{ "id": 9443423, "name": "MOORE COUNTY, by and through its CHILD ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, MOORE COUNTY DSS on behalf of Nathan Evans v. EARL BROWN", "name_abbreviation": "Moore County ex rel. Child Enforcement Agency v. Brown", "decision_date": "2001-04-03", "docket_number": "No. COA00-531", "first_page": "692", "last_page": "695", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "142 N.C. App. 692" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "485 S.E.2d 351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352", "parenthetical": "in ruling on issues of child support, \"trial court may consider the conduct of the parties, the equities of the given case, and any other relevant facts.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11711137 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431", "parenthetical": "in ruling on issues of child support, \"trial court may consider the conduct of the parties, the equities of the given case, and any other relevant facts.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 S.E.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525769 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 S.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232", "parenthetical": "quoting Flanders v. Gabriel, 110 N.C. App. 438, 440, 429 S.E.2d 611, 612-13 (1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12130407 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528", "parenthetical": "quoting Flanders v. Gabriel, 110 N.C. App. 438, 440, 429 S.E.2d 611, 612-13 (1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755941 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "524 S.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581", "parenthetical": "quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11239421 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296", "parenthetical": "quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 110-135", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 425, "char_count": 8445, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5446452748061187e-07, "percentile": 0.8137505314016377 }, "sha256": "7fd7f31b5252b181d04eebf049c2e4959688a7c95f10ddec6b49176814bb5bc3", "simhash": "1:83fa4887db4a1df6", "word_count": 1375 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:11:55.437222+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur." ], "parties": [ "MOORE COUNTY, by and through its CHILD ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, MOORE COUNTY DSS on behalf of Nathan Evans v. EARL BROWN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nPlaintiff, Moore County, by and through its Child Enforcement Agency, Moore County Department of Social Services (\u201cDSS\u201d), appeals an order denying the collection of public assistance arrear-ages from defendant, Earl Brown (\u201cBrown\u201d). We affirm the trial court\u2019s order.\nNathan Daniel Evans (\u201cNathan\u201d), the minor child at issue, was bom to Denise Ann Epps (\u201cEpps\u201d) on 27 June 1985. Epps was married to Danny Steve Evans (\u201cEvans\u201d) at the time of Nathan\u2019s birth. Nathan was placed in DSS custody in September 1988. On 5 April 1989, Nathan was placed in foster care with Epps\u2019 consent. Nathan has remained in foster care at all times pertinent to this matter. Epps consented to Nathan\u2019s adoption on 17 October 1989. Evans signed a Denial of Paternity of Nathan on 5 May 1992.\nIn June 1998, Brown contacted DSS and stated that he believed he was Nathan\u2019s biological father. On 22 September 1998, Brown submitted to genetic testing. Test results showed a 99.51% probability that Brown was Nathan\u2019s father. Brown\u2019s attempts to enter Nathan\u2019s life were resisted by DSS. DSS filed a petition to terminate Brown\u2019s parental rights. On 4 October 1999, the trial court terminated Brown\u2019s parental rights.\nOn the same day, DSS filed a Complaint for Paternity and Support against Brown. The matter was heard on 16 November 1999. Brown was adjudicated to be Nathan\u2019s father, and the trial court entered an order of ongoing support. Brown filed a Motion to Terminate Support on 8 December 1999. On 21 December 1999, the trial court granted the motion due to termination of Brown\u2019s parental rights.\nFollowing the hearing on 21 December 1999, DSS made an oral motion to establish arrearages against Brown for public assistance that DSS previously paid for Nathan. The trial court denied the motion on 4 January 2000. In its order, the trial court incorporated prior findings of fact and conclusions of law from the 4 October 1999 order terminating Brown\u2019s parental rights. The trial court specifically incorporated into the order its previous finding of no evidence, \u201cthat DSS or Child Support diligently pursued [Brown] to recover the reasonable costs of the care of [Nathan].\u201d The trial court found that DSS had presented no further evidence on the issue of support; and specifically, that DSS \u201cpresented no evidence of the amount of arrearage.\u201d\nThe trial court concluded that \u201cthere are equitable arguments that exist such that [DSS] should not be allowed to establish arrear-ages in this case . . . .\u201d The trial court specifically referenced its conclusion of law from the termination order that the court \u201cdoes not look favorably upon [DSS] attempting to recover such costs, more than eleven years after the child was placed in foster care.\u201d DSS appeals.\nDSS assigns error to the trial court\u2019s denial of its motion to establish arrearages. In support, DSS argues: (1) that DSS should be allowed to collect arrearages from Brown because DSS complied with the applicable statute of limitations; and (2) that Brown should be required to pay arrearages \u201cdue to the fact that no equitable estop-pel argument applies in this case.\u201d We affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion.\nThe summary of the hearing reveals that Brown objected to DSS\u2019 motion to establish arrearages on grounds that DSS\u2019 Complaint for Paternity and Support was filed on 4 October 1999, the same day that Brown\u2019s parental rights were terminated. Brown argued that DSS only became aware of Brown\u2019s claim to paternity after Brown voluntarily came forward, one and one-half years prior to termination of his parental rights. Brown opposed the termination of his parental rights. Evidence was also presented that establishes DSS had never pursued Epps, Nathan\u2019s mother, for reimbursement of public assistance for Nathan, despite DSS\u2019 custody of Nathan since 1988. DSS had also never pursued Brown prior to its December 1999 motion.\nDSS argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion to establish arrearages where the applicable statute provides that such actions may be commenced up until \u201cfive years subsequent to the receipt of the last grant of public assistance.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 110-135. DSS argues that Nathan received public assistance in 1999, and thus, the motion was timely.\nBrown does not dispute that DSS has legal authority to pursue arrearages under the statute of limitations set forth in G.S. \u00a7 110-135. Brown argues that the trial court was vested with discretion to consider the equity of granting DSS\u2019 motion to pursue Brown for arrear-ages, and that the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion due to equitable considerations should be afforded deference. We agree.\nTrial court orders regarding the obligation to pay child support \u201care accorded substantial deference by appellate courts and our review is limited to a \u2018determination of whether there was a clear abuse of discretion.\u2019 \u201d Biggs v. Greer, 136 N.C. App. 294, 296, 524 S.E.2d 577, 581 (2000) (quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)). \u201c \u2018Where trial is by judge and not by jury, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact have the force and effect of a verdict by a jury and are conclusive on appeal if there is evidence to support them, even though the evidence might sustain findings to the contrary.\u2019 \u201d Security Credit Leasing, Inc. v. D.J.\u2019s of Salisbury, Inc., 140 N.C. App. 521, 528, 537 S.E.2d 227, 232 (2000) (quoting Flanders v. Gabriel, 110 N.C. App. 438, 440, 429 S.E.2d 611, 612-13 (1993)).\nThe trial court was not required to grant DSS\u2019 motion simply because DSS moved to establish arrearages within the applicable statute of limitations. We also do not agree with DSS\u2019 assertion that an absence of the elements of equitable estoppel is grounds for reversing the trial court\u2019s order, assuming arguendo, that Brown failed to establish such a claim. The trial court was vested with considerable discretion to consider both law and equity in determining whether to grant DSS\u2019 motion. See, e.g., Maney v. Maney, 126 N.C. App. 429, 431, 485 S.E.2d 351, 352 (1997) (in ruling on issues of child support, \u201ctrial court may consider the conduct of the parties, the equities of the given case, and any other relevant facts.\u201d).\nThe trial court\u2019s findings were supported by competent evidence in the record, and are therefore conclusive. The trial court\u2019s findings support its conclusion of law that equitable factors prohibited DSS from pursuing Brown for arrearages. DSS failed to show an abuse of the trial court\u2019s considerable discretion in denying the motion. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order.\nAffirmed.\nJudges MARTIN and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Catherine B. Cowling, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Rowland & Yauger, by Michael C. Rowland, Jr., for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MOORE COUNTY, by and through its CHILD ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, MOORE COUNTY DSS on behalf of Nathan Evans v. EARL BROWN\nNo. COA00-531\n(Filed 3 April 2001)\nPublic Assistance\u2014 child support \u2014 action to recover \u2014 terminated parental rights\nThe trial court did not err by denying DSS\u2019s motion for child support arrearages where the child was born to a mother married to a man other than defendant; the child was placed in foster care with the mother\u2019s consent; the mother consented to adoption and her husband signed a denial of paternity; defendant contacted DSS and stated that he believed he was the child\u2019s father; genetic testing showed a 99.5% probability that defendant was the father; his attempts to enter the child\u2019s life were resisted by DSS, which filed a petition to terminate his parental rights; DSS filed a complaint for paternity and support against defendant on the same day his parental rights were terminated; the court adjudicated defendant to be the father and entered an ongoing support order; defendant\u2019s motion to terminate support due to the termination of his parental rights was granted; and DSS\u2019s motion to establish arrearages for public assistance previously paid was denied. The trial court was vested with considerable discretion to consider both law and equity in determining whether to grant DSS\u2019s motion and was not required to grant the motion simply because it was made within the statute of limitations. Moreover, the absence of the elements of equitable estoppel is not grounds for reversing the order.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 4 January 2000 by Judge Lillian Jordan in Moore County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 March 2001.\nCatherine B. Cowling, for plaintiff-appellant.\nRowland & Yauger, by Michael C. Rowland, Jr., for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0692-01", "first_page_order": 722, "last_page_order": 725 }