{ "id": 11434973, "name": "JOANNE KELLER v. WILLOW SPRINGS LONG TERM CARE FACILITY, INC.", "name_abbreviation": "Keller v. Willow Springs Long Term Care Facility, Inc.", "decision_date": "2001-06-19", "docket_number": "No. COA00-74", "first_page": "433", "last_page": "437", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "144 N.C. App. 433" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "359 S.E.2d 780", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4726123 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 839", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524438 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 S.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566231 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 S.E.2d 365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 787", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528006 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "790" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0787-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 S.E.2d 467", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132282, 131930, 132234, 132199 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0108-02", "/nc/350/0108-04", "/nc/350/0108-03", "/nc/350/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "893" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571622 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5309293 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2488503 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 341", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344", "parenthetical": "citing Collingwood v. General Electric Real Estate Equities, Inc., 324 N.C. 63, 66, 376 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2498339 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187", "parenthetical": "citing Collingwood v. General Electric Real Estate Equities, Inc., 324 N.C. 63, 66, 376 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567370 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571111 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 S.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568529 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0375-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 601, "char_count": 10016, "ocr_confidence": 0.725, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.24037694861746767 }, "sha256": "d5ee68ad0405e84173c4e443ec730e7bebd948177b620f2dcff8692148ad7b1b", "simhash": "1:0b30362b8885bceb", "word_count": 1605 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:55:44.896074+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and McGEE concur." ], "parties": [ "JOANNE KELLER v. WILLOW SPRINGS LONG TERM CARE FACILITY, INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "THOMAS, Judge.\nPlaintiff Joanne Keller filed a complaint alleging defendant Willow Springs Long Term Care Facility, Inc. was negligent by creating a hidden and dangerous condition which resulted in serious injury to her back. From the grant of defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment, plaintiff appeals.\nPlaintiff was employed as a physical therapy assistant for Home Health Agency of Chapel Hill, Inc. Her duties included caring for several residents of a rest home in Carrboro being operated by defendant.\nOn 21 December 1993, plaintiff went to the room of Peter Koutouzakis (Koutouzakis), a stroke victim, in order to provide physical therapy. She had previously provided care for him including exercise, transfers (moving him from bed to wheelchair and return) and gait training. According to plaintiffs allegations, she noticed Koutouzakis sitting on the edge of his bed, agitated, with one of defendant\u2019s employees attempting to assist him into a wheelchair. The employee was not trained to care for patients, had not locked the wheelchair and had failed to put a leg brace or gait belt on him. As plaintiff entered the room, the employee backed away and Koutouzakis began to slide off the bed. Plaintiff rushed to his aid, putting her knees in front of him to prevent his fall. Plaintiff then placed a gait belt around Koutouzakis and transferred him to the wheelchair. In catching him and placing him in his wheelchair, however, she suffered injury to her back resulting in permanent and total disability.\nAccording to plaintiff, \u201cthe situation which existed in the room\u201d was the hidden and dangerous condition caused by the actions and inactions of defendant. According to the defendant, plaintiff in effect is arguing that Koutouzakis himself was the dangerous condition.\nThe trial court allowed defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment on 20 September 1999, which plaintiff assigns as error.\nThe standard for granting a motion for summary judgment is well-established. A party is entitled to summary judgment only \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1 Rule 56.\nThe party moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing the lack of any triable issue. Caldwell v. Deese, 288 N.C. 375, 218 S.E.2d 379 (1975). The movant may meet this burden by proving that an essential element of the opposing party\u2019s claim is non existent, or by showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his claim or cannot surmount an affirmative defense which would bar the claim. Bernick v. Jurden, 306 N.C. 435, 293 S.E.2d 405 (1982); Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981).\nMozingo v. Pitt County Memorial Hosp., Inc., 331 N.C. 182, 187, 415 S.E.2d 341, 344 (1992) (citing Collingwood v. General Electric Real Estate Equities, Inc., 324 N.C. 63, 66, 376 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1989)).\nHere, plaintiff alleges defendant was negligent in that it: a) failed to exercise ordinary care to keep and maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition; b) created a hidden and dangerous condition by failing to properly medicate Koutouzakis; c) failed to train its employees and agents and properly staff its facility; d) failed to timely toilet him; e) failed to transfer him to an intermediate care facility to provide more extensive medical care and supervision when his health condition deteriorated; f) failed to warn plaintiff of hidden perils and unsafe conditions of which defendant knew or, by reasonable inspection, could have discovered; g) failed to reasonably inspect him and to correct unsafe conditions which such an examination would have revealed; and h) generally failed to warn plaintiff of these hidden and dangerous conditions.\nIn order to establish negligence, plaintiff must show that: 1) defendant owed a legal duty to the plaintiff; 2) the defendant breached the duty; 3) plaintiff sustained injuries; and 4) the plaintiff\u2019s injuries were proximately caused by defendant\u2019s breach. Pulley v. Rex Hospital, 326 N.C. 701, 392 S.E.2d 380 (1990).\nIn the instant case, plaintiff bases her negligence claim on a premises liability theory. She contends a lack of proper care for Koutouzakis caused an unsafe condition which breached a duty to plaintiff as a business invitee.\nOur Supreme Court has held that landowners owe a duty to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of their premises to all lawful visitors. Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615, 507 S.E.2d 882 (1998), reh\u2019g denied, 350 N.C. 108, 533 S.E.2d 467 (1999). The Court in Nelson also eliminated the distinction between licensees and business invitees for the purposes of premises liability and instead imposed a duty on landowners to exercise reasonable care to all lawful visitors. Landowners have a duty to maintain their premises in a reasonably safe condition for their intended use. Pulley v. Rex Hospital, 326 N.C. 701, 392 S.E.2d 380 (1990).\nTo withstand summary judgment under a premises liability theory, plaintiff must demonstrate substantial evidence showing defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of its premises. Nelson, 349 N.C. at 633, 507 S.E.2d at 893.\nPlaintiff argues that a staff shortage resulted in Koutouzakis not being toiletted and properly medicated prior to his 10:00 a.m. appointment with plaintiff. She says this failure created a hidden and dangerous condition which resulted in her injury. In essence, plaintiff advances the novel theory that the rest home resident himself became a dangerous condition. Some of the dangerous conditions recognized by North Carolina Courts have included uneven and/or broken sidewalks, indentures in walkways, a dirt filled ditch, uneven stairs and/or the absence of handrails, wet floors, and unlighted parking lots. See Newsom v. Byrnes, 114 N.C. App. 787, 443 S.E.2d 365 (1994); Rappaport v. Days Inn of America, Inc., 296 N.C. 382, 250 S.E.2d 245 (1979). Additionally, this Court has held that a hospital owes a duty to protect a patient against foreseeable assaults by another patient. Burns v. Forsyth County Hosp. Authority, Inc., 81 N.C. App. 556, 344 S.E.2d 839 (1986). There is no reasonable analogy from any of these holdings to the present case.\nOur review of the record shows no evidence that defendant failed to act outside the standard of care in the maintenance of its premises, that the premises were improperly maintained or of any other breach of duty owed to plaintiff. Plaintiff has not indicated any evidence of a defective, dangerous or unsafe condition on the property of defendant.\nEven if it were determined that the resident was a dangerous condition, or as plaintiff argues, the \u201csituation\u201d in the room was the dangerous condition with defendant not properly caring for its residents, plaintiff\u2019s contention would still fail. Our Supreme Court, in Branks, held that dismissal of plaintiffs complaint alleging premises liability was appropriate where the alleged hazard was obvious to her. 320 N.C. 621, 359 S.E.2d 780 (1987). Similarly in Newsom, this Court held that \u201ceven if the condition... had been rendered unsafe under the circumstances, plaintiff knew of the unsafe condition.\u201d Therefore, defendant was not liable. Newsom, 114 N.C. App. at 790, 443 S.E.2d at 368.\nIn the case at bar, plaintiff claims the condition was both dangerous and hidden. Even while arguably dangerous, however, the condition was in no way hidden from plaintiff. Her argument goes to Koutouzakis\u2019 condition at the moment she entered the room being unexpected, not hidden. Plaintiff also claims defendant had a last clear chance to avoid injury to plaintiff, but fails to adequately analyze the theory or cite appropriate authority.\nThe ultimate facts are straightforward. Plaintiff voluntarily went to the aid of a resident with the admitted knowledge that he was agitated, needed to use the restroom and was not utilizing his leg brace. She also was aware the wheelchair was not in a locked position. Plaintiff is a physical therapy assistant capable of making proper bed to wheelchair transfers. The only danger alleged by plaintiff was a human condition of which plaintiff was apprised and well-trained to address. Plaintiff may not recover where the allegedly dangerous condition would be obvious to an ordinary person or where plaintiff had equal or superior knowledge of the allegedly dangerous condition. See Pulley v. Rex Hospital, 326 N.C. 701, 392 S.E.2d 380 (1990); Branks v. Kerns, 320 N.C. 621, 359 S.E.2d 780 (1987). Accordingly, this assignment of error is rejected and the decision of the trial court affirmed.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges WYNN and McGEE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "THOMAS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Browne, Flebotte, Wilson & Home by Linda L. Czyzyk for plaintiff-appellant.", "McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe by Kurt E. Lindquist, II and Arden Lynn Achenberg for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JOANNE KELLER v. WILLOW SPRINGS LONG TERM CARE FACILITY, INC.\nNo. COA00-74\n(Filed 19 June 2001)\nHospitals and Other Medical Facilities\u2014 negligence \u2014 staff injury \u2014 transfer of patient to wheelchair \u2014 not a hidden condition\nThe trial court did not err by granting defendant\u2019s motion of summary judgment in a negligence action by a physical therapy assistant who suffered a back injury when she went to the aid of a stroke victim who was falling during a transfer from a bed to a wheelchair. Plaintiff did not indicate any evidence of a defective, dangerous, or unsafe condition and, although plaintiff alleged the situation in the room was a hidden and dangerous condition caused by the actions and inactions of defendant-facility, the only danger was a human condition of which plaintiff was apprised and well trained to address.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 20 September 1999 by Judge J.B. Allen, Jr. in Orange County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 February 2001.\nBrowne, Flebotte, Wilson & Home by Linda L. Czyzyk for plaintiff-appellant.\nMcGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe by Kurt E. Lindquist, II and Arden Lynn Achenberg for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0433-01", "first_page_order": 461, "last_page_order": 465 }