{ "id": 9441982, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CARLTON DALE WALL, AKA CARLTON MOONIE WALL", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Wall", "decision_date": "2000-12-29", "docket_number": "No. COA99-1208", "first_page": "529", "last_page": "534", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "141 N.C. App. 529" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "308 S.E.2d 311", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating the same in relation to similar language under section 15A-1340.4(e)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4761304 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating the same in relation to similar language under section 15A-1340.4(e)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 558", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563", "parenthetical": "\"the use of 'may' generally connotes permissive or discretionary action and does not mandate or compel a particular act\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572766 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483", "parenthetical": "\"the use of 'may' generally connotes permissive or discretionary action and does not mandate or compel a particular act\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "465 S.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796160, 796007, 796143, 796091, 795967 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0416-04", "/nc/342/0416-05", "/nc/342/0416-03", "/nc/342/0416-02", "/nc/342/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 10, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238" }, { "page": "370" }, { "page": "238-39" }, { "page": "370" }, { "page": "239" }, { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915738 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370" }, { "page": "370" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 452, "char_count": 10645, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.594908417559974e-08, "percentile": 0.4499104001816322 }, "sha256": "908045481556bf8a8c6705a1c89e159b3973b6dace63cc156bc063af500730cd", "simhash": "1:a7c0246851aeaece", "word_count": 1714 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:28:13.659098+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge FULLER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CARLTON DALE WALL, AKA CARLTON MOONIE WALL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.\nCarlton Dale Wall (\u201cdefendant\u201d) was indicted on 19 January 1999 for possession with intent to sell and deliver a counterfeit controlled substance, sale and delivery of a counterfeit controlled substance, and as an habitual felon. Defendant\u2019s habitual felon indictment was based on two 13 July 1989 convictions for felony larceny, a 4 October 1991 conviction for common law robbery, and a 24 April 1995 conviction for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious bodily injury.\nDuring the habitual felon phase of defendant\u2019s trial and out of the presence of the jury, the State presented copies of court records as evidence of defendant\u2019s alleged prior felony convictions. Defendant objected to the introduction of one of the court records, exhibit S-l, arguing that it was not a certified copy of a court record in compliance with section 14-7.4 of the North Carolina General Statutes. Exhibit S-l referenced defendant\u2019s two alleged 13 July 1989 convictions in Superior Court, Alamance County for felony larceny. The State explained that exhibit S-l was a facsimile of a certified copy and further noted that although one could not \u201cfeel\u201d the certification seal on exhibit S-l, it was visible. Defendant argued that it was unclear, when viewing the seal, who certified the record or whether that person was qualified to certify the record. The State asserted, among other arguments, that the facsimile was submitted as evidence to corroborate defendant\u2019s testimony in the first phase of the trial, where he admitted that he had indeed been convicted of larceny. On cross-examination during phase one of trial, defendant did admit that in July 1989, he was convicted of two counts of felony larceny.\nThe trial court noted that exhibit S-l contained a \u201cfax cover sheet, . . . the judgment and commitment, an indictment, another indictment, [and] transcript of plea\u201d and was stamped with a seal \u201cshowing this is a true copy of the original which was signed by a clerk of Superior Court [,] April 9, 1999.\u201d The court found that \u201calthough not the original, the facsimile [was] a reasonable copy of the seal from Alamance County.\u201d The court concluded that exhibit S-l \u201csuffices [sic] the statute to be introduced into evidence[.]\u201d\nAlthough exhibit S-l contained references to two 13 July 1989 felony larceny convictions, the State utilized only one larceny conviction to establish defendant\u2019s status as an habitual offender. Along with the felonious larceny conviction referenced in exhibit S-l, the State presented evidence of two other felony convictions, exhibits S-2 and S-3. Defendant did not object to the admission of either exhibit S-2 or exhibit S-3 into evidence.\nA jury found defendant guilty of selling and delivering a counterfeit controlled substance and of habitual felon status. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 107 to 138 months imprisonment. Defendant now appeals.\nAlthough defendant presents several assignments of error in the record on appeal, he argues only one in his appellate brief. We therefore deem the remaining assignments of error abandoned. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(5).\nDefendant asserts that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting into evidence a facsimile transmission of a certified copy of court records evincing his prior felony larceny conviction (exhibit S-l) for the purpose of establishing his status as an habitual felon. Defendant does not challenge the admissibility of exhibit S-l under our Rules of Evidence but asserts a challenge to the statutory interpretation of section 14-7.4 of our General Statutes. Defendant argues that section 14-7.4 does not permit the consideration of exhibit S-l to establish a prior conviction. We disagree.\nSection 14-7.4 of our General Statutes states:\nIn all cases where a person is charged . . . with being an habitual felon, the record or records of prior convictions of felony offenses shall be admissible in evidence, but only for the purpose of proving that said person has been convicted of former felony offenses. A prior conviction may be proved by stipulation of the parties or by the original or a certified copy of the court record of the prior conviction. The original or certified copy of the court record, bearing the same name as that by which the defendant is charged, shall be prima facie evidence that the defendant named therein is the same as the defendant before the court, and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts set out therein.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.4 (1999) (emphasis added). At issue in this appeal is the above emphasized provision of section 14-7.4, specifying that \u201c[a] prior conviction may be proved by stipulation of the parties or by the original or a certified copy of the court record of the prior conviction.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-7.4.\nOur appellate courts have never examined whether a faxed certified copy of a criminal record is admissible under section 14-7.4 to prove defendant\u2019s status as an habitual felon. However, our Court found in State v. Jordan, 120 N.C. App. 364, 462 S.E.2d 234, dismissed and disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 416, 465 S.E.2d 546 (1995), that a faxed certified copy of a police record check was admissible under circumstances similar to those presented by the instant case. The Jordan case provides us with guidance concerning the issue presented sub judice.\nIn Jordan, the defendant contended on appeal that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting \u201ca faxed copy of a Connecticut police record check into evidence for sentencing purposes,\u201d in violation of North Carolina General Statutes section 15A-1340.4(e). 120 N.C. App. at 370, 462 S.E.2d at 238; N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(e) (1988) (repealed 1993). The Jordan court noted that section 15A-1340.4(e) provided: \u201c \u2018A prior conviction may be proved by stipulation of the parties or by the original or a certified copy of the court record of the prior conviction.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 370, 462 S.E.2d at 238-39 (quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(e)). The court found that the statutory provision was permissive. Id. at 370, 462 S.E.2d at 239. The court further found that \u201cthe reliability of the method of proof is the important inquiry to be made in determining admissibility.\u201d Id.\nThe Jordan court noted that defendant\u2019s only contention concerning the document\u2019s admission was that the fax did not strictly comply with the formalities of section 15A-1340.4(e). However, \u201cdefendant did not deny that the [] police record was complete and accurate.\u201d Id. The court concluded that the \u201cfaxed, certified copy\u201d of the police record \u201cappearfed] to be a reliable source of the defendant\u2019s prior convictions\u201d and therefore, overruled defendant\u2019s assignment of error. Id.\nThe statute at issue in the instant case, section 14-7.4, clearly indicates that the provision is permissive, not mandatory, in that it provides a prior conviction \u201cmay\u201d be proven by stipulation or a certified copy of a record. See Campbell v. Church, 298 N.C. 476, 483, 259 S.E.2d 558, 563 (1979) (\u201cthe use of \u2018may\u2019 generally connotes permissive or discretionary action and does not mandate or compel a particular act\u201d). Thus, although section 14-7.4 contemplates the most appropriate means to prove prior convictions for the purpose of establishing habitual felon status, it does not exclude other methods of proof. Cf. State v. Graham, 309 N.C. 587, 308 S.E.2d 311 (1983) (stating the same in relation to similar language under section 15A-1340.4(e)).\nIn the present case, the State, similar to the State in Jordan, presented a facsimile, certified copy of a 1989 court record referencing defendant\u2019s felony larceny conviction for the purpose of establishing defendant\u2019s status as an habitual felon. Prior to its admission, the trial judge carefully examined the facsimile, noting that it was stamped with a seal \u201cshowing this is a true copy of the original which was signed by a clerk of Superior Court[,] April 9, 1999.\u201d The trial court found that \u201calthough not the original, the facsimile is a reasonable copy of the seal from Alamance County.\u201d The court concluded that exhibit S-l \u201csuffices [sic] the statute to be introduced into evidence.\u201d Defendant, similar to the Jordan defendant, does not contend that exhibit S-l was inaccurate or incomplete, but only that its admission was not in compliance with the plain language of section 14-7.4.\nBased on the above noted observations by the trial court and our own examination of exhibit S-l, we conclude that the faxed, certified copy \u201cappears to be a reliable source of [defendant\u2019s] prior conviction[]\u201d for felony larceny. Jordan, 120 N.C. App. at 370, 462 S.E.2d at 239. The exhibit\u2019s reliability was further bolstered below by defendant\u2019s own admission under oath that he indeed was convicted of the crimes listed therein. As such, we conclude that the trial court properly admitted exhibit S-l into evidence as proof of defendant\u2019s prior felonious larceny conviction for the purpose of establishing his status as an habitual felon. Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is consequently overruled.\nFor the foregoing reasoning, we find that defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nChief Judge EAGLES and Judge FULLER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Ted R. Williams, for the State.", "Richard M. Dailey, Jr. for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CARLTON DALE WALL, AKA CARLTON MOONIE WALL\nNo. COA99-1208\n(Filed 29 December 2000)\nSentencing\u2014 habitual felon \u2014 evidence\u2014faxed copy of prior conviction\nThe trial court in an habitual felon prosecution properly admitted a faxed certified copy of a prior conviction. Defendant challenged the exhibit only under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-7.4, not under the Rules of Evidence; although N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-7.4 contemplates the most appropriate means to prove prior convictions, it does not exclude other methods of proof. The trial court in this case carefully examined the facsimile, noting that it was stamped with a seal showing it to be a true copy of the original signed by a clerk of superior court, found that the seal was a reasonable copy, and concluded that the exhibit sufficed to be introduced into evidence. The Court of. Appeals concluded that the faxed, certified copy was a reliable source of the prior conviction based on the trial court\u2019s observations and its own examination of the exhibit. Finally, defendant admitted under oath that he was convicted of the crimes listed therein.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 13 April 1999 by Judge Henry E. Frye, Jr. in Superior Court, Guilford County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 September 2000.\nAttorney General Michael F Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Ted R. Williams, for the State.\nRichard M. Dailey, Jr. for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0529-01", "first_page_order": 559, "last_page_order": 564 }