{ "id": 11437514, "name": "BETHANIE C. MASSEY, et al., Petitioners v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE and ALBEMARLE LAND COMPANY, LLC, Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "Massey v. City of Charlotte", "decision_date": "2001-08-07", "docket_number": "No. COA00-905", "first_page": "345", "last_page": "355", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "145 N.C. App. 345" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "322 N.C. 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2517410 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 L. Ed. 2d 263", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "375 U.S. 931", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11775588, 11775301, 11775495, 11775406, 11775439, 11775348, 11775549 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/375/0931-07", "/us/375/0931-01", "/us/375/0931-05", "/us/375/0931-03", "/us/375/0931-04", "/us/375/0931-02", "/us/375/0931-06" ] }, { "cite": "131 S.E.2d 329", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 N.C. 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561439 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/259/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 S.E.2d 648", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Markham, 259 N.C. 566, 569, 131 S.E.2d 329, 332, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931, 11 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1963)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 777", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11890745 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "778", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Markham, 259 N.C. 566, 569, 131 S.E.2d 329, 332, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931, 11 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1963)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 586", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2561393, 2561378, 2562195, 2562245 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0629-04", "/nc/323/0629-01", "/nc/323/0629-03", "/nc/323/0629-02" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 564", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2563061 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 S.E.2d 309", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12169746 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 S.E.2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566715 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 S.E.2d 487", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 N.C. App. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8546967 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/6/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 S.E.2d 106", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563992, 8564011, 8563944, 8563965 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0562-03", "/nc/300/0562-04", "/nc/300/0562-01", "/nc/300/0562-02" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575681 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "626" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 S.E.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "876-77", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525743 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 S.E.2d 604", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612" }, { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529794 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507-08" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 S.E.2d 763", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765", "parenthetical": "citing County of Lancaster v. Mecklenburg County, 334 N.C. 496, 507-08, 434 S.E.2d 604, 612 (1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11434646 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337", "parenthetical": "citing County of Lancaster v. Mecklenburg County, 334 N.C. 496, 507-08, 434 S.E.2d 604, 612 (1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 N.C. App. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11433446 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[W]e are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/144/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 S.E.2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330-31", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575506 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 S.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 N.C. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626938 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/254/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 30, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618" }, { "page": "583" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "625" }, { "page": "587" }, { "page": "615" }, { "page": "582" }, { "page": "613" }, { "page": "581" }, { "page": "622" }, { "page": "586" }, { "page": "617" }, { "page": "583" }, { "page": "595" }, { "page": "582" }, { "page": "593" }, { "page": "634" }, { "page": "593" }, { "page": "593-94" }, { "page": "636" }, { "page": "594" }, { "page": "637" }, { "page": "594" }, { "page": "638-39" }, { "page": "594-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2517410 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0611-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 931, "char_count": 24595, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.637153073120317e-07, "percentile": 0.8227425614389101 }, "sha256": "9460435a2955fb6a86d8fd43b6e140a5fa8a30617e533f4a7c21509aa6635052", "simhash": "1:0b7124be15853c74", "word_count": 3927 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:02:14.256422+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge McGEE concur." ], "parties": [ "BETHANIE C. MASSEY, et al., Petitioners v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE and ALBEMARLE LAND COMPANY, LLC, Respondents" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nAlbemarle Land Company, LLC (\u201cALC\u201d) and the City of Charlotte (\u201cCity\u201d) (collectively \u201crespondents\u201d) appeal the entry of judgment in favor of Bethanie C. Massey, et. al (\u201cpetitioners\u201d) invalidating the City\u2019s approval of ALC\u2019s petition for re-zoning. We reverse.\nI. Facts\nOn 18 June 1999, ALC filed an application with the City to rezone approximately 42 acres of \u201cR-3\u201d residential property, to \u201cCC\u201d, commercial center on this property. ALC concurrently submitted an application which provided a 100-foot buffer strip between the shopping center and the neighboring landowners. ALC submitted a site plan setting forth all of the conditions restricting the use of the subject property, as required by City ordinance.\nPetitioners, the neighboring landowners, filed a written petition with the City opposing the application. A public hearing on ALC\u2019s application was held before the City Council on 18 October 1999. On 15 November 1999, a majority of the City Council voted to approve ALC\u2019s application and site plan. After its decision to re-zone, the City issued to ALC a \u201cConditional Use District Permit.\u201d\nPetitioners filed a petition for writ of certiorari and a complaint for declaratory judgment in the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County on 15 December 1999. ALC moved to dismiss the petition on 14 February 2000 for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The City moved to dismiss the petition on 16 February 2000, asserting lack of subject matter jurisdiction \u201cin that the process and decision of the Charlotte City Council . . . was a legislative process and decision and is not subject to review on certiorari.'\"\nOn 17 April 2000, the trial court denied the motions to dismiss and granted the petition for writ of certiorari. Upon review of the matter, the trial court concluded as follows:\nThe City . . . has attempted to implement a purely legislative system of conditional use zoning. Such a system violates N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-381, 382, and thus is invalid. Although conditional use zoning has been approved in North Carolina, both the courts and the legislature have limited such approval to systems which utilize a two step process \u2014 a legislative rezoning decision followed by a quasi-judicial determination of whether to issue a conditional use permit. No decision of an appellate court in this state has approved a one-step, wholly legislative, conditional use zoning procedure .... [T]he conditional use permit may not be written out of a system of conditional use district zoning. The Cityf\u2019s] ... position . . . that its purely legislative process was proper is erroneous.\nThe trial court entered an order invalidating the decision of the City Council. Respondents appeal.\nII. Issues\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether the City had authority to engage in conditional use zoning as a purely legislative act. The trial court held that conditional use zoning requires the issuance of a conditional use permit through a quasi-judicial proceeding, and found that to \u201cargue otherwise overlooks both the plain language of the [enabling] statute and the holding in Chrismon v. Guilford County, 322 N.C. 611, 370 S.E.2d 579 [(1988)].\u201d In examining whether the City\u2019s decision to re-zone the land and approve ALC\u2019s site plan was a valid exercise of its legislative authority, we must determine (1) whether the City\u2019s actions fell within the range of permissible conditional use zoning as expressly adopted by our Supreme Court in Chrismon, and (2) whether the City acted within the authority of the general zoning enabling statute.\nWe note that subsequent to the trial court\u2019s decision invalidating the legislative process used by the City here, our legislature specifically authorized the City to implement a purely legislative model of conditional zoning. See N.C. Sess. Laws. ch. 84 (2000) (\u201cconditional zoning shall not require the issuance of a conditional use or special use permit or permitting process apart from the establishment of the district and its application to particular properties .... Conditional zoning decisions under this act are a legislative process . . . .\u201d)\u2022 Our decision is limited to the particular facts of this case and to the laws applicable at the time of the filing of this proceeding.\nWhile the City issued a \u201cConditional Use District Permit\u201d upon its decision to re-zone the property from \u201cR-3\u201d to commercial center, the trial court found that the issuance of the permit was \u201csuperfluous\u201d and \u201ca nullity.\u201d The trial court also found that the City engaged in a purely legislative act of conditional use zoning. Petitioners have not challenged on appeal the trial court\u2019s finding that the issuance of the \u201cConditional Use District Permit\u201d was \u201ca nullity,\u201d or that the City engaged in a purely legislative act. These findings are therefore binding on appeal. See Moss v. City of Winston-Salem, 254 N.C. 480, 483, 119 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1961) (citations omitted) (\u201cThe findings of fact by the court below are not challenged by any exception or assignment of error, hence they are binding on appeal.\u201d).\nIII. Chrism,on v. Guilford Countv\nIn Chrismon v. Guilford County, 322 N.C. 611, 370 S.E.2d 579 (1988), our Supreme Court expressly approved conditional use zoning in this State as \u201cone of several vehicles by which greater zoning flexibility can be and has been acquired by zoning authorities.\u201d Id. at 618, 370 S.E.2d at 583. The Court stated that \u201cconditional use zoning occurs when a government body, without committing its own authority, secures a given property owner\u2019s agreement to limit the use of his property to a particular use or to subject his tract to certain restrictions as a precondition to any rezoning.\u201d Id. (citation omitted). The Court further held that \u201cit is not necessary that property rezoned to a conditional use district be available for all of the uses allowed under the corresponding general use district.\u201d Id. at 625, 370 S.E.2d at 587.\nThe applicant in Chrismon submitted a request for' re-zoning, along with an additional description of the desired uses for the property. Id. at 615, 370 S.E.2d at 582. Similarly, in this case, ALC submitted a petition for re-zoning, as well as a site plan showing the restrictions that would be applicable to the property. In Chrismon, as here, the zoning authority held a public hearing and voted, in a single proceeding, to re-zone the land subject to the proposed restrictions or conditions. Id.\nThe Supreme Court reversed this Court\u2019s holding in Chrismon that the re-zoning decision was illegal \u201cspot\u201d zoning and illegal \u201ccontract\u201d zoning. Id. at 613, 370 S.E.2d at 581. The Court held that the conditional use zoning decision was valid, so long as it was \u201creasonable, neither arbitrary nor unduly discriminatory, and in the public interest.\u201d Id. at 622, 370 S.E.2d at 586.\nIn the present case, the trial court analyzed the Chrismon decision to support its position that the City\u2019s purely legislative method of conditional use zoning was invalid. The trial court here made the finding that \u201cit is clear that the quasi-judicial aspect of the zoning decision [in Chrismon] was central to the court\u2019s decision to uphold conditional use district zoning.\u201d\nWe disagree with the trial court\u2019s interpretation of Chrismon. Nowhere in the Chrismon decision does our Supreme Court hold that a quasi-judicial process is required in order for conditional use zoning to be valid. To the contrary, the Supreme Court\u2019s holding was stated as follows:\n[W]e hold today that the practice of conditional use zoning is an approved practice in North Carolina, so long as the action of the local zoning authority in accomplishing the zoning is reasonable, neither arbitrary nor unduly discriminatory, and in the public interest.\nId. at 617, 370 S.E.2d at 583. This standard of review for conditional use zoning adopted by the Supreme Court is the standard of review for a legislative decision. See, e.g., Zopfi v. City of Wilmington, 273 N.C. 430, 434, 160 S.E.2d 325, 330-31 (1968) (citations omitted) (legislative function of zoning subject only to limitations forbidding arbitrary and unduly discriminatory interference with the rights of property owners and to limitations of enabling statute).\nThe trial court in this case found, as part of its policy reasons for requiring the quasi-judicial process, that this standard \u201cdoes not adequately protect neighboring landowners who seek to prevent specific uses of adjacent property.\u201d However, the trial court is without authority to disregard the applicable standard of review as set forth by our Supreme Court, as are we. See, e.g., State v. Nolen, 144 N.C. App. 172, - S.E.2d - (2001) (\u201c[W]e are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court.\u201d).\nThe trial court\u2019s conclusion that the quasi-judicial process was central to the Supreme Court\u2019s holding in Chrismon is also erroneous because a review of the procedures used in Chrismon does not reveal evidence of the requirements for an independent quasi-judicial hearing. Such a hearing involves all due process requirements, including: an evidentiary hearing in which parties offer evidence; the cross-examination of adverse witnesses; the right to inspect documents; the giving of sworn testimony; and the right to have written findings of fact supported by competent, substantial, and material evidence. Devaney v. City of Burlington, 143 N.C. App. 334, 337, 545 S.E.2d 763, 765 (2001) (citing County of Lancaster v. Mecklenburg County, 334 N.C. 496, 507-08, 434 S.E.2d 604, 612 (1993)).\nTo the contrary, nothing in Chrismon suggests that the local authority made findings of fact, nor did \u201cthe trial court [make] . . . findings of fact [or] conclusions of law with regard to the issuance of the conditional use permit.\u201d Id. at 615, 307 S.E.2d at 582. Further, the Guilford County Zoning Ordinance, under which the re-zoning decision was made and reviewed by the Supreme Court in Chrismon, did not require a separate, quasi-judicial proceeding for adoption of the conditional use permit. Id. at 638, 370 S.E.2d at 595. Although the ordinance required that an applicant apply separately for re-zoning and a conditional use permit, the ordinance allowed for both to be approved or disapproved in a single, public hearing held before the Board of County Commissioners. Id.\nAlso absent from Chrismon is any mention of the appropriate standard of review upon a quasi-judicial decision. That standard of review, based upon review of the whole record, involves the following:\n1) Reviewing the record for errors in law, 2) Insuring that procedures specified by law by both statute and ordinance are followed, 3) Insuring that appropriate due process rights of a petitioner are protected including the right to offer evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and inspect documents, 4) Insuring that decisions of town boards are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence in the whole record, and 5) Insuring that decisions are not arbitrary and capricious.\nAbernethy v. Town of Boone Board of Adjustment, 109 N.C. App. 459, 462, 427 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (1993) (citation omitted); Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Board of Comm\u2019rs, 299 N.C. 620, 626, 265 S.E.2d 379, 383, reh\u2019g denied, 300 N.C. 562, 270 S.E.2d 106 (1980).\nIn Chrismon, as in this case, a public hearing was held on the zoning application where the Board of Commissioners was able to hear statements from both sides. Following consideration of the matter, the Board voted to re-zone the land \u201cand as \u00e1 part of the same resolution, they also voted to approve the conditional use permit application.\u201d Id. at 615, 370 S.E.2d at 582. Nothing in Chrismon suggests that the Board engaged in a two-step, part legislative, part quasi-judicial process which would warrant the \u201ccompetent and material evidence\u201d standard of review. Rather, the re-zoning decision and the decision regarding the conditional uses that would be allowed on the land were determined in a single proceeding. Id.\nIn the case at bar, the City Council approved the re-zoning, and as a part of that same legislative function, made an administrative determination that the site plan submitted by ALC would comply with the permitted uses and required restrictions for that zoning. Nothing in the zoning ordinance required the submission or issuance of a conditional use permit. We hold that nothing in the Chrismon decision, or any subsequent authority, required that the City employ a two-step quasi-judicial process in determining whether to re-zone the subject property and adopt ALC\u2019s site plan. The trial court\u2019s reliance on Decker v. Coleman, 6 N.C. App. 102, 169 S.E.2d 487 (1969) is inappo-site in that it applies only to general use district zoning and was decided prior to Chrismon.\nMoreover, we reject the trial court\u2019s assertion that absence of the quasi-judicial process would amount to a re-zoning decision being based upon the proposed use of the property, thereby constituting \u201ccontract\u201d zoning that was held to be illegal in Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971). Chrismon defines illegal contract zoning as \u201ca transaction wherein both the landowner who is seeking a certain zoning action and the zoning authority itself undertake reciprocal obligations in the context of a bilateral contract.\u201d Chrismon at 635, 370 S.E.2d at 593.\nThe Chrismon court rejected the underlying decision of this Court which held that the re-zoning decision at issue constituted illegal \u201ccontract\u201d zoning because it was done on the assurance that the applicant would submit an application specifying that he would use the property only in a particular manner. Id. at 634, 370 S.E.2d at 593 (quoting Chrismon v. Guilford County, 85 N.C. App. 211, 219, 354 S.E.2d 309, 314 (1987)). In holding that the re-zoning decision was valid conditional use zoning, the Supreme Court stated:\nIn the view of this Court, the Court of Appeals, in its approach to the question of whether the rezoning at issue in this case constituted illegal contract zoning, improperly considered as equals two very different concepts \u2014 namely, valid conditional use zoning and illegal contract zoning. ... In our view, therefore, the principal differences between valid conditional use zoning and illegal contract zoning are related and are essentially two in number. First, valid conditional use zoning features merely a unilateral promise from the landowner to the local zoning authority as to the landowner\u2019s intended use of the land in question, while illegal contract zoning anticipates a bilateral contract in which the landowner and the zoning authority make reciprocal promises. Second, in the context of conditional use zoning, the local zoning authority maintains its independent decision-making authority, while in the contract zoning scenario, it abandons that authority by binding itself contractually with the landowner seeking a zoning amendment.\nId. at 634-36, 370 S.E.2d at 593-94.\nIn applying this standard to the re-zoning decision before it, the Supreme Court determined that the record failed to show evidence that the zoning authority entered into a bilateral contract with the rezoning applicant. Id. at 636, 370 S.E.2d at 594. Rather, the only evidence of a promise was the unilateral promise from the applicant to the authority in the form of his proposed conditional uses. Id. at 637, 370 S.E.2d at 594.\nThe Supreme Court further concluded that the zoning authority did not abandon its role as an independent decision-maker. In rejecting the holding of this Court that the decision was not a \u201c \u2018valid exercise of the county\u2019s legislative discretion,\u2019 \u201d the Supreme Court found that \u201call procedural requirements [of the ordinance] were observed\u201d and the decision was rendered only after \u201cthorough consideration of the merits.\u201d Id. at 638-39, 370 S.E.2d at 594-95.\nIn the present case, we reject the trial court\u2019s conclusion that absence of the quasi-judicial element renders the re-zoning decision and concurrent approval of the site plan illegal contract zoning. Applying the standard set forth in Chrismon, we conclude that the City acted lawfully. The record does not reveal that the City engaged in any bilateral contract with ALC. Rather, as in Chrismon, the only evidence of a promise is the unilateral promise of ALC to abide by the conditions and restrictions as set forth in its site plan. Nor does the record show that the City abandoned its independent decision-making process. The record shows that the City followed the procedural requirements set forth in its ordinance, and that it approved ALC\u2019s application after ample consideration of the merits, and after hearing opposing viewpoints.\nWe do not interpret Chrismon as requiring that the City must employ a two-step legislative/quasi-judicial proceeding in order to engage in conditional use zoning. We further hold that the City did not engage in illegal contract zoning by virtue of the absence of such a proceeding.\nIV. Zoning Enabling Statutes\nWe next determine whether the City\u2019s act of legislative re-zoning was in violation of the general zoning enabling statute. G.S. \u00a7 160A-4 applies to the interpretation of the zoning enabling statute:\nIt is the policy of the General Assembly that the cities of this State should have adequate authority to execute the powers, duties, privileges, and immunities conferred upon them by law. To this end, the provisions of this Chapter and of city charters shall be broadly construed and grants of power shall be construed to include anv additional and supplementary powers that are reasonably necessary or expedient to carry them into execution and effect: Provided, that the exercise of such additional or supplementary powers shall not be contrary to State or federal law or to the public policy of this State.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-4 (emphasis supplied).\nG.S. \u00a7 160A-381 is the enabling statute which grants a city the legislative power to regulate the uses of property. Hall v. City of Durham, 323 N.C. 293, 305, 372 S.E.2d 564, 572, reh\u2019g denied, 323 N.C. 629, 374 S.E.2d 586 (1988). It provides:\n(a) For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community, any city may regulate and restrict the height, number of stories and size of buildings and other structures, the percentage of lots that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts and other open spaces, the density of population, and the location and use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes and to provide density credits or severable development rights for dedicated rights-of-way pursuant to G.S. 136-66.10 or G.S. 136-66.11. These regulations may provide that a board of adjustment may determine and vary their application in harmony with their general purpose and intent and in accordance with general or specific rules therein contained. The regulations mav also provide that the board of adjustment or the city council mav issue special use permits or conditional use permits in the classes of cases or situations and in accordance with the principles, conditions, safeguards, and procedures specified therein and may impose reasonable and appropriate conditions and safeguards upon these permits.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-381(a) (emphasis supplied).\nThe plain language of this statute does not require that local ordinances provide for the issuance of conditional use permits. The statute clearly states that a city may provide for the issuance of such permits, but it clearly does not mandate such a procedure. Interpreting this statute \u201cbroadly,\u201d with all grants of power \u201cconstrued to include any additional and supplementary powers,\u201d G.S. \u00a7 160A-4, we hold that the City\u2019s act of legislative re-zoning was not outside the bounds of authority granted it through G.S. \u00a7 160A-381.\nThe trial court further concluded that \u201c[t]o attempt to eliminate the quasi-judicial aspect of conditional use district zoning runs afoul of the grant of authority contained in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-382.\u201d We decline to read this statute so narrowly. G.S. \u00a7 160A-382 provides a city with the legislative authority to divide its territorial jurisdiction into various zoning districts:\nFor any or all these purposes, the city may divide its territorial jurisdiction into districts of any number, shape, and area that may be deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of this Part; and within those districts it mav regulate and restrict the erection. construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair or use of buildings. structures, or land. Such districts may include, but shall not be limited to, general use districts, in which a variety of uses are permissible in accordance with general standards; overlay districts, in which additional requirements are imposed on certain properties within one or more underlying general or special use districts; and special use districts or conditional use districts, in which uses are permitted only upon the issuance of a special use permit or a conditional use permit.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-382 (emphasis supplied).\nThis statute confers upon local authorities the right to establish and develop zoning districts. The statute clearly provides local authorities with the right to \u201cregulate and restrict\u201d the \u201cuse\u201d of the land in those districts. The City has the authority under this statute to develop a zoning district such as the one at issue here, and to regulate and restrict the uses permitted within that district. We do not interpret this statute as imposing any requirement of a quasi-judicial permitting process as a prerequisite to the exercise of the discretion granted under the statute. The language of the statute is also clear that the types of zoning districts allowed may include \u201cbut shall not be limited to\u201d the four types of districts listed.\nHaving held that the City acted within the power granted it by these enabling statutes, we reverse the decision of the trial court invalidating the City\u2019s re-zoning decision and hold that the decision was a valid exercise of the City\u2019s legislative authority. A legislative decision is not reviewable upon a writ of certiorari. Gossett v. City of Wilmington Through City Council, 124 N.C. App. 777, 778, 478 S.E.2d 648, 649 (1996) (quoting In re Markham, 259 N.C. 566, 569, 131 S.E.2d 329, 332, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931, 11 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1963)) (\u201c \u2018the writ of certiorari will lie to review only those acts which are judicial or quasi judicial in their nature\u2019 and \u2018does not lie to review or annul any judgment or proceeding which is legislative, executive, or ministerial rather than judicial.\u2019 \u201d).\nThe trial court\u2019s review of this case was limited to petitioner\u2019s petition for writ of certiorari. We therefore do not address the merits of petitioner\u2019s action for declaratory judgment, any mention of which is absent from the trial court\u2019s order. This case is therefore reversed and remanded to the trial court for entry of an order dismissing petitioners\u2019 petition. In light of this holding, we need not address respondents\u2019 additional argument that petitioners lacked standing to bring their petition for writ of certiorari.\nReversed and remanded for entry of an order of dismissal.\nChief Judge EAGLES and Judge McGEE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hewson Lapinel Owens, P.A., by H. L. Owens, for petitioners-appellees.", "Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, RA. by Frank E. Emory, Jr. and Stephen M. Cox, for respondent-appellant Albemarle Land Company, LLC; Robert E. Hagemann, for respondent-appellant City of Charlotte." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BETHANIE C. MASSEY, et al., Petitioners v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE and ALBEMARLE LAND COMPANY, LLC, Respondents\nNo. COA00-905\n(Filed 7 August 2001)\nZoning\u2014 conditional use permit \u2014 quasi-judicial proceeding not required\nThe trial court erred by invalidating a conditional use zoning permit allowing a commercial use in a previously residential district where the court held that conditional use zoning requires the issuance of a permit through a quasi-judicial proceeding under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-381 and Chrismon v. Guilford County, 322 N.C. 611. Chrismon does not require a two-step legislative/quasi-judicial proceeding and the City did not engage in illegal contract zoning by virtue of the absence of such a proceeding. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-381 states that a city may provide for the issuance of conditional use permits, but clearly does not mandate such a procedure.\nAppeal by respondents from judgment entered 17 April 2000 by Judge Ben F. Tennille in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 May 2001.\nHewson Lapinel Owens, P.A., by H. L. Owens, for petitioners-appellees.\nRobinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, RA. by Frank E. Emory, Jr. and Stephen M. Cox, for respondent-appellant Albemarle Land Company, LLC; Robert E. Hagemann, for respondent-appellant City of Charlotte." }, "file_name": "0345-01", "first_page_order": 375, "last_page_order": 385 }