{ "id": 9441101, "name": "ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Plaintiff v. SONDRA ADAMS BLEDSOE, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Erie Insurance Exchange v. Bledsoe", "decision_date": "2000-12-29", "docket_number": "No. COA99-1392", "first_page": "331", "last_page": "339", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "141 N.C. App. 331" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "152 S.E. 684", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1930, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8615199 ], "year": 1930, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/198/0572-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 S.E.2d 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 N.C. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8611628 ], "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/245/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E.2d 253", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 N.C. App. 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554960 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/11/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 S.E.2d 808", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "809" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521473 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241" }, { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525862 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" }, { "page": "513" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356" }, { "page": "356" }, { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 N.C. App. 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11868603 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" }, { "page": "453" }, { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/125/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 S.E.2d 892", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896" }, { "page": "896" }, { "page": "896" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11919346 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" }, { "page": "500" }, { "page": "500" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 66", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" }, { "page": "73" }, { "page": "73" }, { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732740 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "546" }, { "page": "546" }, { "page": "547" }, { "page": "546" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E. 271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 N.C. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8609354 ], "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/208/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-181", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 738, "char_count": 20318, "ocr_confidence": 0.739, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1583179296857218e-07, "percentile": 0.7694660962859224 }, "sha256": "523cf88e2cc126e7d90d49cb7d81957f1d80c4a14092b6a54180b666988a2c41", "simhash": "1:48fe6d7ac73f3796", "word_count": 3239 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:28:13.659098+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges LEWIS and WYNN concur." ], "parties": [ "ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Plaintiff v. SONDRA ADAMS BLEDSOE, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Judge.\nSondra Adams Bledsoe (\u201cBledsoe\u201d) appeals from the trial court\u2019s declaratory judgment after a jury verdict in favor of Erie Insurance Exchange (\u201cErie\u201d), and its order denying Bledsoe\u2019s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative a new trial. Bledsoe assigns as error the trial court\u2019s failure to give a special jury instruction regarding proximate concurrent causation in this homeowner\u2019s insurance coverage determination suit. After a careful review of the record and briefs, we agree with Bledsoe and find that the trial court erred in failing to give such an instruction, thus we remand for a new trial.\nIn May 1995, Bledsoe purchased a homeowner\u2019s insurance policy from Erie for her residence located in Rolesville, North Carolina. This policy provided coverage for damage to Bledsoe\u2019s home caused by certain perils including fire, water damage caused by fire suppression efforts (hereinafter \u201cwater damage\u201d), and \u201ccollapse.\u201d On 13 November 1995, a fire occurred at Bledsoe\u2019s home, which resulted in significant damage to the residence. During post-fire repairs, the contractor renovating the home placed approximately three and a half tons of sheet rock on the residence\u2019s living room floor for an extended period. As a result of the fire, water damage, and the contractor\u2019s actions, Bledsoe alleges that the floor and foundation of the residence (hereinafter \u201cfloor\u201d) was damaged by \u201cnoticeable and substantial buckling and sagging.\u201d\nWhile Erie paid Bledsoe for all of the damage to the residence which it believed was caused by the fire and water damage, Erie has refused to pay for the renovations to the floor claiming that the damage at issue was preexisting and the result of natural \u201csettling\u201d \u2014 an excluded event under the policy \u2014 that occurred over a long period of time due to the inadequate original construction of the home. Conversely, Bledsoe alleges that the buckling and sagging of the floor was a \u201ccollapse\u201d caused by the combination of multiple factors, including fire, water damage, and the contractor\u2019s defective methods of renovation, in particular, the placement of three and a half tons of sheet rock on the residence\u2019s living room floor.\nIn an effort to resolve their dispute, Erie instituted this action on 22 November 1996 seeking a declaratory judgment concerning its obligations under the homeowner\u2019s insurance policy, specifically whether it was liable under the policy to provide coverage for the renovation of the floor and related costs. Subsequently, Bledsoe filed an answer and counterclaims seeking punitive damages and alleging breach of contract, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and unfair trade practices.\nOn 28 July 1997, the Honorable Narley L. Cashwell of Wake County Superior Court entered an order, on Erie\u2019s motion, bifurcating Erie\u2019s declaratory judgment action from Bledsoe\u2019s counterclaims. This appeal arises out of the declaratory judgment phase of the litigation.\nErie\u2019s declaratory judgment action came on for trial before the Honorable Robert L. Farmer and a duly empaneled jury in Wake County Superior Court on 21 September 1998. Ultimately, two issues were submitted to the jury for resolution:\n1. Were the deflections or displacements in the floors a result of the condition of the floor framing and/or the foundation caused by the fire or water to extinguish the fire on November 13, 1995?\n2. Were the deflections or displacements in the floors after the fire on November 13,1995 a collapse caused by the placement of sheetrock by the contractor, Bryant-Phillips Associates?\nJudge Farmer instructed the jury based on a \u201cdominant or efficient cause\u201d standard. Specifically, he stated,\nWhen I use the word caused, the word caused means proximate cause to which the loss is to be attributed and is the dominant or efficient cause. In other words, something is caused by an event when the event is the real efficient or proximate cause.\nThe jury answered \u201c[n]o\u201d to both submitted issues.\nJudge Farmer entered a declaratory judgment after the jury\u2019s determination on 1 October 1998, declaring that the damage to the floor was not a covered loss under Erie\u2019s policy with Bledsoe. On 12 October 1998, Bledsoe followed with a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative a new trial. Judge Farmer denied the motion, and on 30 November 1998, Bledsoe gave notice of appeal.\nBledsoe\u2019s sole assignment of error on appeal is that the trial court committed reversible error by denying her request for a special jury instruction regarding proximate concurrent cause as to issue one\u2014 \u201c[w]ere the deflections or displacements in the floors a result of the condition of the floor framing and/or the foundation caused by the fire or water to extinguish the fire on November 13, 1995?\u201d We agree with Bledsoe\u2019s contention that the trial court\u2019s failure to incorporate a proximate concurrent cause instruction was reversible error. We find that this error misled the jury, and ultimately precluded the jury from considering that multiple factors may have combined to cause the damage to the floor.\nFirst, requests for special jury instructions are allowed in North Carolina pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-181 and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 51(b). In particular, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-181(b) (1999) requires that \u201crequests for special instructions must be submitted to the trial judge before the judge\u2019s charge to the jury is begun. . . .\u201d\nIn the case at bar, Bledsoe complied with this statutory requirement by making her initial request for a special jury instruction prior to the trial court charging the jury. Bledsoe stated, \u201c[t]he only thing I want is a proximate cause instruction and pattern that \u2014 pattern the jury instructions.\u201d Bledsoe then submitted two pattern proximate cause jury instructions \u2014 applicable to tort cases \u2014 to the court. As Erie fails to raise any statutory deficiency challenges to the form of Bledsoe\u2019s request, we treat Bledsoe\u2019s initial prayer as a proper request for a special jury instruction.\nAdditionally, while we agree with Erie that the pattern instructions submitted by Bledsoe were not applicable to the case sub judice, Bledsoe\u2019s intent was to have a special jury instruction which patterned the models that she submitted. She was not requesting the actual pattern jury instructions themselves.\nIn answer to Bledsoe\u2019s request for a special instruction, Judge Farmer responded, \u201c[tjhat\u2019s not the law I don\u2019t think,\u201d and he placed the request in the file. Judge Farmer did not include a proximate concurrent cause instruction in his charge.\nAfter the jury charge was complete, Judge Farmer asked the parties, \u201cif you have any additional matters you wish the Court to consider charging on or any corrections you feel should be made to the charge already given . ...\u201d In response, Bledsoe submitted a handwritten request adapting the pattern jury instructions to the case at bar. Upon this request, Judge Farmer did not give the proximate concurrent cause instruction, but he did place the request in the file. Erie contends that this request was not timely made, however, according to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-181(b), \u201cthe judge may, in his discretion, consider such requests [for special instructions] regardless of the time they are made.\u201d Judge Farmer had the discretion to elicit and hear additional requests for special jury instructions, thus he did so here. We acknowledge that Bledsoe\u2019s requested instruction may have been flawed, however, her intent to have an instruction that incorporated proximate concurrent cause was clear.\nFurthermore, our Supreme Court has held that\nwhen a request is made for a specific instruction, correct in itself and supported by evidence, the trial court, while not obliged to adopt the precise language of the prayer, is nevertheless required to give the instruction, in substance at least, and unless this is done, either in direct response to the prayer or otherwise in some portion of the charge, the failure will constitute reversible error.\nCalhoun v. Highway Com., 208 N.C. 424, 426, 181 S.E. 271, 272 (1935). Therefore, to determine whether the trial court committed reversible error here, we must assess whether Bledsoe\u2019s request for a proximate concurrent cause jury instruction was correct in itself and supported by the evidence.\nTo make this determination, we must address the present state of the law of homeowners\u2019 insurance policies in North Carolina. \u201cFirst, it is well settled in North Carolina that insurance policies are construed strictly against insurance companies and in favor of the insured.\u201d State Capital Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 318 N.C. 534, 546, 350 S.E.2d 66, 73 (1986); Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Davis, 118 N.C. App. 494, 500, 455 S.E.2d 892, 896 (1995).\nSecondly, two primary principles with respect to determining coverage under homeowners\u2019 policies have been espoused in North Carolina:\n(1) ambiguous terms and standards of causation in exclusion provisions of homeowners policies must be strictly construed against the insurer, and (2) homeowners policies provide coverage for injuries so long as a non-excluded cause is either the sole or concurrent cause of the injury giving rise to liability. Stating the second principle in reverse, the sources of liability which are excluded from homeowners policy coverage must be the sole cause of the injury in order to exclude coverage under the policy.\nState Capitol, 318 N.C. 534, 546, 350 S.E.2d 66, 73; Nationwide, 118 N.C. App. 494, 500, 455 S.E.2d 892, 896.\nAt bar, Erie\u2019s policy with Bledsoe provides coverage for damage by fire and water damage resulting from fire suppression efforts. Further, Erie\u2019s policy with Bledsoe also provides coverage for \u201ccollapse\u201d:\n8. Collapse. We insure for direct physical loss to covered property involving collapse of a building or any part of a building caused only by one or more of the following:\nf. use of defective material or methods in construction, remodeling or renovation if the collapse occurs during the course of the construction, remodeling or renovation.\nImportantly, this Court has previously deemed the term \u201ccollapse\u201d as used in homeowners\u2019 policies ambiguous and has construed the ambiguity against the insurance company and in favor of the insured. See Markham v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 125 N.C. App. 443, 453, 481 S.E.2d 349, 356 (1997); Guyther v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 109 N.C. App. 506, 512, 428 S.E.2d 238, 241 (1993); Thomasson v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 103 N.C. App. 475, 476, 405 S.E.2d 808, 809 (1991). At bar, Erie\u2019s policy makes clear that coverage for \u201ccollapse\u201d is allowed if, \u201ccaused only by one or more of the following . . . use of defective . . . methods in construction, remodeling or renovation . . . .\u201d However, the policy does not make clear whether coverage for \u201ccollapse\u201d is allowed if one of the listed factors \u2014 in this case, defective methods of renovation \u2014 combines with another covered peril under a different provision of the policy \u2014 fire and water damage \u2014 to cause a \u201ccollapse.\u201d Thus, we deem the term \u201ccollapse\u201d as it appears in Erie\u2019s policy with Bledsoe ambiguous.\nWe recognize that Erie\u2019s policy with Bledsoe excludes liability for \u201csettling\u201d in two places. In Section I \u2014 Perils Insured Against, the policy states, \u201cwe do not insure loss:... (2) caused by:. .. (f) .. . (6) settling, cracking, shrinking, bulging, or expansion of pavements, patios, foundations, walls, floors, roofs or ceilings . . . .\u201d Also, in the \u201ccollapse\u201d provision itself, it is stated, \u201c[c]ollapse does not include settling, cracking, shrinking, bulging or expansion.\u201d\nHowever, this Court has in the past held that coverage will not be barred by the \u201csettling\u201d provision in a homeowners\u2019 policy when there is evidence of \u201csettling\u201d which is so severe that it \u201csuddenly and materially impair[s] the structure or integrity of [a] building,\u201d and therefore constitutes a \u201ccollapse.\u201d Guyther, 109 N.C. App. 506, 513, 428 S.E.2d 238, 242; Markham, 125 N.C. App. 443, 453, 481 S.E.2d 349, 356. Moreover, provisions, such as Erie\u2019s \u201csettling\u201d clauses, \u201cwhich exclude liability of insurance companies are not favored\u201d by this Court. State Capitol, 318 N.C. 534, 547, 350 S.E.2d 66, 73; Nationwide, 118 N.C. App. 494, 500, 455 S.E.2d 892, 896.\nHence, evoking principle one as stated in State Capitol above, we strictly construe all ambiguities against Erie and in favor of Bledsoe. We next repeat the second principle regarding homeowners\u2019 policy coverage stated in State Capitol, \u201cthe sources of liability which are excluded from homeowners policy coverage must be the sole cause of the injury in order to exclude coverage under the policy.\u201d 318 N.C. at 546, 350 S.E.2d at 73. Under this interpretation, \u201csettling\u201d must be the sole cause of the damage to Bledsoe\u2019s floors to be excluded under the policy.\nThrough issue one \u2014 \u201c[w]ere the deflections or displacements in the floors a result of the condition of the floor framing and/or the foundation caused by the fire or water to extinguish the fire on November 13, 1995?\u201d \u2014 the jury was only allowed to determine whether the fire and water damage (covered perils) resulted in the damage to the floor.\nThrough issue two \u2014 \u201c[w]ere the deflections or displacements in the floors after the fire on November 13, 1995 a collapse caused by the placement of sheetrock by the contractor, Bryant-Phillips Associates?\u201d \u2014 the jury was only allowed to consider whether the damage to the floor was a \u201ccollapse\u201d caused by defective methods of renovation (covered peril).\nWe disagree with Erie\u2019s conclusion that the existence of issue two gave the jury an actual opportunity to consider multiple causes of the damage to the floor. With regards to this second issue, we accept that the jury answered that the damage to the floor was not a \u201ccollapse\u201d caused by the contractor\u2019s placement of sheet rock. However, we find that the wording of issue two limited the scope of the jury\u2019s analysis, so that they could only consider one cause of the collapse, the sheet rock, and no other.\nConsequently, while the jury was allowed to consider through these two submitted issues whether (1) the fire and water damage or (2) defective methods of renovation (all covered perils) individually caused the damage to the floor, at no time was the jury allowed to determine whether (1) the fire and water damage combined with (2) the contractor\u2019s defective methods of renovation to cause a \u201ccollapse,\u201d or in the alternative, \u201csettling\u201d so severe that it constitutes a \u201ccollapse\u201d (covered peril). A question of that nature should have been sent to the jury for determination.\nAccordingly, we find that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to have submitted to the jury this issue of whether the damage was a result of natural \u201csettling,\u201d as Erie contends, or the combination of (1) fire and water damage (covered perils) and (2) the contractor\u2019s defective methods of renovation (covered peril), which caused a \u201ccollapse,\u201d or in the alternative, \u201csettling\u201d so severe that it constitutes a \u201ccollapse\u201d (covered peril) \u2014 a prospective issue three.\nWe find little guidance in the line of North Carolina cases that interpret insurance contracts\u2019 \u201cwindstorm\u201d provisions, and we therefore find these cases distinguishable from the case at bar. See Harrison v. Insurance Co., 11 N.C. App. 367, 181 S.E.2d 253 (1971); Wood v. Insurance Co., 245 N.C. 383, 96 S.E.2d 28 (1957); Miller v. Insurance Association, 198 N.C. 572, 152 S.E. 684 (1930).\nAll three cases mentioned above address insurance policies which provide \u201cwindstorm\u201d coverage. Although these cases do rightfully uphold a \u201cdominant or efficient cause\u201d standard, they are distinguishable in this instance. For example, unlike the case at bar, these cases do not deal with coverage under the \u201ccollapse\u201d provision of a homeowner\u2019s policy. Secondly, \u201cwindstorm\u201d has not been deemed ambiguous by this Court, while \u201ccollapse\u201d has been so deemed. These cases therefore are not applicable to the case sub judice.\nMore directly on point, this Court has on at least three occasions specifically dealt with \u201ccollapse\u201d provisions under homeowners\u2019 insurance policies. Nee Markham, 125 N.C. App. 443, 481 S.E.2d 349; Guyther, 109 N.C. App. 506, 428 S.E.2d 238; Thomasson, 103 N.C. App. 475, 405 S.E.2d 808. In each case, we deemed \u201ccollapse\u201d ambiguous. Id. In two of these cases, we specifically dealt with the \u201csettling\u201d exclusion provision. Markham, 125 N.C. App. 443, 481 S.E.2d 349; Guyther, 109 N.C. App. 506, 428 S.E.2d 238. Finally, in both cases, we refused to bar coverage for \u201ccollapse\u201d under the \u201csettling\u201d provision as there was sufficient evidence that the \u201csettling\u201d was so severe that it could constitute a \u201ccollapse.\u201d Id. Thus, our holding at bar is entirely consistent with our prior rendered decisions interpreting \u201ccollapse\u201d and \u201csettling\u201d provisions of homeowners\u2019 insurance policies.\nWe reiterate that our holding here is based on the ambiguity of the term \u201ccollapse\u201d as it appears in Erie\u2019s policy with Bledsoe. Further, we stress that our holding is not premised on the notion that the \u201cdominant or efficient cause\u201d jury instruction used sub judice was improper, but, in fact, we find that the court\u2019s instruction was simply incomplete and unclear. Without a proximate concurrent cause clarification here, we find that the jury was not fully instructed in the law as they were not allowed to consider whether multiple factors combined to cause the damage at issue.\nNevertheless, when, as here, the facts and circumstances surrounding a claim \u2014 especially causation \u2014 remain in dispute, it is for the jury, not the trial court, to determine whether the ultimate cause of the claimed damages falls within the scope of the policy\u2019s exclusionary provisions, as defined by the trial court.\nMarkham, 125 N.C. App. 443, 453, 481 S.E.2d 349, 355.\nThus, Bledsoe\u2019s request for a proximate concurrent cause jury instruction, although flawed, was correct in itself and supported by the evidence. Consequently, the trial court\u2019s failure to include a charge incorporating a proximate concurrent cause instruction in substance was reversible error. We hereby remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion.\nNew trial.\nJudges LEWIS and WYNN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Cranfill, Sumner & Hartzog, L.L.P., by Robert W. Sumner and Stephanie Hutchins Autry, for plaintiff-appellee.", "G. Henry Temple, Jr. and Stephen W. Petersen, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Plaintiff v. SONDRA ADAMS BLEDSOE, Defendant\nNo. COA99-1392\n(Filed 29 December 2000)\nInsurance\u2014 homeowner\u2019s \u2014 coverage\u2014instructions\u2014proximate concurrent cause\nThe trial court erred by not giving a requested special jury instruction on proximate concurrent cause in a declaratory judgment action to determine coverage under a homeowner\u2019s insurance policy where a fire occurred at defendant\u2019s home; the contractor renovating the home placed about three and a half tons of sheet rock on the living room floor for an extended period; defendant alleges that the floor and foundation were damaged by the fire, water damage, and the contractor\u2019s actions; and plaintiff contends that the damage to the floor was the result of settling due to inadequate original construction, an event excluded by the policy. The policy excludes settling, but coverage will not be barred by the settling provision if the settling is so severe as to constitute a collapse. The policy here is ambiguous because it provides coverage for \u201ccollapse\u201d under certain circumstances but does not make clear whether coverage is allowed if one of the listed factors combines with another covered peril under a different provision of the policy (fire and water damage) to cause the collapse. The dominant or efficient cause jury instruction given by the court was not improper, but was incomplete and unclear because the jury was not allowed to consider whether multiple factors combined to cause this damage. Defendant\u2019s request for a proximate concurrent cause instruction, though flawed, was correct and supported by the evidence.\nAppeal by defendant from a judgment and order entered 1 October 1998 and 25 November 1998 respectively by Judge Robert L. Farmer in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 September 2000.\nCranfill, Sumner & Hartzog, L.L.P., by Robert W. Sumner and Stephanie Hutchins Autry, for plaintiff-appellee.\nG. Henry Temple, Jr. and Stephen W. Petersen, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0331-01", "first_page_order": 361, "last_page_order": 369 }