{ "id": 11435754, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CARLTON LAMONT CRENSHAW", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Crenshaw", "decision_date": "2001-07-03", "docket_number": "No. COA00-440", "first_page": "574", "last_page": "582", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "144 N.C. App. 574" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "145 L. Ed. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating this Court cannot declare the drug tax unconstitutional absent such a ruling by our Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court, or legislation by the General Assembly" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "528 U.S. 1022", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9611137, 9610658, 9611044, 9610279, 9611213, 9610927, 9610831, 9610512, 9610354, 9611412, 9610421, 9611316, 9610751 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating this Court cannot declare the drug tax unconstitutional absent such a ruling by our Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court, or legislation by the General Assembly" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/528/1022-10", "/us/528/1022-05", "/us/528/1022-09", "/us/528/1022-01", "/us/528/1022-11", "/us/528/1022-08", "/us/528/1022-07", "/us/528/1022-04", "/us/528/1022-02", "/us/528/1022-13", "/us/528/1022-03", "/us/528/1022-12", "/us/528/1022-06" ] }, { "cite": "538 S.E.2d 570", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating this Court cannot declare the drug tax unconstitutional absent such a ruling by our Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court, or legislation by the General Assembly" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 836", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132224, 132168, 132164, 132319 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating this Court cannot declare the drug tax unconstitutional absent such a ruling by our Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court, or legislation by the General Assembly" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0836-03", "/nc/350/0836-02", "/nc/350/0836-04", "/nc/350/0836-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 S.E.2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating this Court cannot declare the drug tax unconstitutional absent such a ruling by our Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court, or legislation by the General Assembly" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 L. Ed. 2d 641", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "No. 00-8618" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "536 S.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685069 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 66", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306390 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 S.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "affirming this Court's holding that North Carolina's drug tax does not violate the double jeopardy clause" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139558 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "affirming this Court's holding that North Carolina's drug tax does not violate the double jeopardy clause" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 29", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "affirming this Court's holding \"that the North Carolina Controlled Substance Tax does not have such fundamentally punitive characteristics as to render it violative of the prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offense contained in the [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 817", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11484418, 11484324, 11484453, 11484489, 11484298, 11484142, 11484239, 11484527, 11484206, 11484177, 11484275, 11484380, 11484349, 11484573 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/0817-10", "/us/522/0817-07", "/us/522/0817-11", "/us/522/0817-12", "/us/522/0817-06", "/us/522/0817-01", "/us/522/0817-04", "/us/522/0817-13", "/us/522/0817-03", "/us/522/0817-02", "/us/522/0817-05", "/us/522/0817-09", "/us/522/0817-08", "/us/522/0817-14" ] }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 54070 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 N.C. 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Rev.", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "849" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 128", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 630", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132043 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0630-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App. 675", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9442902 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" }, { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550000 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140" }, { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 869, "char_count": 17988, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.421057237347906e-08, "percentile": 0.48363533935762276 }, "sha256": "b888b69f54807d05fffd8649be5c116a5d105b584f091bf475fabdc235dfeeca", "simhash": "1:a231802f963c8dac", "word_count": 2934 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:55:44.896074+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER and TYSON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CARLTON LAMONT CRENSHAW" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WALKER, Judge.\nOn 6 October 1999, defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(a)(l) (1999). The trial court found defendant had a prior record level of IV and sentenced him to a minimum of nine months and a maximum of eleven months.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tends to show the following: On 6 November 1997 at approximately 9:00 a.m., Officer Timothy Splain (Splain) of the Asheville Police Department (department) was patrolling an area known for drug activity on South Market Street in Asheville, North Carolina. Splain noticed defendant sitting in the driver\u2019s seat of a vehicle parked in an area marked with a \u201cNo Trespassing\u201d sign. Upon deciding to check defendant\u2019s vehicle and its occupants, Splain contacted Officer Joseph Palmer (Palmer) of the department\u2019s vice division for assistance. Splain then drove down Market Street, at which time defendant\u2019s vehicle left the parking lot and traveled behind Splain\u2019s vehicle.\nPalmer arrived in the area, spotted defendant\u2019s vehicle and noticed one of its taillights was inoperable. Palmer then stopped defendant\u2019s vehicle and informed defendant he had been illegally parked and that his taillight was inoperable. Palmer asked for defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license and registration just as Splain arrived on the scene. Defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license and registration proved to be valid and Palmer and Splain were familiar with defendant\u2019s name. Palmer next asked defendant to exit his vehicle, at which time he frisked defendant \u201cto make sure there were no weapons\u201d and found a pager on him. Officer Darryl Fisher (Fisher), who was familiar with defendant\u2019s prior conviction of possession of a firearm by a felon, arrived and searched defendant\u2019s vehicle. The search revealed a screwdriver, a utility knife near the console and a small, black container in the glove compartment which held weight scales and cocaine. A further search of defendant\u2019s person at the detention center revealed additional cocaine hidden in his sweatshirt.\nIn his first assignment of error, defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during the traffic stop. Defendant argues the search and seizure violated his state and federal constitutional rights because, under a totality of the circumstances, the officers detained him longer than necessary to issue a citation. Defendant further contends his consent to search his vehicle was not freely and voluntarily given. U.S. Const, amend. IV; N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7 20.\nWe first note a \u201ctrial court\u2019s findings of fact following a suppression hearing concerning the search of [a] defendant\u2019s vehicle are conclusive and binding on the appellate courts when supported by competent evidence.\u201d State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994). However, whether a trial court\u2019s findings support its conclusions that an officer had reasonable suspicion to detain a defendant is reviewable de novo. State v. Munoz, 141 N.C. App. 675, 541 S.E.2d 218, 222, cert. denied, 353 N.C. 454, 548 S.E.2d 534 (2001), citing Brooks, 337 N.C. at 141, 446 S.E.2d at 585.\nA law enforcement officer may make a brief investigative stop, known as a Terry stop, of a vehicle if he is led to do so by specific, articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968). The test implemented by the United States Supreme Court for constitutional searches and seizures pursuant to a Terry stop was summarized by our Supreme Court in State v. Peck, 305 N.C. 734, 741, 291 S.E.2d 637, 641 (1982), where it stated:\n... if the totality of circumstances affords an officer reasonable grounds to believe that criminal activity may be afoot, he may temporarily detain the suspect. If, after the detention, his personal observations confirm his apprehension that criminal activity may be afoot and indicate that the person may be armed, he may then frisk him as a matter of self-protection.\nId. (emphasis added); State v. Sreeter, 283 N.C. 203, 209-10, 195 S.E.2d 502, 506-07 (1973). In addition, a court must objectively \u201c \u2018view the facts \u2018through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training\u2019 at the time he determined to detain defendant.\u2019 \u201d Munoz, 141 N.C. App. at 682, 541 S.E.2d at 222, quoting State v. Parker, 137 N.C. App. 590, 598, 530 S.E.2d 297, 302 (2000). See also State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 636, 517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (1999). As noted by another jurisdiction, \u201c \u2018[individually, any of the factors cited [in a Terry case] might not justify a search, but one cannot piecemeal this analysis. One piece of sand may not make a beach, but courts will not be made to look at each grain in isolation and conclude there is no seashore.\u2019 \u201d Robert G. Lindauer, Jr., State v. Pearson and State v. McClendon: Determining Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion from the Totality of the Circumstances in North Carolina, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 831, 849 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Shelly, 703 A.2d 499, 503 (Pa. Super Ct. 1997).\nRegarding the stop, search and seizure in the instant case, the trial court found \u201c[t]hat when [Fisher] searched the glove container and opened [the small, black container therein], that he was searching in a place that was large enough to have contained some type of weapon, especially some type of bladed weapon.\u201d Based upon this finding, the Court concluded:\n[1)] That based upon [Palmer\u2019s] observation of [defendant\u2019s] vehicle\u2019s rear lights and the information that he had received from [Splain], [Palmer] had probable cause and a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant\u2019s vehicle to investigate possible improper equipment and to investigate trespassing. 2) Even though [Fisher] told the defendant that he was going to search the defendant\u2019s vehicle for weapons and may have told defendant \u2014 and the defendant may have been told by the officer that he had a right to do so, the defendant, nevertheless, voluntarily consented to this search of his vehicle, there being no evidence that he was threatened, or deceived in any manner, or that he was promised anything. 3) That none of the constitutional rights, either federal or state, of the defendant were violated by the stopping and searching of the defendant\u2019s vehicle or by the search of the defendant\u2019s person at the jail prior to his being incarcerated.\nWe first determine whether defendant\u2019s initial detention was a . lawful Terry stop. The totality of circumstances surrounding the stop of defendant\u2019s vehicle supports the trial court\u2019s conclusions. Defendant\u2019s illegal parking in an area known for drug activity along with the inoperable taillight on his vehicle, afforded the officers reasonable grounds to believe that criminal activity may be afoot, thus justifying a brief detention.\nWe next determine whether the duration of defendant\u2019s stop was reasonable. Defendant contends the duration was invalid because it was longer than necessary to issue a citation by virtue of the following: (1) during the stop, defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license and registration proved to be valid; (2) defendant was not charged with trespassing nor for improper equipment; (3) no evidence was introduced at trial to show defendant\u2019s taillight was inoperable nor that defendant was aware he had been illegally parked; and (4) a frisk of defendant\u2019s person revealed no weapon or contraband on him.\nIn State v. Butler, 331 N.C. 227, 415 S.E.2d 719 (1992), our Supreme Court upheld a prolonged detention of a defendant to frisk for any weapons under a totality of the circumstances analysis. Defendant was on a corner specifically known for drug activity, was a stranger to the officer and attempted to move away from the officer after making eye contact with him. Id. at 232-34, 415 S.E.2d at 721-22. In addition, it was the officer\u2019s experience that people involved in drug traffic are often armed. Id. Although the Court acknowledged the United States Supreme Court\u2019s mandate that \u201cmere presence in a neighborhood frequented by drug users is not, standing alone, a basis for concluding that the defendant was himself engaged in criminal activityf,]\u201d the additional circumstances were found to justify a Terry stop and frisk. Id. at 233-35, 415 S.E.2d at 722-23.\nLikewise, in the instant case, the officers determined that to ensure their safety, it was necessary to ask defendant to step outside his vehicle so they could frisk him. This was based upon the officers\u2019 familiarity with defendant, defendant\u2019s presence in a specific area known for drug activity, and his having been illegally parked. Thus, the duration of defendant\u2019s detention beyond his initial stop was not unreasonable.\nWe next determine whether defendant\u2019s constitutional rights were violated on the basis that his consent to search his vehicle was not freely and voluntarily given. Defendant contends his mere acquiescence to Fisher\u2019s statement that he was going to search defendant\u2019s vehicle does not amount to clear and unequivocal consent.\nWhen \u201cthe State seeks to rely upon [a] defendant\u2019s consent to support the validity of a search, it has the burden of proving that the consent was voluntary.\u201d State v. Morocco, 99 N.C. App. 421, 429, 393 S.E.2d 545, 549-50 (1990), citing State v. Hunt, 37 N.C. App. 315, 321, 246 S.E.2d 159, 163 (1978); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973). When defendant\u2019s detention is lawful, the State need only show \u201cthat defendant\u2019s consent to the search was freely given, and was not the product of coercion.\u201d Munoz, 141 N.C. at 683, 541 S.E.2d at 223.\nDefendant relies on State v. Pearson, 348 N.C. 272, 498 S.E.2d 599 (1998), where our Supreme Court held \u201c[tjhere must be a clear and unequivocal consent before a defendant can waive his constitutional rights.\u201d Id. at 277, 498 S.E.2d at 601, citing State v. Little, 270 N.C. 234, 239, 154 S.E.2d 61, 65 (1967). In that case, the Court concluded defendant\u2019s acquiescence upon being informed by an officer that he would be frisked was not consent \u201cconsidering all the circumstances.\u201d Id. However, the facts in Pearson differ from the facts of this case. In Pearson, the officers had defendant\u2019s written consent to search his vehicle. Id. at 274, 277, 498 S.E.2d at 600, 601. The officers also searched defendant\u2019s person without objection. Id. at 277, 498 S.E.2d at 601. The Court found the search of defendant\u2019s person to be error, as the written consent applied only to the vehicle. Id.\nThis Court addressed the voluntariness of consent to search a vehicle in Munoz, 141 N.C. App. 675, 541 S.E.2d 218. In that case, the State offered testimony of two troopers that defendant verbally consented to a search of his vehicle and signed a consent form. Id. at 684, 541 S.E.2d at 221. On appeal, defendant contended the search was unlawful. In addressing whether defendant\u2019s consent to the search was freely given or was the product of coercion, this Court found \u201c[defendant did not attempt to refute the voluntariness of the consent on cross-examination nor by presenting his own evidence.\u201d Id. at 684, 541 S.E.2d at 223. We thus held that the search of defendant\u2019s vehicle was lawful, since the evidence supported the trial court\u2019s finding that the consent was voluntary. Id.\nHere, Splain, Palmer and Fisher each testified that defendant verbally consented by answering \u201cokay\u201d when Fisher stated he wanted to search defendant\u2019s vehicle. Defendant did not produce any evidence to refute the voluntariness of his consent. In response to defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence, the trial court concluded that defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle and that no evidence to the contrary had been presented.\nWe agree with the trial court that the evidence supports a finding that defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle. The search was therefore lawful and this assignment of error is overruled.\nIn his next assignment of error, defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charge of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine by requiring him to pay taxes on the drugs seized from him pursuant to the North Carolina Unauthorized Substances Taxes in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 \u00a7 105-113.105 through 105.113.113 (1997). Defendant contends that his being prosecuted for this charge, in addition to paying such tax, amounts to double jeopardy in violation of his constitutional rights.\nIn support of his argument, defendant relies on a decision by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lynn v. West, 134 F.3d 582 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 813, 142 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1998). However, our Courts have stated on several occasions that the holding in Lynn is not binding on our State courts. See State v. Adams, 132 N.C. App. 819, 513 S.E.2d 588, disc. review denied, 350 N.C. 836, 538 S.E.2d 570, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1022, 145 L. Ed. 2d 414 (1999) (stating this Court cannot declare the drug tax unconstitutional absent such a ruling by our Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court, or legislation by the General Assembly); State v. Ballenger, 345 N.C. 626, 481 S.E.2d 84, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 817, 139 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1997) (affirming this Court\u2019s holding \u201cthat the North Carolina Controlled Substance Tax does not have such fundamentally punitive characteristics as to render it violative of the prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offense contained in the [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause\u201d); State v. Creason, 346 N.C. 165, 484 S.E.2d 525 (1997) (affirming this Court\u2019s holding that North Carolina\u2019s drug tax does not violate the double jeopardy clause). Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nIn his last assignment of error, defendant contends the trial court committed plain error after the jury initially convicted defendant of both possession of cocaine with intent to sell and the lesser included offense of possession of cocaine. When presented with this initial verdict sheet out of the presence of the jury, the trial court informed counsel that he would give the jury another verdict sheet and \u201cre[-]instruct them [sic] that they are to unanimously decide on only one of the three charges.\u201d Defendant contends the trial court should have re-instructed the jury on the differing elements of the two crimes, although defendant did not request such an instruction at trial.\nThe trial court re-instructed the jury as follows:\n... you marked two of the possible three verdicts. Let me instruct you that you are only to arrive at one of the possible three verdicts: either guilty of possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine or guilty of possession of cocaine or not guilty. Only one of those three possibilities is to be found by the jury .... Does everyone understand that? Anybody have any questions about that? (No hands were raised.) ...\nIn addition, the trial court polled the jury after the final verdict, at which time the jury unanimously agreed with and consented to the verdict.\nBecause defendant failed to object to the jury instructions before the jury retired to deliberate, he is only entitled to relief if he can show that the instructions complained of constitute \u201cplain error.\u201d State v. Cummings, 326 N.C. 298, 389 S.E.2d 66 (1990). \u201cPlain error\u201d exists where defendant can show that absent the error, a different result at trial would have been reached. State v. Cummings, 352 N.C. 600, 536 S.E.2d 36 (2000), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 149 L. Ed. 2d 641 (Apr. 23 2001) (No. 00-8618) (citations omitted). We fail to see how defendant was prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s re-instructing the jury to correct the verdict and to indicate the correction on the verdict sheet.\nIn sum, defendant received a fair trial free of prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges HUNTER and TYSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WALKER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Newton G. Pritchett, Jr., for the State.", "Rudolf Maher Widenhouse & Fialko, by M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CARLTON LAMONT CRENSHAW\nNo. COA00-440\n(Filed 3 July 2001)\n1. Search and Seizure\u2014 traffic stop \u2014 cocaine\u2014motion to suppress evidence\nThe trial court did not err in a possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine case under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(a)(l) by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop of his vehicle, because: (1) defendant\u2019s illegal parking in an area known for drug activity along with the inoperable taillight on his vehicle afforded the officers reasonable grounds to believe that criminal activity may be afoot, thus justifying a brief detention; (2) the duration of defendant\u2019s detention beyond his initial stop was not unreasonable; and (3) defendant failed to present evidence refuting the voluntariness of his consent to a search of his vehicle.\n2. Constitutional Law\u2014 double jeopardy \u2014 possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine \u2014 drug taxation\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine when it required defendant to pay taxes on the drugs seized from him under N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 105-113.105 through 105-113.113, because North Carolina\u2019s drug tax does not violate the double jeopardy clause.\n3. Drugs\u2014 possession with intent to sell cocaine \u2014 lesser included offense of possession of cocaine \u2014 reinstruction to jury\nThe trial court did not commit plain error by its reinstruction to the jury to correct the verdict and to indicate the correction on the verdict sheet after the jury initially convicted defendant of both possession with intent to sell cocaine and the lesser included offense of possession of cocaine.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 6 October 1999 by Judge Charles C. Lamm, Jr. in Buncombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 March 2001.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Newton G. Pritchett, Jr., for the State.\nRudolf Maher Widenhouse & Fialko, by M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0574-01", "first_page_order": 602, "last_page_order": 610 }