{ "id": 11436709, "name": "IN RE THE ESTATE OF CANDICE LEIGH LUNSFORD, Deceased", "name_abbreviation": "In re the Estate of Lunsford", "decision_date": "2001-06-05", "docket_number": "No. COA00-674", "first_page": "646", "last_page": "656", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "143 N.C. App. 646" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556418, 2553763, 2556549, 2557037, 2554458 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0499-02", "/nc/329/0499-05", "/nc/329/0499-01", "/nc/329/0499-04", "/nc/329/0499-03" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 151", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 N.C. App. 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523122 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/102/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 S.E.2d 204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560844 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 S.E.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575015, 8574953, 8574992, 8574966, 8574975 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0314-05", "/nc/281/0314-01", "/nc/281/0314-04", "/nc/281/0314-02", "/nc/281/0314-03" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E.2d 348", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 N.C. App. 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8546796 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/14/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 S.E.2d 692", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573538 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567694 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4704578 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 475", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520625 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 S.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684906, 685103, 684880, 684948, 685083 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0356-03", "/nc/352/0356-02", "/nc/352/0356-04", "/nc/352/0356-05", "/nc/352/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 S.E.2d 684", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11238911 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 S.E.2d 597", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 N.C. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568884 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/257/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 29-15", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 873, "char_count": 22093, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.996573116795698e-07, "percentile": 0.9056296332334434 }, "sha256": "fea5d544ca732cdc25930e2de491a85f0ea9dc29fc774c75d0d84ef6b335583c", "simhash": "1:c21fb921d0affc72", "word_count": 3660 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:26:47.079244+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge BRYANT concurs.", "Chief Judge EAGLES dissents." ], "parties": [ "IN RE THE ESTATE OF CANDICE LEIGH LUNSFORD, Deceased" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCullough, judge.\nThe subject of this appeal is the distribution of the estate of Candice Leigh Lunsford, who died at the age of eighteen in an automobile accident on 30 June 1999. Decedent\u2019s parents, petitioner Dawn Bean and respondent Randy Lunsford, were married in November 1980. Their only child, Candice Leigh Lunsford (\u201cCandi\u201d), was born on 21 June 1981. Respondent suffered from alcoholism, and the marriage deteriorated after a short time. Petitioner and respondent separated in 1982, and a decree of absolute divorce was entered on 30 January 1985. Petitioner was granted sole custody, care, and control of the couple\u2019s daughter, Candi. The divorce judgment did not bar respondent from participating in Candi\u2019s care and maintenance, nor did it operate to terminate his parental rights.\nDuring Candi\u2019s lifetime, respondent paid no more than $100.00 toward her support. Respondent maintains that he offered to pay more, but that petitioner repeatedly refused his offers of financial support. Respondent visited Candi less than a dozen times from the time the couple separated until Candi\u2019s death in 1999.\nOn 9 July 1999, petitioner applied for Letters of Administration so that she could serve as administratrix of her daughter\u2019s estate. Candi\u2019s estate consisted of some personal effects; there was also a potential claim for wrongful death arising under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 28A-18.2 (1999), the proceeds of which were also part of the estate. Petitioner was appointed administratrix, and respondent appealed to the clerk of superior court. The clerk heard the matter on 16 November 1999 and determined that respondent willfully abandoned Candi Lunsford and was therefore barred from inheriting from her estate.\nRespondent then filed a complaint requesting that petitioner be relieved of her duties as administratrix because she allegedly abused her position and violated her fiduciary duty by failing to notify him that she was applying for Letters of Administration. Respondent also asked the trial court to grant injunctive relief by delaying the disbursement of the estate proceeds until his appeals were exhausted. The clerk of superior court denied respondent\u2019s motion and dismissed his complaint on 20 December 1999, whereupon respondent appealed to the Surry County Superior Court for a trial de novo. The trial court entered judgment in favor of petitioner on 3 March 2000.\nRespondent appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by (I) finding that he willfully abandoned his daughter; (II) determining that exception (2) to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 31A-2 does not apply to this case; and (III) finding that petitioner was the only proper person to serve as administrator. We disagree with respondent\u2019s arguments, and affirm the decision of the trial court.\nI. Willful Abandonment\nNorth Carolina intestacy laws allow parents to inherit in equal shares when an intestate child dies without leaving issue. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 29-15(3) (1999). A parent can, however, act in a way that negates the right to inherit. If a parent abandons a child, that parent cannot share in the deceased child\u2019s estate. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 31A-2 (1999) states that\n[a]ny parent who has wilfully abandoned the care and maintenance of his or her child shall lose all right to intestate succession in any part of the child\u2019s estate and all right to administer the estate of the child, except\u2014\n(1) Where the abandoning parent resumed its care and maintenance at least one year prior to the death of the child and continued the same until its death; or\n(2) Where a parent has been deprived of the custody of his or her child under an order of a court of competent jurisdiction and the parent has substantially complied with all orders of the court requiring contribution to the support of the child.\nThough it is clear that abandonment prevents a parent from inheriting from an intestate child, the determination of what behavior actually constitutes abandonment is a factual issue to be addressed on a case-by-case basis.\nPrior North Carolina case law has dealt with the issue of abandonment. Abandonment has been defined as\nany wilful or intentional conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child. Wilful intent is an integral part of abandonment and this is a question of fact to be determined from the evidence.\nAbandonment has also been defined as wilful neglect and refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of parental care and support. It has been held that if a parent withholds his presence, his love, his care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and wilfully neglects to lend support and maintenance, such parent relinquishes all parental claims and abandons the child.\nPratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 501, 126 S.E.2d 597, 608 (1962) (citations omitted); Hixson v. Krebs, 136 N.C. App. 183, 188, 523 S.E.2d 684, 687 (1999), disc. review denied, 352 N.C. 356, 544 S.E.2d 546 (2000).\nA finding of abandonment is key to the ultimate disposition of this case. If respondent abandoned his daughter, he falls under the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 31A-2 and is precluded from sharing in the estate\u2019s wrongful death proceeds. \u201cThe proceeds of a settlement for wrongful death of a child are subject to the provisions of G.S. 31A-2 even though such proceeds are not assets of the estate of the deceased child.\u201d Lessard v. Lessard, 77 N.C. App. 97, 101, 334 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1985), aff\u2019d, 316 N.C. 546, 342 S.E.2d 522 (1986).\nAfter initial appearances before the Surry County Clerk of Superior Court, respondent appealed to the Surry County Superior Court for a trial de novo. The trial court made findings of fact and concluded, as a matter of law, that\n1. The Respondent, Randy Keith Lunsford, willfully abandoned his late daughter, Candice Leigh Lunsford, whose estate is the subject of this dispute, in accordance with North Carolina General Statute 31A-2.\n2. North Carolina General Statute 31A-2(2) does not apply to the facts of this case as there was no Order of a Court depriving the defendant of custody.\n3. The Petitioner, Dawn Collins Bean, is the only proper person to serve as Administratrix.\n4. Although the Respondent maintains his objection to jurisdiction, all parties agreed and stipulated to a de novo hearing on the appeal from the Clerk of Superior Court.\n5. All parties stipulate that this Order may be signed out of Session, Term and/or County.\nThe Surry County Superior Court also entered the following Order:\nThat the Respondent, Randy Keith Lunsford, willfully abandoned his late daughter, Candice Leigh Lunsford, and is, therefore, precluded by North Carolina General Statute 31A-2, from sharing in the proceeds of the Estate of Candice Leigh Lunsford. Further, the Petitioner, Dawn Collins Bean, shall continue to administer the Estate of Candice Leigh Lunsford. Finally, with the consent of all parties, this matter may be executed out of Session, Term and/or County.\nThe superior court conducted a bench trial in this case and undertook the role of fact-finder. We are bound by the trial court\u2019s findings of fact if they are supported by competent evidence. \u201c[T]he scope of appellate review... is strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge\u2019s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge\u2019s ultimate conclusions of law.\u201d State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). Petitioner and respondent each presented evidence on the issue of abandonment. Respondent maintained that he initially left petitioner and Candi because of his alcoholism and his inability to handle the rigors of family life. He presented evidence that he and Candi always had a good relationship, as evidenced by the fact that he attended her high school graduation and made plans for furthering their relationship just before her death. Respondent acknowledged that he was not always emotionally stable, but stated that he intentionally limited his contact with Candi to those times when he could nurture their relationship. Respondent also maintained that he offered to financially support his daughter, but that petitioner refused his offers.\nPetitioner, on the other hand, provided evidence that respondent visited Candi less than a dozen times from the date of their separation in 1985 to Candi\u2019s death in 1999. She also stated that respondent paid less than $100.00 during those fifteen years (though she also acknowledged that she refused his offers to pay support). Petitioner referenced the divorce judgment and noted that it did not terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights, nor did it prevent him from taking an active role in his daughter\u2019s life. Petitioner argued that respondent could have financially supported their daughter in a variety of ways, and could have taken a more active visitation stance over the years, perhaps by initiating a court action to get visitation or custody of Candi. Finally, petitioner noted that respondent\u2019s mother was the one who facilitated visits between respondent and Candi because respondent was immature and battled alcoholism.\nThe trial court heard the conflicting evidence and was in the best position to render a decision based on the parties\u2019 positions. The trial court\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law ended the factual dispute and resolved the issue of abandonment in favor of petitioner. The trial court concluded that respondent abandoned his daughter, and we are bound by that conclusion, as it is supported by the evidence of record. Respondent\u2019s first assignment of error is therefore overruled.\nII. Applicability of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 31A-2\nPetitioner and respondent agree that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 31A-2 is the relevant statute in this case; however, they disagree on its interpretation and the applicability of its provisions to their dispute. Respondent first argues that the statute does not apply in this case because the Legislature meant it to apply only to the estates of minor children; that is, those children who are under the age of eighteen when they die. It is undisputed that Candi Lunsford was eighteen years old at the time of her death. Respondent contends that his daughter should not be covered under the statute\u2019s purview. Petitioner urges this Court to give the statute its plain meaning and find that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 31A-2 applies to the estate of any son or daughter of an individual.\nThis argument constitutes an issue of first impression, as this is the first time this question has been squarely presented to this Court. We agree with petitioner\u2019s reading of the statute, however, and hold that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 31A-2 applies to the estate of any son or daughter of an individual, even after that child has reached the age of majority. Absent some inequitable result, words or phrases in a statute are to be given their ordinary, everyday meaning. Wood v. J.P. Stevens and Co., 297 N.C. 636, 643, 256 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1979) (citations omitted). There are numerous other statutes wherein the Legislature specifically noted that \u201cchild\u201d meant a child under the age of eighteen. In those instances, the Legislature chose to insert the words \u201cminor child\u201d into the statutory scheme. See N.C. Gen. Stat. Chapter 48A, \u201cMinors,\u201d effective 5 July 1971. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 48A-1 (1999) abrogates the common-law definition of minor. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 48A-2 (1999) states that \u201c[a] minor is any person who has not reached the age of 18 years.\u201d When the two statutes are read together, \u201cthe effect is that wherever the term \u2018minor,\u2019 \u2018minor child\u2019 or \u2018minor children\u2019 is used in a statute, the statute now refers to age 18.\u201d Crouch v. Crouch, 14 N.C. App. 49, 51, 187 S.E.2d 348, 349, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 314, 188 S.E.2d 897 (1972). We interpret this to mean that, unless the word \u201cminor\u201d is inserted before the word \u201cchild,\u201d then \u201cchild\u201d can be a person of any age.\nWebster\u2019s Dictionary defines a child as \u201c[a] son or a daughter; an offspring.\u201d The American Heritage Dictionary 165 (2d ed. 1985). Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines a child as \u201c[p]rogeny; offspring of parentage.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 239 (6th ed. 1991). These definitions do not place an upper age limit on a child; thus, a parent\u2019s child may be a newborn or a person of any age.\nThe law has singled out certain ages and attributed legal significance to them. Generally, the Legislature has used the term \u201cminor child\u201d when the age of eighteen is significant. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines a minor as \u201c[a]n infant or person who is under the age of legal competence. ... In most states, a person is no longer a minor after reaching the age of 18[.]\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 997 (6th ed. 1991). We note that the Legislature did not use the term \u201cminor child\u201d in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 31A-2. As a practical matter, it does not seem logical to believe that the Legislature meant that only a \u201cminor\u201d child would be protected by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 31A-2. If that were the case, an abandoning parent could inherit from a child if that child was over eighteen, but the abandonment would be held against the parent if the child was under the age of eighteen. In any event, it is not the province of this Court to rewrite the General Statutes. If the Legislature wishes to change or clarify the meanings of certain words in the General Statutes, it may do so. Until then, we give the word \u201cchild\u201d its plain meaning and decline to place an age limit on the word unless so directed by the Legislature. The child\u2019s age does not change the facts of abandonment, if they are present in a case. Thus, we hold that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 31A-2 applies to all children of an individual, not just to minor children under the age of eighteen.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 31A-2 prevents parents who abandon their children from inheriting from those children unless the parent meets one of two exceptions. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 31A-2(2) allows a parent to inherit from a child \u2014 despite evidence of parental abandonment \u2014 if the pg\u00e9rent has been \u201cdeprived of the custody of his or her child under an order of a court of competent jurisdiction and the parent has substantially complied with all orders of the court requiring contribution to the support of the child.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 31A-2(2).\nPetitioner and respondent divorced when Candi was a small child. The 1985 divorce judgment granted sole \u201ccare, custody and control\u201d of Candi Lunsford to petitioner. That judgment did not, however, prevent respondent from helping to raise his daughter or contribute to her care and maintenance. The prior cases of Hixson and Lessard shed light on the issue of a divorce judgment and its significance to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 31A-2(2). We note, however, that both Hixson and Lessard dealt with divorce judgments that relied on provisions in prior separation agreements. There was no prior separation agreement in the present case. However, we can analogize and reason that the divorce judgment in this case did not operate to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights. Indeed, the divorce judgment did not speak to future relationships. It merely gave custody, care, and control of Candi to her mother at the time of the divorce. There was no language in the divorce judgment that prevented respondent from seeking visitation or even custody of Candi. Our Supreme Court has previously noted that \u201cthe control and custody of minor children cannot be determined finally. Changed conditions will always justify inquiry by the courts in the interest and welfare of the children, and decrees may be entered as often as the facts justify.\u201d In re Marlowe, 268 N.C. 197, 199, 150 S.E.2d 204, 206 (1966). See also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.7 (1999).\nThe divorce judgment in this case did not order respondent to support Candi; however, parents have a duty to support their children until they reach the age of majority. See Nisbet v. Nisbet, 102 N.C. App. 232, 402 S.E.2d 151, disc. review denied, 329 N.C. 499, 407 S.E.2d 538 (1991), and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.4(b) (1999). Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 31A-2, parents have a duty to provide \u201ccare and maintenance\u201d for their children until they reach the age of majority. Undoubtedly, the duty of care is a natural obligation, whereby a parent shows love and affection for the child and is a presence in the child\u2019s life, while the duty of maintenance pertains to the legal duty a parent has for a child.\nTherefore, because the divorce judgment did not deprive respondent of custody of Candi, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 31A-2(2) does not apply. Respondent remains under the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 31A-2, and the trial court has already found that respondent abandoned Candi Lunsford. No exceptions to this conclusion exist, and respondent cannot inherit from his daughter\u2019s estate.\nIII. The Proper Administrator\nThe trial court sat as the fact-finder in this matter, and concluded that respondent abandoned his daughter. Because the trial court\u2019s findings are supported by the evidence, we are bound by those findings. Therefore, we do not reach the issue of whether petitioner was the only proper administrator of Candi Lunsford\u2019s estate, and we also need not examine whether petitioner breached her fiduciary duties, as these points are now moot.\nTherefore, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact and judgment naming petitioner as the administratrix of Candi Lunsford\u2019s estate are\nAffirmed.\nJudge BRYANT concurs.\nChief Judge EAGLES dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "McCullough, judge." }, { "text": "EAGLES, Chief Judge,\ndissenting.\nI respectfully dissent.\nThe majority\u2019s logic would be flawless if the intestate had died while a minor. Had intestate died as a minor, her father\u2019s abandonment of her would have properly deprived him of the right to inherit from her by intestacy. G.S. 31A-2. Here, however, the intestate was no longer a minor. Since intestate died as an adult, her father has a statutory right to inherit without regard to his prior sins of omission. G.S. 29-15(3). As an adult, intestate could have prepared a will and could have specified how her estate would be distributed. G.S. 31-1. Whether through negligence or by intention, intestate (like most people her age) never executed a will to assure that the principles of North Carolina intestate law would not control disbursement of her estate. Here, I believe the intestate succession act mandates that the father share in intestate\u2019s estate.\nG.S. 31A-2 bars abandoning parents\u2019 right to administer a deceased child\u2019s estate and to share in the estate by intestate succession. In the statute\u2019s exceptions it refers to a parent resuming \u201cits care and maintenance,\u201d G.S. 31A-2(1), and a parent having \u201cbeen deprived of the custody of his or her child\u201d and having \u201csubstantially complied with all orders . . . requiring contribution to the support of the child.\u201d G.S. 31A-2(2). Generally, only where a minor child is involved does a parent have responsibility for \u201ccare and maintenance\u201d and only where a minor child is involved does a parent have custody rights or obligations to support a child. Nothing in this record indicates that the father here any longer had responsibilities for care and maintenance, or custody and support. It is clear from the plain language of the statute when read in context that \u201cchild\u201d for the purposes of G.S. 31A-2 is limited to minor children.\nOn the facts of this case, this result might not seem \u201cfair.\u201d We have all learned, however, that \u201chard cases make bad law.\u201d This is the most recent example. To rale as the majority has decided will foster estates disputes and potential litigation in every case where parents and deceased adult children are estranged at the time of death or were estranged at any time in the child\u2019s minority. I think certainty in the law requires us to conclude that G.S. 31A-2 applies only to minor children-decedents.", "type": "dissent", "author": "EAGLES, Chief Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Law Offices of Jonathan S. Dills, P.A., by Jonathan S. Dills and Daniel B. Anthony, for respondent appellant.", "Royster and Royster, by Michael D. Beal and Stephen G. Royster, for petitioner appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN RE THE ESTATE OF CANDICE LEIGH LUNSFORD, Deceased\nNo. COA00-674\n(Filed 5 June 2001)\n1. Intestate Succession\u2014 death of child \u2014 willful abandonment by father prior to death\nThe trial court did not err by finding that respondent father could not inherit money from his intestate eighteen-year-old daughter\u2019s estate because the evidence reveals that respondent willfully abandoned his daughter prior to her death. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2.\n2. Parent and Child\u2014 death of child \u2014 willful abandonment by father prior to death \u2014 inheritance disallowed for child of any age\nAlthough respondent father contends that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2 which provides protection from an abandoning parent inheriting from a child is inapplicable to this case since respondent\u2019s deceased daughter was eighteen years old when she died, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2 applies to the estate of any son or daughter of an individual, even after the child has reached the age of majority.\n3. Parent and Child\u2014 death of child \u2014 willful abandonment by father prior to death \u2014 not deprived of custody\nRespondent father is barred from inheriting from his daughter\u2019s estate based on his willful abandonment of her prior to her death and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2(2) does not apply to allow respondent to inherit from the child despite his abandonment, because: (1) respondent was not deprived of the custody of his child under the order of a court of competent jurisdiction and he was not prevented from helping to contribute to her care and maintenance; and (2) there was no language in the divorce judgment that prevented respondent from seeking visitation or even custody of his daughter.\n4. Estates\u2014 administration \u2014 death of child \u2014 mother was proper administratrix\nThe trial court\u2019s findings of fact naming petitioner mother as the administratrix of her daughter\u2019s estate are affirmed.\nChief Judge Eagles dissenting.\nAppeal by respondent from order entered 3 March 2000 by Judge L. Todd Burke in Surry County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 April 2001.\nLaw Offices of Jonathan S. Dills, P.A., by Jonathan S. Dills and Daniel B. Anthony, for respondent appellant.\nRoyster and Royster, by Michael D. Beal and Stephen G. Royster, for petitioner appellee." }, "file_name": "0646-01", "first_page_order": 676, "last_page_order": 686 }