{ "id": 9439898, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MITCHELL WAYNE WATTS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Watts", "decision_date": "2000-12-19", "docket_number": "No. COA99-1234", "first_page": "104", "last_page": "109", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "141 N.C. App. 104" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 644", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648" }, { "page": "648" }, { "page": "650" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155865 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 S.E.2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 14", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11091655 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684986, 685113, 684938, 685089 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0360-03", "/nc/352/0360-04", "/nc/352/0360-02", "/nc/352/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 S.E.2d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11095935 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 S.E.2d 663", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667" }, { "page": "669" }, { "page": "670" }, { "page": "671" }, { "page": "671" }, { "page": "672" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155670 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" }, { "page": "287" }, { "page": "291" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0277-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 559, "char_count": 11573, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.2176603732495601 }, "sha256": "f8a0d29a85775afca27ada00936471d4d1724dae7e71ecc845e598cf8c4e9205", "simhash": "1:5d07f078d4a64dcf", "word_count": 1830 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:28:13.659098+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge EAGLES and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MITCHELL WAYNE WATTS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "FULLER, Judge.\nOn 2 March 1997 defendant Mitchell Wayne Watts was arrested and charged with first degree statutory rape and taking indecent liberties with a minor. Evidence admitted at trial tended to show that on the afternoon of 28 February 1997 defendant arrived home as his wife, Vickie Watts (Watts), was leaving to take her sister home. Defendant\u2019s three young daughters, as well as his eleven year-old stepdaughter (hereinafter referred to as S), were at home with defendant. Watts testified that upon returning home approximately one half hour later, she thought she saw defendant leaving S\u2019s bedroom. Watts noticed S standing in the doorway of her bedroom closet naked from the waist down and holding her underwear. S was unresponsive to Watts\u2019 questions as to why she was unclothed.\nWatts questioned S about the incident the following day when defendant was not home. S responded that defendant had touched her private parts, whereupon Watts took S to a Family Crisis Center and to the hospital emergency room for treatment. S was later examined by a Child Medical Examiner and a Child Mental Health Examiner.\nOver defendant\u2019s hearsay objection, the State introduced testimony from Nurse Gail Rushing, who examined S upon her arrival at the hospital. Nurse Rushing read into evidence her emergency room notes from her examination of S, including a statement that S \u201crevealed that dad in her room on her bunk bed put his private part all the way in her private part. ...\u201d\nThe State also introduced, over defendant\u2019s objections, testimony of Dr. Mary Johnson, the Child Medical Examiner, and Dr. Christopher Sheaffer, the Child Mental Health Examiner. Dr. Johnson testified that S said defendant, wearing only a towel, entered S\u2019s room while she was playing, took her clothes off and made her lay down, and that defendant \u201cput his privates\u201d against her. Dr. Sheaffer also testified S relayed to him that defendant entered her bedroom while she was playing, removed her clothes and made her lay down, and that defendant removed his towel and touched her with his private parts.\nAs to all three witnesses, the trial court instructed the jury that such testimony was only to be considered for the purpose of corroborating the testimony of a later witness and not for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted. However, during S\u2019s voir dire testimony, she was unresponsive to questions asked by both the State and the defense. The trial court ruled S incompetent to testify, and the State therefore rested its case without offering her testimony.\nDefendant moved to strike the corroborative testimony, followed by a motion to dismiss. The trial court, without specifically addressing the motion to strike, denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. Upon argument from defense counsel, the trial court revisited the admissibility of the testimony previously admitted as corroborative. The trial court concluded that the testimony of \u201cmedical authorities and psychologists, and investigating officers\u201d was allowed into evidence under the medical exception to the hearsay rule, with certain portions of such testimony being admitted under the \u201cmedical diagnosis and treatment\u201d exception; that the testimony was found to be reliable and trustworthy due to the consistency of the hearsay statements; that some evidence was admissible under the \u201cstate of mind\u201d exception to the hearsay rule; and that some of the evidence was admissible as substantive such that the jury could determine the credibility of the testimony.\nDefendant testified on his own behalf. At the close of all evidence, defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him, moved for a mistrial based on the admission of corroborative evidence without victim testimony, and moved to strike the corroborative evidence. The trial court denied all motions and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both charges. Defendant appeals.\nDefendant brings forth nine assignments of error on appeal, including that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements under the \u201cmedical examination and treatment\u201d exception as substantive evidence. Because we agree with defendant that the admission of certain hearsay statements as substantive evidence under the medical diagnosis and treatment exception was error entitling him to a new trial, we need not address remaining arguments.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803(4) (1999) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence provides an exception to the rule excluding hearsay for statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment:\nStatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.\nThis exception has been interpreted by our Supreme Court as requiring a two-part inquiry: \u201c(1) whether the declarant\u2019s statements were made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment; and (2) whether the declarant\u2019s statements were reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.\u201d State v. Hinnant, 351 N.C. 277, 284, 523 S.E.2d 663, 667 (2000); see also, State v. McGraw, 137 N.C. App. 726, 529 S.E.2d 493, disc. review denied, 352 N.C. 360, - S.E.2d - (2000); In re Clapp, 137 N.C. App. 14, 526 S.E.2d 689 (2000).\nThe Hinnant court elaborated on the evidence required to meet the two-part test, holding that the first prong requires the proponent \u201caffirmatively establish that the declarant had the requisite intent by demonstrating that the declarant made the statements understanding that they would lead to medical diagnosis or treatment.\u201d Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 287, 523 S.E.2d at 669. Regarding the second prong, the Supreme Court determined that to ensure admission of statements made only for treatment purposes, \u201cRule 803(4) does not include statements to non-physicians made after the declarant has already received initial medical treatment and diagnosis.\u201d Id. at 289, 523 S.E.2d at 670.\nThus, the Hinnant court excluded expert hearsay testimony of a child sexual abuse psychologist where there was \u201cno evidence that [the child] had a treatment motive when speaking to [the expert]. The record does not disclose that [the expert] or anyone else explained to [the child] the medical purpose of the interview or the importance of truthful answers.\u201d Id. at 289, 523 S.E.2d at 671. In sum, there was simply \u201cno affirmative record evidence indicating that [the child\u2019s] statements were medically motivated and, therefore, inherently reliable.\u201d Id. at 290, 523 S.E.2d at 671. Moreover, because the child\u2019s statements were made to the expert two weeks after the initial medical examination, the Supreme Court determined the evidence also failed to satisfy the pertinency requirement of Rule 803(4). Id.\nThe Supreme Court recently followed principles enumerated in Hinnant. State v. Waddell, 351 N.C. 413, 527 S.E.2d 644 (2000). In holding expert witness testimony pertaining to sexual abuse inadmissible under Rule 803(4), the court again noted that the record \u201clacks any evidence that there was a medical treatment motivation on the part of the child declarant or that [the expert] or anyone else explained to the child the medical purpose of the interview or the importance of truthful answers.\u201d Id. at 418, 527 S.E.2d at 648.\nApplying these principles here, the testimony of Nurse Rushing and Drs. Johnson and Sheaffer regarding S\u2019s statements was improperly admitted as substantive evidence under Rule 803(4). As in Hinnant and Waddell, the record is devoid of evidence that S understood she was making the statements to any of the three for medical purposes, or that the medical purpose of the examination and importance of truthful answers were adequately explained to her. Indeed, Nurse Rushing testified that when Watts brought S in for treatment, \u201c[S] really didn\u2019t know what was going on. She acted like she didn\u2019t know what she was even there for.\u201d Moreover, both Drs. Johnson and Sheaffer examined S approximately three months after her initial medical examination, making S\u2019s statements even less medically pertinent than those in Hinnant elicited two weeks following initial examination.\nWe are cognizant that the erroneous admission of hearsay does not always amount to prejudicial error requiring a new trial. See, e.g., Waddell, 351 N.C. at 419, 527 S.E.2d at 648; Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 291, 523 S.E.2d at 672. While the Waddell court concluded admission of the expert\u2019s hearsay testimony was not prejudicial so as to require a new trial, the Supreme Court qualified the holding by noting that the issue was under a plain error review, and that with several other witnesses\u2019 substantive testimony, there was an \u201cabundance of evidence properly presented at trial, particularly defendant\u2019s own extensive and detailed admissions_\u201d Waddell, 351 N.C. at 421, 527 S.E.2d at 650.\nIn the present case, however, there was no such abundance of substantive evidence before the court. Indeed, both experts\u2019 rendition of the incident according to S was among the most damaging evidence offered by the State. Moreover, Nurse Rushing\u2019s hearsay testimony was the only direct evidence of actual penetration. We therefore cannot hold there was no reasonable possibility that a different result would have been reached absent the error, and thus, that the admission of the hearsay testimony was harmless.\nHowever, this holding does not foreclose the possibility that such testimony is admissible as substantive evidence with the proper foundation. As was Justice Lake in Hinnant, we too are compelled to emphasize that although the testimony at issue here was not admissible under Rule 803(4), such evidence may be admissible with the proper foundation under the residual hearsay exceptions, Rule 803(24), Rule 804(b)(5), and, we believe, Rule 703 pertaining to expert witness testimony.\nReversed and remanded.\nChief Judge EAGLES and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "FULLER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Jane Rankin Thompson for the State.", "Moser, Schmidly, Mason & Roose, by Richard G. Roose for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MITCHELL WAYNE WATTS\nNo. COA99-1234\n(Filed 19 December 2000)\nEvidence\u2014 hearsay \u2014 not medical diagnosis and treatment exception\nThe trial court erred in a first-degree statutory rape and indecent liberties case by admitting hearsay statements of a nurse and two doctors regarding the alleged victim\u2019s statements as substantive evidence under the medical diagnosis and treatment exception of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803(4), because: (1) the record does not reveal that the victim understood she was making the statements for medical purposes, or that the medical purpose of the examination and importance of truthful answers were adequately explained to her; and (2) it cannot be said that there was no reasonable possibility that a different result would have been reached when the doctors\u2019 renditions of the incident were among the most damaging evidence offered and the nurse\u2019s testimony was the only direct evidence of actual penetration. However, this testimony may be admissible as substantive evidence with the proper foundation under the residual hearsay exceptions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), and under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 703 pertaining to expert witness testimony.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 21 May 1999 by Judge C. Preston Cornelius in Randolph County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 September 2000.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Jane Rankin Thompson for the State.\nMoser, Schmidly, Mason & Roose, by Richard G. Roose for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0104-01", "first_page_order": 134, "last_page_order": 139 }