{ "id": 11435553, "name": "WILLIAM EDWARD VAUGHN, Plaintiff v. CVS REVCO D.S., INC., Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Vaughn v. CVS Revco D.S., Inc.", "decision_date": "2001-07-03", "docket_number": "No. COA00-159", "first_page": "534", "last_page": "541", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "144 N.C. App. 534" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "360 S.E.2d 107", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 638", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4723523, 4726053, 4726533, 4730695 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0638-02", "/nc/320/0638-03", "/nc/320/0638-01", "/nc/320/0638-04" ] }, { "cite": "354 S.E.2d 746", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12169838 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1161-67", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "COBRA" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 805", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139520, 139681, 139619, 139449, 139673 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0548-02", "/nc/346/0548-01", "/nc/346/0548-04", "/nc/346/0548-05", "/nc/346/0548-03" ] }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 727", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11708301 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 U.S. 125", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11925032 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/506/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 F.3d 1156", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9046435 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/89/1156-01" ] }, { "cite": "851 F. Supp. 210", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. 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CVS REVCO D.S., INC., Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CAMPBELL, Judge.\nPlaintiff appeals the trial court\u2019s determination that his claims are preempted by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1001-1461 (ERISA), and, thus, subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.\nOn 9 June 1999, plaintiff filed an action against CVS Reveo D.S., Inc. (defendant), successor in interest to Reveo D.S., Inc. (Reveo), alleging anticipatory breach of contract and unfair and deceptive trade practices. Plaintiffs complaint alleged that he began employment with Reveo on 15 February 1972. Plaintiff later operated his own business, Vaughn Independent Pharmacy, until in or around August 1995, at which time his pharmacy was purchased by Reveo. Plaintiff further alleged that an agent of Reveo orally contracted with plaintiff for a position of employment as a salaried pharmacist at Revco\u2019s Carrboro location. In evidence of this alleged oral contract, plaintiff received written confirmation by letter dated 5 June 1995, stating \u201cyou will retain your tenure showing a date of hire of February 15, 1972,\u201d and \u201c[a]ll benefits will be applicable per your tenure.\u201d Defendant subsequently acquired Reveo, and plaintiff retained his employment with defendant. Plaintiff alleged that agents of defendant have expressly stated on numerous occasions that upon retirement plaintiff\u2019s pension benefits will be calculated as if he were hired in or about August 1995, although the contract provides for a date of hire of 15 February 1972. Plaintiff alleged that these statements constituted an anticipatory breach of contract, and that defendant\u2019s conduct constituted unfair and deceptive trade practices.\nDefendant answered plaintiff\u2019s complaint and moved to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s claims, arguing that they are preempted by ERISA. The trial court agreed and entered an order dismissing plaintiff\u2019s claims for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.\nPlaintiff argues the trial court erred in its conclusion that his claims are preempted by ERISA. We agree, and reverse the order of the trial court.\nERISA preempts \u201cany and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan\u201d covered by ERISA. 29 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 1144(a) (1999). The text of ERISA\u2019s preemption provision is \u201cclearly expansive.\u201d New York Blue Cross v. Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. 645, 655, 131 L. Ed. 2d 695, 705 (1995), However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the term \u201crelate to\u201d cannot be \u201ctaken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminancy,\u201d or else \u201cfor all practical purposes pre-emption would never run its course.\u201d Id. Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has cautioned that \u201c[s]ome state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law \u2018relates to\u2019 \u201d an ERISA plan. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n. 21, 77 L. Ed. 2d 490, 503 n. 21 (1983).\nIn Shaw, the United States Supreme Court explained that \u201c[a] law \u2018relates to\u2019 an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it [1] has a connection with or [2] reference to such a plan.\u201d Id. at 96-97, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 501. Under the latter inquiry, where a State\u2019s law acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans, as in Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency, 486 U.S. 825, 100 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1988) (holding that ERISA preempts a state law specifically exempting ERISA plans from an otherwise generally applicable garnishment provision), or where the existence of an ERISA plan is essential to the law\u2019s operation, as in Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 112 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1990) (holding that ERISA preempts a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge premised on the existence of an ERISA plan), the law impermissibly \u201crefers to\u201d an employment benefit plan, resulting in preemption. Cal. Div. of Lab. Stds. v. Dillingham, 519 U.S. 316, 324-25, 136 L. Ed. 2d 791, 799 (1997).\nA law that does not refer to ERISA plans may still be preempted if it has an impermissible connection with ERISA plans. To determine whether a state law has the forbidden connection with ERISA plans, the United States Supreme Court in Travelers adopted a pragmatic approach, \u201cgo[ing] beyond the unhelpful text [of \u00a7 1144(a)] and the frustrating difficulty of defining its key term [\u201crelates to\u201d], and looking] instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive [preemption].\u201d Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 705.\nERISA was enacted to \u201cprotect.. . the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries ... by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.\u201d 29 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 1001(b) (1999). In passing ERISA\u2019s preemption provision, Congress intended\nto ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and financial burden of complying with conflicting directives among States or between States and the Federal Government..., [and to prevent] the potential for conflict in substantive law... requiring the tailoring of plans and employer conduct to the peculiarities of the law of each jurisdiction.\nTravelers, 514 U.S. at 656-57, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 706 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. at 142, 112 L. Ed. 2d at 486 (1990)). \u201cThe basic thrust of the preemption clause, then, was to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans.\u201d Id.\n\u201c[I]n light of the objectives of ERISA and its preemption clause, Congress intended ERISA to preempt at least three categories of state laws that can be said to have a connection with an ERISA plan.\u201d Coyne & Delany Co. v. Selman, 98 F.3d 1457, 1468 (4th Cir. 1996). \u201cFirst, Congress intended ERISA to preempt state laws that \u2018mandate!] employment benefit structures or their administration.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 707). For example, the Court in Shaw held that ERISA preempted a New York statute which prohibited employers from structuring benefit plans in a manner that discriminated on the basis of pregnancy, as well as a statute that required employers to pay employees specific benefits. Shaw, 463 U.S. 85, 77 L. Ed. 2d 490. Without preemption, such laws would subject benefit plans to conflicting directives from one state to the next. Id.\n\u201cSecond, Congress intended to preempt state laws that bind employers or plan administrators to particular choices or preclude uniform administrative practice, thereby functioning as a regulation of an ERISA plan itself.\u201d Coyne & Delany Co., 98 F.3d at 1468. \u201cAccordingly, the Court in Travelers held that ERISA did not preempt New York\u2019s statute imposing surcharges on patients covered by certain insurers because the statute merely had an \u2018indirect economic influence\u2019 on a plan\u2019s shopping choices but did not bind a plan to any particular choice.\u201d Id.\nThird, Congress intended to preempt \u201cstate laws providing alternate enforcement mechanisms\u201d for employees to obtain ERISA plan benefits. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 707. In considering whether a particular state law claim falls within this category, it is important to determine whether the claim is \u201caimed at obtaining ERISA benefits.\u201d Coyne & Delany Co., 98 F.3d at 1471. Specifically, in Coyne & Delany Co., the Fourth Circuit emphasized that the plaintiff\u2019s claims were not preempted by ERISA because if the plaintiff succeeded on its claims, the defendants would be liable in their individual capacities, not as an administrator or fiduciary of an ERISA plan, and the plaintiff would not be entitled to ERISA plan benefits. See also Smith v. Cohen Ben. Group, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 210, 214 (M.D.N.C.1993).\nIn contrast to the three categories of state laws that Congress intended ERISA to preempt, \u201cCongress did not intend to preempt \u2018traditional state-based laws of general applicability [that do not] implicate the relations among the traditional ERISA plan entities . . . Coyne & Delany Co., 98 F.3d at 1469 (quoting Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1167 (4th Cir. 1996).\nIn the instant case, plaintiff alleged (1) a common law claim of anticipatory breach of contract, and (2) a statutory claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices. The factual basis for both of plaintiffs claims is that defendant does not intend to honor its agreement with plaintiff that allegedly established 15 February 1972 as the date of hire for purposes of determining plaintiff\u2019s pension benefits. In light of the principles already discussed, we now consider whether plaintiff\u2019s claims \u201crelate to\u201d an ERISA plan.\nAt the outset, we hold that plaintiff\u2019s claims do not make \u201creference to\u201d an ERISA plan, and, thus, are not preempted on that basis. To be preempted for making \u201creference to\u201d an ERISA plan, a law must specifically refer to ERISA plans, See Mackey, 486 U.S. 825, 100 L. Ed. 2d 836; District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 121 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1992), or the cause of action must be dependent on the existence of an ERISA plan. See Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. 133, 112 L. Ed. 2d 474. In the instant case, plaintiff\u2019s claims are based on state law that applies in a variety of contexts and does not specifically refer to ERISA plans, and plaintiff\u2019s claims are not dependent on the existence of an ERISA plan. Therefore, we must consider whether plaintiff\u2019s claims have an impermissible \u201cconnection with\u201d ERISA plans.\nWe start by emphasizing that allowing plaintiff\u2019s claims to go forward in state court would not in any way undermine the objectives of the ERISA statute. Hearing plaintiff\u2019s claims in state court in no way threatens ERISA\u2019s objective to \u201cprotect . . . the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries ... by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans and by providing appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to Federal courts.\u201d 29 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 1001(b). Further, allowing plaintiff\u2019s claims to survive in state court does not interfere with the purposes of ERISA\u2019s preemption provision. Plaintiff\u2019s claims will not subject plans and plan sponsors to \u201cconflicting directives among States or between States and the Federal Government. . . .\u201d Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 706 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 142, 112 L. Ed. 2d at 474). Nor do they create \u201cthe potential for conflict in substantive law . . . requiring the tailoring of plans and employer conduct to the peculiarities of the law of each jurisdiction.\u201d Id. Plaintiffs state law claims simply do not threaten Congress\u2019 goal of \u201cthe nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans.\u201d Id. at 657, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 706. Therefore, a finding of preemption in this case is not necessary to protect the objectives of ERISA.\nFurther, we do not feel that plaintiffs state law claims fall within any of the three categories of state laws Congress intended ERISA to preempt. First, plaintiffs state law claims do not \u201cmandate [] employee benefit structures or their administration.\u201d Id. at 658, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 707. The state law claims at issue here do not attempt to require an employee benefit plan with particular terms, or to regulate the types of benefits a plan may provide. They do not create reporting, disclosure, or funding requirements, nor do they define fiduciary duties or address faulty plan administration. See Coyne & Delany Co., 98 F.3d at 1471. Plaintiffs claims simply seek to enforce, or secure compensation for the breach of, an alleged agreement as to the date of hire for purposes of determining plaintiffs pension benefits.\nSecond, plaintiffs claims do not seek to bind a plan administrator to particular choices or preclude uniform administrative practice, thereby functioning as a regulation of an ERISA plan. Plaintiffs claims are not aimed at the administrator of defendant\u2019s employee benefits plan. Instead, plaintiff is suing defendant in its individual corporate capacity for its alleged anticipated refusal to adhere to the agreement entered into between it and plaintiff concerning plaintiff\u2019s date of hire for pension purposes. Plaintiff\u2019s claims do not attempt to regulate the employee benefit plan itself, but merely seek to establish the length of service plaintiff will be credited with upon retirement.\nThird, plaintiff\u2019s state law claims cannot be considered an \u201calternate enforcement mechanism\u201d for obtaining plan benefits. Travelers, 514 U.S at 658, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 707. Should plaintiff prevail on the damages portion of his claim, his recovery would be limited to damages against the defendant itself, and he would not be entitled to recover ERISA plan benefits. Although plaintiff does, in the alternative, seek to enjoin defendant from denying that plaintiff\u2019s date of hire for pension purposes is 15 February 1972, we hold that the connection between such an injunction and defendant\u2019s employee benefits plan is likewise too minimal to bring plaintiffs claims within ERISA\u2019s preemption provision. See Smith, 851 F. Supp. at 214.\nWe believe that plaintiffs claims are traditional state-based claims of general applicability that do not implicate the relations among the traditional ERISA plan entities. Plaintiffs causes of action function irrespective of the existence of an ERISA plan. Defendant\u2019s liability is not premised on conditions in or a construction of defendant\u2019s employee benefits plan. The existence of an employee benefit plan is not a factor critical to establishing liability because the same causes of action would exist if an employee benefit plan were not in existence or was merely a fraudulent scheme. See Smith, 851 F. Supp. at 213. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that plaintiff\u2019s claims do not have the forbidden \u201cconnection with\u201d an ERISA plan that would bring them within ERISA\u2019s preemption provision.\nDefendant argues that the instant case is controlled by the decision in Middleton v. Russell Group, Ltd., 126 N.C. App. 1, 483 S.E.2d 727, disc. review denied, 346 N.C. 548, 488 S.E.2d 805 (1997), where this Court held that several of the plaintiff\u2019s state law claims were preempted by ERISA. In Middleton, the defendant-employer hired the plaintiff as an advertising consultant and agreed to enroll the plaintiff and his family in its employee health insurance plan, which was administered by Life of Georgia (LOG). Approximately one month after the defendant-employer terminated the plaintiff\u2019s employment, the plaintiff\u2019s wife was injured when a brick wall fell on her. After admitting the plaintiff\u2019s wife for medical treatment, the hospital called LOG to verify health insurance coverage. LOG referred the hospital to the defendant-employer which informed the hospital that the plaintiff\u2019s wife was not covered. It was later discovered that the share of the plaintiff\u2019s health insurance premium had never been deducted from his paycheck, nor had he paid the premium share directly to the company. A letter was prepared notifying the plaintiff that he was entitled to continuation coverage under the health insurance plan pursuant to the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1161-67 (COBRA). This letter was never mailed because the president of the defendant-employer determined that if the plaintiff had not paid his share of the premiums, he never had health insurance coverage, and, thus, the defendant-employer was not obligated to provide continuation coverage under COBRA. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant-employer and LOG asserting claims for: (1) breach of contract; (2) failure to provide benefits under ERISA; (3) injunctive relief to provide COBRA benefits; (4) constructive fraud; (5) negligent misrepresentation; and (6) unfair and deceptive trade practices. After the defendants failed in their attempt to remove the case to federal court, the trial court granted defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment on all state law claims except negligent misrepresentation. This Court affirmed based on case law that has consistently found state law claims which involve redress for mishandling benefit claims or other maladministration of employee benefit plans to be preempted. Defendant contends that plaintiff\u2019s claims in the instant case axe likewise preempted. We disagree.\nThe instant case is factually distinguishable from Middleton, in that here plaintiff\u2019s claims are premised upon an alleged anticipated breach of a promise that pension benefits will be determined based upon a certain date of hire, whereas, the state law claims held to be preempted in Middleton were premised on the plaintiff\u2019s health insurance benefits claim being mishandled. Further, our analysis of ERISA preemption law leads us to the conclusion that plaintiff\u2019s claims in the instant case are not preempted, and we so hold.\nIn conclusion, we reiterate that plaintiff\u2019s claims are not against defendant\u2019s employee benefits plan. Rather, they are against the defendant for its anticipated failure to abide by its promise to provide pension benefits based on an agreed upon date of hire. These claims neither concern the substance of the pension plan nor the plan\u2019s regulation. The plan is only incidentally or tangentially involved. Since plaintiff\u2019s claims are only tangential to the plan, his claims are not preempted by ERISA. See Welsh v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 85 N.C. App. 281, 354 S.E.2d 746, disc. review denied, 320 N.C. 638, 360 S.E.2d 107 (1987).\nBased on the foregoing, we hold that plaintiff\u2019s claims are not preempted by ERISA.\nReversed and remanded.\nChief Judge EAGLES and Judge HUNTER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "CAMPBELL, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Haywood, Denny & Miller, L.L.P., by Michael W. Patrick, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Yates, McLamb & Weyher, L.L.P, by Barry S. Cobb, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WILLIAM EDWARD VAUGHN, Plaintiff v. CVS REVCO D.S., INC., Defendant\nNo. COA00-159\n(Filed 3 July 2001)\nPensions and Retirement\u2014 anticipatory breach of contract\u2014 unfair and deceptive trade practices \u2014 Employment Retirement Income Security Act\nThe trial court erred by concluding that plaintiffs claims for anticipatory breach of contract and unfair and deceptive trade practices, arising out of defendant\u2019s alleged failure to honor its purported agreement with plaintiff establishing 15 February 1972 as the date of hire for purposes of determining plaintiff\u2019s pension benefits, are preempted by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) under U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1001-1461 and thus subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, because: (1) plaintiff\u2019s claims do not make reference t\u00f3 an ERISA plan and are based on state law; (2) a finding of preemption is not necessary to protect the objectives of ERISA; (3) plaintiff\u2019s state law claims do not fall within any of the three categories of state laws that Congress intended ERISA to preempt; and (4) plaintiff\u2019s claims are not against defendant\u2019s employee benefits plan, but are instead against defendant for its anticipated failure to abide by its promise to provide pension benefits based on an agreed upon date of hire which does not concern the substance of the pension plan or the plan\u2019s regulation.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 5 November 1999 by Judge J.B. Allen, Jr. in Orange County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 February 2001.\nHaywood, Denny & Miller, L.L.P., by Michael W. Patrick, for plaintiff-appellant.\nYates, McLamb & Weyher, L.L.P, by Barry S. Cobb, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0534-01", "first_page_order": 562, "last_page_order": 569 }