{ "id": 9442687, "name": "CARL JEFFREY LANE, Plaintiff v. CITY OF KINSTON and STEPHEN L. THOMPSON, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Lane v. City of Kinston", "decision_date": "2001-04-03", "docket_number": "No. COA00-265", "first_page": "622", "last_page": "629", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "142 N.C. App. 622" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "142 L. Ed.2d 449", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 S. Ct. 540", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "502 S.E.2d 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "495 S.E.2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "716", "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551270 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482", "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(5)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "515 S.E.2d 722", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. App. 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11219901 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/133/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 S.E.2d 72", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2510175, 2511623, 2511756, 2510714, 2509663 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0441-04", "/nc/330/0441-03", "/nc/330/0441-02", "/nc/330/0441-01", "/nc/330/0441-05" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519999 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 S.E.2d 13", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Hull v. Oldham, 104 N.C. App. 29, 38, 407 S.E.2d 611, 616, disc. review denied, 330 N.C. 441, 412 S.E.2d 72 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 851", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132006, 131914, 132202, 132079, 131994 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Hull v. Oldham, 104 N.C. App. 29, 38, 407 S.E.2d 611, 616, disc. review denied, 330 N.C. 441, 412 S.E.2d 72 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0851-05", "/nc/350/0851-04", "/nc/350/0851-02", "/nc/350/0851-03", "/nc/350/0851-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 S.E.2d 41", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44", "parenthetical": "quoting Hull v. Oldham, 104 N.C. App. 29, 38, 407 S.E.2d 611, 616, disc. review denied, 330 N.C. 441, 412 S.E.2d 72 (1991)" }, { "page": "45" }, { "page": "44" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11237763 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338", "parenthetical": "quoting Hull v. Oldham, 104 N.C. App. 29, 38, 407 S.E.2d 611, 616, disc. review denied, 330 N.C. 441, 412 S.E.2d 72 (1991)" }, { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155776, 1155872, 1155810, 1155924, 1155901 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0354-01", "/nc/351/0354-04", "/nc/351/0354-02", "/nc/351/0354-03", "/nc/351/0354-05" ] }, { "cite": "519 S.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11238888 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 S.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 834", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2514028, 2518960, 2516821, 2517941, 2513435 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0834-04", "/nc/322/0834-02", "/nc/322/0834-01", "/nc/322/0834-05", "/nc/322/0834-03" ] }, { "cite": "366 S.E.2d 2", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" }, { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521115 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" }, { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 S.E.2d 550", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 854", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2508528 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0854-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 15, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "902" }, { "page": "902" }, { "page": "902" }, { "page": "902" }, { "page": "902" }, { "page": "902" }, { "page": "902" }, { "page": "902" }, { "page": "902" }, { "page": "902" }, { "page": "902" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2509910 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" }, { "page": "372" }, { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155717, 1155826, 1155731, 1155895, 1155679 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0474-05", "/nc/351/0474-04", "/nc/351/0474-01", "/nc/351/0474-03", "/nc/351/0474-02" ] }, { "cite": "524 S.E.2d 378", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "380" }, { "page": "380" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11240122 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "433" }, { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 S.E.2d 887", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "889" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11711652 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135721, 135755, 135901, 135758 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0267-02", "/nc/353/0267-04", "/nc/353/0267-03", "/nc/353/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 S.E.2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "846", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "846" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9497081 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0487-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 771, "char_count": 16579, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1206233345616191e-07, "percentile": 0.5733452027512028 }, "sha256": "39ba89e074c55af0944f126fd02f3862ff036ff9e670cd2b9d240e1c35723f19", "simhash": "1:0511a4f02fe16c1b", "word_count": 2715 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:11:55.437222+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur." ], "parties": [ "CARL JEFFREY LANE, Plaintiff v. CITY OF KINSTON and STEPHEN L. THOMPSON, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nPlaintiff, Carl Jeffrey Lane (\u201cLane\u201d), appeals the trial court\u2019s order dismissing his complaint against defendants City of Kinston (\u201cCity\u201d) and Stephen L. Thompson (\u201cThompson\u201d) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. We affirm the trial court\u2019s dismissal of Lane\u2019s action for the reasons stated below.\nOn 13 September 1999, Lane filed a complaint seeking damages for defendants\u2019 negligence. Lane filed an amended complaint on 28 September 1999. The amended complaint alleged, in relevant part, that lane was walking southward on Queen Street in Kinston, North Carolina, in the early morning of 27 July 1997. Lane was walking toward the home of his brother, Mark Lane, from a house a few miles away. The complaint alleged that Lane was \u201cintoxicated.\u201d Lane stopped to rest temporarily on a bench in front of the Lenoir County Library.\nThe complaint alleged that Thompson, a City police officer, drove up to Lane in a marked City police car at approximately 12:49 a.m., as Lane sat on the bench. The complaint stated that Thompson observed Lane\u2019s \u201cinebriation.\u201d The complaint alleged that Lane \u201casked defendant Thompson to give him a ride to his brother\u2019s residence, located approximately three to four miles away, which Thompson refused to do.\u201d The complaint further alleged that Lane requested that Thompson call a taxi-cab to come and transport Lane home. Thompson did not call a cab, and drove away instead. In the alternative, Lane\u2019s complaint alleged that Thompson agreed to call a taxi-cab at Lane\u2019s request, but that Thompson did not wait to ensure Lane\u2019s safety.\nLane\u2019s complaint further alleged that, after Thompson left, Lane again began to walk in a southward direction on Queen Street toward Mark Lane\u2019s home. It stated that, during the walk, Lane \u201cwas accosted by several individuals who robbed him, beat him, and threw him over the side of a bridge causing a fall of approximately twenty-five feet.\u201d Lane alleged that, as a result of defendants\u2019 negligence in failing to assist him, he incurred permanent injuries, and medical expenses in excess of $122,000.00.\nThe complaint alleged that Thompson, an agent of the City, was negligent in (1) failing to assist an intoxicated individual under G.S. \u00a7 122C-301; (2) failing to assist Lane when Lane\u2019s condition of peril was or should have been obvious; (3) refusing to call a taxi-cab to transport Lane; and (4) refusing to aid a person in obvious peril who requested assistance, and thus had a \u201cspecial relationship\u201d with Thompson.\nOn 19 October 1999, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), N.C. R. Civ. P. The trial court entered an order dismissing Lane\u2019s complaint on 10 November 1999. Lane appeals.\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in dismissing Lane\u2019s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Lane argues that the complaint states a claim for relief based on Chapter 122C of the North Carolina General Statutes. Lane maintains that G.S. \u00a7 122C-2 and 122C-301 operate outside the general public duty doctrine and \u201cimpose an affirmative duty\u201d on the City and its agents \u201cto assist individuals with substance abuse problems.\u201d\nIn reviewing the grant of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we assess the legal sufficiency of the complaint, taking all factual allegations as true. Peacock v. Shinn, 139 N.C. App. 487, 492, 533 S.E.2d 842, 846, disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 267, -S.E.2d- (2000) (citation omitted). \u201cA complaint cannot withstand a motion to dismiss where an insurmountable bar to recovery appears on its face.\u201d Id. (citation omitted). \u201c \u2018Such an insurmountable bar may consist of an absence of law to support a claim, an absence of facts sufficient to make a good claim, or the disclosure of some fact that necessarily defeats the claim.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Al-Hourani v. Ashley, 126 N.C. App. 519, 521, 485 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1997)).\nA. Public Duty Doctrine\nThe public duty doctrine arises when allegations of a complaint involve the exercise of the defendants\u2019 police powers as a municipality. Little v. Atkinson, 136 N.C. App. 430, 432, 524 S.E.2d 378, disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 474, \u2014 S.E.2d\u2014(2000) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court adopted the public duty doctrine in Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 371, 410 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1991), reh\u2019g denied, 330 N.C. 854, 413 S.E.2d 550 (1992). The Court defined the doctrine as follows:\nThe general common law rule, known as the public duty doctrine, is that a municipality and its agents act for the benefit of the public, and therefore, there is no liability for the failure to furnish police protection to specific individuals. This rule recognizes the limited resources of law enforcement and refuses to judicially impose an overwhelming burden of liability for failure to prevent every criminal act.\nId. at 370-71, 410 S.E.2d at 901 (citing Coleman v. Cooper, 89 N.C. App. 188, 193, 366 S.E.2d 2, 6, disc. review denied, 322 N.C. 834, 371 S.E.2d 275 (1988)) (emphasis supplied).\nIn adopting the doctrine, the Supreme Court noted two general exceptions to the rule: \u201c(1) where there is a special relationship between the injured party and the police\u201d and \u201c(2) \u2018when a municipality, through its police officers, creates a special duty by promising protection to an individual, the protection is not forthcoming, and the individual\u2019s reliance on the promise of protection is causally related to the injury suffered.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 371, 410 S.E.2d at 902 (quoting Coleman, 89 N.C. App. at 194, 366 S.E.2d at 6).\nThe first exception, the \u201cspecial relationship\u201d exception, \u201cmust be specifically alleged, and is not created merely by a showing that the state undertook to perform certain duties.\u201d Frazier v. Murray, 135 N.C. App. 43, 50, 519 S.E.2d 525, 530 (1999), appeal dismissed, 351 N.C. 354,-S.E.2d-(2000) (citation omitted). \u201cA \u2018special relationship\u2019 depends on \u2018representations or conduct by the police which cause the victim(s) to detrimentally rely on the police such that the risk of harm as the result of police negligence is something more than that to which the victim was already exposed.\u2019 \u201d Vanasek v. Duke Power Co., 132 N.C. App. 335, 338, 511 S.E.2d 41, 44, cert. denied, 350 N.C. 851, 539 S.E.2d 13 (1999) (quoting Hull v. Oldham, 104 N.C. App. 29, 38, 407 S.E.2d 611, 616, disc. review denied, 330 N.C. 441, 412 S.E.2d 72 (1991)).\nLane\u2019s complaint alleges that a special relationship was created between Lane and Thompson because Thompson \u201crefused to aid a person in obvious peril who requested the aid of a police officer.\u201d This allegation does not sufficiently allege an exception to the public duty doctrine based on a \u201cspecial relationship.\u201d This Court held that this State does not recognize an exception to the public duty doctrine for failure to act where an officer \u201c \u2018knew or should have known the plaintiff . . . would be exposed to an unusually high risk if care was not taken. . . .\u2019 \u201d Vanasek at 339, 511 S.E.2d at 45.\nThe second exception to the public duty doctrine, the \u201cspecial duty\u201d exception, \u201c \u2018is a very narrow one; it should be applied only when the promise, reliance, and causation are manifestly present.\u2019 \u201d Little, 136 N.C. App. at 433, 524 S.E.2d at 380 (quoting Braswell, 330 N.C. at 372, 410 S.E.2d at 902). In order for a plaintiff to state a prima facie case under this exception, \u201c \u2018the complaint must allege an \u2018overt promise\u2019 of protection by defendant, detrimental reliance on the promise, and a causal relation between the injury and the reliance.\u2019 \u201d Id. (citing Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 133 N.C. App. 408, 412-13, 515 S.E.2d 722, 725 (1999)); see also, Braswell at 372, 410 S.E.2d at 902.\nIn Braswell, the plaintiff argued that he could recover for the defendants\u2019 negligence under the \u201cspecial duty\u201d exception to the public duty doctrine. Braswell, 330 N.C. at 371, 410 S.E.2d at 902. The evidence tended to show that the plaintiff\u2019s mother was killed by the plaintiff\u2019s father, Billy. Id. at 372, 410 S.E.2d at 902. The victim had expressed to the defendant-officer that she felt as though she may be in danger of being harmed by Billy. Id. The defendant-officer told the victim \u201cthat Billy would not harm [her] and that his men would be keeping an eye on her.\u201d Id. at 371-72, 410 S.E.2d at 902. The officer further promised that \u201c[she] would get to and from work safely.\u201d The victim was shot by Billy while driving to her attorney\u2019s office. Id. at 372, 410 S.E.2d at 902.\nThe defendants argued that the officer\u2019s statements, if made, were \u201cgeneral words of comfort and assurance, commonly offered by law enforcement officers in situations involving domestic problems, and that such promises were merely gratuitous and hence not sufficient to constitute an actual promise of safety.\u201d Id. at 371-72, 410 S.E.2d at 902. Our Supreme Court agreed, noting that, although the officer had offered assurances that the victim would be safe, \u201cthere is absolutely no evidence tending to indicate that he expressly or impliedly promised her protection at any time other than when she was driving to and from work.\u201d Id. at 372, 410 S.E.2d at 902. The Court further stated that, because the victim was driving to her attorney\u2019s office when killed, \u201ceven if there were a promise to provide protection while traveling to and from work, [the victim\u2019s] alleged reliance on [the officer\u2019s] promise cannot in any way be considered to have caused her death.\u201d Id.\nHere, Lane\u2019s complaint alleges, in the alternative, that Thompson promised to call a taxi-cab for Lane, but then \u201chaving recognized that Lane was inebriated and in a position of peril abandoned him and failed and refused to aid [Lane] in any way whatsoever.\u201d This allegation is insufficient to state a claim under the \u201cspecial duty\u201d exception. Thompson\u2019s alleged promise to call a taxi-cab was \u201cmerely gratuitous and hence not sufficient to constitute an actual promise of safety.\u201d Braswell at 372, 410 S.E.2d at 902.\nThe complaint does not allege that Thompson promised to stay with Lane until a taxi-cab arrived; that Thompson promised that a taxi-cab would, in fact, arrive; or that Thompson promised to ensure Lane\u2019s safety on his way home. The complaint, taken as true, fails to show that Thompson ever promised to ensure Lane\u2019s safety on 27 July 1997. In short, Lane\u2019s complaint fails to \u201callege an \u2018overt promise\u2019 of protection by defendant, detrimental reliance on the promise, and a causal relation between the injury and the reliance.\u2019 \u201d Little, 136 N.C. App. at 433, 524 S.E.2d at 380. Lane\u2019s complaint fails to state a claim for relief under either exception to the public duty doctrine.\nB. Statutory Exceptions\nLane maintains that G.S. \u00a7 122C-301 imposes an affirmative duty on defendants beyond the public duty doctrine. Lane argues that the statute affirmatively required that Thompson assist Lane, upon observing Lane\u2019s intoxicated condition. G.S. \u00a7 122C-301 provides, in relevant part:\n(a) An officer may assist an individual found intoxicated in a public place by taking any of the following actions: (1) The officer may direct or transport the intoxicated individual home; (2) The officer may direct or transport the intoxicated individual to the residence of another individual willing to accept him . . .\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122C-301(a) (1999). Lane also relies on G.S. \u00a7 122C-2 in support of his argument that defendants were under an affirmative obligation to assist Lane beyond the general application of the public duty doctrine:\nThe policy of the State is to assist individuals with mental illness, developmental disabilities, and substance abuse problems in ways consistent with the dignity, rights, and responsibilities of all North Carolina citizens. Within available resources it is the obligation of State and local government to provide services to eliminate, reduce, or prevent the disabling effects of mental illness, developmental disabilities, and substance abuse. . . .\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122C-2 (1999).\nLane\u2019s reliance on these statutes is misplaced. Although instructive, the statutes do not place an affirmative obligation on a police officer to transport an intoxicated individual, or to call for hired transportation. G.S. \u00a7 122C-301 clearly states that an \u201cofficer mav assist an individual found intoxicated in a public place by taking any of the following actions.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines \u201cmay\u201d as \u201cpermitted to,\u201d and states \u201c[t]his is the primary legal sense \u2014 usually termed the \u2018permissive\u2019 or \u2018discretionary\u2019 sense.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 993 (7th ed. 1999). This language does not impose an affirmative duty. The language of G.S. \u00a7 122C-2 simply explains the policy of this State with respect to substance abusers.\nMoreover, in the context of the public duty doctrine, our Supreme Court has held that, unless a statute prescribes a private right of action for its breach, the statute will not be interpreted as an exception to the general public duty doctrine:\n[W]e do not believe the legislature, in establishing the Occupational Safety and Health Division of the Department of Labor in 1973, intended to impose a duty upon this agency to each individual worker in North Carolina. Nowhere in chanter 95 of our General Statutes does the legislature authorize a private. individual right of action against the State to assure compliance with OSHANC standards. Rather, the most the legislature intended was that the Division prescribe safety standards and secure some reasonable compliance through spot-check inspections made \u201cas often as practicable.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-4(5) (1996).\nStone v. North Carolina Dep\u2019t of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 482, 495 S.E.2d 711, 716, reh\u2019g denied, -N.C. -, 502 S.E.2d 836, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 540, 142 L. Ed.2d 449 (1998) (emphasis supplied). \u201cOur caselaw generally holds that a statute allows for a private cause of action only where the legislature has expressly provided a private cause of action within the statute.\u201d Vanesek, 132 N.C. App. at 339, 511 S.E.2d at 44.\nNeither G.S. \u00a7 122C-301 nor G.S. \u00a7 122C-2 expressly authorizes a private right of action for the breach of its terms. Therefore, consistent with the court\u2019s decision in Stone, we do not interpret either statute as being outside the general application of the public duty doctrine.\nThe allegations of Lane\u2019s complaint fail to show that defendants\u2019 actions fall outside the public duty doctrine. Taking all factual allegations in the complaint as true, we hold that the face of Lane\u2019s complaint reveals a bar to Lane\u2019s recovery. The trial court properly dismissed Lane\u2019s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Peacock, 139 N.C. App. at 492, 533 S.E.2d at 846.\nAffirmed.\nJudges MARTIN and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Jeffrey S. Miller, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Sumrell, Sugg, Carmichael, Hicks & Hart, P.A., by Scott C. Hart, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CARL JEFFREY LANE, Plaintiff v. CITY OF KINSTON and STEPHEN L. THOMPSON, Defendants\nNo. COA00-265\n(Filed 3 April 2001)\nCities and Towns\u2014 public duty doctrine \u2014 protection of individuals with substance abuse problems \u2014 no special relationship exception \u2014 no special duty exception\nThe trial court did not err in a negligence case by dismissing plaintiffs complaint against defendant city and defendant police officer based on failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted even though plaintiff maintains that N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 122C-2 and 122C-301 operate outside the public duty doctrine and impose an affirmative duty on the city and its agents to assist individuals with substance abuse problems, because: (1) a special relationship was not created by the officer\u2019s alleged failure to act where the officer knew or should have known plaintiff would be exposed to an unusually high risk if care was not taken; (2) a special duty did not arise from the officer\u2019s alleged promise to call a taxi cab for the inebriated plaintiff since it was merely gratuitous and not sufficient to constitute an actual promise of safety; (3) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 122C-301 is not an exception to the public duty doctrine when it does not place an affirmative duty on a police officer to transport an intoxicated individual or to call for hired transportation; and (4) N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 122C-301 and 122C-2 are not exceptions to the public duty doctrine since neither expressly authorizes a private right of action for the breach of its terms.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 10 November 1999 by Judge Donald Jacobs in Lenoir County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 February 2001.\nJeffrey S. Miller, for plaintiff-appellant.\nSumrell, Sugg, Carmichael, Hicks & Hart, P.A., by Scott C. Hart, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0622-01", "first_page_order": 652, "last_page_order": 659 }