{ "id": 9442172, "name": "LUNDY LANGSTON, Plaintiff v. CHARLES E. JOHNSON, SR., Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Langston v. Johnson", "decision_date": "2001-03-20", "docket_number": "No. COA00-28", "first_page": "506", "last_page": "510", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "142 N.C. App. 506" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "491 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675", "parenthetical": "appellate court not bound by trial court's classification of matter as a conclusion of law or a finding of fact" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11798267 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510", "parenthetical": "appellate court not bound by trial court's classification of matter as a conclusion of law or a finding of fact" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 S.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "7 N.C. App. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549549 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/7/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 S.E.2d 111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "87 N.C. App. 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358415 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/87/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 613", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615", "parenthetical": "defendant estopped from denying validity of separation agreement where plaintiff relied upon and performed obligations pursuant to terms thereof" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523324 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294-95", "parenthetical": "defendant estopped from denying validity of separation agreement where plaintiff relied upon and performed obligations pursuant to terms thereof" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 S.E.2d 353", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting 3 Strong's N.C. Index 2d Estoppel \u00a7 4" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 734", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571450, 8571479 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting 3 Strong's N.C. Index 2d Estoppel \u00a7 4" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0734-01", "/nc/288/0734-02" ] }, { "cite": "218 S.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415", "parenthetical": "quoting 3 Strong's N.C. Index 2d Estoppel \u00a7 4" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "27 N.C. App. 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550565 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105-06", "parenthetical": "quoting 3 Strong's N.C. Index 2d Estoppel \u00a7 4" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/27/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 S.E.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "905" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "254 N.C. 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625781 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265-66" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/254/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 S.E.2d 780", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "784" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11146921 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0657-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 503, "char_count": 9422, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.939155244961223e-08, "percentile": 0.42090156607586005 }, "sha256": "09dc9c52db398c7ead069c6f0c017abce510132ee2e4408bdc305883dbc47611", "simhash": "1:df5f7fac725cbc68", "word_count": 1521 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:11:55.437222+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge HUDSON concurs.", "Judge McCULLOUGH concurs in result in separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "LUNDY LANGSTON, Plaintiff v. CHARLES E. JOHNSON, SR., Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nLundy Langston (Plaintiff) appeals an order filed 12 March 1999, dismissing Plaintiff\u2019s motion for contempt against Charles E. Johnson, Sr. (Defendant).\nThe record shows that on 22 March 1991, Plaintiff filed a pro se verified complaint for divorce in Durham County, seeking an absolute divorce from Defendant and \u201cfurther relief as the Court may deem just and proper.\u201d Both parties were present at the hearing on Plaintiffs complaint. On 6 June 1991, the trial court filed a judgment containing the following pertinent findings of fact:\n7. That there were two children, Tari Krystal Aquia Johnson, born November 20, 1974 and Charles Edward Johnson, Jr., bom October 17, 1979, born of the marriage of . . . Plaintiff and Defendant.\n8. That Plaintiff is granted sole physical custody of the children and Defendant is granted liberal visitation rights.\n9. That both Plaintiff and Defendant are granted joint legal custody.\n10. That Plaintiff is responsible for major medical for both children and Defendant will be responsible for amounts not covered.\n11. That Defendant is responsible for life insurance for both children.\n12. That both Plaintiff and Defendant'are equally responsible for college tuition for both children.\n13. That Defendant is to pay $340, monthly, in child support to Plaintiff.\nThe 6 June 1991 judgment concluded: \u201cIT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between Plaintiff and Defendant be, and they . . . hereby are, dissolved, and Plaintiff and Defendant are granted an absolute divorce from each other.\u201d\nOn 31 July 1997, Plaintiff filed a Motion and Notice of Hearing for Modification of Child Support Order, which the trial court heard on 4 September 1997. The trial court subsequently ordered, inter alia, the following:\n1. That... [Defendant shall forward to [P]laintiff an amount of $31.00. This amount constitutes [Defendant's current child support obligation through October, 1997, when the minor child, Charles Edward Johnson, Jr., born October 17, 1979, shall reach majority.\n3. That . . . [Defendant is only obligated to pay one-half of the tuition per the previous court order entered between the parties on June 6, 1991.\n7. That... [Djefendant shall reimburse ... [PJlaintiff for one-half of the daughter\u2019s Fall, 1997, tuition at North Carolina State University.\nIn May 1998, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Show Cause for Failure to Pay Child Support, alleging Defendant had violated the 6 June 1991 judgment by failing to pay child support. The trial court thereafter issued an Order to Show Cause for Failure to Pay Child Support, stating that \u201cthere was probable cause that. . . Defendant is in contempt of Court in that he failed to pay $22,100.00 ... in child support to . . . Plaintiff as he was ordered to do in the Order entered by this Court on June 6, 1991.\u201d\nOn 15 December 1998, the matter came before the trial court. Upon reviewing the court file and prior to the parties\u2019 arguments, the trial court found that, although the 6 June 1991 judgment contained findings of fact regarding child support, it \u201cdecreed and ordered only that the bonds of matrimony between the parties be dissolved\u201d and there was no valid order regarding child support. The trial court, therefore, concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff\u2019s motion for contempt. Accordingly, Plaintiff\u2019s motion was dismissed \u201cdue to a lack of jurisdiction by the court.\u201d\nThe dispositive issue is whether the trial court\u2019s 6 June 1991 judgment contained a valid order for Defendant to pay child support when the order requiring Defendant to pay child support was not contained in the decretal portion of the judgment.\nGenerally, a judgment is in a form that contains findings, conclusions, and a decree. The decretal portion of a judgment is that portion which adjudicates the rights of the parties. See 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments \u00a7 99 (1994). The failure to follow this precise form, however, is not fatal to the judgment. Id. \u00a7 83. \u201cThe sufficiency of a writing claimed to be a judgment is to be tested by its substance rather than its form.\u201d Id.) see In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 510, 491 S.E.2d 672, 675 (1997) (appellate court not bound by trial court\u2019s classification of matter as a conclusion of law or a finding of fact).\nIn this case, the 6 June 1991 judgment contains an unequivocal directive that Defendant pay child support in the amount of $340.00 per month. Although this directive was not contained in the decretal portion of the judgment, it nonetheless constitutes a decree of the trial court. To hold otherwise would place form over substance, which this Court is not required to do.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudge HUDSON concurs.\nJudge McCULLOUGH concurs in result in separate opinion.", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." }, { "text": "McCULLOUGH, Judge,\nconcurring in the result.\nI would also reverse the trial court\u2019s order, but on the grounds of equitable estoppel. The 6 June 1991 judgment was explicitly recognized as a child support order by both parties who were present when it was entered. Defendant also signed the order, thereby acknowledging his awareness of its contents. Both plaintiff and defendant reared their children and otherwise managed their affairs for seven years as if a valid order were in place. A subsequent order filed 12 January 1998 also acknowledged the 6 June 1991 order as a valid child support order. In his reply to plaintiffs Motion to Show Cause, defendant stated that he had \u201cnot willfully refused to make monthly child support payments as required under the previous and last order in this matter of June 6, 1991\u201d and further, that \u201cthe parties both did not modify or change the previously entered court order, but rather, worked with one another based upon verbal agreement and physical locality of the child.\u201d\nUnder the facts of this case, defendant is equitably estopped from denying the validity of the 6 June 1991 order regarding defendant\u2019s duty to pay child support. In Chance v. Henderson, 134 N.C. App. 657, 663, 518 S.E.2d 780, 784 (1999), this Court held that, although the consent order entered by the trial court was invalid, defendant\u2019s subsequent actions \u201cratified and validated the Order,\u201d such that defendant was estopped from challenging the judgment. Where a party engages in positive acts that amount to ratification resulting in prejudice to an innocent party, the circumstances may give rise to estoppel. Howard v. Boyce, 254 N.C. 255, 265-66, 118 S.E.2d 897, 905 (1961). Further, \u201c \u2018[a] party who, with knowledge of the facts, accepts the benefits of a transaction, may not thereafter attack the validity of the transaction to the detriment of other parties who relied thereon.\u2019 \u201d Yarborough v. Yarborough, 27 N.C. App. 100, 105-06, 218 S.E.2d 411, 415, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 734, 220 S.E.2d 353 (1975) (quoting 3 Strong\u2019s N.C. Index 2d Estoppel \u00a7 4); see also Amick v. Amick, 80 N.C. App. 291, 294-95, 341 S.E.2d 613, 615 (1986) (defendant estopped from denying validity of separation agreement where plaintiff relied upon and performed obligations pursuant to terms thereof). In the instant case, defendant explicitly recognized and complied with (at least to some extent) the terms of the 6 June 1991 order for seven years. Nothing in the record indicates that defendant objected to or repudiated the order before the trial court, sua sponte, rejected the judgment as invalid as to child support.\nFurther, it is a well-established principle of law in North Carolina that no appeal lies from one superior court judge to another. Smithwick v. Crutchfield, 87 N.C. App. 374, 376, 361 S.E.2d 111, 113 (1987). The same rule also applies to district court judges. Johnson v. Johnson, 7 N.C. App. 310, 313, 172 S.E.2d 264, 266 (1970). Accordingly, one district court judge may not correct errors of law committed by another; such errors may only be corrected by an appellate court. See id. The 12 January 1998 order clearly recognized the validity of the 6 June 1991 child support order. By rejecting the 6 June 1991 order as invalid as to child support, the trial court also implicitly and unacceptably modified the 12 January 1998 order regarding defendant\u2019s child support obligations. Defendant did not appeal the 12 January 1998 order, which specifically references defendant\u2019s child support obligations under the previous 6 June 1991 judgment.\nUpon fully reviewing the pleadings, the orders, and the parties\u2019 subsequent behavior pursuant to the orders, it is clear that both parties intended that defendant should pay monthly child support. I would hold that defendant is equitably estopped from denying the validity of the 6 June 1991 order and accordingly reverse the trial court\u2019s dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s motion for contempt.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "McCULLOUGH, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Tracy Hicks Barley & Associates, P.A., by Tracy Hicks Barley, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Frances P. Solarifor defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LUNDY LANGSTON, Plaintiff v. CHARLES E. JOHNSON, SR., Defendant\nNo. COA00-28\n(Filed 20 March 2001)\nJudgments\u2014 directive not in decretal portion \u2014 valid\nA judgment containing an unequivocal directive that defendant pay child support constituted a decree of the court even though the directive was not contained in the decretal portion of the judgment.\nJudge McCullough concurring in the result.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order filed 12 March 1999 by Judge Kenneth C. Titus in Durham County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 February 2001.\nTracy Hicks Barley & Associates, P.A., by Tracy Hicks Barley, for plaintiff-appellant.\nFrances P. Solarifor defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0506-01", "first_page_order": 536, "last_page_order": 540 }