{ "id": 11433573, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GILES BRANTLEY FLOYD, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Floyd", "decision_date": "2001-04-17", "docket_number": "No. COA00-291", "first_page": "128", "last_page": "136", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "143 N.C. App. 128" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "148 L. Ed. 2d 498", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 1018", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9679042, 9678662, 9678761, 9678795, 9678864, 9678962, 9678739, 9678834, 9678903, 9678645, 9678999, 9678940, 9678686, 9678719 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/1018-14", "/us/531/1018-02", "/us/531/1018-06", "/us/531/1018-07", "/us/531/1018-09", "/us/531/1018-12", "/us/531/1018-05", "/us/531/1018-08", "/us/531/1018-10", "/us/531/1018-01", "/us/531/1018-13", "/us/531/1018-11", "/us/531/1018-03", "/us/531/1018-04" ] }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155877 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 826", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518874 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "829-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0826-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 L. Ed. 2d 873", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "515 U.S. 1169", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1564321, 1564514, 1563810, 1564225, 1564429, 1563982, 1564143, 1563761, 1563860, 1564409, 1564054, 1564249, 1564283 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/515/1169-13", "/us/515/1169-06", "/us/515/1169-03", "/us/515/1169-12", "/us/515/1169-01", "/us/515/1169-02", "/us/515/1169-05", "/us/515/1169-08", "/us/515/1169-04", "/us/515/1169-09", "/us/515/1169-10", "/us/515/1169-07", "/us/515/1169-11" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 826", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "850" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2558011 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 S.E.2d 468", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 N.C. App. 637", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555490 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "641", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/42/0637-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 L. Ed. 2d 818", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "515 U.S. 1135", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1563969, 1564577, 1564483, 1564008, 1564296, 1564331, 1564174, 1563855, 1564503, 1564049, 1563795, 1563863, 1563768, 1564252, 1564093 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/515/1135-02", "/us/515/1135-14", "/us/515/1135-10", "/us/515/1135-04", "/us/515/1135-15", "/us/515/1135-07", "/us/515/1135-03", "/us/515/1135-09", "/us/515/1135-08", "/us/515/1135-01", "/us/515/1135-12", "/us/515/1135-11", "/us/515/1135-05", "/us/515/1135-06", "/us/515/1135-13" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 211", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556681 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 S.E.2d 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798921 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 S.E.2d 442", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" }, { "page": "448-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2513652 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279-80", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4733270 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0663-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 818, "char_count": 18120, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0810702842992488e-07, "percentile": 0.759059311952164 }, "sha256": "3c12522cbf7631abc718ac4e066e12d5040d0a13b624e8ade30cce9a999445e3", "simhash": "1:8f4ff222665f1d6c", "word_count": 2964 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:26:47.079244+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GREENE and McCULLOUGH concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GILES BRANTLEY FLOYD, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUDSON, Judge.\nDefendant was tried and convicted on one count of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The evidence at trial tended to show the following. Linda Gore Floyd (Linda), defendant\u2019s wife of twenty-nine years, was killed on 24 April 1996. She was found dead in a utility workshop located outside the home in which she and defendant lived. Her death resulted from multiple blows to her head with a blunt instrument.\nOn the morning of 24 April 1996, Linda\u2019s daughter, Crystal Floyd Gore (Crystal), who lived about ten miles from her parents, spoke on the phone with Linda. During the conversation, Linda told her daughter that defendant had \u201cjust left.\u201d Later in the conversation, Crystal heard the phone drop and then silence. Crystal tried calling back but the line was busy. Crystal drove to her parents\u2019 house, calling her grandfather Ralph Gore (Ralph) on her cell phone, as well as 911. Ralph went to the home and found Linda dead, lying face down in the utility shop in a pool of blood. Crystal arrived after Ralph, and defendant returned home at approximately 11:00 a.m.\nThe State\u2019s expert witness in forensic serology and blood spatter testified that the boots and jeans which defendant had been wearing on the day of the murder had blood spatter stains on them. The State\u2019s expert in DNA analysis testified that Linda\u2019s DNA matched the DNA taken from defendant\u2019s jeans and boots, that the DNA from the jeans and boots came from a single person, and that the DNA did not match defendant\u2019s DNA. Defendant\u2019s expert in DNA analysis testified that DNA taken from defendant\u2019s boots matched Linda\u2019s DNA. Defendant\u2019s expert in crime scene analysis, although critical of some procedures that had been used in collecting samples from the jeans, testified that the source of the blood on defendant\u2019s boots was Linda.\nDefendant had been involved with another woman, Karen Fowler (Karen), for several years prior to Linda\u2019s death. At various times during the affair with Karen, defendant separated from Linda to live with Karen. Linda had filed a divorce complaint against defendant on 12 March 1996. Thereafter, defendant and Linda apparently reconciled, and on 20 March 1996, they entered into a consent order filed with the district court. The order provided that if Linda suspected defendant of an extramarital affair, defendant would have to immediately vacate the home, taking only his personal effects, and defendant would have to begin paying Linda $600.00 per month in alimony until she remarried. Defendant then moved back in with Linda.\nThe State presented an abundance of circumstantial evidence regarding defendant\u2019s motive for the murder. For example, a neighbor of defendant testified that about two weeks before the murder, he overheard defendant say, \u201cYou don\u2019t know what\u2019s in my mind. You don\u2019t know what I\u2019m thinking. But you\u2019ll read about it in a couple of weeks in the paper.\u201d A friend of defendant testified that about a month before Linda\u2019s murder, defendant stated that he had ended a relationship with another woman, and that he missed having sex with her and dreamed about it. A second neighbor testified that after defendant moved back in with Linda, defendant told him that he still loved Karen. Karen testified that when defendant was initially served with the divorce complaint, he told Karen that \u201che\u2019d rather go to jail before he paid [Linda] any money.\u201d Karen also testified that defendant once stated to her that he \u201cthought about either killing [Linda] or [having] her killed.\u201d Telephone records were introduced showing twelve calls made from defendant and Linda\u2019s home to Karen\u2019s home between 15 April 1996 and 22 April 1996, as well as five calls made to Karen\u2019s home after Linda\u2019s death. After Linda\u2019s death, defendant filed claims for two life insurance policies, including one for $50,000.00.\nDefendant attempted to present evidence to establish that Karen and her two teenage sons had a motive for killing Linda. Some of this evidence was admitted at trial, including: a tape of a harassing message left by Karen on defendant and Linda\u2019s home answering machine in early spring of 1996; evidence that Linda had taken out a restraining order against Karen and her sons; and testimony that Karen had dumped clothing in the front yard of defendant and Linda\u2019s home on one occasion. As we discuss in further detail below, other evidence offered by defendant to establish motive and opportunity on the part of Karen\u2019s two sons was excluded by the trial court.\nDefendant timely appealed from the judgment against him. On appeal, defendant raises five assignments of error. Defendant\u2019s first argument, encompassing three assignments of error, is that the trial court committed reversible error on three occasions in excluding evidence offered by defendant to show that Karen\u2019s two sons might have killed Linda. First, defendant sought to admit testimony by an investigating officer that during an interview with Karen\u2019s two sons, they admitted they had not been in school on the morning of 24 April 1996, the day Linda was murdered. The trial court sustained the State\u2019s objection to this evidence. Second, Crystal was asked a question regarding the feelings Linda had expressed about the harassing answering machine message left by Karen. In response, Crystal'was apparently prepared to testify that Linda had told her that on one occasion while she was driving her car, Karen\u2019s two sons had pulled up beside her at a stop light, had yelled obscenities at her, and had given her the finger. The trial court interrupted Crystal, without an objection by the State, and instructed her to restrict her answers to the scope of the question asked. Third, defense counsel sought to elicit Crystal\u2019s testimony that she had told the investigating officer about Linda\u2019s statements to Crystal regarding the stop light incident. The State objected, and during voir dire in the absence of the jury, defense counsel argued the testimony should be admitted in order to explain why the investigating officer had interviewed Karen\u2019s two sons. The trial court sustained the State\u2019s objection.\nThe rule applicable to the admission of evidence of third-party guilt is well-established:\nEvidence that another committed the crime for which the defendant is charged generally is relevant and admissible as long as it does more than create an inference or conjecture in this regard. It must point directly to the guilt of the other party. Under Rule 401 such evidence must tend both to implicate another and be inconsistent with the guilt of the defendant.\nState v. Cotton, 318 N.C. 663, 667, 351 S.E.2d 277, 279-80 (1987) (emphasis in original). Defendant contends that the evidence in question should have been admitted pursuant to the holding in State v. McElrath, 322 N.C. 1, 366 S.E.2d 442 (1988). la McElrath, the defendant was convicted of the first-degree murder of his son-in-law based solely upon circumstantial evidence. On appeal, the Court held that it was error for the trial judge to refuse to admit a map found among the victim\u2019s personal papers showing the area surrounding the defendant\u2019s summer home, with notations indicating that the victim, with others, planned a larceny. Id. at 12, 366 S.E.2d at 448. Citing Rule 401, the Court found that the map and notations, together with other evidence offered, could indicate that the victim suffered a falling out with his co-conspirators which resulted in his death at their hands and not at the hands of the defendant. Id. at 12-14, 366 S.E.2d at 448-49. Here, defendant claims that the evidence in question tends to show that Karen\u2019s two sons had motive and opportunity for the murder, and that this evidence was therefore relevant and should have been admitted at trial. We disagree.\nIn McElrath, the excluded evidence arguably established the possibility that other individuals, involved in a larceny scheme with the victim to rob the defendant\u2019s house, had killed the victim. This theory was inconsistent with the theory that defendant committed the murder, since no evidence was presented that defendant had any connection to anyone involved in the possible larceny scheme, and since it would be unlikely for the defendant to be involved in a larceny scheme to rob his own house. Thus, the evidence in McElrath served to inculpate other individuals, and at the same time served to exculpate the defendant as the perpetrator of the murder. Here, the evidence in question was not relevant because it neither implicated Karen\u2019s sons in the murder, nor exculpated defendant.\nIn State v. Hester, 343 N.C. 266, 470 S.E.2d 25 (1996), the defendant assigned as error the trial court\u2019s exclusion of the testimony of a witness which suggested that the victim\u2019s husband, rather than the defendant, might have murdered the victim. At trial, the defendant called the witness to testify about the victim\u2019s relationship with her husband. The witness testified on voir dire that the victim\u2019s husband was a member of Hell\u2019s Angels and was nicknamed \u201cCowboy,\u201d that the victim and her husband did not get along very well, that the husband physically abused the victim and her children from a former marriage, and that the victim often hid from her husband by spending the night at the home of the witness. The witness further testified that the victim had said that her husband had threatened several times to kill her. On appeal, the Court stated:\n[I]t is well settled that \u201cto be both relevant and admissible, evidence tending to show the guilt of one other than the defendant must point directly to the guilt of a specific person or persons.\u201d It must do more than create mere conjecture of another\u2019s guilt. The proffered evidence did no more than arouse suspicion as to Randall\u2019s guilt on the basis that he might have had a motive to murder the victim. There was no evidence linking him directly to the crime, and the evidence was not inconsistent with defendant\u2019s guilt. The trial court thus properly excluded the evidence.\nId. at 271, 470 S.E.2d at 28 (citations omitted). Similarly, the evidence here, showing that Karen\u2019s two sons were hostile toward Linda and were not in school on the day of the murder, does no more than arouse suspicion that Karen\u2019s sons had motive and opportunity to murder Linda. This evidence does not directly link Karen\u2019s sons to the murder.\nNor does the evidence exculpate defendant. In State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 451 S.E.2d 211 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135, 132 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1995), the defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of armed robbery. The defendant on appeal contended that the trial court had erred by not allowing him to ask the investigating detective if he had an opinion about the number of people involved in the murders. During an offer of proof, the detective stated that immediately after investigating the murders he believed there was a strong possibility that a particular individual named Harvey, an acquaintance of defendant who was also in the area at the time of the murders, had knowledge of, and might have been involved in, the murders. The defendant argued that this testimony should have been admitted because it was relevant evidence which showed that someone else might have committed the murders. The Court held that the evidence amounted to mere conjecture that Harvey was involved in the murders, and did not show that defendant did not commit them. Id. at 191, 451 S.E.2d at 222. The Court also expressly distinguished the case from McElrath, explaining that the evidence in McElrath not only inculpated another, but also exculpated the defendant, while the evidence in Rose was not necessarily inconsistent with defendant\u2019s guilt. Id.\nHere, the evidence in question does not have any bearing on whether defendant committed the murder. This is because even assuming arguendo that the evidence in question established that Karen\u2019s two sons were involved in the murder, such evidence would not establish that defendant did not commit the murder, since it is perfectly conceivable that defendant and Karen\u2019s sons were, together, responsible for the murder. \u201cEvidence which tends to show nothing more than that someone other than the accused had an opportunity to commit the offense, without tending to show that such person actually did commit the offense and that therefore the defendant did not do so, is too remote to be relevant and should be excluded.\u201d State v. Britt, 42 N.C. App. 637, 641, 257 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1979) (emphasis added). In sum, the evidence in question was not relevant because it neither inculpated Karen\u2019s sons in Linda\u2019s murder, nor served to exculpate defendant. The trial court properly excluded this evidence, and defendant\u2019s first three assignments of error are overruled.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred in sustaining the State\u2019s objection to a comment made by counsel for defendant during closing argument. Counsel stated:\nNow, Karen Fowler denied the threats but you all heard the tape. And you\u2019re going to hear it again in a minute. And the threats are in there. \u201cI\u2019m going to f\u2014 you up. I\u2019m your worst f\u2019ing nightmare.\u201d Now, she denied doing that when she took the witness stand and testified. But they\u2019re there. And it makes you wonder why she and her family haven\u2019t been investigated in this case.\nThe State objected to this last comment, which objection was sustained by the trial court.\nIt is well-settled that in North Carolina counsel is granted wide latitude to argue the case to the jury. Counsel is permitted to argue the facts that have been presented as well as the reasonable inferences which can be drawn therefrom. However, counsel may not argue matters to the jury which are incompetent and prejudicial by injecting his own knowledge, beliefs, or personal opinions or matters which are not supported by the evidence. Ordinarily, the control of jury arguments is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and the trial court\u2019s rulings thereon will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion.\nState v. Jones, 339 N.C. 114, 158-59, 451 S.E.2d 826, 850 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1169, 132 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1995) (citations omitted). The comment in questidn appears to have been an attempt by counsel to express to the jury his opinion that the evidence presented was sufficient to implicate Karen\u2019s sons in the murder of Linda. We can only assume that the trial court found this comment to be prejudicial and not supported by the evidence, and we are not persuaded that this conclusion constituted an abuse of discretion. As we have stated, the evidence purportedly implicating Karen\u2019s sons in the murder was properly excluded by the trial court because, in fact, it did no more than create mere conjecture, and did not directly link Karen\u2019s sons to the murder. Thus, the statement by counsel during closing argument sought to present an inference that could not reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that sustaining the objection was error, such error standing alone would be insufficient to require a new trial. The trial lasted a total of seven days, excluding many days of jury selection and pre-trial hearings. The transcript of the trial comprises over 5,000 pages. Defendant has not shown a reasonable possibility that there would have been a different result if the State\u2019s objection to this one statement had been overruled. See State v. Rosier, 322 N.C. 826, 829-30, 370 S.E.2d 359, 361 (1988). This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant lastly contends that the \u201cshort form\u201d murder indictment employed in this case violated his constitutional rights and deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to try him for the indicted charge of first-degree murder. Defendant acknowledges that he has raised this issue \u201cfor preservation purposes to permit further review in federal court, if necessary,\u201d and defendant readily concedes that this issue has previously been considered and rejected by our Supreme Court in State v. Wallace, 351 N.C. 481, 528 S.E.2d 326, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1018, 148 L. Ed. 2d 498 (2000). Pursuant to the holding in Wallace, this assignment of error is overruled.\nNo error.\nJudges GREENE and McCULLOUGH concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUDSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Celia Grasty Lata, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GILES BRANTLEY FLOYD, Defendant\nNo. COA00-291\n(Filed 17 April 2001)\n1. Evidence\u2014 offense committed by others \u2014 speculative\nThe trial court did not err in the first-degree murder prosecution of defendant for killing his wife by excluding evidence that his girlfriend\u2019s sons might have committed the murder. Evidence that the defendant\u2019s girlfriend\u2019s sons were hostile to his wife and were not in school on the day of the murder does no more than arouse suspicion that they had motive and opportunity and does not link them directly to the murder. Moreover, the evidence has no bearing on whether defendant committed the murder because, assuming that it established that the two sons were involved, it is perfectly conceivable that defendant and the two sons were together responsible for the murder.\n2. Criminal Law\u2014 defendant\u2019s argument \u2014 suggestion that others not investigated\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a first-degree murder prosecution by sustaining the State\u2019s objection during defendant\u2019s closing argument to the expression of an opinion that there was sufficient evidence to implicate others. The evidence had been properly excluded and, assuming error, there was not a reasonable possibility of a different result without the error.\n3. Homicide\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 short-form indictment\u2014 constitutionality\nThe short-form indictment for first-degree murder is constitutional.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 2 March 1998 by Judge Gregory A. Weeks in Columbus County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 March 2001.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Celia Grasty Lata, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nMalcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0128-01", "first_page_order": 158, "last_page_order": 166 }