{ "id": 11434189, "name": "KENNETH A. BLOCH, Plaintiff-Appellee v. THE PAUL REVERE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, THE PAUL REVERE VARIABLE ANNUITY INSURANCE COMPANY, THE PAUL REVERE PROTECTIVE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, KYLE S. MERCER and BRIDGET COSTNER, Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Bloch v. Paul Revere Life Insurance", "decision_date": "2001-05-01", "docket_number": "No. COA00-97", "first_page": "228", "last_page": "244", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "143 N.C. App. 228" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "524 S.E.2d 821", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826" }, { "page": "826-27" }, { "page": "827" }, { "page": "827" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11240352 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 S.E.2d 295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" }, { "page": "298", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "297" }, { "page": "299" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524278 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "702" }, { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 S.E.2d 458", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11238427 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2519568, 2518281, 2516346, 2514601 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0486-03", "/nc/322/0486-02", "/nc/322/0486-01", "/nc/322/0486-04" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 647", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "650" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515946 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 S.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" }, { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 N.C. App. 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549333 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" }, { "page": "200" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/40/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 S.E.2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Fitzgerald v. Wolf, 40 N.C. App. 197, 199, 252 S.E.2d 523, 524 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659852, 1659916, 1659953, 1659893, 1659769 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Fitzgerald v. Wolf, 40 N.C. App. 197, 199, 252 S.E.2d 523, 524 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0695-04", "/nc/348/0695-01", "/nc/348/0695-03", "/nc/348/0695-05", "/nc/348/0695-02" ] }, { "cite": "498 S.E.2d 841", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "850", "parenthetical": "quoting Fitzgerald v. Wolf, 40 N.C. App. 197, 199, 252 S.E.2d 523, 524 (1979)" }, { "page": "851", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "850" }, { "page": "850" }, { "page": "851" }, { "page": "851" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11649914 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317", "parenthetical": "quoting Fitzgerald v. Wolf, 40 N.C. App. 197, 199, 252 S.E.2d 523, 524 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 S.E.2d 282", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290" }, { "page": "290" }, { "page": "294" }, { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566728 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85" }, { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 S.E.2d 348", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 85, 221 S.E.2d 282, 290 (1976)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2505409, 2504968, 2504747, 2505141, 2504699 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 85, 221 S.E.2d 282, 290 (1976)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0345-01", "/nc/332/0345-02", "/nc/332/0345-05", "/nc/332/0345-04", "/nc/332/0345-03" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286", "parenthetical": "citing Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 85, 221 S.E.2d 282, 290 (1976)" }, { "page": "286" }, { "page": "286" }, { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5314074 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512", "parenthetical": "citing Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 85, 221 S.E.2d 282, 290 (1976)" }, { "page": "512-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518481 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 916", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "924", "parenthetical": "citing United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 661, 370 S.E.2d 375, 387 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2513373 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498", "parenthetical": "citing United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 661, 370 S.E.2d 375, 387 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E.2d 46", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49", "parenthetical": "contract damages for at-will employee are coextensive with entitlement" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 N.C. App. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170477 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583", "parenthetical": "contract damages for at-will employee are coextensive with entitlement" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/52/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2499683, 2502026, 2498378, 2501299, 2501692 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0119-05", "/nc/331/0119-03", "/nc/331/0119-01", "/nc/331/0119-04", "/nc/331/0119-02" ] }, { "cite": "412 S.E.2d 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523555 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 S.E.2d 735", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "737", "parenthetical": "quoting Salt v. Applied Analytical, Inc., 104 N.C. App. 652, 655, 412 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1991), disc. review denied, 331 N.C. 119, 415 S.E.2d 200 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524183 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54", "parenthetical": "quoting Salt v. Applied Analytical, Inc., 104 N.C. App. 652, 655, 412 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1991), disc. review denied, 331 N.C. 119, 415 S.E.2d 200 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 S.E.2d 815", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "817" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528278 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 S.E.2d 175", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 N.C. 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625315 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/248/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 S.E.2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164", "parenthetical": "quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 344(a) comment a (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 N.C. App. 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525568 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725", "parenthetical": "quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 344(a) comment a (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/102/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 S.E.2d 810", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "812-13", "parenthetical": "quoting 15 A.J. 449, \u00a7 51; 25 C.J.S. Damages, \u00a7 24, page 481" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 10", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627948 ], "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14", "parenthetical": "quoting 15 A.J. 449, \u00a7 51; 25 C.J.S. Damages, \u00a7 24, page 481" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0010-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 822", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "825" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530532 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 S.E.2d 476", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479", "parenthetical": "citing Abels v. Renfro Corp., 335 N.C. 209, 214-15, 436 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1993)" }, { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11080078 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429", "parenthetical": "citing Abels v. Renfro Corp., 335 N.C. 209, 214-15, 436 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1993)" }, { "page": "429" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0425-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1310, "char_count": 39310, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.884220570962105e-07, "percentile": 0.843808847542849 }, "sha256": "5646626c2bc2b1d3ed459b221adc091fb67c8c7a36a58b8e15a71b5444fcf8b7", "simhash": "1:0b8cd47d6c5f0e5c", "word_count": 6157 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:26:47.079244+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur." ], "parties": [ "KENNETH A. BLOCH, Plaintiff-Appellee v. THE PAUL REVERE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, THE PAUL REVERE VARIABLE ANNUITY INSURANCE COMPANY, THE PAUL REVERE PROTECTIVE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, KYLE S. MERCER and BRIDGET COSTNER, Defendants-Appellants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nDefendants: The Paul Revere Life Insurance Company, The Paul Revere Variable Annuity Insurance Company, and The Paul Revere Protective Life Insurance Company (collectively, \u201cPaul Revere\u201d) and individual defendants Kyle S. Mercer (\u201cMercer\u201d) and Bridget Costner (\u201cCostner\u201d), appeal the trial court\u2019s entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff Kenneth A. Bloch (\u201cBloch\u201d). We reverse in part and affirm in part the trial court\u2019s entry of judgment as to Paul Revere, and affirm the trial court\u2019s entry of judgment as to Mercer and Costner.\nFacts\nBloch began working for Paul Revere as a Group Insurance Underwriter in 1972 in Chicago, Illinois. In 1979, Bloch was transferred to Charlotte, North Carolina to establish a disability insurance office for Paul Revere. On 1 November 1983, Bloch executed a General Management Agreement (\u201cGMA\u201d) with Paul Revere to become a Brokerage General Manager in Paul Revere\u2019s Charlotte office. The GMA detailed Bloch\u2019s responsibilities as General Manager and Paul Revere\u2019s responsibilities of support and assistance for Bloch\u2019s office operations. The GMA provided: (1) \u201cPaul Revere reserves the right to restrict [Bloch\u2019s] authority at any time with respect to . . . the management of the office\u201d and (2) \u201c[t]his Agreement may be terminated by either party giving the other thirty days\u2019 written notice.\u201d\nMercer was also transferred by Paul Revere to Charlotte in 1983. In 1984, Mercer became a General Manager for Paul Revere\u2019s Group Sales in Charlotte. Although Bloch and Mercer worked in different divisions of Paul Revere, Brokerage and Group, the two were required to work together to sell certain policies. Bloch and Mercer exercised differing management styles, and friction developed between the two.\nCostner began employment with Paul Revere in 1984 as an office manager, supervising the daily functions of Bloch\u2019s Brokerage office. Bloch promoted Costner to Brokerage Representative in 1986. Bloch considered Costner for a promotion to Sales Manager in 1991. In a confidential annual evaluation for management review, Bloch stated that Costner was a candidate for the Sales Manager position. However, Bloch expressed concern that Costner was a single mother with two children, and that she \u201cno longer has any support mechanism at home.\u201d Costner was not promoted in 1991.\nIn 1992, Mary Rachal, Sales Vice-President, provided Costner with a set of criteria to achieve in order for her to be promoted to Sales Manager in Bloch\u2019s office by 1993. Bloch urged Costner to meet the criteria and work for the promotion.\nIn July 1993, Mercer was promoted by Paul Revere to Regional Managing Director. Bloch remained in his position as General Manager. Bloch requested Paul Revere\u2019s senior management to reconsider Mercer\u2019s promotion, without success. Mercer was promoted. Bloch was required to report to Mercer.\nCostner and Mercer had become friendly during the time they worked together at Paul Revere. Donald Tardif (\u201cTardif\u2019), a sales representative in Mercer\u2019s Charlotte office and Mercer\u2019s personal friend, testified that Mercer and Costner had confided in him that their relationship had developed into a sexual relationship. Susan Potter (\u201cPotter\u201d), who became Bloch\u2019s Office Manager in 1991, corroborated that Costner had admitted to having a sexual relationship with Mercer.\nTardif also testified that Mercer and Costner often talked about Bloch, \u201chow poor of a manager he was, how much they disliked him, they didn\u2019t trust him, he was an idiot.\u201d Tardif further testified that, based on \u201cjust hundreds of conversations,\u201d it was apparent that Mercer \u201cwas interested in having Mr. Bloch removed from Paul Revere.\u201d Potter testified that Bloch was \u201cone of the best managers [she] ever had.\u201d\nFollowing Mercer\u2019s promotion, and with his assistance, Costner filed a formal internal discrimination complaint against Bloch. Costner alleged that Bloch unfairly discriminated against her by failing to promote her to Sales Manager in 1991. Specifically, Costner cited as unfair Bloch\u2019s comments that he was concerned about her. single-mother status at home.\nBloch testified that his comments were made in a confidential review for management, and that he did not know how Costner obtained the document. A copy of the review with Costner\u2019s handwritten notes was introduced into evidence. Bloch testified it was \u201chighly unusual\u201d for a sales representative to have a copy of their own evaluation, and that he was \u201cflabbergasted\u201d when he saw Costner\u2019s handwritten notes on the evaluation.\nPaul Revere investigated Costner\u2019s complaint. Patrick Morris (\u201cMorris\u201d), Sales Vice-President, interviewed Costner, Mercer and Bloch. Costner alleged that Bloch reneged on a promise to promote her. Bloch denied promising Costner the promotion. Bloch testified that he asked to see any documentation that had been developed regarding the complaint, but that Paul Revere management \u201crefused to give it to [him].\u201d Bloch acknowledged that his GMA gave Paul Revere senior management the final authority to determine office operations, including promotions.\nOver Bloch\u2019s written protest, Morris promoted Costner to the Sales Manager position in Bloch\u2019s office in December 1993. Morris further ordered Bloch to pay Costner back pay and manager commissions from November 1991 through November 1993. Bloch made the required payments.\nCostner admitted at trial that she had not met all of the sales criteria that had been given to her by Mary Rachal prior to her promotion. Tardif testified that just prior to her promotion, Mercer confided in him that \u201che was concerned\u201d about Costner because she \u201cwas not doing her job.\u201d Tardif testified that Mercer admitted to him that Costner \u201cwas not achieving her numbers.\u201d Mercer told Tardif that \u201cbecause of their friendship he was fighting hard for her.\u201d Bloch also testified that Mercer had expressed to him that Costner was not qualified for the promotion, but that Mercer supported her claim that she was entitled to the promotion nonetheless.\nPotter testified that she later discovered Costner had told Paul Revere senior management that Potter had corroborated her claim that Bloch promised Costner the promotion. Potter drafted a letter to Barry Lundquist (\u201cLundquist\u201d), Senior Sales Vice-President, to state that she \u201cabsolutely did not\u201d corroborate Costner\u2019s claim, and that she never heard Bloch promise Costner the promotion. Potter testified that she was upset that no one had \u201ceven bothered to look into it or ask me or have anyone else ask me.\u201d Potter further stated that she expressed to Lundquist that she felt \u201cthat there were still things going on in the office that [he] needed to know about.\u201d\nRelations between Bloch, Mercer, and Costner continued to deteriorate. Bloch testified that after Mercer became a regional director, Mercer began to \u201ccircumvent [his] general managership.\u201d Bloch testified that Mercer began sending documents and \u201cpertinent information on the running of the brokerage operation\u201d directly to Costner. Bloch complained to Morris, who stated that he would have Mercer rectify the situation. Bloch testified that the situation did not change, and that Mercer continued to channel information \u201cthat should be coming to the manager . . . directly to Bridget Costner and not to me at all.\u201d\nBloch stated that the documents Mercer channeled to Costner \u201cdid in fact affect the performance of the operation and other representatives.\u201d Bloch testified that Mercer sent Costner, and not Bloch, the training manuals for two large Paul Revere accounts. The manuals contained pertinent information on how to operate the accounts. Tardif testified that while he worked in Mercer\u2019s Charlotte office, he witnessed and participated in conversations with Mercer and Costner wherein Costner would provide Mercer with information about Bloch\u2019s office and operation, even though Costner reported to Bloch.\nBloch testified that he \u201credefined [Paul Revere\u2019s] override system that [employees] could give commissions to brokers. Ms. Costner was aware of that.\u201d Bloch further testified that Costner interfered in a broker relationship without his knowledge. Costner completed documentation raising a broker\u2019s commission from 50% to 70%. This documentation required Bloch\u2019s signature as General Manager. However, the documents were signed by Mercer and delivered directly to the Paul Revere home office without Bloch\u2019s knowledge. Bloch learned of the higher commissions from the home office, and requested that the documents be sent back to Charlotte for his review.\nBloch stated that overall, Costner and Mercer were \u201cundermining my authority at every turn. [Costner] was running into [Mercer\u2019s] office all the time, [Mercer] was running into- [Costner\u2019s] office all the time. I had learned that [Costner] had made comments that I could not be trusted, and do not talk with [me], those types of things.\u201d Bloch testified that Mercer\u2019s and Costner\u2019s actions had a negative impact on his operations. Frances Hendricks (\u201cHendricks\u201d), Costner\u2019s assistant, complained to Bloch that \u201cshe was unhappy having to cover up for [Costner]\u201d and that she was \u201cintimidated to go directly to [Mercer].\u201d\nTardif testified that in 1994, Mercer discussed with both Tardif and Morris his desire to remove Bloch from the Charlotte office. They discussed a proposal for a new distribution system at Paul Revere in North Carolina which would eliminate the distinction between the Brokerage and Group divisions. The new distribution system eliminated the need for Bloch\u2019s General Manager position. Tardif testified that Mercer and Costner expressed to him that one of the reasons to implement the new plan was to force Bloch out.\nBloch testified that Mercer developed a new marketing initiative program in 1995. Bloch stated that Mercer did not inform him of the new program, thereby preventing Bloch\u2019s sales representatives from benefitting from the new program. Again in 1995, Mercer introduced a new sales program in the Carolinas. Bloch testified that the program information went directly to Costner and not to Bloch, thereby \u201cpreventfing] all my other reps [other than Costner] from selling that concept.\u201d Bloch testified that the new concepts and initiatives were introduced to his sales team, only after his removal as General Manager.\nIn 1995, Bloch discovered Costner\u2019s handwritten notes in her office, wherein Bloch\u2019s removal from the Charlotte office was contemplated. The notes expressed a need for better leadership, and stated that Bloch had caused \u201clow productivity, continuous staff problems, low morale, lack of vision, growth and unity.\u201d Costner also had written that Bloch had continuously failed to meet goals, and that \u201che is distrusted by sales and staff alike.\u201d Costner\u2019s notes concluded that Mercer should be made head of all operations in Charlotte.\nBloch interpreted the notes as originating from a meeting of which Bloch was not aware and had not attended. Costner testified that the notes were a \u201chomework\u201d assignment, wherein she was asked to design her own ideal office structure as though she had \u201ca magic wand.\u201d Bloch reported the notes to Morris and Lundquist. Bloch informed them that Mercer and Costner were conspiring against him and interfering with his ability to perform his job. Bloch testified that he had never received an unfavorable performance review during his employment at Paul Revere.\nWhile Lundquist investigated the contents of Costner\u2019s memorandum, Costner filed another complaint against Bloch. Costner based the complaint on the manner in which Bloch had handled Hendrick\u2019s complaint of being unhappy working for Costner, and of being intimidated by Mercer. Bloch testified that Costner was upset because \u201c[Costner] felt that she could control the situation, that no one had to be involved in it.\u201d Mercer accused Bloch of lying about the details surrounding Hendricks\u2019 complaint.\nMercer prepared a memorandum to Lundquist and Morris on 20 September 1995. The memorandum contained \u201ca written summary of [Mercer\u2019s] notes with the employees who are involved in a recent situation involving [Bloch] and the Charlotte Brokerage office.\u201d Mercer\u2019s memorandum indicated that he interviewed Tanya Green (\u201cGreen\u201d), a sales assistant in Bloch\u2019s office, on 11 September 1995. Mercer\u2019s memorandum also indicated that Green had told Mercer that Bloch did not provide \u201cbackup or support\u201d for employees. Mercer\u2019s memorandum indicated that Green stated that Costner \u201ccares about the staff and how we feel and our happiness. ...\u201d Green testified that Mercer never conducted any such interview.\nAs a result of the memorandum and Costner\u2019s complaint, Paul Revere investigated Bloch. Morris spent time at the Charlotte office evaluating Bloch in November 1995. Bloch testified that Morris also met with Costner. Bloch told Morris the various problems he had encountered with Mercer and Costner. Morris\u2019 evaluation report did not address Bloch\u2019s concerns. Morris\u2019 report detailed Bloch\u2019s weaknesses, the \u201cbiggest concern\u201d of which was Bloch\u2019s \u201cleadership abilities going forward.\u201d Morris\u2019 report concluded that Bloch\u2019s lack of improvement would be \u201cgrounds for removal from [his] management position.\u201d\nGreen testified that Morris called her on 14 November 1995. Morris\u2019 summary of the interview with Green indicated that Green had expressed that Bloch was not a good manager, that he did not help employees, that he encouraged only certain employees, but not Costner, and that Bloch always took 100% of the credit, without recognizing staff for their work. Green testified that she did not make any such statements to Morris, and that she did not know where Morris had gotten this information.\nIn November 1995, in the same month Morris evaluated Bloch\u2019s performance, Bloch received a letter from Lundquist congratulating Bloch on his outstanding performance:\nYou are to be especially commended for your efforts and that of your associates for exceeding your contest goal during our just concluded centennial sales campaign. I know this in a large part has to do with the leadership you provide through your hard work, dedication, and the fact that you truly care about our company and your associates.\nBloch testified that Morris\u2019 appraisal report did not reference Bloch\u2019s high performance addressed in Lundquist\u2019s letter.\nMorris instructed Bloch to meet with Mercer to discuss ways in which Bloch could improve his performance. Bloch met with Mercer at Morris\u2019 direction, also in November 1995. Bloch told Mercer that he believed that the two could work well together. Bloch testified that Mercer responded that he did not agree, and that he did not think Bloch would ever change. Mercer told Bloch that he \u201cwas fired,\u201d and to expect a package in December explaining Bloch\u2019s future role at Paul Revere. Bloch reported the incident to Morris. Morris directed Bloch to meet again with Mercer.\nAt Morris\u2019 direction, Bloch met with Mercer the following day.\n. Bloch testified that he told Mercer, \u201clet\u2019s get through these [trust factors] and let\u2019s work together for the future.\u201d Mercer responded to Bloch, \u201cI don\u2019t like you, I don\u2019t respect you, I don\u2019t trust you... you\u2019re fired effective December 1, 1995.\u201d Bloch again reported the meeting to Morris, who told Bloch that he was not fired. Nonetheless, in late December 1995, Morris notified Bloch that Paul Revere was terminating his GMA. The contract ended 31 January 1996.\nOn 23 April 1996, Bloch filed this action against Paul Revere, Mercer, and Costner. Bloch alleged: (1) breach of contract; (2) tor-tious interference with contract; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (4) libel and slander. All defendants filed motions to dismiss, or in the alternative, for partial summary judgment on 24 June 1996. On 13 August 1996, the trial court granted partial summary judgment for defendants on Bloch\u2019s claim for breach of contract arising out of the termination of the GMA. The trial court dismissed Bloch\u2019s claim for tortious interference with contract against Paul Revere, as well as Bloch\u2019s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress as to all defendants.\nThe trial court deferred judgment pending discovery on Bloch\u2019s breach of contract claim arising out of alleged breaches prior to termination of the GMA, claims for tortious interference with contract against Mercer and Costner, and Bloch\u2019s claim for libel and slander against all defendants. On 8 May 1997, the trial court allowed defendants to file an Amended Answer with counterclaims against Bloch for breach of the GMA, breach of a fiduciary duty, and breach of a confidentiality agreement.\nOn 18 September 1997, the trial court denied defendants\u2019 renewed motion for summary judgment on Bloch\u2019s remaining claims. Bloch\u2019s claims were tried before a jury during April 1999. All defendants moved for a directed verdict following the close of Bloch\u2019s evidence. The trial court granted the motion as to Bloch\u2019s libel and slander claims, but denied the motion as to all other claims.\nThe jury returned a verdict in favor of Bloch in the amount of $1,079,000.00 for breach of contract. The jury specifically divided the breach of contract award, finding that the amount of damages Bloch suffered prior to the 31 January 1996 termination of the GMA was $15,000.00. The jury also found that Bloch sustained damages of $1,064,000.00 after termination of the GMA.\nThe jury also awarded Bloch $75,000.00 in compensatory damages and $100,000.00 in punitive damages against Mercer for tortious interference with contract. The jury further awarded Bloch $15,000.00 in compensatory damages and $5,000.00 in punitive damages against Costner for tortious interference with contract. The jury found that Bloch had breached the GMA, the confidentiality agreement, and a fiduciary duty. The jury awarded Paul Revere a total of $5,000.00.\nOn 3 May 1999, all defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or new trial. The trial court denied the motions on 4 June 1999. The trial court entered judgment on the jury\u2019s award on 11 June 1999, and additionally ordered that all defendants pay Bloch a total of $19,105.25 in costs, and that Bloch pay Paul Revere $822.00 in costs. Defendants appeal.\nIssues\nPaul Revere appeals the trial court\u2019s denial of its motions for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or new trial, contending that Bloch is an at-will employee, and cannot recover damages beyond the 31 January 1996 termination of the GMA. Mercer and Costner appeal the trial court\u2019s denial of their motions for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or new trial, on grounds that Bloch failed to produce evidence sufficient to sustain claims of tortious interference with contract.\nWe reverse the trial court\u2019s entry of judgment for $1,064,000.00 for Paul Revere\u2019s breach of contract post-termination. We remand for entry of judgment against Paul Revere for $15,000.00, plus costs and interest, consistent with the jury\u2019s finding of damages sustained by Bloch prior to termination of the GMA. We affirm the trial court\u2019s entry of judgment as to Mercer and Costner.\nI. Breach of Contract\nPaul Revere assigns error to the trial court\u2019s denial of its motions for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or new trial, on grounds that Bloch, an at-will employee, cannot recover damages past the 31 January 1996 termination of the GMA. We agree.\nOur standard of review on a motion for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict is whether, \u201cupon examination of all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and that party being given the benefit of every reasonable inference drawn therefrom, the evidence is sufficient to be submitted to the jury.\u201d Fulk v. Piedmont Music Center, 138 N.C. App. 425, 429, 531 S.E.2d 476, 479 (2000) (citing Abels v. Renfro Corp., 335 N.C. 209, 214-15, 436 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1993)).\nHere, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Bloch for $1,079,000.00 for breach of Bloch\u2019s GMA. The jury specifically divided the award, indicating that Bloch was entitled to $15,000.00 for Paul Revere\u2019s breach of the GMA prior to its 31 January 1996 termination. The jury awarded $1,064,000.00, equal to 15 years of Bloch\u2019s lost earnings, following his termination. Paul Revere does not assign error to the trial court\u2019s entry of judgment in favor of Bloch for $15,000.00 prior to termination of the GMA.\nIt is a well-established principle of contract law that:\n\u2018A party to a contract who is injured by another\u2019s breach of the contract is entitled to recover from the latter damages for all injuries and only such injuries as are the direct, natural, and proximate result of the breach or which, in the ordinary course of events, would likely result from a breach and can reasonably be said to have been foreseen, contemplated, or expected by the parties at the time when they made the contract as a probable or natural result of a breach.\u2019\nLamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. 10, 14, 55 S.E.2d 810, 812-13 (1949) (quoting 15 A.J. 449, \u00a7 51; 25 C.J.S. Damages, \u00a7 24, page 481). \u201cThe interest being protected by this general rule is the non-breaching party\u2019s \u2018expectation interest.\u2019 \u201d First Union Nat\u2019l Bank of North Carolina v. Naylor, 102 N.C. App. 719, 725, 404 S.E.2d 161, 164 (1991) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 344(a) comment a (1979)).\nOur Supreme Court has specifically held that the measure of damages recoverable for breach of an employment contract is \u201cthe actual loss or damage sustained on account of the breach. The maximum amount recoverable would be the difference, if any, between the agreed compensation and the amount plaintiff earned or by reasonable effort could earn during the contract period.\u201d Thomas v. Catawba College, 248 N.C. 609, 615, 104 S.E.2d 175, 179 (1958) (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied); see also, Lowery v. Love, 93 N.C. App. 568, 571, 378 S.E.2d 815, 817 (1989).\nIt is also well-settled \u201cthat \u2018in the absence of an employment contract, for a definite period, both employer and employee are generally free to terminate their association at any time and without any reason.\u2019 \u201d McMurry v. Cochrane Furniture Co., 109 N.C. App. 52, 54, 425 S.E.2d 735, 737 (1993) (quoting Salt v. Applied Analytical, Inc., 104 N.C. App. 652, 655, 412 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1991), disc. review denied, 331 N.C. 119, 415 S.E.2d 200 (1992)).\nWe apply these basic contract principles here. Bloch maintained that Paul Revere\u2019s breach of its obligations under the GMA interfered with Bloch\u2019s ability to perform the GMA. As a result, Bloch sustained an actual loss of the GMA. Bloch\u2019s damages for Paul Revere\u2019s breach of the GMA are coequal with his entitlement under the GMA. Bloch was entitled to recover the damages he sustained only while the GMA was effective. The jury determined this amount to be $15,000.00. Bloch, a contractual employee for an indefinite term, was not contractually or legally entitled to continued employment with Paul Revere under the GMA beyond 30 days. Paul Revere or Bloch could terminate the GMA for any reason with 30 days notice. Thus, Bloch is not entitled to recover damages beyond the lawful termination of the GMA. See Bennett v. Eastern Rebuilders, Inc., 52 N.C. App. 579, 583, 279 S.E.2d 46, 49 (1981) (contract damages for at-will employee are coextensive with entitlement).\nThe jury\u2019s award of $1,064,000.00, equal to 15 years of lost earnings following termination of the GMA, is contrary to basic contract principles. Bloch had no contractual right or reasonable expectation to 15 years of continued employment under the GMA. The trial court erred in failing to grant Paul Revere\u2019s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on breach of contract post-termination of the GMA.\nII. Tortious Interference with Contract\nMercer and Costner assign error to the trial court\u2019s denial of their motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or new trial, on grounds that Bloch did not present evidence sufficient to sustain claims of tortious interference with contract against them. We disagree.\nThe elements of tortious interference with contract are:\n(1) a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third person which confers upon the plaintiff a contractual right against a third person; (2) defendant knows of the contract; (3) the defendant intentionally induces the third person not to perform the contract; (4) and in doing so acts without justification; (5) resulting in actual damage to the plaintiff.\nEmbree Construction Group, Inc. v. Rafcor, Inc., 330 N.C. 487, 498, 411 S.E.2d 916, 924 (1992) (citing United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 661, 370 S.E.2d 375, 387 (1988)). A plaintiff may maintain a claim for tortious interference with contract even if the employment contract is terminable at will. Lenzer v. Flaherty, 106 N.C. App. 496, 512, 418 S.E.2d 276, 286, disc. review denied, 332 N.C. 345, 421 S.E.2d 348 (1992) (citing Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 85, 221 S.E.2d 282, 290 (1976)).\nA party who induces one party \u201c \u2018to terminate or fail to renew a contract with another may be held liable for malicious interference \u25a0with the party\u2019s contractual rights if the third party acts without justification.\u2019 \u201d Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A. v. Smith, 129 N.C. App. 305, 317, 498 S.E.2d 841, 850, disc. review denied, 348 N.C. 695, 511 S.E.2d 649 (1998) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Wolf, 40 N.C. App. 197, 199, 252 S.E.2d 523, 524 (1979)). Bad motive is the essence of a claim for tortious interference with contract. Id. at 318, 498 S.E.2d at 851 (citation omitted).\nWhether a defendant is justified in interfering with a plaintiff\u2019s contract depends upon \u201c \u2018the circumstances surrounding the interference, the actor\u2019s motive or conduct, the interests sought to be advanced, the social interest in protecting the freedom of action of the act or [,] and the contractual interests of the other party.\u2019 \u201d Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A. at 317-18, 498 S.E.2d at 850 (quoting Peoples Security Life Ins. Co. v. Hooks, 322 N.C. 216, 221, 367 S.E.2d 647, 650, reh\u2019g denied, 322 N.C. 486, 370 S.E.2d 227 (1988)). A defendant may be justified in interfering with a contract if he does so \u201c \u2018for a reason reasonably related to a legitimate business interest.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 318, 498 S.E.2d at 850 (quoting Fitzgerald, 40 N.C. App. at 200, 252 S.E.2d at 524); see also, Barnard v. Rowland, 132 N.C. App. 416, 426, 512 S.E.2d 458, 465-66 (1999).\nAs a general rule, \u201c \u2018non-outsiders\u2019 [to the contract] often enjoy qualified immunity from liability for inducing their corporation or other entity to breach its contract with an employee.\u201d Lenzer at 513, 418 S.E.2d at 286 (citing Smith at 85, 221 S.E.2d at 290). However, \u201c[t]he qualified privilege of a non-outsider is lost if exercised for motives other than reasonable, good faith attempts to protect the non-outsider\u2019s interests in the contract interfered with.\u201d Id. (quoting Smith at 91, 221 S.E.2d at 294).\nIn order to hold a \u201cnon-outsider\u201d liable for tortious interference with contract, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted with legal malice, that \u201c \u2018he does a wrongful act or exceeds his legal right or authority in order to prevent the continuation of the contract between the parties.\u2019 \u201d Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., at 318, 498 S.E.2d at 851 (quoting Varner v. Bryan, 113 N.C. App. 697, 702, 440 S.E.2d 295, 298 (1994)). \u201cThe plaintiff\u2019s evidence must show that the defendant acted without any legal justification for his action.\u201d Varner at 702, 440 S.E.2d at 298 (citation omitted).\nMercer and Costner argue that, as employees of Paul Revere, they were \u201cnon-outsiders\u201d to Bloch\u2019s GMA, and are insulated from liability. They also argue that Bloch did not present sufficient evidence to establish that they acted outside the scope of their employment and without a legitimate business interest, consequently establishing that they acted without legal justification.\nIn Lenzer, supra, we held that the plaintiff forecast sufficient evidence to overcome the defendants\u2019 \u201cnon-outsider\u201d privilege. Lenzer, 106 N.C. App. at 512-13, 418 S.E.2d at 286. The defendants argued that they were immune from liability because \u201ctheir supervisory status dictates they were not outsiders to plaintiff\u2019s employment contract.\u201d Id. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants, her supervisors, purposefully withdrew their supervision from her \u201cfor the purpose of causing her to lose the certification required for plaintiff to maintain her position with the State.\u201d Id. at 512, 418 S.E.2d at 286. She alleged \u201cthat defendants were motivated by unlawful reasons rather than legitimate business interests; and that withdrawal of supervision in fact caused the intended effect of plaintiff losing her employment, resulting in damage to plaintiff.\u201d Id.\nWe stated that even if the defendants \u201cwere deemed to have the status of non-outsiders, such status \u2018is pertinent only to the question [of the] justification for [defendants\u2019] action.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 513, 418 S.E.2d at 286 (quoting Smith, 289 N.C. at 88, 221 S.E.2d at 292). In reversing summary judgment for the defendants, we noted that the plaintiff\u2019s \u201cforecast of evidence raises precisely the issue of wrongful purpose, which would defeat a non-outsider\u2019s qualified privilege to interfere.\u201d Id.\nThis Court recently reiterated the principles set forth in Lenzer. See Barker v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 136 N.C. App. 455, 524 S.E.2d 821 (2000). We again held that \u201cnon-outsider\u201d status does not insulate a defendant from liability where the defendant acts without a reasonable, good-faith motive. Id. at 463, 524 S.E.2d at 826.\nThe plaintiff in Barker alleged that her former managers, the defendants, \u201cout of personal hostility and ill-will toward the Plaintiff, schemed to come up with false and defamatory accusations against the Plaintiff with the intent to bring about the termination of her employment.\u201d Id. at 463, 524 S.E.2d at 826-27. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendants had a \u201chit list\u201d of employees they wanted \u201cto get rid of,\u201d and that her name was on the list. Id. at 463, 524 S.E.2d at 827. The plaintiff contended that when she confronted one of the defendants about the \u201chit list,\u201d he admitted his desire to terminate her employment. Id. We reversed the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment for the defendants, and held that the plaintiff\u2019s forecast of evidence was sufficient to raise an issue of whether the defendants\u2019 motives \u201cwere reasonable, good faith attempts to protect their interests or the corporation\u2019s interests.\u201d Id.\nIn the present case, Tardif testified that Mercer and Costner constantly discussed their desire to have Bloch terminated. Tardif also testified that Mercer was receiving improper and illegal commissions through a Paul Revere shell entity known as Tax Advantage Planning Company (\u201cTAPCO\u201d), which consisted only of a bank account. Tardif testified that, aside from Mercer\u2019s desire to be in control of all North Carolina operations, Mercer wanted Bloch terminated, in part, due to \u201cthe fact that [Bloch] was aware of TAPCO.\u201d One month prior to his termination, Bloch made known to Paul Revere that he had a \u201cfile of evidence\u201d against Mercer.\nTardif testified that Costner, who reported to Bloch, provided Mercer with the details of Bloch\u2019s operations. Bloch also testified that Mercer and Costner shared information pertinent to Bloch\u2019s office operations without Bloch\u2019s knowledge. The evidence established that Mercer channeled information intended for Bloch, the General Manager, directly to Costner, without Bloch\u2019s knowledge on several occasions. This information, including the operating manuals for two large Paul Revere accounts, was pertinent to Bloch\u2019s ability to successfully operate his office.\nThe evidence further established that Costner channeled information intended for Bloch, the General Manager, directly to Mercer, without Bloch\u2019s knowledge. This information, including increases in broker commissions, was pertinent to Bloch\u2019s success as General Manager. Bloch also forecast evidence that Mercer purposefully failed to disclose new sales initiatives and programs to Bloch and his sales representatives, other than Costner. The evidence established that such information was pertinent to the success of Bloch\u2019s office in relation to other Paul Revere offices. This and other testimony tended to show that Mercer\u2019s and Costner\u2019s actions to undermine Bloch as General Manager negatively impacted Bloch\u2019s performance and the operations in his area of responsibility.\nEvidence also established that Mercer and Costner told Paul Revere senior management, as well as Paul Revere employees working in Bloch\u2019s office, that Bloch was a poor manager, that he could not be trusted, and that employees should not confide in or speak with Bloch. Hendricks, Costner\u2019s assistant, testified that she was unhappy having to \u201ccover up\u201d for Costner, and that she was intimidated by Mercer. Green testified that she never met with Mercer in September 1995, despite Mercer\u2019s memorandum to Lundquist and Morris indicating that he had interviewed Green, and that she had complained about Bloch\u2019s management skills. Green also testified that she never made the negative statements about Bloch that appeared in Morris\u2019 November 1995 notes from an interview with Green.\nThe evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to Bloch, giving him the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. See Fulk, 138 N.C. App. at 429, 531 S.E.2d at 479. We hold that Bloch presented sufficient evidence to show that Mercer and Costner were not motivated by \u201creasonable, good faith attempts to protect their interests or the corporation\u2019s interests,\u201d and that they exceeded their legal right or authority in order to prevent the continuation of the contract between Bloch and Paul Revere. See Barker at 463, 524 S.E.2d at 827; Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., at 318, 498 S.E.2d at 851.\nWe distinguish Varner, supra, on which Mercer and Costner rely. The plaintiff in Varner was the former town manager of Knightdale, North Carolina. Varner, 113 N.C. App. at 698, 440 S.E.2d at 296. The plaintiff brought suit for tortious interference with contract against three town council members who sought his resignation:\nPlaintiffs evidence tended to show that defendants\u2019 dissatisfaction with his performance was personal in nature, having to do with plaintiffs opinion that defendants Bullock and Bryan were violating certain town ordinances in connection with their businesses, or was politically motivated; defendants\u2019 evidence tended to show that they considered plaintiff\u2019s job performance to be inadequate. . . . [Defendants informed plaintiff that they considered plaintiff\u2019s job performance to be inadequate and requested his resignation.\nId. at 699, 440 S.E.2d at 297.\nIn upholding the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment for the defendants, we held that the plaintiff failed to present evidence establishing that the defendants, as non-outsiders, acted with legal malice. Id. at 702, 440 S.E.2d at 299. We noted that the plaintiff, as town manager, served at the pleasure of the town council, and that the defendants, as town council members, had authority to discharge the plaintiff. Id. We stated that, \u201c[e]ven if plaintiff was terminated by defendants for personal or political reasons, as his evidence tends to show, such termination was neither a wrongful act nor one in excess of defendants\u2019 authority and therefore not legally malicious.\u201d Id.\nIn this case, as compared to Varner, Bloch forecast evidence beyond Mercer\u2019s and Costner\u2019s personal or political motivation. The plaintiff\u2019s evidence in Varner did not establish that the defendants actively undermined the plaintiff\u2019s authority in a manner that interfered with the plaintiff\u2019s abilities as town manager. Nor did the evidence in Varner reveal that the defendants actively spread false and defamatory information about the plaintiff in an effort to turn other council members against him. The evidence merely showed that the defendants sought to terminate the plaintiff for personal reasons.\nThe present case is more analogous to Lenzer and Barker, where the evidence tended to show that the non-outsider defendants actively schemed against the plaintiff, falsely accused the plaintiff, or purposely failed to supervise and work with the plaintiff in an effort to bring about termination.\nWe hold that Bloch presented sufficient evidence that Mercer and Costner interfered with his employment contract without legal justification to do so. The jury was entitled to consider these issues and render its verdict thereon. The trial court did not err in denying Mercer\u2019s and Costner\u2019s motions.\nWe hereby reverse the trial court\u2019s denial of Paul Revere\u2019s motion for judgment notwithstanding the jury\u2019s verdict of $1,079,000.00 for breach of the GMA. We remand for entry of judgment against Paul Revere in the amount of $15,000.00, with costs and interest awarded, consistent with the jury\u2019s finding of damages sustained by Bloch prior to the 31 January 1996 termination of the GMA. We affirm the trial court\u2019s entry of judgment for compensatory and punitive damages and costs against Mercer and Costner.\nAffirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.\nJudges MARTIN and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wilson & Bos, by Gerard A. Bos, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., by Charles E. Johnson; Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, LLP, by Eric T. Levine and Patrick W. Shea, for defendants-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KENNETH A. BLOCH, Plaintiff-Appellee v. THE PAUL REVERE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, THE PAUL REVERE VARIABLE ANNUITY INSURANCE COMPANY, THE PAUL REVERE PROTECTIVE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, KYLE S. MERCER and BRIDGET COSTNER, Defendants-Appellants\nNo. COA00-97\n(Filed 1 May 2001)\n1. Employer and Employee\u2014 termination of at-will employee \u2014 damages\nThe trial court erred by denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict by defendants-Paul Revere in an action arising from the termination of an at-will employee on the ground that the employee could not recover damages past his termination date. Although the jury returned damages for 15 years of lost earnings, either plaintiff or defendant could terminate the employment contract for any reason with thirty days\u2019 notice and plaintiff had no contractual right or reasonable expectation of 15 years continued employment.\n2. Wrongful Interference\u2014 tortious interference with employment contract \u2014 co-employees\u2014sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err by denying motions for a directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a new trial by defendants Mercer and Costner on a tortious interference with contract claim where there was sufficient evidence to show that these two defendants, co-employees with plaintiff, were not motivated in their actions by reasonable good faith attempts to protect their interests or the corporation\u2019s interests, and that they exceeded their legal right or authority in order to prevent the continuation of the contract between plaintiff and defendants-Paul Revere.\nAppeal by defendants from judgment entered 11 June 1999 by Judge W. Robert Bell in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 February 2001.\nWilson & Bos, by Gerard A. Bos, for plaintiff-appellee.\nRobinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., by Charles E. Johnson; Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, LLP, by Eric T. Levine and Patrick W. Shea, for defendants-appellants." }, "file_name": "0228-01", "first_page_order": 258, "last_page_order": 274 }