{ "id": 11434438, "name": "LELA CHRISTINE SHEEHY SHERLOCK, Plaintiff v. ROGER THOMAS SHERLOCK, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Sherlock v. Sherlock", "decision_date": "2001-05-01", "docket_number": "No. COA00-356", "first_page": "300", "last_page": "307", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "143 N.C. App. 300" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 663", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4724089 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 S.E.2d 766", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no evidence in record that defendant had conducted activities in this state or otherwise invoked the protection of North Carolina's laws" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 N.C. App. 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524153 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no evidence in record that defendant had conducted activities in this state or otherwise invoked the protection of North Carolina's laws" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/98/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 S.E.2d 435", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant's only contact with North Carolina consisted of two brief visits" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.C. App. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524685 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant's only contact with North Carolina consisted of two brief visits" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/117/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 U.S. 235", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6162253 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" }, { "page": "1298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/357/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 S.E.2d 816", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 N.C. App. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527927 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/107/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 U.S. 462", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6205101 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "542", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/471/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4734507 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "712 F.Supp. 1223", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7398852 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1226", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/712/1223-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "when plaintiff is resident of forum state, the fairness to plaintiff in permitting suit in her home state is a factor in determination of fairness to defendant of being required to defend the suit in that state" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 674", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558922 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "when plaintiff is resident of forum state, the fairness to plaintiff in permitting suit in her home state is a factor in determination of fairness to defendant of being required to defend the suit in that state" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0674-01" ] }, { "cite": "479 S.E.2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "794", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 N.C. App. 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11866240 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/125/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 U.S. 310", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6157001 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315" }, { "page": "102", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "319" }, { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/326/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2498691, 2499210, 2496875, 2499020, 2499320 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0286-01", "/nc/331/0286-03", "/nc/331/0286-04", "/nc/331/0286-05", "/nc/331/0286-02" ] }, { "cite": "409 S.E.2d 725", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stressing importance of the same factors" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521893 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stressing importance of the same factors" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "521 S.E.2d 735", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11242087 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 S.E.2d 132", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "parties did not share matrimonial domicile in North Carolina, and no indication that defendant had conducted business or other activities here, or had invoked the protection of the State's laws" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523510 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "parties did not share matrimonial domicile in North Carolina, and no indication that defendant had conducted business or other activities here, or had invoked the protection of the State's laws" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 S.E.2d 75", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527912 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 S.E.2d 317", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11238795 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 S.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "679", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 700", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569715 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0700-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2527047, 2526538, 2528399, 2527859, 2527927 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0176-03", "/nc/335/0176-04", "/nc/335/0176-05", "/nc/335/0176-02", "/nc/335/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 830", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526593 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0830-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 S.E.2d 733", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "737", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9442864 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 S.E.2d 854", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12134645 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568484 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0324-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 865, "char_count": 17724, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1911287785860168e-07, "percentile": 0.5914346743767687 }, "sha256": "2a755a2ba4143cfdab58d87294917e11b735d28b4652d97c8d1d7f6e74dfff32", "simhash": "1:8b0a4ceeb04baa5a", "word_count": 2800 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:26:47.079244+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WALKER and SMITH concur." ], "parties": [ "LELA CHRISTINE SHEEHY SHERLOCK, Plaintiff v. ROGER THOMAS SHERLOCK, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BIGGS, Judge.\nRoger Sherlock (defendant) appeals from an order denying his motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s action pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. R 12(b)(2), based on lack of personal jurisdiction. We find that the trial court properly concluded that grounds exist to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling.\nLela and Roger Sherlock were married in Durham, North Carolina, on 27 December 1983. They separated in June 1999, and on 6 July 1999, Lela Sherlock (plaintiff) instituted the present action, seeking post-separation support, equitable distribution, attorneys\u2019 fees, alimony, and a restraining order barring the defendant from disposing of marital assets. The defendant was properly served with the summons and complaint in Bangkok, Thailand, on 26 July 1999. On 23 August 1999, defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint under Rule 12(b)(2), asserting the absence of personal jurisdiction. His motion was heard on 9 December 1999. The trial court ruled that grounds for jurisdiction were found under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-75.4(12) (1999), and that the defendant\u2019s due process rights were not offended by his being required to defend the suit in North Carolina. The trial corut denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, and from this ruling defendant appeals.\nThe denial of a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, though interlocutory, is immediately appealable. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-277(b) (1999); Teachy v. Goble Dairies, Inc., 306 N.C. 324, 293 S.E.2d 182 (1982); Cooper v. Shealy, 140 N.C. App. 729, 537 S.E.2d 854 (2000). The burden is upon the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that personal jurisdiction exists. Filmar Racing, Inc. v. Stewart, 141 N.C. App. 668, 541 S.E.2d 733 (2 January 2001); Murphy v. Glafenhein, 110 N.C. App. 830, 431 S.E.2d 241, disc. review denied, 335 N.C. 176, 436 S.E.2d 382 (1993). The court\u2019s determination that grounds exist for personal jurisdiction is a question of fact. Chadbourn, Inc. v. Katz, 285 N.C. 700, 208 S.E.2d 676 (1974); Hiwassee Stables, Inc. v. Cunningham, 135 N.C. App. 24, 519 S.E.2d 317 (1999). Upon review by this Court, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact should be upheld if supported by competent evidence. Hiwassee, 135 N.C. App. at 24, 519 S.E.2d 317.\nWhen a defendant challenges the court\u2019s exercise of personal jurisdiction, the court must undertake a two part inquiry. Buck v. Heavner, 93 N.C. App. 142, 377 S.E.2d 75 (1989). The court first determines whether North Carolina law provides a statutory basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction. Filmar Racing, Inc. v. Stewart, 141 N.C. App. 668, 541 S.E.2d 733 (2001); Cooper v. Shealy, 140 N.C. App. 729, 537 S.E.2d 854 (2000); Schofield v. Schofield, 78 N.C. App. 657, 338 S.E.2d 132 (1986). If the court concludes that there is a statutory basis for jurisdiction, it next must consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction complies with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bates v. Jarrett, 135 N.C. App. 594, 521 S.E.2d 735 (1999); Powers v. Parisher, 104 N.C. App. 400, 409 S.E.2d 725 (1991), disc. review denied, 331 N.C. 286, 417 S.E.2d 254 (1992).\nIn the present case, the trial court found statutory grounds for jurisdiction under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-75.4 (1999). This statute confers jurisdiction over a wide range of cases, including:\nany action under Chapter 50 that arises out of the marital relationship within this State, notwithstanding subsequent departure from the State, if the other party to the marital relationship continues to reside in this state.\nG.S. \u00a7 1-75.4(12). We agree with the trial court\u2019s conclusion that jurisdiction is proper under this statutory provision. The parties were married in North Carolina. Plaintiff \u201ccontinues to reside\u201d in North Carolina. The action arises under Chapter 50, \u201cDivorce and Alimony,\u201d and seeks resolution solely of issues pertaining to the dissolution of their marriage. Under these circumstances, plaintiffs action is authorized under G.S. \u00a7 1-75.4(12). The defendant argues that this action does not \u201carise out of the marital relationship within this state\u201d because, e.g., the couple never established a permanent home in North Carolina, and the defendant has never owned property within the state. However, these factors do not necessarily render jurisdiction improper. Instead, they are relevant to our evaluation of defendant\u2019s connections with this state in regard to the due process implications of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him.\nThe requirements for in personam jurisdiction were articulated by the United States Supreme Court in International Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945), in which the Court held:\n[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend \u2018traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\u2019\nId. at 315, 90 L. Ed. at 102 (citations omitted). International Shoe remains the leading authority in this area, and decisions of this Court have adhered to its principles. The plaintiff in this case sought to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 1-75.4, often called the \u201clong arm statute\u201d in reference to its power to compel defense of a suit even by those located at a great distance, provided that the defendant has the requisite \u201cminimum contacts\u201d with North Carolina. This Court has noted that:\nUnder our \u2018long arm\u2019 statute, North Carolina courts may obtain personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.\nSaxon v. Smith, 125 N.C. App. 163, 173, 479 S.E.2d 788, 794 (1997) (citations omitted). See also Dillon v. Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 231 S.E.2d 629 (1977). Therefore, when personal jurisdiction is alleged to exist pursuant to the long-arm statute, \u201cthe question of statutory authority collapses into the question of whether [the defendant] has the minimum contacts with North Carolina necessary to meet the requirements of due process.\u201d Hanes Companies, Inc. v. Ronson, 712 F.Supp. 1223, 1226 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (citations omitted); Murphy v. Glafenhein, 110 N.C. App. 830, 431 S.E.2d 241, disc. review denied, 335 N.C. 176, 436 S.E.2d 382 (1993).\nThus, the issue before this Court is whether Roger Sherlock has had \u201cminimum contacts\u201d with this State so as to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him without offense to his due process rights. The resolution of this question \u201cwill vary with the quality and nature of the defendant\u2019s activity, but it is essential. . . that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails [himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.\u201d Chadbourn, Inc. v. Katz, 285 N.C. 700, 705, 208 S.E.2d 676, 679 (1974) (citations omitted). Further, the relationship between defendant and North Carolina must be such that the defendant \u201cshould reasonably anticipate being haled into court\u201d in this state. Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Industries Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 365, 348 S.E.2d 782, 786 (1986) (citations omitted). As expressed by the United States Supreme Court:\n[the] purposeful availment requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of \u2018random,\u2019 \u2018fortuitous,\u2019 or \u2018attenuated\u2019 contacts,... or of the \u2018unilateral activity\u2019 of another party or a third person. . . . Jurisdiction is proper, however, where the contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant himselj\\.]\nBurger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 542 (1985) (citations omitted). This Court recently has summarized the aspects of a defendant\u2019s situation that have proven useful in an analysis of \u201cminimum contacts\u201d with a jurisdiction:\nOur courts have developed a list of factors helpful to determining the existence of minimum contacts. Such factors include, (1) the quantity of the contacts, (2) nature and quality of the contacts, (3) the source and connection of the cause of action to the contacts, (4) the interest of the forum state, and (5) convenience of the parties. . . . The Court must also weigh and consider the interests of and fairness to the parties involved in the litigation.\nFilmar Racing Inc. v. Stewart, 141 N.C. App. 668, 672, 541 S.E.2d 733, 737 (2001) (citations omitted). See also Tutterrow v. Leach, 107 N.C. App. 703, 421 S.E.2d 816 (1992); Powers v. Parisher, 104 N.C. App. 400, 409 S.E.2d 725 (1991) (stressing importance of the same factors).\nPlaintiff and defendant were married in 1983, and lived together until 1999. They were married in Durham, but did not reside there. The couple never purchased a home or established a permanent residence in this country. In fact, a six month stay in Georgia was the only time during their marriage that they lived in the United States. Nor did they establish a permanent home in any other country. Rather, defendant\u2019s employment at all times dictated their place of residence. Roger Sherlock was employed during the marriage by Lucent Technologies and by ATT. These corporations shuttled defendant to various international locales, as need arose. Between 1983 and 1999, the Sherlocks resided in Egypt, Korea, the Philippines, India, Indonesia, Australia, and Thailand. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that either of the Sherlocks intended to become naturalized citizens or permanent residents of any of these countries.\nAfter the Sherlocks married, they managed their concerns using both professional relationships and family connections in Durham. Despite their continuous travel, they administered their important legal, civic, personal, and financial affairs primarily from one location \u2014 Durham, North Carolina. The plaintiff\u2019s parents and her other relatives live in Durham. North Carolina clearly served as the couple\u2019s headquarters in the United States. The trial court in their order found that the defendant either initiated or participated in an array of actions in North Carolina, including the following: (1) their marriage ceremony was performed in Durham, North Carolina. Consequently, their marriage license was filed there, and the provisions of Chapter 52, \u201cPowers and Liabilities of Married Persons,\u201d governed various legal aspects of their relationship during the marriage; (2) while he was overseas, the defendant used his father-in-law\u2019s Durham address to receive important mail, including federal income tax documents; (3) between 1983 and 1989 the defendant\u2019s salary was directly deposited into a Wachovia bank account in Durham, North Carolina; (4) between 1984 and 1995 the defendant had a North Carolina drivers\u2019 license. To obtain a license, the defendant must have had at least a nominal \u201cresidence\u201d in North Carolina; (5) in 1984, the defendant executed a Power of Attorney in Durham, and made Albert Sheehy, his father-in-law, his Attorney in Fact. This document was filed in the Durham County Registry; (6) in his capacity as Attorney in Fact, Mr. Sheehy conducted business on behalf of plaintiff and defendant while they were overseas; (7) in 1984, the defendant made a Last Will and Testament, naming Mr. Sheehy, of Durham, the executor of his will, and Mary Meschter, also of Durham, as alternate executor; (8) from 1992 to 1995 the defendant retained Frank Brown, a Durham accountant, to receive and pay bills on his behalf; and (9) in 1992, plaintiff and defendant opened an investment account with Edward D. Jones, Oxford, North Carolina, consisting of IRA accounts, money market funds, and mutual funds.\nThese findings are supported by competent evidence in the record, and thus should be upheld. We find that the record sufficiently establishes that the defendant \u201cavailed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within [North Carolina], thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.\u201d Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283, 1298 (1958). We find that the defendant intentionally developed an assortment of financial, legal, and personal connections within North Carolina. These endeavors were sustained over a period of years, and appear intended to inure to his benefit. Defendant\u2019s purposeful conduct in this regard clearly separates this case from those in which personal jurisdiction is improper. See, e.g., Shamley v. Shamley, 117 N.C. App. 175, 455 S.E.2d 435 (1994) (defendant\u2019s only contact with North Carolina consisted of two brief visits); Tompkins v. Tompkins, 98 N.C. App. 299, 390 S.E.2d 766 (1990) (no evidence in record that defendant had conducted activities in this state or otherwise invoked the protection of North Carolina\u2019s laws); Schofield v. Schofield, 78 N.C. App. 657, 338 S.E.2d 132 (1986) (parties did not share matrimonial domicile in North Carolina, and no indication that defendant had conducted business or other activities here, or had invoked the protection of the State\u2019s laws).\nDefendant contends that the fact that the plaintiff lives in Durham is irrelevant to our determination regarding personal jurisdiction. Defendant also stresses that he has never lived in North Carolina or purchased real estate here, and attempts to characterize plaintiffs move to North Carolina as the kind of \u201cunilateral act\u201d that precludes the exercise of jurisdiction. We disagree. While the plaintiffs residence is a legitimate factor for our consideration, it is not dispositive. See Dillon v. Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 231 S.E.2d 629 (1977) (when plaintiff is resident of forum state, the fairness to plaintiff in permitting suit in her home state is a factor in determination of fairness to defendant of being required to defend the suit in that state). Moreover, the defendant\u2019s own actions sufficiently demonstrate his connections with this state, regardless of plaintiff\u2019s residence.\nThis Court recognizes that a state does not attain personal jurisdiction over a defendant \u201csimply by being the \u2018center of gravity\u2019 of the controversy or the most convenient location for the trial of the action.\u201d Miller v. Kite, 313 N.C. 474, 477, 329 S.E.2d 663, 665 (1985) (citations omitted). In the ordinary divorce case, it might be improper to assert jurisdiction over a defendant who has spent so little time in the forum state. However, the Sherlocks\u2019 history is unusual; their frequent moves from one foreign country to another, and their failure to establish a permanent home anywhere in the United States or abroad, require this Court to evaluate their situation on its own merits. We note that:\n[T]he criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those activities which justify the subjection of [defendant] to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative.\nInternational Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319, 90 L. Ed. 95, 103 (1945). This Court, upon review of the facts and circumstances of this case, determines that Durham, North Carolina has served as the home of defendant\u2019s legal and financial interests throughout his marriage, even though he was seldom physically present within the state. We find also that North Carolina has an interest in the resolution of the plaintiff\u2019s action, and that fairness to the parties supports the plaintiff\u2019s assertion of personal jurisdiction. The quantity and quality of defendant\u2019s contacts with North Carolina far exceed the \u201cminimum contacts\u201d required for jurisdiction, and thus his right to due process is not offended by this action.\nFor the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nAffirmed.\nJudges WALKER and SMITH concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BIGGS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "William J. Cotter, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Moore & Van Allen, PLLC, by Edward L. Embree, III, and Laura Keohane, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LELA CHRISTINE SHEEHY SHERLOCK, Plaintiff v. ROGER THOMAS SHERLOCK, Defendant\nNo. COA00-356\n(Filed 1 May 2001)\nJurisdiction\u2014 personal \u2014 long-arm statute \u2014 minimum contacts\nThe trial court did not err in an action for post-separation support, equitable distribution, attorney fees, alimony, and a restraining order barring defendant from disposing of marital assets, by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss based on an alleged lack of personal jurisdiction even though defendant was served with the summons and complaint in Thailand, the parties frequently moved from one foreign country to another, and the parties failed to establish a home anywhere in the United States or abroad, because: (1) the long arm statute, of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-75.4(12), confers jurisdiction on any action under Chapter 50 that arises out of a marital relationship within North Carolina, notwithstanding subsequent departure from the state, if the other party to the marital relationship continues to reside in this state; (2) the parties were married in North Carolina, plaintiff continues to reside in North Carolina, and this action arises under Chapter 50; (3) defendant has had minimum contacts with this state so as to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him without offense to his due process rights since Durham, North Carolina served as the home of defendant\u2019s legal and financial interests throughout his marriage even though he was seldom physically present within the state; and (4) plaintiff\u2019s residence in North Carolina is a legitimate factor for consideration although it is not dispositive.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 30 December 1999 by Judge Ann E. McKown in Durham County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 February 2001.\nWilliam J. Cotter, for plaintiff-appellee.\nMoore & Van Allen, PLLC, by Edward L. Embree, III, and Laura Keohane, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0300-01", "first_page_order": 330, "last_page_order": 337 }