{ "id": 11434008, "name": "GREGORY N. THOMAS, Employee, Plaintiff v. B.F. GOODRICH, Employer; SELF-INSURED (Gates McDonald, Servicing Agent), Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Thomas v. Goodrich", "decision_date": "2001-06-19", "docket_number": "No. COA00-656", "first_page": "312", "last_page": "320", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "144 N.C. App. 312" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "357 S.E.2d 670", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4728157 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 S.E.2d 360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11652441 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675", "parenthetical": "conclusions of law are reached through the exercise of judgment or the application of legal principles and findings of fact are reached through logical reasoning based on the evidentiary facts" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11798267 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510", "parenthetical": "conclusions of law are reached through the exercise of judgment or the application of legal principles and findings of fact are reached through logical reasoning based on the evidentiary facts" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "875", "parenthetical": "\"trial court may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its ruling could not have been the result of a reasoned decision\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867641 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90", "parenthetical": "\"trial court may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its ruling could not have been the result of a reasoned decision\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293", "parenthetical": "\"The language of [section] 97-42 clearly indicates that a credit... is not required to be grantedf;] [r]ather, the language places the decision of whether to grant a credit within the sound discretion of the . . . Commission.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.C. App. 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522779 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75", "parenthetical": "\"The language of [section] 97-42 clearly indicates that a credit... is not required to be grantedf;] [r]ather, the language places the decision of whether to grant a credit within the sound discretion of the . . . Commission.\"" }, { "page": "76" }, { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 844", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "846" }, { "page": "846" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4695872 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 S.E.2d 102", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104", "parenthetical": "noting the policy of section 97-42 is \"to encourage voluntary payments by the employer while the [employee's] claim is being litigated and he is receiving no wages\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.C. App. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523903 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484", "parenthetical": "noting the policy of section 97-42 is \"to encourage voluntary payments by the employer while the [employee's] claim is being litigated and he is receiving no wages\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 S.E.2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2493826, 2495367, 2493134, 2497807, 2494779 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0429-04", "/nc/327/0429-03", "/nc/327/0429-01", "/nc/327/0429-05", "/nc/327/0429-02" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122" }, { "page": "122", "parenthetical": "whether to allow employer a credit under section 97-42 is within the discretion of the Commission" }, { "page": "122" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 N.C. App. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521869 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494-95" }, { "page": "495" }, { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/97/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 S.E.2d 669", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 717", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11919896 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 921", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "926" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 N.C. App. 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522220 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/49/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 S.E.2d 806", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571392, 8571365, 8571463, 8571337, 8571433 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0726-03", "/nc/304/0726-02", "/nc/304/0726-05", "/nc/304/0726-01", "/nc/304/0726-04" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E.2d 436", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 N.C. App. 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521916 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/54/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-42", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 8, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 672, "char_count": 19814, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.6110813281371605e-07, "percentile": 0.8882046791144966 }, "sha256": "986db7938d39d1fdc0ccffa30545485c9ce953515d251c6762296313b290192f", "simhash": "1:a1bb6e8e5bae2a04", "word_count": 3229 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:55:44.896074+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "GREGORY N. THOMAS, Employee, Plaintiff v. B.F. GOODRICH, Employer; SELF-INSURED (Gates McDonald, Servicing Agent), Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nB.F. Goodrich (Defendant) appeals an opinion and award of the Full Commission of the North Carolina Industrial Commission (the Commission) filed 19 January 2000.\nThe record shows that Gregory N. Thomas (Plaintiff) suffered a compensable injury on 3 June 1986 while employed by Defendant. In an opinion and award filed 26 February 1990, a deputy commissioner of the North Carolina Industrial Commission concluded Plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled as a result of his compensable injury. Pursuant to the 26 February 1990 opinion and award, Defendant was ordered to pay Plaintiff \u201ccompensation for total disability for the remainder of his life, return to work, or change of condition, whichever first occurs, at the rate of $197.34 per week beginning from 3 June 1986.\u201d Additionally, the 26 February 1990 opinion and award contained the following provision:\n3. A reasonable attorney[\u2019s] fee of twenty-five (25%) percent of the compensation due [P]laintiff is approved for [Plaintiffs counsel and shall be paid as follows: twenty-five (25%) of the lump sum due [P]laintiff shall be deducted from that sum and paid directly to [Plaintiff\u2019s counsel. Every fourth compensation check, thereafter, shall be deducted from the sum due [Pjlaintiff and paid directly to [P]laintiff\u2019s counsel.\nSubsequent to entry of the 26 February 1990 opinion and award, Defendant began making weekly payments to Plaintiff in the amount of $197.34. Although the 26 February 1990 opinion and award ordered Defendant to send every fourth check to Plaintiff\u2019s counsel, Defendant forwarded every check, including every fourth check, directly to Plaintiff. Defendant continued to pay Plaintiff in this manner until January 1996, which resulted in Plaintiff receiving $15,195.18 in funds that Defendant should have forwarded to Plaintiff\u2019s counsel rather than to Plaintiff. On 8 January 1996, Defendant \u201cchanged servicing agents and the new servicing agent began sending every fourth compensation check directly to [Pjlaintiff\u2019s attorney.\u201d\nOn 4 October 1996, Plaintiff filed a motion with the Industrial Commission requesting that Defendant be compelled to pay to Plaintiff\u2019s counsel all attorney\u2019s fees due under the 26 February 1990 opinion and award that remained unpaid. In an order filed 27 November 1996, the executive secretary of the Commission ordered:\nthat [Defendant pay to [Pjlaintiff\u2019s counsel all attorney[\u2019s] fees due pursuant to the February 26, 1990 [o]pinion and [a]ward and subsequent Orders, which have not been paid within thirty (30) days of this Order. Plaintiff\u2019s counsel should have received every fourth check from the entry of the [o]pinion and [a]ward and continuing.\nDefendant did not appeal the 27 November 1996 order. In compliance with the 27 November 1996 order, on 10 February 1997, Defendant forwarded to Plaintiff\u2019s counsel attorney\u2019s fees in the amount of $15,195.18. However, on 28 February 1997, Defendant sent a letter to the executive secretary of the Industrial Commission stating that Plaintiff, as a result of receiving funds that should have been forwarded by Defendant to Plaintiff\u2019s counsel, received \u201can overpayment of temporary... benefits.\u201d Also in the letter, Defendant inquired as to whether it was \u201callowed a credit for this money paid and how [it] should go about taking this credit from [Plaintiffs] future payments.\u201d In a letter of response dated 7 May 1997, the executive secretary informed Defendant that she was \u201cnot inclined to award a credit for attorney[\u2019s] fees\u201d and that, should Defendant wish to pursue this matter, it should file a Form 33 request for a hearing.\nOn 27 May 1998, Defendant filed a Form 33 request for a hearing on the issue of whether it was entitled to \u201ca credit for all amounts paid to both . . . [P]laintiff and his attorney.\u201d On 19 January 2000, subsequent to a hearing on this issue during which the parties presented evidence, the Commission filed an opinion and award containing the following pertinent findings of fact:\n5. Instead of sending every fourth compensation check directly to [Plaintiff\u2019s counsel for attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to the February 26, 1990 [o]pinion and [a]ward, [Defendant sent each compensation check, including every fourth check, directly to [P]laintiff, who cashed them and spent the money. There was nothing on the checks to indicate to [P]laintiff that the money did not belong to him. Additionally, [P]laintiff is functionally illiterate and has reading and writing abilities at the third grade level and a Beta IQ of 72.\n12. The $15,195.18 paid by [Defendant to [PJIaintiff during the period 1990 through 1995 by sending checks for $197.34 every week instead of every three out of four weeks (with the fourth week\u2019s check to be sent directly to [P]laintiff\u2019s attorney) was not due and payable to [P]laintiff at the time it was paid.\n13. The $15,195.18 [Defendant paid [P]laintiff\u2019s attorney pursuant to [the executive secretary\u2019s] November 27, 1996 Order was due and payable at the time it was paid because [Defendant had not made payment of every fourth check directly to [PJlaintiff\u2019s counsel as required by the February 26,1990 [opinion and award].\nThe Commission then made the following pertinent conclusions of law:\n2. Since this is a case of lifetime disability, it is impossible to \u201cshorten the period during which compensation must be paid[.]\u201d[] To the extent the . . . Commission grants a credit to [Defendant, such credit would \u201creduc(e) the amount of the weekly payment\u201d and thus be in violation of... N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-42. . . .\n3. It would not be fair to make [P]laintiff repay the $15,195.18 to [Defendant. The only way the . . . Commission could accomplish this would be to permit . . . [Defendant to reduce [P]laintiff\u2019s compensation, which is already below the poverty levelf.] . . .\n4. As between [Defendant and [P]laintiff, [Defendant should bear the responsibility for its failure to pay every fourth check to [P]laintiff\u2019s attorney as directed in the [o]pinion and [a]ward of February 26, 1990. Plaintiff did not have the mental ability to realize that his receipt of every fourth check was not in accordance with the provisions of the [ojpinion and [a]ward of February 26, 1990.\nBased on its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Commission ordered the following:\nDefendant is not entitled to a credit pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-42 against future compensation payments to [P]laintiff. Alternatively, the . . . Commission in its discretion determines that, as between [P]laintiff and [Defendant based on the facts of this matter, [Defendant should bear the entire cost of its failure to follow the dictates of the [o]pinion and [a]ward of February 26, 1990, and no credit is awarded.\nThe issues are whether: (I) Defendant preserved for appellate review the issue of whether the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence in the record; (II) an employer can receive a credit pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-42 when the employee has received an award of permanent disability; and (III) the Commission abused its discretion by denying Defendant\u2019s request for a credit pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-42.\nI\nDefendant argues several of the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence in the record.\nAppellate review of the Commission\u2019s findings of fact is limited to whether the findings of fact are supported by competent evidence. Hemric v. Manufacturing Co., 54 N.C. App. 314, 316, 283 S.E.2d 436, 437-38 (1981), disc. review denied, 304 N.C. 726, 288 S.E.2d 806 (1982). When a party challenges the Commission\u2019s findings of fact based on insufficiency of the evidence, the record on appeal must contain all evidence necessary for review of the findings, including all relevant transcripts of proceedings. N.C.R. App. P. 9(a)(1)(e). When such relevant evidence is not made part of the record on appeal, this Court is precluded from reviewing the Commission\u2019s findings of fact; therefore, the findings of fact are \u201cdeemed to be supported by competent evidence.\u201d See Britt v. Britt, 49 N.C. App. 463, 469, 271 S.E.2d 921, 926 (1980); In re Estate of Barrow, 122 N.C. App. 717, 722, 471 S.E.2d 669, 672 (1996).\nIn this case, the record on appeal does not contain any evidence or a transcript of the proceedings relied upon by the deputy commissioner of the Industrial Commission in making its 26 February 1990 opinion and award. Additionally, the record on appeal does not contain any transcript of proceedings relied upon by the Commission in making its 19 January 2000 opinion and award, though the record indicates the Commission received evidence during a hearing on this matter. This Court is therefore precluded from reviewing the Commission\u2019s findings of fact. Thus, the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are deemed to be supported by competent evidence. This assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.\nII\nDefendant argues the Commission erred by concluding Defendant could not be awarded a credit because any credit would \u201c \u2018reduc(e) the amount of weekly payment\u2019 and thus be in violation of . . . N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-42.\u201d We agree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-42 provides in pertinent part:\nPayments made by the employer to the injured employee during the period of his disability, or to his dependents, which by the terms of this Article were not due and payable when made, may, subject to the approval of the Commission be deducted from the amount to be paid as compensation. Provided, that in the case of disability such deductions shall be made by shortening the \u2022period during which compensation must be paid, and not by reducing the amount of the weekly payment.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 (1999) (emphasis added). Generally, deductions to an employee\u2019s award which are allowed by the Commission pursuant to section 97-42 must be made by shortening the period during which payments are due. Id. When, however, an employee receives an award of permanent disability to be paid during his lifetime, it is not possible to \u201cshorten[] the period during which compensation must be paid.\u201d Thus, when a deduction is allowed in such a case, the Commission may order the employer to reduce the amount of the employee\u2019s payments in order to compensate the employer for the deduction. See, e.g., Johnson v. IBM, 97 N.C. App. 493, 494-95, 389 S.E.2d 121, 122 (affirming opinion and award of the Commission which allowed employer to deduct funds pursuant to section 97-42 from an employee\u2019s award of permanent disability), disc. review denied, 327 N.C. 429, 395 S.E.2d 679 (1990). To hold otherwise would preclude an employer from seeking a deduction under section 97-42 in any case involving an award of permanent disability. We, however, do not believe the Legislature intended such a result. See Gray v. Carolina Freight Carriers, 105 N.C. App. 480, 484, 414 S.E.2d 102, 104 (1992) (noting the policy of section 97-42 is \u201cto encourage voluntary payments by the employer while the [employee\u2019s] claim is being litigated and he is receiving no wages\u201d).\nIn this case, the Commission erred by concluding an award of a deduction to Defendant would violate section 97-42 because it would \u201c \u2018reduc(e) the amount of weekly payment\u2019 \u201d made to Plaintiff pursuant to Plaintiff\u2019s award of permanent disability. Nevertheless, because the Commission made alternative findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its denial of Defendant\u2019s motion for a deduction, this error does not require reversal.\nIll\nDefendant argues the Commission erred by denying its request for a credit under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-42 based on its conclusion that \u201c[Defendant should bear the entire cost of its failure to follow the dictates of the [o]pinion and [a]ward of February 26, 1990.\u201d We disagree.\nPayments are due and payable under section 97-42 when the employer has accepted the plaintiff\u2019s injury as compensable and initiated payment of benefits, \u201cso long as the payments [do] not exceed the amount determined by statute or by the Commission to compensate [the] plaintiff for his injuries.\u201d Moretz v. Richards & Associates, 316 N.C. 539, 542, 342 S.E.2d 844, 846 (1986). If payments made by an employer are due and payable, the employer may not be awarded a credit for the payments under section 97-42. Id. at 541, 342 S.E.2d at 846. When, however, an employer makes payments that are not due and payable, the Commission may in its discretion award the employer a credit for the payments pursuant to section 97-42. Johnson, 97 N.C. App. at 495, 389 S.E.2d at 122 (whether to allow employer a credit under section 97-42 is within the discretion of the Commission); Moretz v. Richards & Associates, 74 N.C. App. 72, 75, 327 N.C. 290, 293 (1985) (\u201cThe language of [section] 97-42 clearly indicates that a credit... is not required to be grantedf;] [r]ather, the language places the decision of whether to grant a credit within the sound discretion of the . . . Commission.\u201d), modified on other grounds and affirmed, 316 N.C. 539, 342 S.E.2d 844 (1986). Thus, this Court\u2019s review of the Commission\u2019s decision to grant or deny a credit for payments made by an employer that were not due and payable \u201cis strictly limited to a determination of whether the record affirmatively demonstrates a manifest abuse of discretion\u201d by the Commission. Mortez, 74 N.C. App. at 76, 327 S.E.2d at 293; see State v. Burrus, 344 N.C. 79, 90, 472 S.E.2d 867, 875 (1996) (\u201ctrial court may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its ruling could not have been the result of a reasoned decision\u201d).\nIn this case, the parties do not dispute that Defendant mailed every fourth payment directly to Plaintiff rather than to Plaintiff\u2019s counsel. Additionally, the Commission found as fact that \u201c[Pjlaintiff is functionally illiterate and has reading and writing abilities at the third grade level and a Beta IQ of 72\u201d; \u201c[a]s between [Defendant and [Pjlaintiff, [Defendant should bear the responsibility for its failure to pay every fourth check to [P]laintiff\u2019s attorney as directed in the [o]pinion and [a]ward of February 26, 1990\u201d; and \u201cPlaintiff did not have the mental ability to realize that his receipt of every fourth check was not in accordance with the provisions of the [o]pinion and [a]ward of February 26, 1990.\u201d These findings of fact demonstrate the Commission\u2019s opinion and award denying Defendant\u2019s request for a credit was based on a reasoned decision; thus, the Commission did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant\u2019s request for a credit. Accordingly, the Commission\u2019s 19 January 2000 opinion and award is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges TIMMONS-GOODSON and BRYANT concur.\n. Although the Commission classified paragraph numbers 3 and 4 as \u201cCONCLUSIONS OF LAW,\u201d these paragraphs contain findings of fact as well as conclusions of law. See In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 510, 491 S.E.2d 672, 675 (1997) (conclusions of law are reached through the exercise of judgment or the application of legal principles and findings of fact are reached through logical reasoning based on the evidentiary facts).\n. Defendant argues in its brief to this Court that pursuant to Tucker v. Workable Company, 129 N.C. App. 695, 501 S.E.2d 360 (1998), the standard of review of the Commission\u2019s decision to grant or deny a credit under section 97-42 is not \u201ca wholly discretionary standard.\u201d We disagree. Tucker does not overrule well-established law that the Commission may, in Us discretion, grant or deny a credit under section 97-42. See Johnson, 97 N.C. App. at 495, 389 S.E.2d at 122; Moretz, 74 N.C. App. at 75, 327 S.E.2d at 293. Rather, the teaching of Tucker is that the Commission abused its discretion when it disallowed a credit for the purpose of penalizing the employer for failing \u201cto abide by the law and rules of the ... Commission.\u201d Tucker, 129 N.C. App. at 703, 501 S.E.2d at 366.\nWe acknowledge the North Carolina Supreme Court held'in Foster v. Western-Electric Co., 320 N.C. 113, 117-18, 357 S.E.2d 670, 673 (1987), that an employer should be allowed a \u201ccredit for the amount paid [to an employee pursuant to a private disability plan] as against the amount which was subsequently determined to be due the employee under workers\u2019 compensation\u201d when the amount paid under the private disability plan was not \u201cdue and payable.\u201d Thus, it is an abuse of discretion for the Commission to deny a credit under section 97-42 in such cases. Nevertheless, in the case sub judice, Defendant does not seek a credit for payments made to Plaintiff pursuant to a private benefits plan prior to Plaintiff\u2019s award of permanent disability; thus, the holding of Foster is not applicable to the facts of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wallace and Graham, P.A., by Barbara L. Curry, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice PLLC, by Clayton M. Custer and Christopher A. Kreiner, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GREGORY N. THOMAS, Employee, Plaintiff v. B.F. GOODRICH, Employer; SELF-INSURED (Gates McDonald, Servicing Agent), Defendant\nNo. COA00-656\n(Filed 19 June 2001)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 findings of fact \u2014 record on appeal \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe Court of Appeals is precluded from reviewing the Industrial Commission\u2019s findings of fact and the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are deemed to be supported by competent evidence in the record, because: (1) the record on appeal does not contain any evidence or a transcript of the proceedings relied upon by the deputy commissioner in making an opinion and award; and (2) the record on appeal does not contain any transcript of proceedings relied upon by the Industrial Commission in making its opinion and award even though the record does indicate the Commission received evidence during a hearing on the matter.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 request for credit \u2014 lifetime permanent disability payments \u2014 deductions\nThe Industrial Commission did not err by concluding that defendant employer could not receive credit under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 for its payments of permanent disability to plaintiff employee that were supposed to be made directly to plaintiff\u2019s attorney for attorney fees, because: (1) generally deductions to an employee\u2019s award under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 must be made by shortening the period that payments are due, and it is not possible to shorten the period of payments when an employee receives an award of permanent disability to be paid during his lifetime; and (2) although an award of a deduction in the amount of the employee\u2019s payment in order to compensate the employer would not violate N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42, the Commission made alternative findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its denial of defendant\u2019s motion for a deduction.\n3. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 request for credit \u2014 lifetime permanent disability payments \u2014 failure to follow dictates of opinion and award\nThe Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant employer\u2019s request for a credit under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-42 based on the Commission\u2019s conclusion that defendant should bear the entire cost of its failure to follow the dictates of the opinion and award of 26 February 1990 requiring defendant to pay every fourth permanent disability payment directly to plaintiff\u2019s attorney for attorney fees instead of to plaintiff employee, because: (1) the parties do not dispute that defendant mailed every fourth payment directly to plaintiff rather than to plaintiff\u2019s counsel; (2) plaintiff did not have the mental ability to realize that his receipt of every fourth check was not in accordance with the provisions of the opinion and award; and (3) the Commission\u2019s findings of fact demonstrate the denial of a credit was based on a reasoned decision.\nAppeal by defendant from opinion and award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission filed 19 January 2000. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 May 2001.\nWallace and Graham, P.A., by Barbara L. Curry, for plaintiff-appellee.\nWomble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice PLLC, by Clayton M. Custer and Christopher A. Kreiner, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0312-01", "first_page_order": 340, "last_page_order": 348 }