{ "id": 11436511, "name": "LARRY EDMOND STAMM, Plaintiff v. TRACEY SALOMON, LISA SALOMON, SALOMON OF IREDELL COUNTY, INC., Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Stamm v. Salomon", "decision_date": "2001-07-17", "docket_number": "No. COA00-839", "first_page": "672", "last_page": "684", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "144 N.C. App. 672" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "70 S.E.2d 578", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 N.C. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625413 ], "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/235/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 L. Ed. 2d 997", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Trust Co. v. Schneider, 235 N.C. 446, 70 S.E.2d 578 (1952)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "488 U.S. 1045", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1495104, 1495555, 1494789, 1495397, 1493289, 1493259, 1493741, 1495342, 1494222, 1493681, 1493202, 1494519, 1493339, 1494780, 1495327 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Trust Co. v. Schneider, 235 N.C. 446, 70 S.E.2d 578 (1952)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/488/1045-10", "/us/488/1045-12", "/us/488/1045-07", "/us/488/1045-01", "/us/488/1045-04", "/us/488/1045-14", "/us/488/1045-09", "/us/488/1045-02", "/us/488/1045-08", "/us/488/1045-03", "/us/488/1045-06", "/us/488/1045-11", "/us/488/1045-13", "/us/488/1045-05", "/us/488/1045-15" ] }, { "cite": "371 S.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 834", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2514028, 2518960, 2516821, 2517941, 2513435 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0834-04", "/nc/322/0834-02", "/nc/322/0834-01", "/nc/322/0834-05", "/nc/322/0834-03" ] }, { "cite": "366 S.E.2d 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "895" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 717", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524807 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 S.E.2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557369 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 S.E.2d 730", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733", "parenthetical": "citing Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 112, 229 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1976)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. App. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11217162 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136", "parenthetical": "citing Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 112, 229 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1976)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/133/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 N.C. App. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526915 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/76/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 S.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798788, 798828, 798798, 798776, 798811 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0122-03", "/nc/343/0122-01", "/nc/343/0122-05", "/nc/343/0122-04", "/nc/343/0122-02" ] }, { "cite": "467 S.E.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796101, 796107, 796077, 796024, 796153 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0655-01", "/nc/342/0655-03", "/nc/342/0655-04", "/nc/342/0655-05", "/nc/342/0655-02" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916580 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 S.E.2d 442", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "445" }, { "page": "577" }, { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 131948 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 S.E.2d 735", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 N.C. 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626052 ], "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/239/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 S.E.2d 831", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "832", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 N.C. App. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525552 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/98/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 128", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573665, 8573740, 8573712, 8573650, 8573687 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0572-02", "/nc/298/0572-05", "/nc/298/0572-04", "/nc/298/0572-01", "/nc/298/0572-03" ] }, { "cite": "257 S.E.2d 78", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 N.C. App. 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554570 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/42/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 483", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489", "parenthetical": "quoting Stone v. McClam, 42 N.C. App. 393, 401, 257 S.E.2d 78, 83, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 572, 261 S.E.2d 128 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538399 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588", "parenthetical": "quoting Stone v. McClam, 42 N.C. App. 393, 401, 257 S.E.2d 78, 83, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 572, 261 S.E.2d 128 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 S.E.2d 202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205", "parenthetical": "quoting 37 C.J.S., Fraud, s 1, p. 204" }, { "page": "205-06", "parenthetical": "quoting 37 C.J.S., Fraud, s 16, p. 247" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8599905 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113", "parenthetical": "quoting 37 C.J.S., Fraud, s 1, p. 204" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/233/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "884", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4778394 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116-17", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 S.E.2d 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11712298 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 S.E.2d 100", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Claggett v. Wake Forest University, 126 N.C. App. 602, 610, 486 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135678, 135926, 135611, 135676, 135870 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Claggett v. Wake Forest University, 126 N.C. App. 602, 610, 486 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0265-01", "/nc/353/0265-05", "/nc/353/0265-02", "/nc/353/0265-04", "/nc/353/0265-03" ] }, { "cite": "534 S.E.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236", "parenthetical": "quoting Claggett v. Wake Forest University, 126 N.C. App. 602, 610, 486 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1997)" }, { "page": "237", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9497365 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599", "parenthetical": "quoting Claggett v. Wake Forest University, 126 N.C. App. 602, 610, 486 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1997)" }, { "page": "601" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 91", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527889 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 S.E.2d 160", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Snead v. Holloman, 101 N.C. App. 462, 400 S.E.2d 91 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790140 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Snead v. Holloman, 101 N.C. App. 462, 400 S.E.2d 91 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 567", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527820 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 822", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "825" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530532 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 S.E.2d 476", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479", "parenthetical": "citing Abels v. Renfro Corp., 335 N.C. 209, 214-15, 436 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11080078 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429", "parenthetical": "citing Abels v. Renfro Corp., 335 N.C. 209, 214-15, 436 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 U.S.C. \u00a7 362", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1087, "char_count": 27613, "ocr_confidence": 0.745, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.5775259263758263e-07, "percentile": 0.8866070956260385 }, "sha256": "47d68a58b9c5fe34f0abe454d78f7356f569ef51151e7ae6a1888aecfdb0019b", "simhash": "1:2f6cd46b3c140d7e", "word_count": 4455 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:55:44.896074+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge McGEE concur." ], "parties": [ "LARRY EDMOND STAMM, Plaintiff v. TRACEY SALOMON, LISA SALOMON, SALOMON OF IREDELL COUNTY, INC., Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nTracey Salomon (\u201cTracey\u201d), Lisa Salomon (\u201cLisa\u201d), and their wholly owned corporation, Salomon of Iredell (\u201cthe corporation\u201d) (collectively \u201cdefendants\u201d) appeal the entry of judgment for Larry Edmond Stamm (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) upon a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff.\nFacts\nThe evidence presented at trial tended to establish that in the late summer of 1998, plaintiff and Tracey began discussing the possibility of starting a business together. The parties discussed opening a business specializing in race car painting and \u201cblasting.\u201d Plaintiff testified that Tracey and Lisa represented to plaintiff that Tracey owned land near Mooresville, North Carolina in close proximity to many race teams that would provide business to the new company.\nThe parties agreed that Tracey would provide the land for the business, that plaintiff would provide capital for construction of the building on the property, and that Tracey and plaintiff would be equal partners in the business. Plaintiff testified that Tracey said \u201cFve got the land, you\u2019ve got the money, we\u2019ll be 50/50. 50/50 on the business, 50/50 on the building and 50/50 on the property.\u201d Plaintiff testified that he \u201ctrusted that this was truly [Tracey\u2019s] land.\u201d In furtherance of their agreement, plaintiff and Tracey filed articles of incorporation for LK Norm S&S, Inc., d/b/a Race City USA Paint and Blast.\nPlaintiff testified that in reliance on Tracey\u2019s statements regarding the land and the business, he \u201cmoved forward\u201d with a \u201ctremendous amount of work\u201d to procure the necessary building permits and begin construction on a building for their business. Construction on the building began in September 1998. Plaintiff testified that he \u201cimmediately\u201d began putting money behind the business, including paying for all necessary permits, paying an architectural firm, procuring insurance, and paying several deposits for building services such as grading and plumbing. Plaintiff introduced into evidence an itemized list of his expenditures for the building, totaling approximately $44,400.00. Plaintiff further testified that he spent hours performing strenuous manual labor in the actual construction of the building. He stated that he \u201cworked every day, seven days a week, at least 15 hours a day\u201d on getting the building and the business ready for operation.\nPlaintiff testified that as construction on the braiding progressed and he continued to invest money, Lisa \u201cbecame every more [sic] present in our conversations and Tracey . . . eventually became nonexistent.\u201d He testified that Lisa \u201cbecame increasingly visible and increasingly involved in the process.\u201d Plaintiff further testified that throughout the time that he was investing in construction of the building, Tracey and Lisa represented to him that the land on which they were building was owned by Tracey. He stated that \u201c[t]hey told me I\u2019d be 50/50 on the land when it was supposed to be Tracey\u2019s land\u201d and that they represented this \u201cfor quite some time.\u201d\nIn September 1998, Lisa told plaintiff that the land was in fact owned by the corporation, Salomon of Iredell, and not by her or Tracey. Plaintiff testified that at the time he discovered Tracey did not own the land, he \u201chad already spent in excess of $31,000.00.\u201d Plaintiff testified that Tracey \u201cdidn\u2019t have a whole lot to say about it,\u201d but stated \u201cyou\u2019ve got to ask [Lisa].\u201d Plaintiff spoke to Lisa, stating, \u201csomething\u2019s got to be put in place . . . showing that I\u2019m 50 percent owner on this property.\u201d Lisa responded that they would see an attorney to help them with the appropriate procedure. Plaintiff stated that he \u201cin good faith . . . believed that [Tracey and Lisa] were going to hold up to their end of the bargain.\u201d Lisa also discussed with plaintiff the possibility of him entering into a lease with the corporation with an option to buy. Plaintiff believed that Lisa had authority to act on behalf of the corporation because she had told him she was its president. Plaintiff testified, \u201cthey continued to lead me down the path and said you will have an interest in this property.\u201d\nPlaintiff moved forward with the business in reliance on the assurances of Lisa that his ownership interest in the business would be protected. The business began operating on 15 November 1995. Plaintiff testified that on 16 November 1995, he was discussing bills with Lisa when she stated that Tracey had \u201crelinquished all rights to this business\u201d to her, and that she was the one that was going to make the decisions. Plaintiff testified that the following day, Lisa \u201ccharged towards [him]\u201d while he was at work and began yelling \u201cI run this business.\u201d\nOn 18 November 1995, the two exchanged words again, and Lisa \u201cspit directly in [plaintiff\u2019s] face.\u201d Plaintiff testified that Lisa yelled \u201cI ought to . . . kill you. I ought to turn you upside down and bash your head into the ground.\u201d Plaintiff returned to work the following day and \u201cpretended that nothing had really happened.\u201d Plaintiff stated that shortly thereafter, a locksmith arrived at the building and began to change the locks to the business. Plaintiff telephoned his wife who advised him to leave, since Lisa \u201chad already threatened to kill [him].\u201d\nPlaintiff attempted to gather some personal belongings from the business, including his computer monitor. Plaintiff testified that Lisa \u201cgrabbed the monitor off of the desk and put it on her lap,\u201d stating \u201cif you take this monitor, if you take this computer, I\u2019ll get you.\u201d Plaintiff left the business. Plaintiff never returned to the premises because he \u201cwas told [he] would be killed.\u201d\nPlaintiff incurred additional expenses following his removal from the business. Defendants refused to pay all of the contractors who had performed work on the building. Plaintiff paid approximately $4,100.00, subsequent to his removal from the building and the business.\nOn 28 January 1999, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants for actual damages, fraud and misrepresentation, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and assault and battery by Lisa. Defendants answered on 29 March 1999, asserting counterclaims for breach of contract, fraud and misrepresentation, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and assault and battery by plaintiff upon Lisa. Defendant corporation filed a motion for summary judgment on 7 October 1999, which motion was denied. Defendants filed a motion for a continuance on 30 December 1999 and again on 12 January 2000, both of which were denied.\nThe matter was tried to a jury at the 17 January 2000 civil session of Iredell County Superior Court. Defendants moved for a directed verdict. The trial court granted defendants\u2019 motion on plaintiff\u2019s claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices.\nOn 21 January 2000, during trial, Tracey discharged his attorneys. On 24 January 2000, at approximately 10:30 p.m., defendants corporately and individually filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of North Carolina. Tracey failed to appear in court for trial on 25 and 26 January 2000.\nThe jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff on 26 January 2000. The jury awarded plaintiff $56,909.12 for all three defendants\u2019 fraud, $125,000.00 in punitive damages, and $5,000.00 for an assault and battery perpetrated by Lisa. Defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. The motions were denied, and the trial court entered judgment on the jury\u2019s verdict, in addition to awarding plaintiff $24,900.00 in attorney\u2019s fees. Defendants appeal.\nDefendants argue that the trial court erred in the following: (1) contacting the United States Bankruptcy Court following defendants\u2019 filing of Chapter 7 Bankruptcy during the pendency of the trial; (2) denying defendants\u2019 motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict on plaintiff\u2019s claim for fraud; (3) denying the corporations\u2019 motion for summary judgment and motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict; (4) awarding punitive damages where the evidence failed to establish a cause of action for fraud; and (5) awarding attorney\u2019s fees. We hold that the trial court did not err with respect to issues (1) through (4). We reverse the trial court\u2019s award of attorney\u2019s fees.\nI. Contact with Bankruptcy Court\nDefendants argue that the trial court deprived defendants of their due process rights by engaging in \u201csua sponte and ex parte contact\u201d with the United States Bankruptcy Court judge following defendants\u2019 filing for bankruptcy. Defendants contend that the contact between the trial judge and the bankruptcy judge \u201cevidenced bias and a lack of neutrality\u201d by the trial court, requiring a new trial. We disagree.\nThe record reflects that towards the end of the trial, defendants\u2019 attorney announced in open court that defendants had filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy at 10:29 p.m. on 24 January 2000 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of North Carolina. Defendants requested that the trial court stay the proceedings based upon the filing of bankruptcy.\nFollowing defendants\u2019 request, the trial court contacted the bankruptcy court to inquire whether the proceedings must be stayed. The bankruptcy judge expressed to the trial judge that he planned to lift the stay and allow the trial to proceed, but that the stay would remain in effect at the conclusion of the trial and would prevent execution on any judgment rendered against defendants. The bankruptcy court issued an order to that effect on 25 January 2000. The order also scheduled a hearing for 8 February 2000 to allow defendants to be heard on the issuance of the order.\nThe propriety of the order issued by the bankruptcy court is not for our review, though we note that the lifting of an automatic stay is within the authority of that court. See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 362. The bankruptcy court issued an order lifting the automatic stay such that the trial, which was nearing a close, could be completed. The trial court complied with the order of the bankruptcy court and allowed the trial to proceed. Even if the trial court erred in communicating with the bankruptcy judge ex parte, defendants have failed to show how they were prejudiced by such communication.\nAlthough defendants intimate that the bankruptcy judge was improperly swayed by the trial judge in issuing the order lifting the stay, the issuance of the order is not for our consideration. Defendants have failed to show any prejudice that would require the granting of a new trial.\nII. Fraud\nTracey and Lisa argue that the trial court erred in denying their motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict on plaintiffs claim of fraud. Lisa alleges that plaintiff failed to forecast sufficient evidence that she made a false representation to plaintiff. Tracey argues that plaintiff failed to forecast sufficient evidence to show that plaintiff relied to his detriment on Tracey\u2019s misrepresentations about ownership of the land. We address the arguments of each defendant in turn.\nOur standard of review on a motion for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict is whether, \u201cupon examination of all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and that party being given the benefit of every reasonable inference drawn therefrom, the evidence is sufficient to be submitted to the jury.\u201d Fulk v. Piedmont Music Center, 138 N.C. App. 425, 429, 531 S.E.2d 476, 479 (2000) (citing Abels v. Renfro Corp., 335 N.C. 209, 214-15, 436 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1993)). \u201cIf there is more than a scintilla of evidence supporting each element of the plaintiffs case, the directed verdict motion should be denied.\u201d Little v. Matthewson, 114 N.C. App. 562, 565, 442 S.E.2d 567, 569 (1994), affirmed, 340 N.C. 102, 455 S.E.2d 160 (1995) (citing Snead v. Holloman, 101 N.C. App. 462, 400 S.E.2d 91 (1991)).\n\u201cTo establish fraud, a plaintiff must show \u2018(1) that defendant made a false representation or concealment of a material fact; (2) that the representation or concealment was reasonably calculated to deceive him; (3) that defendant intended to deceive him; (4) that plaintiff was deceived; and (5) that plaintiff suffered damage resulting from defendant\u2019s misrepresentation or concealment.\u2019 \u201d Jay Group, Ltd. v. Glasgow, 139 N.C. App. 595, 599, 534 S.E.2d 233, 236, disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 265, 546 S.E.2d 100 (2000) (quoting Claggett v. Wake Forest University, 126 N.C. App. 602, 610, 486 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1997)).\nA. Fraud Claim against Lisa\nLisa argues that plaintiff failed to establish the necessary element of a false representation to warrant issuance of the fraud claim to the jury. Plaintiff concedes that he does not allege that Lisa made the initial misrepresentation regarding ownership of the land. However, plaintiff contends that there was sufficient evidence to establish fraud against Lisa based on her continued failure to disclose the true ownership of the property throughout the parties\u2019 business dealings, and her continued assertions that plaintiffs interest in the land and business would be protected following plaintiff\u2019s discovery that neither she nor Tracey owned the property. We agree with plaintiff.\nAlthough Lisa argues that plaintiff failed to show evidence of a false representation, we note that a plaintiff may prove fraud by alleging facts which establish a false representation or concealment of a material fact. See, e.g., Watts v. Cumberland, County Hosp. System, Inc., 317 N.C. 110, 116-17, 343 S.E.2d 879, 884 (1986) (citations omitted); Vail v. Vail, 233 N.C. 109, 113, 63 S.E.2d 202, 205 (1951) (quoting 37 C.J.S., Fraud, s 1, p. 204) (\u201cin general terms fraud may be said to embrace \u2018all acts, omissions, and concealments involving a breach of legal or equitable duty and resulting in damage to another, or the taking of undue or unconscientious advantage of another.\u2019 \u201d). \u201cWhere a relation of trust and confidence exists between the parties, \u2018there is a duty to disclose all material facts, and failure to do so constitutes fraud.\u2019 \u201d Vail at 114, 63 S.E.2d at 205-06 (quoting 37 C.J.S., Fraud, s 16, p. 247).\nA fiduciary relationship exits \u201c \u2018in all cases where there has been a special confidence reposed in one who in equity and good conscience is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the interests of the one reposing confidence.\u2019 \u201d HAJMM Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 328 N.C. 578, 588, 403 S.E.2d 483, 489 (1991) (quoting Stone v. McClam, 42 N.C. App. 393, 401, 257 S.E.2d 78, 83, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 572, 261 S.E.2d 128 (1979)). Generally, the existence of such a relationship is determined by specific facts and circumstances, and is thus a question of fact for the jury. Tin Originals, Inc. v. Colonial Tin Works, Inc., 98 N.C. App. 663, 665, 391 S.E.2d 831, 832 (1990) (citation omitted). Business partners, however, \u201care each others\u2019 fiduciaries as a matter of law.\u201d HAJMM Co. at 588, 403 S.E.2d at 489 (citing Casey v. Grantham, 239 N.C. 121, 79 S.E.2d 735 (1954)).\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint alleges fraud based on false representations and defendants\u2019 \u201cfail[ure] to disclose\u201d that they did not own the land. The trial court in this case correctly instructed the jury that in order to find Lisa guilty of fraud, the jury must find that she made a false representation or that she concealed a material fact. The trial court instructed the jury that a concealment occurs \u201cwhen a person fails to disclose that which under the circumstances he should disclose. A person has a duty to disclose all facts material to a transaction or event where he is a fiduciary, he has made a partial or incomplete representation, [or] he is specifically questioned about them.\u201d\nWe hold that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to overcome Lisa\u2019s motion for directed verdict on the fraud claim. Plaintiff testified that \u201cthey [Lisa and Tracey] told me I\u2019d be 50/50 on the land when it was supposed to be Tracey\u2019s land\u201d and that they represented this \u201cfor quite some time,\u201d including during the period when plaintiff was expending significant sums of money for construction of the building. Plaintiff testified that as construction progressed, Tracey became \u201cnonexistent\u201d and Lisa was \u201cincreasingly visible and increasingly involved in the process.\u201d However, it was not until plaintiff \u201chad already invested almost $32,000.00\u201d of his own money and weeks of his own labor towards construction of the building that defendants disclosed that they did not own the land. Thus, during that several weeks that plaintiff and Lisa were conversing regularly about the business and construction on the building, Lisa failed to disclose to plaintiff the true ownership of the land.\nViewing this evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we hold that the trial court did not err in allowing the jury to consider plaintiff\u2019s claim and in denying Lisa\u2019s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.\nB. Fraud Claim against Tracev\nTracey argues that plaintiff failed to forecast sufficient evidence of his detrimental reliance on Tracey\u2019s misrepresentation about his ownership of the property to warrant submission of the fraud claim to the jury. Tracey argues that plaintiff was aware that the corporation owned the land prior to plaintiff\u2019s expending significant sums of money on construction of the building.\nWe first note that Tracey\u2019s motion for directed verdict was not properly made. On 21 January 2000, Tracey dismissed his attorneys. Defense counsel stated for the record,\nthat we are completely relieved of our obligations to represent [Tracey] in this case, given that he has fired us as his counsel.... [a]nd that the court has acknowledged that, and that we, due to his discharge of our services, no longer have any responsibility to represent him throughout the lawsuit.\nThe trial court noted for the record that Tracey \u201chas fired his attorneys.\u201d Tracey was not present in court on 25 and 26 January 2000, because he felt \u201che was denied his constitutional right to representation\u201d and therefore \u201cconstrued [the trial] as a mistrial.\u201d Tracey\u2019s former defense counsel, who still represented Lisa, moved for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict on his behalf.\nAn attorney or a law firm may not represent a client without the client\u2019s permission to do so. Dunkley v. Shoemate, 350 N.C. 573, 578, 515 S.E.2d 442, 445 (1999). \u201c \u2018[N]o person has the right to appear as another\u2019s attorney without the authority to do so, granted by the party for which he [or she] is appearing.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 577, 515 S.E.2d at 444 (quoting Johnson v. Amethyst Corp., 120 N.C. App. 529, 532, 463 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1995), disc. rev. allowed, 342 N.C. 655, 467 S.E.2d 713, disc. rev. withdrawn, 343 N.C. 122, 471 S.E.2d 65 (1996)). Nothing in the record suggests that Tracey gave his former attorneys permission to further represent him following their dismissal on 21 January 2000; thus, his former counsel was without authority to make motions on his behalf.\nWe have also held, however, that the trial court has authority to direct a verdict on its own motion. See L. Harvey and Son Co. v. Jarman, 76 N.C. App. 191, 199, 333 S.E.2d 47, 52 (1985) (where party fails to move for directed verdict, trial court has authority to direct verdict of own initiative; \u201c[h]owever, mindful of the low evidentiary threshold necessary to take a case to the jury, and also of the detailed procedure outlined in Rule 50, which presumes the use of a motion before a verdict is directed, we do not encourage the frequent use of this practice, and caution trial judges to use it sparingly.\u201d).\nWe hold that the trial court did not err in failing to do so here. Plaintiff testified that \u201cfor quite some time,\u201d and throughout the time that he was investing in construction of the building, Tracey and Lisa continued to represent that the land on which they were building was owned by Tracey. Plaintiff testified that he \u201chad already spent in excess of $31,000.00\u201d at the time he discovered Tracey did not own the land. Moreover, plaintiff testified that after he discovered Tracey did not own the land, defendants continued to misrepresent that they would \u201cwork something out\u201d regarding ownership of the land. Plaintiff testified that he continued to rely on defendants\u2019 assertions and expend significant sums of money on preparing the business.\nSuch evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, is sufficient evidence of detrimental reliance to allow the jury to consider plaintiff\u2019s fraud claim against Tracey. Nor did the trial court err in failing to grant the motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. These assignments of error are overruled.\nIII.Claims against the Corporation\nDefendants argue that the trial court erred in denying the corporation\u2019s motion for summary judgment and motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Defendants argue that plaintiff failed to bring forth any cause of action against the corporation.\nDefendants\u2019 argument is not supported by any authority, cf. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(5) (assignments of error for which no authority is cited will be taken as abandoned), nor do we find that it has merit. The knowledge of a corporation\u2019s president, in this case Lisa, or its agent, is imputed to the corporation itself. Jay Group, Ltd., supra, 139 N.C. App. at 601, 534 S.E.2d at 237 (citations omitted). We reject this argument.\nIV.Punitive Damages\nDefendants argue that the trial court erred in denying defendants\u2019 motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial and in awarding punitive damages where the evidence failed to establish a cause of action for fraud. In light of our holding that the trial court did not err with respect to plaintiff\u2019s fraud claims, we find no error in the entry of an award for punitive damages thereon. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 ID-15 (1999) (allowing imposition of punitive damages where defendant is liable in compensatory damages for fraud); Mehovic v. Mehovic, 133 N.C. App. 131, 136, 514 S.E.2d 730, 733 (1999) (citing Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 112, 229 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1976)) (\u201cfraud is, itself, one of the elements of aggravation which will permit punitive damages to be awarded.\u201d).\nV.Attorney\u2019s Fees\nDefendants also argue that the trial court erred in awarding plaintiff $24,900.00 in attorney\u2019s fees. \u201cAs a general rule, attorneys fees are not awarded to the prevailing party without statutory authority.\u201d Brown v. Rhyne Floral Supply Mfg. Co., Inc., 89 N.C. App. 717, 717, 366 S.E.2d 894, 895, cert. denied, 322 N.C. 834, 371 S.E.2d 275 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1045, 102 L. Ed. 2d 997 (1989) (citing Trust Co. v. Schneider, 235 N.C. 446, 70 S.E.2d 578 (1952)). The trial court in this case did not specify the statutory authority under which it awarded attorney\u2019s fees to plaintiff.\nOur thorough review of defendants\u2019 remaining arguments that the trial court erred in failing to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial reveals no error. We find no error in the award of compensatory and punitive damages in favor of plaintiff. The entry of the award of attorney\u2019s fees in the amount of $24,900.00 for plaintiff is reversed.\nNo error in part; reversed in part.\nChief Judge EAGLES and Judge McGEE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Homesley, Jones, Gaines, Homesley & Dudley, by Clifton W. Homesley and Kevin C. Donaldson, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Robert K. Trobich, for defendants-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LARRY EDMOND STAMM, Plaintiff v. TRACEY SALOMON, LISA SALOMON, SALOMON OF IREDELL COUNTY, INC., Defendants\nNo. COA00-839\n(Filed 17 July 2001)\n1. Judges\u2014 ex parte contact by trial judge with bankruptcy judge \u2014 due process\nIn an action arising from representations allegedly made in forming a business, the trial court did not deprive defendants of their due process rights by contacting a bankruptcy judge ex parte where defendants announced their bankruptcy filing in open court and requested a stay; the trial judge contacted the bankruptcy judge to ask whether the proceedings must be stayed; the bankruptcy judge indicated that he planned to lift the stay and allow the trial to proceed and then reinstate the stay at the conclusion of the trial to prevent execution of any judgment; the bankruptcy court issued an order to that effect which also included an opportunity for defendants to be heard; and the trial court complied with the order and allowed the jury trial to be completed. Even if the trial court erred in communicating with the bankruptcy judge ex parte, there was no prejudice.\n2. Fraud\u2014 false representation \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err in an action arising from the formation of a business by denying defendant Lisa Salomon\u2019s motions for a directed verdict and j.n.o.v. on the issue of fraud where defendant contended that plaintiff failed to establish a false representation, but there was evidence that defendant did not disclose the true ownership of land during several weeks of conversations with plaintiff about the business and construction of a building for the business. A plaintiff may prove fraud by alleging facts which establish a concealment of a material fact; there is a duty to disclose all material facts where a relationship of trust and confidence exists between the parties.\n3. Attorneys\u2014 discharged \u2014 authority to act for client\nAttorneys were without authority to make a motion for a directed verdict in an action arising from representations allegedly made during the formation of a business where defendants Tracey and Lisa Salomon were represented by the same attorneys, defendants filed for bankruptcy during the trial and defendant Tracey Salomon discharged his counsel, Tracey\u2019s former attorneys continued to represent Lisa Salomon, and defense counsel moved for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Tracey\u2019s behalf. Nothing in the record suggests that Tracey gave his former attorneys permission to further represent him following their dismissal; an attorney or law firm may not represent a client without the client\u2019s permission.\n4. Fraud\u2014 detrimental reliance \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err by refusing to direct a verdict for defendant Tracey Salomon on its own motion on a fraud claim arising from the formation of a business where defendant raised the issue of detrimental reliance, but plaintiff testified that he relied on defendants\u2019 assertions regarding ownership of the land on which a building was being built and expended significant sums on preparing the business.\n5. Appeal and Error; Corporations\u2014 argument not supported by authority \u2014 imputed knowledge from corporate president\nThe trial court did not err by denying a corporation\u2019s motions for summary judgment, directed verdict, and j.n.o.v. in an action arising from the formation of another business where the argument was not supported by authority and did not have merit. The knowledge of a corporation\u2019s president is imputed to the corporation itself.\n6. Damages and Remedies\u2014 punitive damages \u2014 underlying fraud claim established\nThe trial court did not err by awarding punitive damages where the court had correctly refused to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s claims for fraud.\n7. Costs\u2014 attorney fees \u2014 no authority for award specified\nThe trial court erred by awarding attorney fees to plaintiff in a fraud action without specifying the statutory authority under which it made the award.\nAppeal by defendants from judgment entered 26 January 2000 by Judge Mark Klass in Iredell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 May 2001.\nHomesley, Jones, Gaines, Homesley & Dudley, by Clifton W. Homesley and Kevin C. Donaldson, for plaintiff-appellee.\nRobert K. Trobich, for defendants-appellants." }, "file_name": "0672-01", "first_page_order": 700, "last_page_order": 712 }