{ "id": 12134458, "name": "MARTHA HILLARY SCHOUT, Plaintiff v. ANNE COOPER SCHOUT and WACHOVIA BANK & TRUST, N.A., Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Schout v. Schout", "decision_date": "2000-12-05", "docket_number": "No. COA99-1157", "first_page": "722", "last_page": "729", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "140 N.C. App. 722" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 33-69", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 33-76", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)", "parenthetical": "now repealed" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 491", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522824 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 892", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684910, 685042, 684952, 685112, 685116 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0147-02", "/nc/352/0147-01", "/nc/352/0147-03", "/nc/352/0147-05", "/nc/352/0147-04" ] }, { "cite": "525 S.E.2d 230", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11240947 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 S.E.2d 435", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4763743 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 883", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "885" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11079655 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.C. App. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915582 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/121/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 S.E.2d 807", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "807-08", "parenthetical": "quoting Wilhelm v. City of Fayetteville, 121 N.C. App. 87, 89, 464 S.E.2d 299, 300 (1995) (citation omitted)" }, { "page": "808" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9495768 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46", "parenthetical": "quoting Wilhelm v. City of Fayetteville, 121 N.C. App. 87, 89, 464 S.E.2d 299, 300 (1995) (citation omitted)" }, { "page": "46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 S.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11080132 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 S.E.2d 96", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 N.C. App. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527552 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/68/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 S.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "805", "parenthetical": "adopting the definition of \"substantial right\" appearing in Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1971)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560682 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130", "parenthetical": "adopting the definition of \"substantial right\" appearing in Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1971)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 812", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "815" }, { "page": "815" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8357716 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5" }, { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E.2d 338", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572343 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 33-68", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "1986" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 813, "char_count": 17465, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.611735680820908e-08, "percentile": 0.49032897284745175 }, "sha256": "c1f2d56f8bd5feed1f53733a5d28df79d25a399b17968ee7d719348fa85710b7", "simhash": "1:2fd1040ede3f6ee0", "word_count": 2818 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:18:32.795698+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and McGEE concur." ], "parties": [ "MARTHA HILLARY SCHOUT, Plaintiff v. ANNE COOPER SCHOUT and WACHOVIA BANK & TRUST, N.A., Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.\nAnne Cooper Schout (hereinafter, \u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from an order of partial summary judgment directing Wachovia Bank and Trust to deliver to Martha Hillary Schout (hereinafter, \u201cplaintiff\u2019) all funds, with the exception of $125,000, held in account No. 101-10522-1-2. Having carefully considered the record, briefs, and arguments of counsel, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.\nThe facts relevant to this appeal are summarized as follows: Plaintiff, defendant\u2019s daughter, was bom on 30 November 1980. When plaintiff was three weeks old, defendant\u2019s parents, Mr. and Mrs. P. H. Cooper, gave plaintiff one hundred shares of Abbott Laboratory Stock to be used for her education. The gift was made pursuant to the provisions of the North Carolina Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (hereinafter, the \u201cUGMA\u201d), and defendant was appointed to serve as custodian of the stock. Under the UGMA, the custodial relationship was to terminate when plaintiff attained eighteen years of age. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 33-68 (1) (1986) (now repealed).\nIn 1981, the original 100 shares of Abbott stock split 2 for 1, and at the advice of the donors, defendant opened a dividend reinvestment account for the stock splits at Bank of Boston. In December of 1981, the Coopers gave plaintiff an additional 200 shares of Abbott stock. All stock splits and all dividends earned from the stock were deposited into the Bank of Boston account.\nFor several years, defendant allowed the stock to grow and financed plaintiffs education with her own funds. Then, in the summer of 1994, defendant found it necessary to sell some of the stock to help pay plaintiffs private school tuition. Consequently, defendant transferred 300 shares of Abbott stock to a brokerage account, No. 101-10522-1-2, at Wachovia Bank and Trust (hereinafter, \u201cWachovia\u201d), which procured the sale. The bank, on its own accord, established the account under the provisions of the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act (hereinafter, the \u201cUTMA\u201d), which became effective 1 October 1987 and superseded the UGMA. See generally, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 33A-1, et seq. (1999). Under the UTMA, a custodianship terminates when the beneficiary becomes twenty-one years old. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 33A-20(1) (1999).\nDefendant had additional shares of stock sold in 1997 to pay a portion of plaintiffs tuition. The profits from the sale also went toward the purchase of a car and computer for plaintiff. In 1998, after becoming dissatisfied with the services rendered by Bank of Boston, defendant closed the dividend reinvestment account with the institution and transferred all remaining stock and dividends to the Wachovia brokerage account. Later that year, defendant authorized the sale of 300 to 400 shares of stock, the proceeds of which paid the tuition for the first semester of plaintiffs senior year at Country Day.\nPlaintiff reached her eighteenth birthday on 30 November 1998. One month later, she dropped out of school and moved to Atlanta, Georgia with a man who was ten years her senior and had no discernible means of support. In response to plaintiff\u2019s behavior, defendant caused 3,100 shares of stock to be sold in order to recoup the money she had spent on plaintiffs private school education. The sale proceeds were deposited in the Wachovia brokerage account.\nFollowing her eighteenth birthday, plaintiff demanded custody and control of the assets in Wachovia account No. 101-10522-1-2, i.e., more than 3,000 shares of Abbot stock and approximately $150,000 in cash. Citing the provisions of the UTMA, defendant claimed that plaintiff was not entitled to the funds, as she had not yet attained the age of twenty-one. On 26 January 1999, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant and Wachovia alleging breaches of common law fiduciary duties, breaches of fiduciary duties under the UGMA, and conversion. Plaintiff also sought a writ of mandamus directing Wachovia to transfer all monies and securities remaining in the account to plaintiff. On cross-motions of the parties for summary judgment, the trial court entered an order directing Wachovia to surrender all funds held in account No. 101-10522-1-2, with the exception of $125,000, to which defendant claims a right of set-off. From this order of partial summary judgment, defendant appeals.\nBefore proceeding to the merits of defendant\u2019s arguments, we must determine whether the present appeal is premature. To be sure, the order from which defendant appeals is interlocutory, in that it disposes of fewer than all of the claims between the parties. The record does not show that the trial court certified the order as immediately appealable pursuant to Rule 54(b) of our Rules of Civil Procedure. Hence, the propriety of this appeal turns on whether the order at issue adversely affects a substantial right of defendant. We conclude that it does.\nAs our Supreme Court recognized in Waters v. Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 240 S.E.2d 338 (1978), \u201cthe \u2018substantial right\u2019 test for appealability of interlocutory orders is more easily stated than applied.\u201d Id. at 208, 240 S.E.2d at 343. The reason for the difficulty in applying the test is that \u201c[i]t is usually necessary to resolve the question in each case by considering the particular facts of that case and the procedural context in which the order from which appeal is sought was entered.\u201d Id. The test has two prongs: First, the right affected by the order of the trial court must be a \u201csubstantial\u201d one. J & B Slurry Seal Co. v. Mid-South Aviation, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 1, 5, 362 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1987). A \u201csubstantial right\u201d is \u201ca legal right affecting or involving a matter of substance as distinguished from matters of form: a right materially affecting those interests which a man is entitled to have preserved and protected by law: a material right.\u201d Oestreicher v. Stores, 290 N.C. 118, 130, 225 S.E.2d 797, 805 (1976) (adopting the definition of \u201csubstantial right\u201d appearing in Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary (1971)), declined to follow on other grounds, Day v. Coffey, 68 N.C. App. 509, 315 S.E.2d 96 (1984). The second prong of the test is that the ability to enforce the right \u201cmust be lost, prejudiced or . . . less than adequately protected by exception to entry of the interlocutory order.\u201d J & B Slurry, 88 N.C. App. at 6, 362 S.E.2d at 815.\nIn the case sub judice, defendant, as custodian of the monies and securities held in Wachovia brokerage account No. 101-10522-1-2, has a right, if not a duty, to preserve those assets for the benefit of plaintiff and to ensure that they are used for the purpose intended by the donors. We are of the opinion that this right is substantial and that the order of the trial court directing Wachovia to deliver the corpus of the account to plaintiff jeopardizes defendant\u2019s right to maintain the assets for plaintiffs educational needs. Furthermore, since plaintiff could dispose of all or most of the assets before this matter comes to a full and final resolution, prompt review of the order is necessary to protect defendant\u2019s right. Therefore, we hold that defendant\u2019s appeal is properly before us, and we turn now to the questions presented.\nDefendant argues first that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to plaintiff on the issue of whether plaintiff\u2019s right to receive the custodial property held in Wachovia account No. 101-10522-1-2 vested upon her eighteenth birthday. Defendant contends that pursuant to the provisions of the UTMA, plaintiff is not entitled to possession and control of the property until she reaches twenty-one. We must disagree.\nSummary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that the pleadings, depositions, and other evidentiary materials create no triable issue of fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lynn v. Burnett, 138 N.C. App. 435, 437-38, 531 S.E.2d 275, 278 (2000). The moving party may achieve this result in one of two ways:\n\u201c(1) by showing that an essential element of the opposing party\u2019s claim is nonexistent; or (2) [by] demonstrating that the opposing party cannot produce evidence sufficient to support an essential element of the claim or overcome an affirmative defense which would work to bar [her] claim.\u201d\nWhitman v. Kiger, 139 N.C. App. 44, 46, 533 S.E.2d 807, 807-08 (2000) (quoting Wilhelm v. City of Fayetteville, 121 N.C. App. 87, 89, 464 S.E.2d 299, 300 (1995) (citation omitted)). The trial court, in deciding whether summary judgment is proper, must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all legitimate inferences and intendments to her advantage. Meares v. Jernigan, 138 N.C. App. 318, 320, 530 S.E.2d 883, 885 (2000).\nIn matters of statutory construction, this Court\u2019s task is to effectuate the intent of the legislature, Whitman, 139 N.C. App. at 46, 533 S.E.2d at 808, which is revealed in \u201cthe language of the statute, the spirit of the statute, and what it seeks to accomplish,\u201d State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Public Staff, 309 N.C. 195, 210, 306 S.E.2d 435, 444 (1983). A statute that is facially clear and unambiguous, however, requires no judicial construction. Carrington v. Brown, 136 N.C. App. 554, 558, 525 S.E.2d 230, 234, disc. review denied, 352 N.C. 147, 543 S.E.2d 892 (2000). Instead, we \u201cmust give it its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.\u201d Id. (quoting 27 Strong\u2019s North Carolina Index 4th, Statutes \u00a7 28 (1994) (footnotes omitted)). Moreover, where multiple statutory provisions address the same subject matter, they must be construed together and harmonized, if possible, so that each provision is given effect. Jordan v. Foust Oil Company, 116 N.C. App. 155, 163, 447 S.E.2d 491, 496 (1994).\nThe parties in the instant case do not dispute that the 1980 and 1981 gifts of Abbott stock were made pursuant to the UGMA and that at the time of the gifts, the age of majority in North Carolina was eighteen. As previously noted, however, the UGMA was repealed effective 1 October 1987 and was superseded by the UTMA, under which a custodianship terminates upon \u201c[t]he minor\u2019s attainment of 21 years of age.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 33A-20 (1999). As to the effect of the new statute on existing custodial relationships, section 33A-22 of the UTMA relevantly provides as follows:\n(b) This Chapter applies to all transfers made before October 1, 1987, in a manner and form prescribed in the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act of North Carolina, except insofar as the application impairs constitutionally vested rights or extends the duration of custodianships in existence on October 1, 1987.\n(c) G.S. 33A-1 and G.S. 33A-20 with respect to the age of a minor for whom custodial property is held under this Chapter shall not apply to custodial property held in a custodianship that terminated because of the minor\u2019s attainment of the age of majority and before October 1, 1987.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 33A-22 (b) & (c) (1999).\nPlaintiff argues that under the plain language of section 33A-22(b), the UTMA age provisions do not apply to the custodianship established for her by her grandparents, because to do so would \u201cimpair[] [her] constitutionally vested rights\u201d and would \u201cextend[] the duration of [the] custodianship[].\u201d See id. Plaintiff, therefore, contends that the custodianship terminated on her eighteenth birthday. Defendant, on the other hand, takes the position that section 33A-22(c) excludes application of the UTMA age provisions only where the custodianship terminated prior to 1 October 1987 as a result of the minor reaching the age of majority. Thus, defendant asserts that the custodianship at issue here continues until plaintiff reaches the age of twenty-one.\nContrary to defendant\u2019s position, we do not believe that sections 33A-22(b) and (c) are repugnant. Section 33A-22(b) speaks only to \u201ctransfers made ... in a manner and form prescribed in the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 33A-22(b). The UGMA was but one means of transferring property to minors, see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 33-76(b) (1986) (now repealed) (explaining that UGMA provided alternative, and not exclusive, method for making gifts to minors), and the Act dealt solely with gifts of securities, money, and life insurance, see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 33-69(a), 33-68(5)a (1986) (now repealed). It follows then that prior to 1 October 1987, the effective date of the UTMA, there existed custodianships outside of the UGMA. These cus-todianships, we conclude, are the focus of section 33A-22(c).\nAccordingly, we construe section 33A-22(b) to mean that all UTMA provisions, including those regarding the age of majority, apply to custodial relationships created under the UGMA, unless the application of any provision would impair a constitutionally vested right or extend the duration of a relationship in existence on 1 October 1987. In turn, we interpret section 33A-22(c) to prohibit application of the UTMA\u2019s age provisions to custodianships created outside of the UGMA, if they terminated before 1 October 1987 as a result of the minor reaching majority age. We, therefore, hold that under section 33A-22(b), the custodianship in question terminated when plaintiff attained eighteen years of age, and the trial court correctly entered summary judgment for plaintiff on the issue of whether she is entitled to custody and control of the custodial property.\nDefendant further argues that the order of the trial court deprived her of a reasonable opportunity within which to pursue her right of set-off for her out-of-pocket payments toward plaintiffs education. However, notwithstanding that defendant failed to assert a counterclaim alleging her right of set-off, the court graciously allowed her additional time to state her claim, directing Wachovia not to release $125,000 of the funds in account No. 101-10522-1-2 \u201cuntil the expiration of 30 days, or a further order of this Court directing a release of the funds, whichever occurs first.\u201d As we find nothing unreasonable about the court\u2019s order, we reject defendant\u2019s argument.\nBased upon the foregoing, we affirm the order of summary judgment for plaintiff.\nAffirmed.\nJudges WYNN and McGEE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Templeton & Raynor, P.A., by Kenneth R. Raynor and Erik A. Schwartz, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Joe T. Millsaps for defendant-appellant Anne Cooper Schout." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MARTHA HILLARY SCHOUT, Plaintiff v. ANNE COOPER SCHOUT and WACHOVIA BANK & TRUST, N.A., Defendants\nNo. COA99-1157\n(Filed 5 December 2000)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 grant of summary judgment \u2014 interlocutory order \u2014 substantial right\nAlthough defendant\u2019s appeal from the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff is from an interlocutory order, a substantial right is affected by the trial court\u2019s order directing Wachovia to deliver the corpus of an account to plaintiff when defendant is supposed to maintain the assets for plaintiff\u2019s educational needs, because: (1) defendant, as custodian of the monies and securities held in the pertinent Wachovia brokerage account has a right, if not a duty, to preserve those assets for the benefit of plaintiff and to ensure that they are used for the purpose intended by the donors; and (2) plaintiff could dispose of all or most of the assets before this matter comes to a full and final resolution.\n2. Gifts\u2014 Uniform Gifts to Minors Act \u2014 Uniform Transfers to Minors Act \u2014 custodianship\u2014age entitled to custodial property\nThe trial court did not err by granting summary judgment to plaintiff on the issue of whether plaintiff\u2019s right to receive the custodial property held in a Wachovia account created by her grandparents in December 1980 under the provisions of the North Carolina Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (UGMA) vested upon her eighteenth birthday, even though Wachovia on its own accord established the account under the provisions of the. Uniform Transfers to Minors Act (UTMA) which superseded the UGMA and provides that a custodianship terminates when the beneficiary becomes twenty-one, because: (1) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 33A-22(b) provides that all UTMA provisions, including those regarding the age of majority, apply to custodial relationships created under the UGMA unless the application of any provision would impair a constitutionally vested right or extend the duration of a relationship in existence on 1 October 1987; and (2) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 33A-22(c) prohibits application of the UTMA\u2019s age provisions to custodian-ships created outside of the UGMA, if they terminated before 1 October 1987 as a result of the minor reaching majority age.\n3. Setoff and Recoupment\u2014 out-of-pocket payments \u2014 additional time to state claim\nThe trial court did not deprive defendant custodian of the monies and securities held in a Wachovia brokerage account of a reasonable opportunity to pursue her right of setoff for her out-of-pocket payments toward plaintiffs education, because even though defendant failed to assert a counterclaim alleging her right of setoff, the trial court allowed her additional time to state her claim by directing Wachovia not to release $125,000 of the funds in the brokerage account until the expiration of 30 days or a further order of the court directed a release of the funds.\nAppeal by defendant Anne Cooper Schout from order entered 22 June 1999 by Judge Marcus Johnson in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 August 2000.\nTempleton & Raynor, P.A., by Kenneth R. Raynor and Erik A. Schwartz, for plaintiff-appellee.\nJoe T. Millsaps for defendant-appellant Anne Cooper Schout." }, "file_name": "0722-01", "first_page_order": 754, "last_page_order": 761 }