), the prosecutor, conducted two three-hour interviews with Ferguson about the Zodiac and Puppy Creek shootings. At times during these interviews, Newton\u2019s tone of voice was \u201cangry\u201d and Newton used profane language in questioning Ferguson. Ferguson stated his statements changed based on what Newton wanted to hear and \u201con the advice and the instruction of [his] lawyer.\u201d\nOn 6 October 1997, jury selection began and on that day a search warrant was served on Defendant, without the presence of his counsel. The warrant was issued to search Defendant\u2019s body and clothing for any indication of gang involvement. On 8 October 1997, Defendant filed a motion for sanctions against the attorneys for the State in connection with the 6 October search warrant. At the sanctions hearing, Defendant made a motion to call Newton as a witness in light of her alleged extensive involvement in the preparation of the search warrant affidavit. The trial court denied Defendant\u2019s request to call Newton as a witness, but did order Newton to step aside and allow the examination of witnesses connected with the search warrant to be conducted by someone other than Newton. Defendant was permitted to question Detective Sergeant W.J. Blackburn concerning Newton\u2019s involvement in the preparation of the search warrant affidavit.\nAt trial, Ferguson testified for the State concerning the Zodiac and Puppy Creek shootings. Defendant made a motion to review the tape recordings of the interviews conducted between Newton and Ferguson to hear \u201c[Newton\u2019s] statements, promises, assurance, [and] coercion\u201d and \u201c[her] tone of voice.\u201d Prior to Ferguson\u2019s testimony, Defendant had been given a transcript of the Newton-Ferguson interview which, according to the prosecution, \u201cwas a substantially verbatim recital of the electronic recording of the interviews,\u201d personally prepared by Newton. After conducting an in camera review of the tapes, the trial court denied Defendant\u2019s motion to review the tapes, determining the transcript was \u201cfrightening[ly] close to verbatim, there is nothing about the tone on there that is significantly different than the tone used ... in open court.\u201d\nTelly Stephens (Stephens), an eyewitness to the shooting of Morrison, testified concerning the events surrounding the shooting of Morrison by Defendant. During Defendant\u2019s cross-examination of Stephens, Defendant attempted to inquire into criminal charges filed by the Hoke County District Attorney\u2019s Office against Stephens for events occurring in 1996 and unrelated to the events surrounding the killings at the Zodiac and Puppy Creek. The State objected to this line of questioning and, in response, the trial court conducted a voir dire hearing.\nThe voir dire revealed that in the summer of 1996, in a matter unrelated to the Zodiac and Puppy Creek killings, Stephens was charged with assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury and felony robbery with a dangerous weapon. The police officer Stephens \u201ctalkfed] to with respect to [the summer 1996] charges\u201d was the same officer he spoke with concerning Morrison\u2019s death and the same prosecutor\u2019s office in Defendant\u2019s case also prosecuted Stephens\u2019s 1996 charges. The felony robbery charge against Stephens was dismissed by the district court after conducting a probable cause hearing.' With respect to the other charge, Stephens was permitted to plead guilty to misdemeanor assault and was sentenced to \u201ctime served.\u201d Subsequent to the voir dire, the trial court sustained the State\u2019s objection, but did express the court\u2019s willingness to allow Defendant to \u201cmake inquiry as to past convictions [,] ... to make some brief inquiry regarding the circumstances of those convictions[,] . . . [and Defendant] may ask ... if that was a concession. [Defendant] may argue it to the jury, if [he] believe [s] it was [a concession].\u201d\nIn the presence of the jury, the trial court permitted Stephens to testify that in December 1996, he entered into a plea agreement with the district attorney\u2019s office whereby he was permitted to plead guilty to a misdemeanor assault in exchange for the dismissal of the felony charge of assault with intent to kill.\nFreddie McLaughlin (McLaughlin) testified concerning the events that occurred at the Zodiac and the circumstances surrounding Morrison\u2019s death. On cross-examination, Defendant attempted to impeach McLaughlin with an alleged prior inconsistent statement McLaughlin made to Newton. McLaughlin, however, denied making such statement and Defendant made a motion to call Newton to have her testify about McLaughlin\u2019s prior statement. Newton informed the court that in addition to herself, McLaughlin\u2019s mother, Mae, was present during the interview. The trial court denied Defendant\u2019s request to call Newton as a witness and Defendant never attempted to question McLaughlin\u2019s mother concerning the interviews.\nShon Singletary (Singletary) testified the Zodiac was a violent establishment and he and Defendant had witnessed a murder there sometime in 1991. In the early morning hours of 1 January 1995, Defendant, Singletary, Ferguson, and others, who were all intoxicated, went to the Zodiac. Shortly after the group arrived at the Zodiac, Ferguson and Goode argued. Goode \u201chad his hand in his back . . . like he was ready to pull out a gun. . . . [H]e [was] known for carrying guns.\u201d At the time, shots were being fired in apparent celebration of the New Year, and people were running. When Morrison, with his hand behind his back, \u201cran up behind\u201d Defendant, it was dark and Morrison was wearing a long trench coat. Singletary did not see Morrison approach, but when he saw Morrison it appeared \u201che was going to shoot somebody.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, Newton asked Singletary if he had \u201crefused to speak with law enforcement, [or] the [district [a]ttorney\u2019s [o]ffice.\u201d Defendant objected to Newton asking Singletary this question and the court sustained Defendant\u2019s objection. Defendant made a motion, out of the presence of the jury, to call Newton as a witness to confront allegations of Singletary\u2019s unwillingness to speak with law enforcement. The trial court, however, denied Defendant\u2019s request. On redirect, Defendant was allowed to question Singletary concerning his refusal to speak with Newton about the events that took place on 1 January 1995.\nAt the close of the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on first-degree murder with respect to all five killings. The jury was also instructed on second-degree murder with respect to the killing of Morrison. The trial court denied Defendant\u2019s request for an instruction on manslaughter with regard to the Morrison killing. This request was based on Defendant\u2019s claim the \u201ckilling [was] done in defense of family or third person.\u201d\nThe issues are whether: (I) the participation of the prosecuting attorney in the investigation of this case made her a necessary witness; (II) Defendant was entitled, under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-903(f)(2), to review the tape recorded interviews of Ferguson although he had previously been provided with a written transcript of the tapes; (III) Defendant should be permitted to cross-examine a witness concerning a prior plea bargain; and (IV) evidence was present in this case from which the jury could have concluded Defendant shot Morrison in lawful defense of Ferguson.\nI\nDefendant argues he should have been allowed to call Newton, the prosecutor, to testify concerning her alleged extensive involvement in the preparation of a search warrant affidavit, McLaughlin\u2019s alleged prior inconsistent statement, and Singletary\u2019s refusal to speak with Newton.\nWhile there is a \u201creluctance to allow attorneys to appear in a case as both advocate and witness,\u201d a prosecutor is competent to testify on behalf of a defendant. State v. Simpson, 314 N.C. 359, 373, 334 S.E.2d 53, 62 (1985). There must exist, however, compelling reasons to allow a defendant to call a prosecuting attorney as a witness and whether these compelling circumstances exist is within the trial court\u2019s discretion. Id. There are no compelling reasons if other witnesses are available who can provide the information sought. State v. Daniels, 337 N.C. 243, 265, 466 S.E.2d 298, 312 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1135, 130 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1995).\nOn all three occasions disputed by Defendant, after the trial court denied Defendant\u2019s request to call Newton as a witness, Defendant was permitted to ascertain the information he sought through the availability of other witnesses. Accordingly, there were no compelling reasons to permit Defendant to call Newton as a witness and the trial court did not abuse its discretion.\nII\nDefendant next argues the tape recorded interview of Ferguson should have been provided to Defendant so Defendant could ascertain whether the prosecution unduly influenced Ferguson\u2019s testimony. We disagree.\nAfter a witness has testified for the State on direct examination, a defendant is entitled to \u201cany statement of the witness in the possession of the State that relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903(f)(2) (1999). A \u201cstatement,\u201d within the meaning of section 15A-903(f)(2), includes either \u201c[a] stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, that is a substantially verbatim recital.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903(f)(5)(b) (1999).\nIn this case, Defendant was provided with a transcript of the tape recorded interviews of Ferguson and that transcript was a \u201csubstantially verbatim\u201d copy of the recording. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant\u2019s request to review the tapes.\nIll\nDefendant argues he should have been permitted to impeach Stephens by cross-examining him about his plea bargain with the Hoke County District Attorney\u2019s Office on a 1996 felony assault charge, which is unrelated to the current charges against Defendant.\nThe constitutional right to cross-examine a witness includes the right to examine that witness about any pending criminal charges or any criminal convictions for which he is currently on probation. State v. Prevatte, 346 N.C. 162, 163-64, 484 S.E.2d 377, 378 (1997). This is so because the jury is entitled to consider, in evaluating a witness\u2019s credibility, the fact the State has a \u201cweapon to control the witness.\u201d Id. at 164, 484 S.E.2d at 378; see State v. Jordan, 120 N.C. App. 364, 370, 462 S.E.2d 234, 238 (the possibility criminal charges can be reinstated against a witness is within proper scope of cross-examination), disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 416, 465 S.E.2d 546 (1995).\nIn this case, there is no evidence there were any pending criminal charges against Stephens or that he was on probation. Furthermore, there is nothing in this record or in Defendant\u2019s brief to suggest the Hoke County District Attorney\u2019s Office was in any position to intimidate Stephens or influence his testimony. Therefore, Defendant had no constitutional right to inform the jury that Stephens\u2019 plea to the misdemeanor charge was the result of a plea agreement with the district attorney\u2019s office. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in restricting Defendant\u2019s examination of Stephens with regard to the 1996 conviction.\nIV\nDefendant finally argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct on manslaughter because there is sufficient evidence he shot Morrison in defense of Ferguson. We disagree.\nIn general, a trial court is required \u201cto comprehensively instruct the jury on a defense to the charged crime when the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant reveals substantial evidence of each element of the defense.\u201d State v. Hayes, 130 N.C. App. 154, 178, 502 S.E.2d 853, 869-70 (1998), aff\u2019d in part, dismissed, in part, 350 N.C. 79, 511 S.E.2d 302 (1999). \u201cSubstantial evidence is \u2018such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u2019 \u201d State v. Vause, 328 N.C. 231, 236, 400 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1991) (quoting State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1990)).\nTo support a charge of manslaughter based on the defense of others, there must be substantial evidence: (1) it appeared to defendant and he believed it necessary to kill the deceased to save another from death or great bodily harm; and (2) defendant\u2019s belief was reasonable. State v. Perry, 338 N.C. 457, 466-67, 450 S.E.2d 471, 476 (1994).\nIn this case, the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to Defendant, State v. Blackmon, 38 N.C. App. 620, 621-22, 248 S.E.2d 456, 457 (1978), disc. review denied, 296 N.C. 412, 251 S.E.2d 471 (1979), shows Defendant shot Morrison in the head when Morrison approached Defendant and Ferguson when they were outside the Zodiac. Morrison, who was wearing a long coat, made no threats to either Defendant or Ferguson, and he made no movement suggesting he was going to harm Defendant or Ferguson. Although this confrontation took place in an environment where others were shooting guns, in apparent celebration of the New Year, there is no basis for supporting a conclusion Morrison was about to kill or cause great bodily harm to anyone. Accordingly, Defendant was not entitled to the manslaughter instruction.\nNo error.\nJudges MARTIN and EDMUNDS concur.\n. Because Defendant does not argue self-defense in his brief, we do not address his assignment of error to the trial court\u2019s failure to instruct the jury on self-defense. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(a) (questions raised by assignments of error but not \u201cdiscussed in a party\u2019s brief, are deemed abandoned\u201d).", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Amy C. Kunstling, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defender Charlesena Elliott Walker, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RODRIGUEZ FERGUSON\nNo. COA99-1237\n(Filed 5 December 2000)\n1. Witnesses\u2014 prosecutor as witness \u2014 evidence available elsewhere\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by not permitting a first-degree murder and assault defendant to call the prosecutor as a witness where defendant was permitted to ascertain the information he sought through the availability of other witnesses.\n2. Discovery\u2014 tapes of interview \u2014 transcript provided\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder and assault prosecution by denying defendant\u2019s request to review tapes of an interview between a prosecutor and a State\u2019s witness pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903(f)(2) where defendant was provided with a transcript which was a \u201csubstantially verbatim\u201d copy of the recording.\n3. Evidence\u2014 cross-examination of witness \u2014 prior unrelated charge\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder and assault prosecution by limiting defendant\u2019s examination of a State\u2019s witness regarding a prior unrelated conviction where there was no evidence of any pending criminal charges against the witness or that he was on probation, and nothing to indicate that the prosecutor\u2019s office was in any position to intimidate the witness or influence his testimony.\n4. Homicide\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 instruction on manslaughter \u2014 defense of another \u2014 evidence insufficient\nA first-degree murder defendant was not entitled to a manslaughter instruction based upon defense of another, Ferguson, where the evidence, in the light most favorable to defendant, shows that defendant shot the victim in the head when the victim approached defendant and Ferguson while they were outside a club; the victim, who was wearing a long coat, made no threats to either defendant or Ferguson and made no movement suggesting that he was going to harm defendant or Ferguson; and, although the confrontation took place in an environment where others were shooting guns in celebration of the New Year, there is no basis for the conclusion that the victim was about to kill or cause great bodily harm to anyone.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments dated 6 December 1997 by Judge D. Jack Hooks, Jr. in Bladen County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 September 2000.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Amy C. Kunstling, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defender Charlesena Elliott Walker, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0699-01", "first_page_order": 731, "last_page_order": 738 }