{ "id": 9443038, "name": "DONALD J. GOLDS, Plaintiff-Appellee v. CENTRAL EXPRESS, INC., a Missouri Corporation, CENTRAL EXPRESS, an unincorporated association, partnership, or proprietorship, and DENNIS L. JENNY, Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Golds v. Central Express, Inc.", "decision_date": "2001-04-03", "docket_number": "No. COA00-536", "first_page": "664", "last_page": "669", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "142 N.C. App. 664" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "477 S.E.2d 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2645780 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/51/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 S.E.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4723461, 4723183, 4725138, 4724791, 4719199 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0602-04", "/nc/313/0602-01", "/nc/313/0602-05", "/nc/313/0602-02", "/nc/313/0602-03" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "913" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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Stat.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "546 S.E.2d 90", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135782, 135657, 135981, 135737, 135578 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0261-04", "/nc/353/0261-03", "/nc/353/0261-01", "/nc/353/0261-02", "/nc/353/0261-05" ] }, { "cite": "532 S.E.2d 215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" }, { "page": "217", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11080985 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" }, { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0612-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 730, "char_count": 13472, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.68851932255105e-07, "percentile": 0.8923636088436044 }, "sha256": "77232f45387ba2b29664b0cceef4c8935bf09c77befc4b05524081fa1523ccb7", "simhash": "1:13796d22602f08da", "word_count": 2190 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:11:55.437222+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER and CAMPBELL concur." ], "parties": [ "DONALD J. GOLDS, Plaintiff-Appellee v. CENTRAL EXPRESS, INC., a Missouri Corporation, CENTRAL EXPRESS, an unincorporated association, partnership, or proprietorship, and DENNIS L. JENNY, Defendants-Appellants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WALKER, Judge.\nPlaintiff, a North Carolina resident, filed an action against Central Express, Inc. (defendant Central Express) and Dennis L. Jenny (defendant Jenny) on 6 January 2000, alleging negligence on the part of defendant Jenny resulting from an automobile accident. In his complaint, plaintiff sought damages for personal injury and property loss.\nThe accident occurred on 7 January 1998 around 7:08 p.m. in the parking lot of a fuel station in Hammond, Louisiana. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was sitting in the passenger side of his vehicle, which was parked in a marked parking space. Defendant Central Express\u2019 vehicle, which was being driven by its employee, defendant Jenny, collided with the passenger side of plaintiffs vehicle.\nIn his complaint, plaintiff alleged defendant Jenny was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Plaintiff served defendant Jenny by certified mail but did not obtain service on defendant Central Express.\nOn 14 February 2000, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the action, alleging lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2). N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) (1999). In their motion, defendants asserted that defendant Central Express is a Missouri corporation, defendant Jenny is a citizen and resident of Highland, Illinois, and the accident giving rise to this action occurred in or near Hammond, Louisiana. Defendants further moved for sanctions and costs pursuant to Rule 11 of the North Carlina Rules of Civil Procedure \u201cfor the defense of this action which has no basis in law or fact.\u201d N.C.R. Civ. P. 11 (1999). By order filed 3 March 2000, the trial court denied defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss and for sanctions.\nIn their assignment of error, defendants contend the trial court erred in denying their motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) because defendants have insufficient contacts with this State and because defendant Central Express was not served with process. N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).\nAt the outset, we note \u201c[t]he denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is immediately appealable\u201d and not interlocutory. Bruggeman v. Meditrust Acquisition Co., 138 N.C. App. 612, 614, 532 S.E.2d 215, 217, cert. denied, 353 N.C. 261, 546 S.E.2d 90 (2000), citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-277(b) (1999); Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 306 N.C. 324, 293 S.E.2d 182 (1982). Whether the courts of this State may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant involves a two-prong analysis: \u201c(1) Does a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction exist, and (2) If so, does the exercise of this jurisdiction violate constitutional due process?\u201d J.M. Thompson Co. v. Doral Mfg. Co., 72 N.C. App. 419, 424, 324 S.E.2d 909, 913, cert. denied, 313 N.C. 602, 330 S.E.2d 611 (1985). The assertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant comports with due process if defendant is found to have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to confer jurisdiction. Fungaroli v. Fungaroli, 51 N.C. App. 363, 276 S.E.2d 521, cert. denied, 303 N.C. 314, 281 S.E.2d 651 (1981).\nThe statutory basis for asserting personal jurisdiction pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4 is referred to as the \u201clong-arm statute.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4 (1999); Godwin v. Walls, 118 N.C. App. 341, 346, 455 S.E.2d 473, 478, cert. granted, 341 N. C. 419, 461 S.E.2d 757 (1995) (motion to withdraw petition for discretionary review granted 19 October 1995). Our long-arm statute provides several methods by which personal jurisdiction may be exercised over a defendant and includes in pertinent part:\n(1) Local Presence or Status. \u2014 In any action, whether the claim arises within or without this State, in which a claim is asserted against a party who when service of process is made upon such party:\nd. Is engaged in substantial activity within this State, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-75.4(l)(d). \u201cThis statute is liberally construed to find personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the full extent allowed by due process.\u201d DeArmon v. B. Mears Corp., 67 N.C. App. 640, 643, 314 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1984), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 312 N.C. 749, 325 S.E.2d 223 (1985). However, \u201c[t]he burden is on [the] plaintiff to establish itself within some ground for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant.\u201d Public Relations, Inc. v. Enterprises, Inc., 36 N.C. App. 673, 677, 245 S.E.2d 782, 784 (1978), citing Bryson v. Northlake Hilton, 407 F. Supp. 73 (M.D.N.C. 1976); Munchak Corp. v. Riko Enterprises, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1366 (M.D.N.C. 1973). \u201cThe failure to plead the particulars of jurisdiction is not fatal to the claim so long as the facts alleged permit the inference of jurisdiction under the statute.\u201d Williams v. Institute for Computational Studies, 85 N.C. App. 421, 428, 355 S.E.2d 177, 182 (1987). If a defendant challenges the court\u2019s jurisdiction, \u201ca trial court may hold an evidentiary hearing including oral testimony or depositions or may decide the matter based on affidavits. If the court takes the latter option, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing prima facie that jurisdiction is proper.\u201d Bruggeman, 138 N.C. App. at 615, 532 S.E.2d at 217 (citations omitted).\nPlaintiff, in the instant case, alleges in his complaint \u201c[u]pon information and belief, both named defendants are subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Courts of this State pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-75.4[.]\u201d Although the complaint cites our long-arm statute as providing personal jurisdiction over defendants, the complaint does not state the section of this statute under which jurisdiction is obtained nor does it allege any facts as to activity being conducted in this State at the time of service of process. On appeal, plaintiff argues that personal jurisdiction is based upon N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-75.4(l)(d) because defendant Central Express was engaged in substantial activity in that defendants \u201cregularly conduct business within this [S]tate by delivering freight from, to or through this State.\u201d\nIn Godwin, this Court held plaintiff failed to prove aprima facie statutory basis for jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4(1). Godwin, 118 N.C. App. 341, 455 S.E.2d 473. In that case, neither the complaint nor amended complaint contained any allegations regarding the nature of defendants\u2019 contacts with this State and the record was devoid of evidence to support the trial court\u2019s presumed finding of substantial activity within this State. Id. at 351-52, 455 S.E.2d at 481. Recently, this Court in Cooper v. Shealy, 140 N.C. App. 729, 537 S.E.2d 854 (2000) held that a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-75.4(4)(a) was properly denied where allegations in plaintiff\u2019s complaint satisfied requirements of the long-arm statute by sufficiently claiming that defendant carried on solicitations within the meaning of the statute.\nA review of the record and plaintiff\u2019s complaint shows he failed to meet his burden of proving prima facie a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for a lack of personal jurisdiction.\nIn light of our disposition of this case under our \u201clong arm statute,\u201d we need only address defendants\u2019 additional assignment of error that the trial court err\u00e9d in denying their motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of our Rules of Civil Procedure and in failing to enter findings and conclusions in its order. N.C.R. Civ. P. 11.\nDefendant claims Rule 11 sanctions are warranted because plaintiff \u201cthrough his counsel, filed a complaint which lacks legal sufficiency, factual sufficiency and was filed only to \u2018forum-shop\u2019 in North Carolina after the applicable one year statute of limitations had expired in Louisiana.\u201d\nThe trial court\u2019s decision whether or not to impose Rule 11 sanctions is reviewable de novo. Dodd v. Steele, 114 N.C. App. 632, 635, 442 S.E.2d 363, 365, cert. denied, 337 N.C. 691, 448 S.E.2d 521 (1994), citing Turner v. Duke University, 325 N.C. 152, 165, 381 S.E.2d 706, 714 (1989), cert. denied, 329 N.C. 505, 407 S.E.2d 552 (1991). In general, an order imposing or denying sanctions must be supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law. Turner, 325 N.C. at 165, 381 S.E.2d at 714. The trial court\u2019s failure to make findings and conclusions results in error, which generally requires the case to be remanded for the resolution of any disputed factual issues. Taylor v. Taylor Products, Inc., 105 N.C. App. 620, 630, 414 S.E.2d 568, 576 (1992). \u201cHowever, remand is not necessary when there is no evidence in the record, considered in the light most favorable to the movant, which could support a legal conclusion that sanctions are proper.\u201d Id.\nRule 11, which sets forth the circumstances under which sanctions may be imposed, states in pertinent part:\nThe signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.\nN.C.R. Civ. R 11. In other words, Rule 11 provides that a pleading must contain the following to avoid the imposition of sanctions: (1) legal sufficiency; (2) factual sufficiency; and (3) a proper purpose. Williams v. Hinton, 127 N.C. App. 421, 423, 490 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1997). A pleading lacking in any of these three areas is sufficient to support sanctions under Rule 11. Id.\nTo determine whether a pleading is legally sufficient, the trial court should look \u201cfirst to the facial plausibility of the pleading and only then, if the pleading is implausible under existing law, to the issue of \u2018whether to the best of the signer\u2019s knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, the complaint was warranted by the existing law.\u2019 \u201d Bryson v. Sullivan, 330 N.C. 644, 661, 412 S.E.2d 327, 336 (1992), quoting dePasquale v. O\u2019Rahilly, 102 N.C. App. 240, 246, 401 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1991). This is measured by \u201can objective standard of reasonable inquiry.\u201d Id. (citation omitted).\nTo determine whether a complaint is factually sufficient, the court must determine: \u201c(1) whether the plaintiff undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and (2) whether the plaintiff, after reviewing the results of his inquiry, reasonably believed that his position was well grounded in fact.\u201d McClerin v. R-M Industries, Inc., 118 N.C. App. 640, 644, 456 S.E.2d 352, 355 (1995).\nA complaint has been influenced with an improper purpose when its purpose is \u201c \u2018any purpose other than one to vindicate rights ... or to put claims of right to a proper test.\u2019 \u201d Brown v. Hurley, 124 N.C. App. 377, 382, 477 S.E.2d 234, 238 (1996) (citation omitted). For example, \u201ca party \u2018will be held responsible if his evident purpose is to harass, persecute, otherwise vex his opponents or cause them unnecessary cost or delay.\u2019 \u201d Id. \u201cAn objective standard is used to determine the existence of an improper purpose, with the burden on the movant to prove such improper purpose.\u201d Id.\nAfter careful review, we cannot conclude the complaint was legally and factually deficient or filed with an improper purpose such that sanctions should be imposed.\nIn sum, the trial court\u2019s order denying defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss for a lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) is reversed. N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). The trial court\u2019s order denying defendants\u2019 motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 is affirmed. N.C.R. Civ. P. 11.\nReversed in part and affirmed in part.\nJudges HUNTER and CAMPBELL concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WALKER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Kuehnert Bellas & Bellas, PLLC, by Eric R. Bellas, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Patton, Starnes, Thompson, Ay cock, Teele & Ballew, PA., by Larry A. Ballew, for defendants-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DONALD J. GOLDS, Plaintiff-Appellee v. CENTRAL EXPRESS, INC., a Missouri Corporation, CENTRAL EXPRESS, an unincorporated association, partnership, or proprietorship, and DENNIS L. JENNY, Defendants-Appellants\nNo. COA00-536\n(Filed 3 April 2001)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 denial of motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction\nThe denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is immediately appealable.\n2. Jurisdiction\u2014 personal \u2014 prima facie proof\nThe trial court erred by denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant where the complaint did not state the section of the long-arm statute under which jurisdiction was obtained or allege facts as to activity being conducted in North Carolina by defendant at the time of service of process, and a review of the record and complaint showed that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving prima facie a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-75.4.\n3. Pleadings\u2014 Rule 11 sanctions\nThe trial court did not err by denying a motion for Rule 11 sanctions for a complaint filed in North Carolina arising from an automobile accident in Louisiana.\nAppeal by defendants from judgment entered 2 March 2000 by Judge Claude S. Sitton and filed 3 March 2000 in Burke County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 February 2001.\nKuehnert Bellas & Bellas, PLLC, by Eric R. Bellas, for plaintiff-appellee.\nPatton, Starnes, Thompson, Ay cock, Teele & Ballew, PA., by Larry A. Ballew, for defendants-appellants." }, "file_name": "0664-01", "first_page_order": 694, "last_page_order": 699 }