{ "id": 11435327, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM LYDA MESSER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Messer", "decision_date": "2001-07-17", "docket_number": "No. COA00-709", "first_page": "43", "last_page": "51", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "145 N.C. App. 43" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 508", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714596 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 613", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616", "parenthetical": "district attorney did not violate section 7A-49.3 by placing case on calendar less than one week prior to trial date when the case was docketed after the district attorney filed the calendar of cases" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 N.C. App. 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521890 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321-22", "parenthetical": "district attorney did not violate section 7A-49.3 by placing case on calendar less than one week prior to trial date when the case was docketed after the district attorney filed the calendar of cases" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/70/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-56.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "district attorney may add a case to the calendar if the case is docketed after the calendar has been filed" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 594", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12139688 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 S.E.2d 253", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Appeal of Bass Income Fund, 115 N.C. App. 703, 706, 446 S.E.2d 594, 596 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "357 S.E.2d 172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4726601, 4731024, 4726903, 4730779, 4730591 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0172-05", "/nc/320/0172-01", "/nc/320/0172-02", "/nc/320/0172-04", "/nc/320/0172-03" ] }, { "cite": "356 S.E.2d 607", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12121471 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 N.C. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8682207 ], "year": 1876, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/74/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 L. Ed. 2d 531", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 928", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12062626, 12062492, 12062731, 12062812, 12062554, 12062908 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0928-03", "/us/384/0928-01", "/us/384/0928-04", "/us/384/0928-05", "/us/384/0928-02", "/us/384/0928-06" ] }, { "cite": "89 S.E. 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1916, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "172 N.C. 874", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11256129 ], "year": 1916, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "875" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/172/0874-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 S.E.2d 335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Eure, 172 N.C. 874, 875, 89 S.E. 788, 789 (1916)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "266 N.C. 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559537 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Eure, 172 N.C. 874, 875, 89 S.E. 788, 789 (1916)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/266/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4700332 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0515-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 714, "char_count": 18704, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.617666486176788e-07, "percentile": 0.9482491064150844 }, "sha256": "4a23ae50726794473865796e02c0714efa10a37f6f151ff0ba31dc095e9cd5f7", "simhash": "1:08d99b36de4db84a", "word_count": 3094 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:02:14.256422+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge TIMMONS-GOODSON concurs.", "Judge JOHN dissents." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM LYDA MESSER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nWilliam Lyda Messer (Defendant) appeals a judgment dated 29 September 1999 entered after a jury rendered a verdict finding him guilty of felonious failure to appear pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-543 and after he pleaded guilty to being an habitual felon.\nDefendant was arrested on 30 July 1998 for allegedly breaking into a coin/currency machine on 29 July 1998 in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-56.1. On 31 July 1998, a release order was issued authorizing Defendant\u2019s release upon execution of a secured bond. The release order stated: \u201cYou are Ordered to appear before the Court as provided above and at all subsequent continued dates. If you fail to appear, you will be arrested and may be imprisoned for as many as three years and fined as much as $3,000.00.\u201d On 13 August 1998, Defendant was released from custody on a surety appearance bond. On 21 August 1998, it was noted on a district court calendar that the charge of breaking into a coin/currency machine was \u201ctrans\u00ed[erred] to Superior Court] w[ith] related felony.\u201d\nOn 14 September 1998, Defendant was indicted in case number 98-CRS-60819 for breaking into a coin operated machine on 29 July 1998. This case number appeared on a superior court \u201cADDENDUM\u201d calendar dated 25 September 1998, and the \u201cADDENDUM\u201d calendar indicated the case would be called for trial on 28 September 1998. On 28 September 1998, Defendant\u2019s case was called and he failed to appear. A \u201cCALLED AND FAILED ORDER\u201d was then signed by the trial court. Defendant was indicted on 2 November 1998 in case number 98-CRS-60819A for failure to appear in superior court on 28 September 1998. Additionally, on 7 December 1998, Defendant was indicted as an habitual felon in case number 98-CRS-11655, based on the underlying felony in case number 98-CRS-60819A.\nOn 27 September 1999, Defendant was tried for case numbers 98-CRS-60819A and 98-CRS-11655. Nicole Roberts (Roberts), a deputy clerk of superior court for Buncombe County, testified at trial that her job duties include \u201cmaintain[ing] and keeping] all Superior [Court] files [and] all records [of] pending and disposed cases in Buncombe County.\u201d Roberts testified an \u201cadd-on to the Criminal Calendar\u201d for the Superior Court of Buncombe County was published on 25 September 1998 and Defendant\u2019s case was listed on the calendar. Defendant, however, failed to appear when his case was called. The calendar indicated Defendant was represented by an attorney at the time his case was placed on the calendar. Roberts gave the following testimony regarding how a defendant is notified that his case has been placed on a calendar:\nIf the defendant has an attorney, then it\u2019s the attorney\u2019s responsibility to keep up with that. Or the defendant can also call our office and check with us. If the defendant does not have an attorney, the D.A.\u2019s Office sends [him] a letter to notify [him] of the Court date.\nWhen a defendant telephones the office of the clerk of court to check on a court date and there is \u201cnot a date in the computer,\u201d the standard procedure is to \u201ctell [a defendant] to call back on Friday afternoon, because [the clerk\u2019s office] gets [its] add-on [calendar] around lunchtime on Friday. That way [the clerk\u2019s office] know[s] for sure if [a defendant is] going to be in Court that next week.\u201d A copy of the calendar, including the add-on calendar, is posted on a bulletin board in the clerk\u2019s office. Additionally, a copy of the calendar is posted outside of the courtroom \u201cbefore Monday of that Court date.\u201d\nDuring cross-examination, Roberts testified that the court file on Defendant indicated he appeared in court on 31 July 1998 and 21 August 1998. Roberts stated Defendant\u2019s appearance bond and release bond did not indicate any date on which Defendant was required to appear in court. Also, Defendant\u2019s court file did not contain any documents that indicated Defendant or his attorney were notified of the 28 September 1998 court date.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s evidence, Defendant made a motion to dismiss the charge against him based on insufficiency of the evidence. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant did not present any evidence at trial. Subsequent to its deliberations, the jury returned a verdict finding Defendant guilty of felonious failure to appear. After this verdict was returned, Defendant pleaded guilty to being an habitual felon.\nThe issues are whether: (I) the placement of Defendant\u2019s case on the 28 September 1998 superior court calendar violated N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-49.3; and, if so, (II) Defendant\u2019s failure to appear in court on 28 September 1998 constituted felonious failure to appear pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-543.\nI\nDefendant argues the placement of his case on the superior court calendar for the 28 September 1998 session of court violated the provisions of section 7A-49.3. We agree.\nSection 7A-49.3 sets forth the procedure for calendaring criminal trials in the superior court. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-49.3 (1995). Section 7A-49.3 provides, in pertinent part:\n(a) At least one week before the beginning of any session of the superior court for the trial of criminal cases, the district attorney shall file with the clerk of superior court a calendar of the cases he intends to call for trial at that session. The trial calendar shall fix a day for the trial of each case listed thereon. . . . Any case docketed after the calendar has been filed with the clerk may be placed on the calendar at the discretion of the district attorney.\nId. \u00a7 7A-49.3(a). A case is \u201cdocketed\u201d within the meaning of section 7A-49.3(a) when initial entry of the case is made in a \u201cdocket book\u201d in the office of the clerk of court. See Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 495 (7th ed. 1999).\nIn this case, the record shows Defendant\u2019s case was placed on a superior court \u201cADDENDUM\u201d calendar dated 25 September 1998 and the calendar'was filed with the clerk of court on that date. The calendar indicated Defendant\u2019s case would be called at the 28 September 1998 session of the superior court. The district attorney, therefore, did not file a calendar containing Defendant\u2019s case with the clerk of court \u201c[a]t least one week before\u201d the superior court session. Additionally, we are unable to determine from the record before us the date upon which Defendant\u2019s case was docketed; thus, the record does not contain any evidence Defendant\u2019s case was docketed after an initial calendar for the 28 September 1998 session was filed with the clerk of court and prior to the filing of the \u201cADDENDUM\u201d calendar. See id. (district attorney may add a case to the calendar if the case is docketed after the calendar has been filed); State v. Edwards, 70 N.C. App. 317, 321-22, 319 S.E.2d 613, 616 (1984) (district attorney did not violate section 7A-49.3 by placing case on calendar less than one week prior to trial date when the case was docketed after the district attorney filed the calendar of cases), reversed on other grounds, 315 N.C. 304, 337 S.E.2d 508 (1985). The placement of Defendant\u2019s case on the calendar for the 28 September 1998 session of the superior court therefore violated section 7A-49.3.\nII\nDefendant argues he was not required to appear in court on 28 September 1998, within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-543, because the placement of Defendant\u2019s case on the court calendar violated section 7A-49.3. We agree.\nSection 15A-543 provides, in pertinent part:\n(a) In addition to forfeiture imposed under G.S. 15A-544, any person released pursuant to this Article who willfully fails to appear before any court or judicial official as required is subject to the criminal penalties set out in this section.\n(b) A violation of this section is a Class I felony if:\n(1) The violator was released in connection with a felony charge against him; or\n(2) The violator was released under the provisions of G.S. 15A-536.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-543 (1999). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss a charge of felonious failure to appear, the State must present substantial evidence: (1) the defendant was released on bail pursuant to Article 26 of the North Carolina General Statutes in connection with a felony charge against him or, pursuant to section 15A-536, after conviction in the superior court; (2) the defendant was required to appear before a court or judicial official; (3) the defendant did not appear as required; and (4) the defendant\u2019s failure to appear was willful. Id.\nIn this case, the State presented evidence Defendant\u2019s case appeared on the superior court calendar for the 28 September 1998 session of superior court and Defendant failed to appear in court on that day. As noted above, however, the placement of Defendant\u2019s case on the 28 September 1998 calendar violated section 7A-49.3(a). Thus, Defendant was not \u201crequired\u201d to appear in court on 28 September 1998 within the meaning of section 15A-543 and the trial court erred by denying Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the trial court\u2019s 29 September 1999 judgment is reversed.\nBecause we reverse the trial court\u2019s 29 September 1999 judgment, we need not address Defendant\u2019s additional assignments of error.\nReversed.\nJudge TIMMONS-GOODSON concurs.\nJudge JOHN dissents.\n. Repealed by Session Laws 1999-428, 2.2, effective January 1, 2000. See now N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-49.4.\n. We note that section 7A-49.4, which replaced section 7A-49.3 effective 1 January 2000, requires the district attorney to publish the trial calendar \u201c[n]o less than 10 working days before cases are calendared for trial.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-49.4(e) (1999). Additionally, section 7A-49.4 does not contain any provision allowing the addition of cases to the published calendar when the cases are docketed after publication. Id.\n. Defendant argues in his brief to this Court that his failure to appear in court on 28 September 1998 was not \u201cwillful\u201d within the meaning of section 15A-543 because the record does not contain any evidence Defendant or Defendant\u2019s counsel received notice of the 28 September 1998 calendar. Because we hold Defendant was not required to appear in court on 28 September 1998 within the meaning of section 15A-543, we need not address this issue.\nAdditionally, we need not address the issue of whether a defendant in a properly calendared case is \u201crequired\u201d to appear in court within the meaning of section 15A-543 when the defendant does not receive notice of the calendar. We do note, however, that section 7A-49.4 provides the district attorney must \u201cpublish\u201d the trial calendar. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-49.4(e). Section 7A-49.4 does not, however, state whether publication may be accomplished by filing the calendar with the clerk of court or whether additional action, such as mailing the calendar to the appropriate parties and/or their attorneys, is required.", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." }, { "text": "JOHN, J.,\ndissenting.\nThe majority holds the State\u2019s failure to comply with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-49.3 mandates reversal of defendant\u2019s conviction of violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-543.1 respectfully disagree and therefore dissent.\nInitially and parenthetically, I note the majority posits its conclusion the State failed to comply with G.S. \u00a7 7A-49.3 in part upon the failure of the record to reflect the date defendant\u2019s case was docketed. Further, in footnote three, the majority cites defendant\u2019s assertion that the record contains no evidence that he or his counsel received notice of the 28 September 1998 calendar. These circumstances simply highlight the absolute necessity that parties to an appeal include within the record all pertinent information.\nIn any event, the majority properly sets out the elements of a violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-543. Contrary to the majority, however, I believe the instant record contains sufficient evidence of each element to send the case to the jury.\nViewed in the light most favorable to the State, see State v. Whitaker, 316 N.C. 515, 519, 342 S.E.2d 514, 517 (1986) (citation omitted) (\u201c[i]n considering the sufficiency of the evidence to survive a motion to dismiss, \u2018the trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to every reasonable intendment and inference to be drawn therefrom\u2019 \u201d), the evidence at trial tended to show the following: Defendant was released following his arrest on a felony charge upon posting a secured appearance bond. The release order, signed by the processing magistrate, directed defendant to appear \u201cat all subsequent continued dates.\u201d\nIn addition, defendant signed the appearance bond, likewise processed by a magistrate, acknowledging the release condition that he\nshall appear in the above entitled action(s) whenever required and will at all times remain amendable to the orders and processes of the Court.\nDefendant\u2019s case was set for 21 August 1998 in Buncombe County District Court. Defendant was represented by counsel, a preliminary hearing was waived, and the case transferred to superior court. Following return of a true bill of indictment, the case was placed on a 28 September 1998 calendar, published 25 September 1998 and listing defendant\u2019s district court counsel as his attorney. Defendant did not appear at the 28 September 1998 term of superior court, an order for his arrest was issued, and an indictment charging defendant with failure to appear in violation of G.S. \u00a7 15A-543 was returned 2 November 1998.\nDefendant subsequently was brought into the Greenville County, South Carolina, Detention Center on 20 June 1999 and released to be returned to Buncombe County on 3 August 1999. Testimony by a law enforcement officer indicated defendant had stated he was the \u201cvending machine bandit\u201d and that he had been hiding out in a Motel 6 in South Carolina for nearly one year.\nOur Supreme Court has observed that\n\u201cAn appearance bond by its terms, and under the uniform ruling of the Court, requires that the defendant appear term after term until he is discharged on a verdict of acquittal or by order of the court. An appearance bond is in lieu of custody in jail, in which case the defendant could not be released until discharged by order of the court.\u201d\nState v. Mallory, 266 N.C. 31, 42, 145 S.E.2d 335, 343 (1965) (quoting State v. Eure, 172 N.C. 874, 875, 89 S.E. 788, 789 (1916)), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 928, 16 L. Ed. 2d 531 (1966).\nFurther,\n[a] recognizance for the appearance of the defendant at the next term of the court to be held for a given county is valid and binds the defendant to appear at the next term and at the court house; although neither time nor place be specifically named; because every one knows, or is presumed to know, the time and place of holding the court.\nState v. Houston, 74 N.C. 174, 176,-S.E.-, \u2014 (1876).\nFinally,\n\u201c[wjillful\u201d as used in criminal statutes means the wrongful doing of an act without justification or excuse, or the commission of an act purposely and deliberately in violation of the law. \u201cWilfulness\u201d is a state of mind which is seldom capable of direct proof, but which must be inferred from the circumstances of the particular case.\nState v. Davis, 86 N.C. App. 25, 30, 356 S.E.2d 607, 610, stay allowed, 320 N.C. 172, 357 S.E.2d 172 (1987) (citations omitted).\nApplying the foregoing evidence and legal principles to the elements of the offense of Failure to Appear under G.S. \u00a7 15A-543 (section violated by person released on felony charge \u201cwho wilfully fails to appear before any court or judicial official as required\u201d), it appears defendant was released from custody on a felony charge, was directed by a judicial official to appear at all continued dates, acknowledged before a judicial official his responsibility to appear whenever required and to remain amenable to the processes of the court, failed to appear on the date the case was calendared in Buncombe County Superior Court, and wilfully \u201chid out\u201d in South Carolina until arrested nearly one year later. Further, the record contains no indication either defendant or his counsel sought at any time to have his failure to appear excused or the order for arrest stricken on grounds of lack of notice or improper calendaring.\nI also note that the General Assembly has neither provided that violation of G.S. \u00a7 7A-49.3 constitutes an element of the offense of Failure to Appear under G.S. \u00a7 15A-543 nor has it required, notwithstanding the majority opinion herein, that the State\u2019s violation of G.S. \u00a7 7A-49.3 mandates dismissal of any subsequent G.S. \u00a7 15A-543 charge of Failure to Appear. Had the General Assembly so intended, \u201c \u2018it would have been a simple matter [for it] to [have] include[d],\u2019 \u201d State v. Reaves, - N.C. App.-,-, 544 S.E.2d 253, 258 (2001) (quoting In re Appeal of Bass Income Fund, 115 N.C. App. 703, 706, 446 S.E.2d 594, 596 (1994)), such provisions within the statutes.\nIn sum, I believe the evidence presented was sufficient to withstand defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss and that no error was committed in defendant\u2019s trial. I note the State agrees with defendant\u2019s further contention that there exists a discrepancy in the sentence imposed and that this case must be remanded for re-sentencing. Defendant and the State are correct. I therefore vote no error in the trial, but to vacate the judgment and remand for re-sentencing.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JOHN, J.," } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Elizabeth Leonard McKay, for the State.", "Leah Broker for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM LYDA MESSER\nNo. COA00-709\n(Filed 17 July 2001)\n1. Criminal Law\u2014 felonious failure to appear \u2014 calendaring of case \u2014 docketing\nThe placement of defendant\u2019s case for breaking into a coin/currency machine on the superior court calendar for the 28 September 1998 session of court violated the provisions of former N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-49.3 and defendant was not guilty of felonious failure to appear, because: (1) the district attorney did not file a calendar containing defendant\u2019s case with the clerk of court at least one week before the superior court session; and (2) the record does not contain any evidence defendant\u2019s case was docketed after an initial calendar for the 28 September 1998 session was filed with the clerk of court and prior to the filing of the addendum calendar.\n2. Criminal Law\u2014 felonious failure to appear \u2014 calendar violation\nA defendant was not required to appear in court on 28 September 1998 for his breaking into a coin/currency machine case within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-543 and defendant was not guilty of felonious failure to appear, because the placement of defendant\u2019s case on the court calendar violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-49.3.\nJudge John dissenting.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment dated 29 September 1999 by Judge Loto G. Caviness in Buncombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 May 2001.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Elizabeth Leonard McKay, for the State.\nLeah Broker for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0043-01", "first_page_order": 73, "last_page_order": 81 }