{ "id": 11435233, "name": "GENOAL BLALOCK, Petitioner v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF FACILITY SERVICES, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "Blalock v. North Carolina Department of Health & Human Services", "decision_date": "2001-05-15", "docket_number": "No. COA99-1559", "first_page": "470", "last_page": "477", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "143 N.C. App. 470" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "513 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 704", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11239996 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0704-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526479 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 U.S. 545", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1524686 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" }, { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/380/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 S.E.2d 421", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5313344 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 383", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12137315 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 542", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527848 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 S.E.2d 712", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714", "parenthetical": "quoting Comr. of Insurance, 300 N.C. 381, 420, 269 S.E.2d 547, 573" }, { "page": "714" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527622 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740", "parenthetical": "quoting Comr. of Insurance, 300 N.C. 381, 420, 269 S.E.2d 547, 573" }, { "page": "740" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0737-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 547", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" }, { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562647 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" }, { "page": "420" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 S.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569880 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "888" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567415 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176", "parenthetical": "quoting Comr. of Insurance v. Rating Bureau, 292 N.C. 70, 80, 231 S.E.2d 882, 888 (1977)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568091 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238", "parenthetical": "quoting Comr. of Insurance v. Rating Bureau, 292 N.C. 70, 80, 231 S.E.2d 882, 888 (1977)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53839 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" }, { "page": "365" }, { "page": "364" }, { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520617 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" }, { "page": "168" }, { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0161-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 749, "char_count": 19669, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5263486188356464e-07, "percentile": 0.8120587339261864 }, "sha256": "959f8c639e7b9dae62d4ec5f9f6dcfd53fbcb8cf0ab6604ce0f3eca29d0319a8", "simhash": "1:126be32e548f35d3", "word_count": 3039 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:26:47.079244+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge CAMPBELL concur." ], "parties": [ "GENOAL BLALOCK, Petitioner v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF FACILITY SERVICES, Respondent" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Judge.\nGenoal Blalock (\u201cpetitioner\u201d) appeals from the trial court\u2019s order affirming the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Facility Services\u2019 (\u201cthe agency\u201d) decision to substantiate findings of abuse, neglect, and misappropriation of resident property on the part of petitioner. On appeal, petitioner contends that (1) the trial court erred in affirming the agency\u2019s final decision because it was not supported by substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious, and (2) the agency\u2019s decision was affected by errors of law. As to both contentions, we disagree. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.\nPetitioner worked as a certified nurse assistant (\u201cCNA\u201d) at Autumn Care Nursing Home (\u201cthe facility\u201d) in Salisbury, North Carolina from July 1991 until September 1996. In late August 1996, the facility received a report from another CNA that petitioner had physically and verbally abused a resident during July 1996. Based on this report, the facility reported the allegation of abuse to the agency and then began an internal investigation. From its internal investigation, the facility concluded that petitioner had physically and verbally abused the resident as had been alleged. Consequently, the facility\u2019s Assistant Director of Nursing terminated petitioner\u2019s employment on 5 September 1996. Petitioner did not appeal her termination.\nBy letter dated 28 October 1996, the agency notified petitioner that it would conduct its own investigation to determine whether or not her alleged conduct should result in findings of patient abuse on her part and be placed on the Nurse Aide Registry and the Health Care Personnel Registry (\u201cRegistries\u201d). The agency\u2019s letter informed petitioner that an investigator would contact her to obtain her account of the allegation. Additionally, the letter notified petitioner of her appeals rights and her opportunity to use informal procedures to resolve any dispute she had with the agency\u2019s action. Subsequently, Wayne Denning (\u201cDenning\u201d), an abuse investigator, was assigned to petitioner\u2019s case. During the course of his investigation, Denning interviewed petitioner by telephone and, petitioner denied any wrongdoing. Additionally, Denning interviewed other facility employees and reviewed the facility\u2019s personnel and medical records. Further, Denning interviewed a CNA who was a former facility employee; this individual contacted Denning to provide additional information pertaining to his investigation.\nUpon completing his investigation, Denning substantiated twenty-two allegations involving abuse, neglect, or misappropriation of resident property on the part of petitioner. By letter dated 21 August 1997, Denning informed petitioner of the nature of each substantiated allegation and gave her a summary of the evidence. This letter informed petitioner of the agency\u2019s intent to place its findings on the Registries and informed her of her rights of appeal.\nSubsequently, petitioner filed for a contested case hearing in the Office of Administrative Hearings on 24 September 1997, challenging the agency\u2019s decision to place its findings on the Registries. The hearing was held on 4 and 5 December 1997 before Administrative Law Judge (\u201cAU\u201d) Beecher R. Gray. At the hearing, the agency decided to limit its prosecution to only six incidents involving five residents. On 12 February 1998, ALT Gray issued a Recommended Decision that the agency\u2019s decision be dismissed as not supported by the evidence.\nThereafter, the agency filed exceptions and objections to the Recommended Decision on 23 April 1998. After its review, the agency issued a Final Agency Decision on 7 May 1998, rejecting the AU\u2019s Recommended Decision and upholding the agency\u2019s initial decision to substantiate findings of abuse, neglect, and misappropriation of resident property on the part of petitioner.\nPetitioner filed for judicial review of the Final Agency Decision in Stanly County Superior Court on 12 June 1998. A hearing was held at the 7 June 1999 session of superior court, the Honorable Russell G. Walker, Jr. presiding. By order filed on 12 July 1999, Judge Walker affirmed the Final Agency Decision. Petitioner appeals.\nIn her first assignment of error, petitioner maintains that the trial court erred in affirming the agency\u2019s final decision because it was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.\nWhere there is an appeal to this Court from a trial court\u2019s order affirming an agency\u2019s final decision, we must \u201c(1) determine the appropriate standard of review and, when applicable, (2) determine whether the trial court properly applied this standard.\u201d In re Appeal by McCrary, 112 N.C. App. 161,166, 435 S.E.2d 359, 363 (1993). \u201c[T]he standard of review which should be employed in reviewing an agency decision depends upon the nature of the alleged error.\u201d Id. Where petitioner alleges that the agency\u2019s decision was not supported by substantial evidence, or was arbitrary and capricious, the whole record test is applied. See ACT-UP Triangle v. Commission for Health Services, 345 N.C. 699, 706, 483 S.E.2d 388, 392 (1997). The trial court\u2019s order affirming the agency\u2019s decision indicates that the whole record test was applied. Therefore, we must determine whether the test was applied properly.\nUnder the whole record test, the entire record is examined to determine whether the agency decision is supported by substantial evidence. See id. \u201c \u2018Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u2019 \u201d Lackey v. Dept. of Human Resources, 306 N.C. 231, 238, 293 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1982) (quoting Comr. of Insurance v. Rating Bureau, 292 N.C. 70, 80, 231 S.E.2d 882, 888 (1977)). If substantial evidence supports an agency\u2019s decision after the entire record has been reviewed, the decision must be upheld. See In re Appeal by McCrary, 112 N.C. App. 161, 168, 435 S.E.2d 359, 365.\nSignificantly, the whole record test requires the court to consider both evidence justifying the agency\u2019s decision and contrary evidence that could lead to a different result. Id. at 167-68, 435 S.E.2d. at 364. However, the test \u201cdoes not allow the reviewing court to replace the [agency\u2019s] judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court could justifiably have reached a different result had the matter been before it de novo . . . .\u201d Thompson v. Board of Education, 292 N.C. 406, 410, 233 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1977). We further recognize that witness credibility and the probative value of testimony are determined by the administrative agency, which may accept or reject any or all of a witness\u2019s testimony. See Comr. of Insurance v. Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 406, 269 S.E.2d 547, 565 (1980).\nPrimarily, petitioner contends that the eyewitness testimony the agency relied upon in reaching its decision is inadequate to support the conclusion that she committed the alleged misconduct. To support her contention, petitioner asserts that testimony by the agency\u2019s witnesses was inconsistent, the agency\u2019s witnesses were biased and delayed reporting the alleged misconduct, and there was no evidence of significant physical injury to residents. However, a review of the entire record shows substantial evidence that supports the agency\u2019s decision: (1) credible eyewitness testimony from four of petitioner\u2019s coworkers that petitioner engaged in the misconduct at issue on several occasions; (2) testimony regarding incriminating statements that petitioner made to her coworkers, and; (3) evidence that a resident\u2019s physical condition improved shortly after petitioner was discharged. Based upon our review of the entire record, we conclude that the agency\u2019s final decision is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, petitioner\u2019s first assignment of error is rejected.\nPetitioner\u2019s second assignment of error is that the trial court erred in affirming the agency\u2019s final decision because it was arbitrary and capricious. Again, we disagree.\nIn addition to her contention that the decision was not supported by the evidence, petitioner asserts as additional evidence of the agency\u2019s arbitrariness: (1) the agency\u2019s reliance on petitioner\u2019s credibility in a case in 1996 when she reported a coworker\u2019s act of abuse and its later rejection of petitioner\u2019s credibility in reference to her denials of misconduct in this case, (2) the manner in which the agency conducted its investigation, and (3) the agency\u2019s disregard of petitioner\u2019s character witnesses. We begin by noting that the\n\u201carbitrary or capricious\u201d standard is a difficult one to meet. Administrative agency decisions may be reversed as arbitrary or capricious if they are ... \u201cwhimsical\u201d in the sense that \u201cthey indicate a lack of fair and careful consideration\u201d or \u201cfail to indicate \u2018any course of reasoning and the exercise of judgment\u2019. . . .\u201d\nLewis v. N.C. Dept. of Human Resources, 92 N.C. App. 737, 740, 375 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1989) (quoting Comr. of Insurance, 300 N.C. 381, 420, 269 S.E.2d 547, 573). Moreover, \u201cthe reviewing court does not have authority to override decisions within agency discretion when that discretion is exercised in good faith and in accordance with law.\u201d Lewis, 92 N.C. App. 737, 740, 375 S.E.2d 712, 714.\nOur review of the whole record reveals no unfairness or lack of careful consideration on the agency\u2019s part. The agency made findings of fact indicating the existence of substantial evidence to support its decision. Within those findings, the agency considered petitioner\u2019s credibility, petitioner\u2019s character witnesses, and Denning\u2019s investigation. Furthermore, we note that the agency met the requirements for rejecting the AU\u2019s recommendation. As required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-36(b) (1999), the agency\u2019s final decision stated specific reasons why it did not adopt the AU\u2019s Recommended Decision as its final decision. Also, the agency\u2019s final decision provided substantial reasons, including the credibility of witnesses, for rejecting the AU\u2019s Recommended Decision. We reiterate that although an ALJ makes a Recommended Decision, it is for the agency to decide the credibility of witnesses and conflicts in the evidence. See Oates v. N. C. Dept. of Correction, 114 N.C. App. 597, 601, 442 S.E.2d 542, 545 (1994). In sum, the record does not demonstrate that the agency acted in less than good faith. Thus, the entire record before us indicates that the agency\u2019s final decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Petitioner\u2019s second assignment of error, therefore, is overruled.\nFinally, petitioner\u2019s third assignment of error is that the agency\u2019s decision was affected by errors of law. Yet again, we disagree.\nWhere a petitioner argues that the agency\u2019s final decision was based on an error of law, the trial court must conduct a de novo review. See Eury v. N.C. Employment Security Comm., 115 N.C. App. 590, 597, 446 S.E.2d 383, 387 (1994). De novo review requires a court to consider the question anew, as if the agency has not addressed it. See id. Therefore, \u201cwhere the trial court should have utilized de novo review, this Court will directly review the agency\u2019s decision under a de novo review standard.\u201d In re Appeal by McCrary, 112 N.C. App. 161, 165, 435 S.E.2d 359, 363 (emphasis in original). At bar, petitioner\u2019s argument can be distilled into two parts.\nThe first part of petitioner\u2019s argument is that the agency \u201cexcluded petitioner from any meaningful participation or input in the investigative process\u201d and thus violated her state and federal constitutional rights to due process. Specifically, petitioner claims the investigation was \u201cinadequate\u201d and she was denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard because the agency\u2019s investigator only spoke with her in a single twenty-minute telephone call during his entire investigation.\n\u201cIn North Carolina, due process requires adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.\u201d Frizzelle v. Harnett County, 106 N.C. App. 234, 239, 416 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1992). The opportunity to be heard \u201cmust be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.\u201d Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62, 66 (1965). Here, petitioner\u2019s argument that she was excluded from the agency\u2019s investigation, thus denied due process, is unpersuasive. Viewing the record de novo, we find no indication that petitioner was denied adequate notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard. As required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-23(f) (1999), the agency gave petitioner written notice in October 1996 of its intent to investigate the allegations against her. Subsequently, petitioner had an interview with Denning and remained free to contact him during the remainder of his investigation. After concluding its investigation, the agency gave petitioner written notice in August 1997 of its findings. Both letters to petitioner described her rights to appeal. Further, petitioner exercised her right to a contested case hearing. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-25 (1999), the hearing afforded petitioner the opportunity to present arguments and evidence, and to cross-examine her accusers before the agency made its final decision.\nIn support of her argument, petitioner cites Bishop v. N.C. Dept. of Human Resources, 100 N.C. App. 175, 394 S.E.2d 702 (1990). However, Bishop is distinguishable from the present case. In Bishop, the petitioner was a state employee whose due process rights were violated when her employer made a final decision to discharge her without first giving her an opportunity to be heard. See id. In contrast, petitioner in the present case was given notice and an opportunity to be heard before the agency made its final decision.\nThe second part of petitioner\u2019s argument is that the agency improperly shifted \u201cthe burden of proof to petitioner to prove that the accusations lodged against her were untrue.\u201d Petitioner points out that, among its reasons for rejecting the ALJ\u2019s Recommended Decision, the agency noted four times that \u201cthere was no motive presented as to why [the witness] would fabricate [the allegations against petitioner].\u201d Petitioner asserts that these four comments indicate that the burden of proof was improperly shifted to her. We find that this fabrication issue was not mentioned within the \u201cFindings of Fact\u201d or \u201cConclusions of Law\u201d sections of the agency\u2019s final decision. Instead, the four comments were mentioned in the \u201cMemorandum\u201d section of the agency\u2019s final decision. Additionally, in that portion of its decision, the agency listed numerous other reasons for rejecting the ALJ\u2019s Recommended Decision. Based on those reasons, it is clear that no burden was placed upon petitioner to prove a motive for fabrication. Rather, the lack of any proof of motive was merely one of many factors the agency considered in determining witness credibility.\nThe only case petitioner cites on this issue is Dillingham v. N. C. Dep\u2019t of Human Res., 132 N.C. App. 704, 513 S.E.2d 823 (1999). Petitioner quotes this Court\u2019s holding in Dillingham as follows: \u201cTo the extent respondent agency\u2019s final decision was based upon petitioner\u2019s failure to present sufficient written evidence to support his claim that the asset transfers occurred for a purpose exclusive of eligibility for Medicaid benefits, the decision was affected by an error of law.\u201d Id. at 711, 513 S.E.2d at 828 (emphasis in original). No improper shift in the burden of proof was at issue in Dillingham. Thus, the quotation, taken out of context, is irrelevant to the case sub judice. Our de novo review leads us to conclude that the agency\u2019s final decision was not affected by errors of law.\nThus, we hold that the agency\u2019s final decision is supported by substantial evidence, was neither arbitrary nor capricious, and was not affected by errors of law.\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge EAGLES and Judge CAMPBELL concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Doran and Shelby, P.A., by Michael Doran, for petitioner-appellant.", "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Jane L. Oliver, for respondent-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GENOAL BLALOCK, Petitioner v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF FACILITY SERVICES, Respondent\nNo. COA99-1559\n(Filed 15 May 2001)\n1. Nurses\u2014 registration of misconduct \u2014 final agency decision \u2014 whole record test \u2014 substantial evidence\nThe trial court did not err by affirming the final agency decision of the Department of Health and Human Services to substantiate and register findings of abuse and neglect of nursing home residents, and misappropriation of resident property on the part of petitioner certified nurse assistant, because the whole record test reveals substantial evidence that: (1) four of petitioner\u2019s coworkers testified that petitioner engaged in the misconduct at issue on several occasions; (2) petitioner made incriminating statements to her coworkers; and (3) a resident\u2019s physical condition improved shortly after petitioner was discharged.\n2. Nurses\u2014 registration of misconduct \u2014 final agency decision \u2014 whole record test \u2014 not arbitrary and capricious\nThe trial court did not err by affirming respondent agency\u2019s final decision to substantiate and register findings of abuse and neglect of nursing home residents, and misappropriation of resident property on the part of petitioner nurse assistant even though petitioner contends the decision was arbitrary and capricious, because the whole record test reveals that: (1) there was no unfairness or lack of careful consideration on the agency\u2019s part when the agency made findings of fact indicating the existence of substantial evidence to support its decision; (2) the agency\u2019s final decision stated specific reasons why it did not adopt the administrative law judge\u2019s (ALJ) recommended decision as its final decision as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-36(b); and (3) the agency\u2019s final decision provided substantial reasons, including the credibility of witnesses, for rejecting the ALJ\u2019s recommended decision.\n3. Nurses\u2014 registration of misconduct \u2014 final agency decision \u2014 de novo review \u2014 not affected by errors of law\nThe trial court did not err by affirming respondent agency\u2019s final decision to substantiate and register findings of abuse and neglect of nursing home residents, and misappropriation of resident property on the part of petitioner nurse assistant even though petitioner contends the decision was affected by errors of law, because a de novo review reveals that: (1) petitioner\u2019s argument that she was excluded from the agency\u2019s investigation, and thus denied due process, is unpersuasive when there is no indication that petitioner was denied adequate notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard, the agency gave petitioner written notice of its intent to investigate the allegations against her as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-23(f), the agency gave petitioner written notice of its findings, and petitioner exercised her right to a contested hearing under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-25; and (2) although petitioner argues that the agency improperly shifted the burden of proof to petitioner to prove that the accusations lodged against her were untrue, no burden was placed on petitioner to prove a motive for witness fabrication when the agency listed numerous reasons for rejecting the administrative law judge\u2019s recommended decision, and the lack of any proof of motive concerning why a witness would fabricate the allegations against petitioner was merely one of the many factors the agency considered in determining witness credibility.\nAppeal by petitioner from an order entered 12 July 1999 by Judge Russell G. Walker, Jr. in Stanly County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 February 2001.\nDoran and Shelby, P.A., by Michael Doran, for petitioner-appellant.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Jane L. Oliver, for respondent-appellee." }, "file_name": "0470-01", "first_page_order": 500, "last_page_order": 507 }