{
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  "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: PATRICIA ECKARD, a minor child",
  "name_abbreviation": "In re Eckard",
  "decision_date": "2001-06-19",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges WALKER and HUNTER concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "IN THE MATTER OF: PATRICIA ECKARD, a minor child"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nAngela Eckard (\u201crespondent\u201d or \u201cmother\u201d) appeals from a \u201cpermanency planning order\u201d (\u201corder\u201d) ceasing reunification efforts between her and her daughter, Patricia Eckard (\u201cPatricia\u201d or \u201cTricia\u201d). For the reasons discussed herein, we reverse the order of the trial court.\nFacts\nOn 14 April 1999, respondent went to the grocery store to purchase food for dinner, leaving Patricia, then 22 months old, with her boyfriend, Dale Hart. Upon returning, respondent noticed bruises and cuts on Patricia, and blood on Mr. Hart. Mr. Hart explained that Patricia had fallen and hit her head on a dresser. Respondent took Patricia to Catawba Memorial Hospital. Doctors diagnosed Patricia as having suffered skull fractures and numerous bruises all over her body. Medical personnel at the hospital concluded that the injuries suffered by Patricia \u201ccould not have been caused by accidental means.\u201d Respondent consistently maintained that Patricia\u2019s injuries were suffered while under Mr. Hart\u2019s supervision.\nOn 21 April 1999, a nonsecure custody order was entered removing Patricia from respondent\u2019s home, and placing her in the foster home of Harry and Paulette Sigmon. On 22 April 1999, Catawba County Department of Social Services (\u201cDSS\u201d) filed a petition alleging that Patricia was an abused, neglected, and dependent juvenile. On 26 April 1999, respondent entered into a \u201cMemorandum of Agreement and Order\u201d agreeing to the continuation of the nonsecure custody order until adjudication. The Agreement stated that \u201creasonable efforts will be made to return the child to her home.\u201d The agreement was signed by respondent, DSS, the Guardian Ad Litem\u2019s Office, and the Honorable Gregory R. Hayes.\nOn 25 May 1999, the juvenile petition came on for adjudication before the Honorable Nancy L. Einstein. At this hearing, respondent, through her counsel, consented to an adjudication which found that Patricia was an abused, neglected and dependent juvenile. The trial court ordered:\n1. The custody of the minor child shall be with the Catawba County Department of Social Services with placement in its discretion; current placement in the Catawba County Foster/Adopt home is specifically approved.\n2. That the placement and care of the minor child shall be the responsibility of the Catawba County Department of Social Services and the Catawba County Department of Social Services shall provide for or arrange for the foster care or other placement of the minor child.\n3. That [the] Catawba County Department of Social Services shall make a reasonable effort to return the minor child to her own home.\n4. That visitation between the minor child and the mother shall occur weekly and shall be supervised by the Department of Social Services at a time and place to be determined by the Agency.\n5. That the minor child shall be offered all available support services, including but not limited to foster care, physical and developmental examinations and evaluations.\n6. That the mother shall comply with all aspects and terms of the Family Services Case Plan, Part A.\n7. That the mother shall attend and participate in Agency-approved parenting classes, and be able to demonstrate appropriate nurturing interaction and empathy toward the minor child, and an understanding of appropriate child developmental stages as a result of such classes.\n8. That the mother shall complete an assessment at Mental Health to determine her need for counseling and the need for a full psychological evaluation of the mother. The mother shall pay for the assessment and any recommended counseling. If a full psychological evaluation is necessary, the Agency shall pay for such evaluation.\n9. That the mother shall cooperate fully with the Child Support Enforcement unit to determine the paternity of the minor child. The mother shall enter into a child support agreement establishing her own support payment schedule for the minor child.\n10. That the identity of the minor child\u2019s father shall be determined by paternity testing. That the mother and the putative fathers shall cooperate with Child Support Enforcement Unit in arranging and participation in the paternity testing.\n11. That this matter shall come on for review, without further notice to the parties, on the 17th day of August 1999.\nThe trial court also found that the respondent \u201cis aware that she has a short period of time in which to turn her life around.\u201d\nA review hearing was held on 24 August 1999 before Judge Einstein. At this hearing, DSS informed the court that respondent \u201chas done everything requested by the Department of Social Services,\u201d and \u201cthe permanent plan for Patricia Eckard is reunification with her mother, Angela Eckard.\u201d DSS recommended to the trial court:\nthat the mother be permitted to have weekly unsupervised visits, starting with one hour unsupervised visits at the Department of Social Services, slowly progressing to unsupervised home visits, and eventually to overnight visitation dependent upon the success of the unsupervised visits as they progress to longer periods of unsupervised visitation.\nThe trial court made findings of fact that \u201cthe minor child continues to demonstrate a strong bond to her mother,\u201d and \u201c[t]he child\u2019s face lights up when she sees the mother and she cries for her mother as the visit is ending.\u201d The trial court further found that:\nthe mother continues to cooperate with the Department of Social Services and is actively addressing the goals and objectives set forth in her Family Services Case Plan, Part A. Specifically, she is attending Mental Health counseling, Nurturing classes, regularly paying child support, has established an independent residence, and visits regularly with the child.\nThe court ordered, inter alia, that \u201cvisitation between the mother and minor child shall be unsupervised . . . [and] conducted at the Department of Social Services weekly.\u201d Finally, the court ordered \u201c[t]hat this matter shall come on for permanency planning, without further notice to the parties, on the 16th day of November 1999.\u201d\nOn 16 November 1999, the matter was continued until 14 December 1999 due to the recent discovery of the identity of Patricia\u2019s natural father, Mr. Willard Sanford, Jr. At the 14 December 1999 permanency planning hearing the court heard testimony from several witnesses. The first witness was Patricia\u2019s foster mother, Mrs. Paulette Sigmon. Mrs. Sigmon testified that Patricia \u201chad a lot of bruises\u201d and was \u201cvery shy\u201d when she first arrived at the Sigmon home. According to Mrs. Sigmon, Patricia did not eat or sleep well at first. Mrs. Sigmon testified that it took Patricia several months to gain the trust of her foster family, and that in time, Patricia began eating and sleeping better. Mrs. Sigmon stated that Patricia calls her \u201cmomma\u201d or \u201cmomma Paulette,\u201d and Mr. Sigmon \u201cdaddy.\u201d\nThe foster father, Mr. Harry Sigmon, testified that Patricia was scared of men at first. Mr. Sigmon stated that Patricia gradually became affectionate towards him, and Patricia eventually \u201cbloomed out like a flower.\u201d Both Mr. and Mrs. Sigmon testified that they expected to be able to adopt Patricia, despite DSS\u2019s stated goal of reunifying Patricia with respondent.\nThe court next heard testimony from Ms. Anne Smith, a psychologist with Catawba County Mental Health Counseling Services. Ms. Smith performed a court-ordered psychological evaluation of respondent on 20 September 1999. Ms. Smith concluded that, despite respondent\u2019s low I.Q. level, she had \u201cno severe mental health issues that would significantly interfere with her ability to parent her child,\u201d and that \u201creunification between Ms. Eckard and her child should be considered.\u201d Ms. Smith testified that:\nThe results that I came up with were, are based mainly on the fact that [respondent] was not the person herself who hurt the child. She has been cooperating with everything that\u2019s been asked of her. She\u2019s, it was reported to me by DSS that she\u2019s keeping all of her appointments, she\u2019s been very cooperative, she\u2019s gone to classes. She\u2019s keeping her Mental Health appointments. She expresses a real desire and motivation to, to learn parenting skills that she may not have had in the past. She expresses appreciation for the help that she\u2019s receiving. She expresses some anger towards the man that hurt her daughter but she also accepts some responsibility on her own part for not protecting her. And this is something that, in the number of evaluations that I\u2019ve done, I don\u2019t often see. And I think it\u2019s a real healthy start that she is willing to accept responsibility herself. And that she\u2019s being very cooperative and learning and enjoying what she is learning.\nThe court next heard testimony from David Keyes, a psychologist with Catawba County Counseling Services. Mr. Keyes served as respondent\u2019s regular therapist. Mr. Keyes stated that respondent felt very \u201cguilty . . . about leaving her child with the boyfriend and then having to return and having her be abused.\u201d In a letter addressed to DSS and presented to the court, Mr. Keyes summarized respondent\u2019s progress as follows:\nOverall, Ms. Eckard gained understanding of how and why her relationships with men are unhealthy. She was able to ascertain that the solution to her poor choices is to proceed more slowly in order to get to know someone more before advancing to an intimate or live-in relationship. She also understands that it is more important for her to consider her daughter\u2019s needs over her own needs for companionship.\nMr. Keyes added that respondent\u2019s motivation to change herself was high, and she was eager to grow and learn. Mr. Keyes testified that respondent\u2019s learning disability would not prevent her from appropriately parenting Patricia. Mr. Keyes concluded that, in his experience, respondent has \u201calready grown sufficiently to not be a danger to the child.\u201d\nMs. Nancy Pannell served as respondent\u2019s court-appointed mentor. Ms. Pannell provided transportation and supervision during visits between respondent and Patricia. Ms. Pannell testified that Patricia was always very happy to see respondent, did not cry, and there was nothing negative about the visits between mother and daughter.\nRespondent testified that she did not knowingly allow Patricia to be injured by Mr. Hart. Respondent testified that the only form of corporal punishment she used on Patricia prior to the injury was a \u201csmack\u201d with her hand on Patricia\u2019s \u201cbutt.\u201d Respondent testified that she and Mr. Hart often fought over Mr. Hart\u2019s use of discipline on Patricia. Respondent testified that she left Mr. Hart after this incident. Respondent added that she would have left Mr. Hart earlier, but she \u201cdidn\u2019t know nowhere else to go.\u201d She also testified that she has a support network of friends at work, church, and parenting classes, as well as Ms. Pannell.\nMs. Ellen Menzies, DSS\u2019s Nurturing Program Coordinator, submitted a letter to the court summarizing respondent\u2019s performance during her court-ordered \u201cNurturing classes.\u201d Ms. Menzies reported that respondent had attended \u201ceach of the past 18 sessions and has consistently completed her reading and writing assignments.\u201d Although quiet and reluctant at first, Ms. Menzies wrote that respondent had\nbecome more open and honest about herself, her perceptions regarding her situation and in her interactions with other group members. She has been an attentive and seemingly committed group member throughout the series.\nMs. Eckard has shown a real interest in gaining information in those areas which are considered to be the core constructs of the program. As reflected by her participation in group, she appears to have made particular progress in the areas of understanding the effect of corporal punishment and identifying alternative forms of behavior management. Typically group members have more difficulty grasping the abstract concepts presented, however, she has made an obvious gain in the area of parental empathy or identifying the needs of children. .. . Although Patricia has attended only one session, she and her mother seemed to be very bonded and were appropriately affectionate. Ms. Eckard truly seems to value Patricia and their relationship.\nMs. Beth Peterinelli, a DSS social worker, submitted a report detailing DSS\u2019s evaluation of respondent\u2019s progress. This report informed the court that:\nMs. Eckard continues to remain employed, pay child support, and visit her child regularly. She is currently enrolled in the Nurturing Program to gain in her confidence level and competence in child rearing skills. She has also participated in counseling. Additionally community volunteer Nancy Pannell has worked with Ms. Eckard in a supportive role.\nMs. Eckard terminated her relationship with her former live together partner immediately upon being requested to do so by DSS when the injury was first reported. She has continued to maintain her own dwelling and has fully cooperated with DSS. She appears to have gained in her confidence level and to also have learned that it is her responsibility to protect her child.\nMs. Eckard is somewhat limited and naive, and does tend to be concrete in her thinking. However; once she learns a concept, she is able to act on the concept, (emphasis in original)\nThe report also indicated that respondent \u201chas done everything requested by [DSS],\u201d and that respondent \u201cis following her case plan and is exceeding minimal standards of care.\u201d DSS recommended that the permanent plan for Patricia be reunification with respondent.\nFinally, the Guardian Ad Litem/Attorney Advocate/Petitioner/ Appellee (\u201cGAL\u201d), M. Victoria Jayne, submitted a \u201cpermanency planning report\u201d to the court dated 13 December 1999. In that report the GAL acknowledged that respondent has done everything DSS instructed her to do. However, the GAL requested that the court find and enter an order ceasing reunification efforts between respondent and Patricia. In support of this request, the GAL wrote:\nAlthough the mother has continued to abide by the requests of the Department of Social Services there is no evidence made available to the Guardian Ad Litem that the mother has ever acknowledged the seriousness of the abuse inflicted on Tricia prior to the skull fracture, ever accepted personal responsibility for her abuse of Tricia, or demonstrated that she has the ability or innate desire to make independent decisions to protect Tricia from abuse in the future. The mother has admitted to at least five (5) different intimate relationships with men in a span of two (2) years ... In addition the Guardian Ad Litem learned from the Department of Social Services that the mother had befriended some individuals who, fooled her into giving them money and then betrayed her trust. Based on these very recent incidents the Guardian Ad Litem is not convinced that the mother is able to exercise independent judgment to protect herself, much less Tricia. . . .\nThe Guardian Ad Litem is convinced that any \u201cbonding\u201d between Tricia and her natural mother and father is due solely to the nurturing, safe loving atmosphere of the Sigmon home. They have taken a frail, chronically abused, frightened baby of less than 2 years old and nurtured her into a precocious, inquisitive, enthusiastic, autonomous little girl, a little girl that now shows biased affection for her \u201cdaddy\u201d Harry Sigmon and \u201cmama\u201d Paulette Sigmon . . . Although the mother may be sincerely trying to change her behavior and make healthy decisions for herself, the desire and ability to protect an infant is innate, in the Guardian Ad Litem\u2019s opinion, and the Guardian Ad Litem is not at all convinced that the mother possesses this innate mothering instinct or is capable of protecting Tricia in the future, (emphasis in original)\nThe GAL requested the court to order that: (1) reunification efforts be ceased, (2) if respondent did not agree to release her parental rights of Patricia, then DSS shall file a petition to terminate her parental rights, (3) a \u201cgood-bye visit be scheduled between each parent and the child separately,\u201d and (4) Patricia \u201cremain in the home of the Sigmons permanently.\u201d\nOn 17 December 1999, the trial court filed its \u201cpermanency planning order.\u201d The Court made several findings of fact regarding respondent\u2019s ability to parent Patricia, including:\n5. Ms. Eckard testified that at the sign of the \u201cfirst mark\u201d she would protect Tricia. This is evidence of her inability to understand that protecting Patricia means never letting a mark get there in the first place. Other people easily lead her.\n6. Respondent mother has complied with the Department\u2019s Service Agreement and has taken advantage of every service offered to her. She is a well-meaning woman, but the Court doubts her long term capability of being able to parent any child without constant and ongoing assistance from professionals for a number of reasons.\n* * *\n12. While Ms. Eckard has the desire to be a good parent, the Court believes she does not have the ability. She is gullible and naive with men and friends, to wit: her past relationships and an incident where she befriended a woman, took her into her home and then was robbed by her.\n14. It is a powerful privilege to parent a child, and not a right to parent when abuse comes into play. The best interest of the child must outweigh parental rights. Ms. Eckard would require the Department and/or the GAL as a watchdog forever, with no guarantees that she would [sic] form questionable relationships, which could put her daughter at risk.\nBased on its findings of fact, the trial court made the following conclusions of law:\n1. The Catawba County Department of Social Services has exercised reasonable efforts toward reunification of the minor child with her mother, but reunification is not in the best interest of the minor child and would be contrary to the juvenile\u2019s best interest.\n2. Efforts to reunify the minor child with her mother would be inconsistent with the child\u2019s health, safety, and need for a safe permanent home within a reasonable period of time.\n3. The permanent plan for Tricia should be one of adoption by her foster parents.\nThe court ordered that it would be in Patricia\u2019s \u201cbest interest\u201d that \u201c[t]he custody of the minor child shall remain with the Catawba County Department of Social Service, with placement to remain in the Sigmon home as an adoptive risk placement. Adoption with the Sigmons is the permanent plan for Tricia.\u201d Respondent appeals.\nIssue\nThe issues presented to this court are whether the findings of the trial court are supported by competent evidence, and whether those findings support the court\u2019s conclusions. For the following reasons, we reverse the order of the trial court directing DSS to cease reunification efforts between respondent and Patricia.\nGoals of the Juvenile Code\n\u201cThe family occupies a special and highly revered place in the life of our nation and people. Thus our courts have accorded full constitutional protection to family relationships. \u2018[T]he Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation\u2019s history and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.\u2019 \u201d In re Webb, 70 N.C. App. 345, 350, 320 S.E.2d 306, 309 (1984) (Becton, J. dissenting) (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-4, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531, 540, (1977)), aff'd per curiam, 313 N.C. 322, 327 S.E.2d 879 (1985). \u201cThe fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. . . . When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.\u201d Id. (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 606 (1982)).\n\u201c[0]ne of the essential aims, if not the essential aim, of the dispo-sitional hearing and the review hearing is to reunite the parent(s) and the child, after the child has been taken from the custody of the par-entis).\u201d In re Shue, 311 N.C. 586, 596, 319 S.E.2d 567, 573, modified & aff'd, 311 N.C. 586, 319 S.E.2d 567 (1984). G.S. \u00a7 7B-100 sets forth the purpose of the Juvenile Code:\nThis Subchapter shall be interpreted and construed so as to implement the following purposes and policies:\n(1) To provide procedures for the hearing of juvenile cases that assure fairness and equity and that, protect the constitutional\nrights of juveniles and parents:\n(2) To develop a disposition in each juvenile case that reflects consideration of the facts, the needs and limitations of the juvenile, and the strengths and weaknesses of the family;\n(3) To provide for services for the protection of juveniles by means that, respect both the right, to family autonomy and the juveniles\u2019 needs for safety, continuity, and permanence; and\n(4) To provide standards for the removal, when necessary, of juveniles from their homes and for the return of juveniles to their homes consistent with preventing the unnecessary or inappropriate separation of juveniles from their parents.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-100 (1999) (emphasis supplied). The Juvenile Code, including G.S. \u00a7 7B-907, applicable to permanency planning hearings, must be interpreted and construed so as to implement these goals and policies. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-100.\nStandard of Review\nAll dispositional orders of the trial court in abuse, neglect and dependency hearings must contain findings of fact based upon the credible evidence presented at the hearing. In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 510-11, 491 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1997). If the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, they are conclusive on appeal. In re Isenhour, 101 N.C. App. 550, 553, 400 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1991).\nOrder Ceasing Reunification\nThe purpose of a permanency planning hearing is \u201cto develop a plan to achieve a safe, permanent home for the juvenile within a reasonable period of time.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-907(a) (1999). The trial court has the authority to cease reunification efforts pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 7B-507(b):\n(b) In any order placing a juvenile in the custody or placement responsibility of a county department of social services, whether an order for continued nonsecure custody, a dispositional order, or a review order, the court may direct that reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for placement of the juvenile shall not be required or shall cease if the court makes written findings of fact that:\n(1) Such efforts clearly would be futile or would be inconsistent with the juvenile\u2019s health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-507(b) (1999) (emphasis supplied). See In re Brake, 347 N.C. 339, 493 S.E.2d 418 (1997) (trial court has authority to order DSS to cease reunification efforts where, among other things, juvenile\u2019s mother failed to comply with previous court orders). In its permanency planning order, the trial court made the statutory findings that (1) DSS \u201chas exercised reasonable efforts toward reunification of the minor child with her mother, but reunification is not in the best interest of the minor child and would be contrary to the juvenile\u2019s best interest;\u201d and (2) \u201c[ejfforts to reunify the minor child with her mother would be inconsistent with the child\u2019s health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time.\u201d However, we hold that the evidence before the trial court does not support these findings.\nAs detailed in the recitation of the facts, every witness at the permanency planning hearing testified that respondent had done everything she was required to do by the court and DSS to be reunited with her child. Respondent (1) attended every class, (2) paid child support, (3) attended scheduled visits with Patricia, (4) acknowledged her responsibilities, (5) recognized her errors, and (6) appeared to learn from her mistakes. Respondent\u2019s psychologist, therapist, court-appointed mentor, Nurturing Program instructor, and social worker all testified that respondent had worked hard and made substantial progress towards achieving the goals outlined by the trial court and DSS. Based on its extensive evaluations by numerous psychologists and counselors, DSS recommended that reunification between respondent and Patricia remain the goal. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record that the trial court ever found that respondent inflicted the injuries which lead to Patricia\u2019s removal from the home.\nDespite overwhelming evidence of respondent\u2019s improvements, and full compliance with all provisions of the Family Services Case Plan, the trial court ordered DSS to cease reunification efforts eight months after Patricia was taken from respondent. The trial court further directed DSS to initiate parental right termination proceedings if respondent refused to relinquish her parental rights. After reviewing the transcripts and record, the only \u201cevidence\u201d presented at the hearing which tends to support the trial court\u2019s order is the recommendation submitted by the GAL-appellee. The trial court\u2019s findings substantially mirror GAL-appellee\u2019s recommendations. In its order, the trial court outlined certain findings of fact to support its conclusion that reunification efforts should cease: (1) respondent has had relationships with five different men in the two years preceding the hearing, (2) respondent is \u201cgullible and naive,\u201d (3) respondent would require \u201congoing assistance from professionals for a number of reasons,\u201d with \u201cno guarantees that she would [not] form questionable relationships, which could put her daughter at risk,\u201d (4) respondent has an I.Q. \u201cwhich ranks in the extremely low range,\u201d (5) \u201cTricia is too bonded to her current placement [with the Sigmons] to risk her young and fragile well-being at this time\u201d and (6) respondent did n\u00f3t do more to protect Tricia from Mr. Hart. Nevertheless, we hold that all of the above findings do not constitute sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that it is in Patricia\u2019s best interest to cease reunification efforts with her natural mother. This is particularly true in the light of the mountainous evidence presented to the trial court reaching an opposite conclusion regarding respondent\u2019s progress and parenting ability. See In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 319 S.E.2d 227 (1984) (a prior adjudication of neglect can not be the sole basis for terminating parental rights).\nAt its initial review hearing, the trial court found that respondent \u201cis aware that she has a short period of time in which to turn her life around.\u201d With the exception of GAL/appellee, every person whom the court assigned to assess respondent concluded that respondent had made substantial progress towards \u201cturning her life around.\u201d DSS also recommended that it was in Patricia\u2019s best interest that the goal remain reunification of mother and daughter. In its permanency planning order, the trial court found that respondent \u201chas complied with the Department\u2019s Service Agreement and has taken advantage of every service offered to her.\u201d Nonetheless, the trial court ordered DSS to cease reunification efforts, and to take steps to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights.\nAppellee\u2019s brief contains reference to matters that occurred after the 17 December 1999 order appealed from in this case. Documentation of these subsequent events are not included in the record on appeal. We do not consider any matters discussed in appellee\u2019s brief occurring after the 17 December 1999 order. See N.C.R. App. P. 9.\nIn summary, the trial court ordered that reunification cease: (1) despite finding that respondent had completed all of the services that DSS made available to respondent to put her in a position of being able to care for the child, (2) despite DSS\u2019s recommendation that reunification efforts continue due to respondent\u2019s improvements, and (3) despite the absence of any proof or finding that respondent had ever hurt Patricia. The trial court made the statutory finding that reunification efforts \u201cwould be inconsistent with the child\u2019s health, safety, and need for a safe permanent home within a reasonable period of time.\u201d However, the evidence presented to the trial court supports an opposite conclusion. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-507(b) (1999). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings in order to enable DSS to carry out its statutory duties seeking reunification.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges WALKER and HUNTER concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "TYSON, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "M. Victoria Jayne for Petitioner-Appellee Guardian Ad Litem.",
      "Nathaniel J. Poovey for Respondent-Appellant Angela B. Eckard."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: PATRICIA ECKARD, a minor child\nNo. COA00-655\n(Filed 19 June 2001)\nTermination of Parental Rights\u2014 permanency planning hearing \u2014 error to cease reunification efforts\nThe trial court erred in a permanency planning hearing by directing the Department of Social Services (DSS) to cease reunification efforts between respondent mother and her minor child, because: (1) every witness at the hearing testified that respondent had done everything she was required to do by the court and DSS to be reunited with her child including attending every class, paying child support, attending scheduled visits with her child, acknowledging her responsibilities, recognizing her errors, and appearing to learn from her mistakes; (2) there is no evidence that the trial court ever found that respondent inflicted the injuries which lead to her child\u2019s removal from the home; (3) with the exception of the guardian ad litem, every person whom the court assigned to assess respondent concluded that respondent had made substantial progress towards turning her life around; and (4) DSS recommended that it was in the child\u2019s best interest that the goal remain reunification of mother and daughter.\nRespondent-mother appeals from order entered 17 December 1999 by Judge Nancy L. Einstein in Catawba County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 March 2001.\nM. Victoria Jayne for Petitioner-Appellee Guardian Ad Litem.\nNathaniel J. Poovey for Respondent-Appellant Angela B. Eckard."
  },
  "file_name": "0187-01",
  "first_page_order": 215,
  "last_page_order": 228
}
