{ "id": 11437952, "name": "CHARLES FRANKLIN FULLER, Plaintiff v. MICHAEL F. EASLEY, individually and in his official capacity as ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA, HARLAN E. BOYLES, in his official capacity as STATE TREASURER OF NORTH CAROLINA, et. al., Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Fuller v. Easley", "decision_date": "2001-08-07", "docket_number": "No. COA00-922", "first_page": "391", "last_page": "401", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "145 N.C. App. 391" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defining \"contribution\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.36", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "effective date May 4, 1999" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 594", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596", "parenthetical": "noting that \"it would have been a simple matter to include [an] explicit phrase\" in statute, thus giving it a certain effect" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12139688 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706", "parenthetical": "noting that \"it would have been a simple matter to include [an] explicit phrase\" in statute, thus giving it a certain effect" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 S.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570249 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "482 S.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 N.C. App. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11870783 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/125/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-253", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Courts . . . shall have power to declare rights . . . whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 S.E.2d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561905 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 S.E.2d 556", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523801 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164", "parenthetical": "citation and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 664", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11436790 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668", "parenthetical": "citation and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0664-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.28", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 S.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380" }, { "page": "380" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561615 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" }, { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 S.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. 623", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8614497 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/233/0623-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 S.E.2d 643", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647", "parenthetical": "quoting Branch v. Board of Education, 233 N.C. 623, 625, 65 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1951)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 741", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11890591 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "747", "parenthetical": "quoting Branch v. Board of Education, 233 N.C. 623, 625, 65 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1951)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0741-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 21", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 N.C. App. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552165 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/44/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 S.E.2d 102", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 N.C. App. 605", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555439 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/27/0605-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 S.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11655550 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0490-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 S.E.2d 441", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155610 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0331-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 829, "char_count": 23414, "ocr_confidence": 0.734, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.734188259653317e-07, "percentile": 0.9501920768353677 }, "sha256": "286e1c5e3d9eacaf2c149bdcda3902f9c964fd2928b7f3aea9c97018c1576776", "simhash": "1:09b947803caf8c7c", "word_count": 3712 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:02:14.256422+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CAMPBELL and JOHN concur." ], "parties": [ "CHARLES FRANKLIN FULLER, Plaintiff v. MICHAEL F. EASLEY, individually and in his official capacity as ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA, HARLAN E. BOYLES, in his official capacity as STATE TREASURER OF NORTH CAROLINA, et. al., Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.\nOn 13 October 1999, Charles Franklin Fuller (\u201cplaintiff\u201d) filed an action against then Attorney General Michael F. Easley (\u201cAttorney General Easley\u201d or \u201cthe Attorney General\u201d), State Treasurer Harlan E. Boyles (\u201cTreasurer Boyles\u201d), and \u201cunknown Boards of Education to be identified hereinafter.\u201d Plaintiff brought the action as \u201ca registered voter and citizen of Wake County.\u201d Plaintiff alleged that in his official capacity, Attorney General Easley filed certain lawsuits to collect damages for unfair and deceptive trade practices (hereinafter \u201cthe lawsuits\u201d). According to plaintiff, the proceeds recovered in the lawsuits were \u201cstate funds or penal funds\u201d which should have been remitted to Treasurer Boyles. Plaintiff also alleged that the lawsuit proceeds were disguised campaign contributions, which should have been reported to the State Board of Elections.\nPlaintiff further claimed that Attorney General Easley improperly used the lawsuit proceeds for a \u201cpublic service message campaign.\u201d According to the complaint, Attorney General Easley appeared in so-called public service messages while a declared candidate for the Office of Governor, and the messages were, in fact, communications to support the Attorney General\u2019s candidacy for Governor. Plaintiff contended that in undertaking the above-alleged actions, Attorney General Easley violated the North Carolina State Constitution and state election laws.\nPursuant to his allegations, plaintiff requested a variety of relief, including, inter alia, a temporary restraining order, injunctions, restitution and costs, remittance of the lawsuit proceeds to either Treasurer Boyles or \u201cthe unknown Boards of Education,\u201d and mandamus relief requiring Attorney General Easley to report the lawsuit proceeds to the State Board of Elections. In addition, plaintiff requested a declaratory judgment, asking the trial court to interpret the meaning of the state election laws allegedly violated by the Attorney General and to determine the character of the lawsuit proceeds.\nFinding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success at trial, the trial court denied plaintiff\u2019s request for a temporary restraining order. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss based upon Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6) of our Rules of Civil Procedure. Following a hearing, the trial court summarily dismissed plaintiff\u2019s complaint, as amended. From this order, plaintiff appeals.\nPreliminarily, we note that although defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint on a variety of grounds, the trial court failed to specify upon which of those grounds it based its dismissal. As such, plaintiff presumes and argues on appeal that the trial court dismissed his complaint due to a lack of standing and/or a failure to state a claim.\nBased upon plaintiff\u2019s arguments, there are two pertinent issues presented by the present appeal: (I) whether plaintiff had standing to sue; (II) whether plaintiff stated a claim upon which declaratory and other equitable relief could have been granted.\nI.\nWe first address plaintiff\u2019s argument that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint based upon his lack of standing to bring the present action. Standing concerns the trial court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore properly challenged by a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1) (1999); Energy Investors Fund, L.P. v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 351 N.C. 331, 525 S.E.2d 441 (2000); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1) (1999). Our review of an order granting a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is de novo. Smith v. Privette, 128 N.C. App. 490, 493, 495 S.E.2d 395, 397 (1998).\nPlaintiff first contends that he had standing to sue based upon his status as a Wake County taxpayer. Allegations in plaintiff\u2019s complaint which support this argument are those which reference plaintiff\u2019s status as a taxpayer, registered voter, and citizen of Wake County.\nGenerally, an individual taxpayer has no standing to bring a suit in the public interest. Green v. Eure, Secretary of State, 27 N.C. App. 605, 608, 220 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1975). However, the taxpayer may have standing if he can demonstrate:\n[A] tax levied upon him is for an unconstitutional, illegal or unauthorized purpose^] that the carrying out of [a] challenged provision will cause him to sustain personally, a direct and irreparable injury[;] or that he is a member of the class prejudiced by the operation of [a] statute.\nTexfi Industries v. City of Fayetteville, 44 N.C. App. 268, 270, 261 S.E.2d 21, 23 (1979) (citations omitted). Our review of plaintiff\u2019s complaint reveals no allegations which allow him to sue as an individual taxpayer.\nNonetheless, plaintiff may have had standing to bring a taxpayer action, not as an individual taxpayer, but on behalf of a public agency or political subdivision, if \u201c \u2018the proper authorities neglect[ed] or refus[ed] to act.\u2019 \u201d Guilford County Bd. of Comrs. v. Trogdon, 124 N.C. App. 741, 747, 478 S.E.2d 643, 647 (1996) (quoting Branch v. Board of Education, 233 N.C. 623, 625, 65 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1951)). To establish standing to bring an action on behalf of public agencies and political divisions, a taxpayer must allege\nthat he is a taxpayer of [that particular] public agency or political subdivision,... [and either,] \u201c(1) there has been a demand on and refusal by the proper authorities to institute proceedings for the protection of the interests of the political agency or political subdivision; or (2) a demand on such authorities would be useless.\u201d\nId. (citation omitted).\nPlaintiff alleged in his complaint that Attorney General Easley violated Article IX, section 7 of the North Carolina Constitution. Article IX, section 7 provides:\nAll moneys, stocks, bonds, and other property belonging to a county school fund, and the clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures and of all fines collected in the several counties for any breach of the penal laws of the State, shall belong to and remain in the several counties, and shall be faithfully appropriated and used exclusively for maintaining free public schools.\nN.C. Const, art. IX, \u00a7 7. Plaintiff claimed, based upon the aforementioned constitutional provision, that the lawsuit proceeds were to be remitted to \u201cunknown boards of education.\u201d\nThe only allegation indicating plaintiff had a right to sue under Article IX, section 7 was one noting his status as a taxpayer of Wake County. This allegation was insufficient to support his standing to sue on behalf of any Board of Education. Plaintiff failed to allege that the Wake County Board of Education or any other Board of Education refused to bring a suit to recover funds, that he requested the Board do so, or that such a request would be futile. Furthermore, plaintiff admitted in oral argument that there was no evidence in the record indicating that he had complied with the prerequisites for bringing a taxpayer action on behalf of the unknown Boards. We are therefore satisfied that plaintiff did not have taxpayer standing to challenge Attorney General Easley\u2019s alleged violation of Article IX, section 7 of our State Constitution.\nWe likewise find that plaintiff did not have taxpayer standing to challenge the Attorney General\u2019s alleged violation of state election laws. In his complaint, plaintiff claimed that the funds recovered in the lawsuits should be remitted to the State Treasurer and further named Treasurer Boyles as a defendant. Given these allegations, we can only assume that plaintiff brought the action to recover the proceeds on behalf of the State Treasurer. However, plaintiff again failed to allege that the Treasurer or any state entity refused to file suit to recover the lawsuit proceeds, that he requested a state entity do so, or that such a demand would have been made in vain. We therefore conclude that plaintiff did not have taxpayer standing to bring the present action on behalf of either the unknown boards of education or any state entity.\nPlaintiff next alleged in his complaint and argues on appeal that he had standing to sue based upon the theory of qui tam. We are not so persuaded.\nQui tam actions are those \u201cbrought under a statute that allows a private person to sue for a penalty, part of which the government or some specified public institution will receive.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1262 (7th ed. 1998) (emphasis added); see also In re Lancaster, 290 N.C. 410, 424, 226 S.E.2d 371, 380 (1976). The critical factor allowing plaintiffs to sue under the theory of qui tam is the existence of a statute specifically authorizing such suit. See Lancaster, 290 N.C. at 424, 226 S.E.2d at 380. There is no such statute allowing plaintiff sub judice to sue for a penalty based upon alleged violations of the state election laws or the constitutional provision specified in plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiffs argument is therefore meritless.\nFinally, plaintiff argues and we agree that he had standing to sue to enforce state election laws under section 163-278.28(a) of our General Statutes. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.28(a) (1999). Section 163-278.28(a) provides: \u201cThe superior courts of this State shall have jurisdiction to issue injunctions or grant any other equitable relief appropriate to enforce the provisions of this Article upon application by any registered voter of the State.\u201d As plaintiff alleged that he was a registered voter of Wake County, section 153-278.28(a) allowed him to sue to enforce state election laws by seeking injunctive and other equitable relief.\nBased upon the aforementioned reasoning, we conclude that plaintiff had standing to bring only those claims seeking equitable relief based upon alleged violations of state election laws.\nII.\nWe next address plaintiffs argument that the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss based upon Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff contends on appeal that he was entitled to relief, as he stated claims for declaratory and other equitable relief based upon Attorney General Easley\u2019s alleged violations of state election laws. We disagree.\nA motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) (1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, \u201cthe complaint must provide sufficient notice of the events and circumstances from which the claim arises, and must state allegations sufficient to satisfy the substantive elements of at least some recognized claim.\u201d Taylor v. Taylor, 143 N.C. App. 664, 668, 547 S.E.2d 161, 164 (2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In ruling on the motion, the trial court must take the complaint\u2019s allegations as true and determine whether they \u201care sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory.\u201d Id.\nRequest for Declaratory Judgment\nIn his complaint, plaintiff first requested that the trial court declare the parties\u2019 rights under sections 163-278.16A of our General Statutes. Where a complaint requesting declaratory relief \u201calleges the existence of a real controversy arising out of the parties\u2019 opposing contentions and respective legal rights,\u201d it is normally sufficient. Morris v. Plyler Paper Stock Co., 89 N.C. App. 555, 557, 366 S.E.2d 556, 558 (1988). Thus, although plaintiff\u2019s position may be wrong, if he alleges \u201ca controversy which should be settled\" and \u201c \u2018is entitled to a declaration of rights with respect to the matters alleged [,]\u2019 \u201d plaintiff states a claim for declaratory relief. Walker v. Charlotte, 268 N.C. 345, 348, 150 S.E.2d 493, 495 (1966) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-253 (1999) (\u201cCourts . . . shall have power to declare rights . . . whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.\u201d). Even where a genuine controversy existed, this Court has found that if plaintiffs have \u201cno basis for the relief they seek,\u201d dismissal was proper. Carter v. Stanly County, 125 N.C. App. 628, 632, 482 S.E.2d 9, 11 (1997); Forbis v. Honeycutt, 301 N.C. 699, 701, 273 S.E.2d 240, 241 (1981).\nSection 163-278.16A provides:\nAfter December 31 prior to a general election in which a Council of State office will be on the ballot, no declared candidate for that Council of State office shall use or permit the use of State funds for any advertisement or public service announcement in a newspaper, on radio, or on television that contains that declared candidate\u2019s name, picture, or voice, except in case of State or national emergency and only if the announcement is reasonably necessary to that candidate\u2019s official function. For purposes of this section, \u201cdeclared candidate\u201d means someone who has publicly announced an intention to run.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.16A (1999) (effective date Jan. 1, 1998).\nAccording to plaintiff, section 163-278.16A\nis capable of several distinct interpretations and is in need of construction. One construction is that for any year after December 31, 1998 no declared candidate may use state funds for campaign like prohibited \u201cpublic service announcements\u201d and another construction is that after December 31 for any year immediately prior to a general election no candidate may use state funds for campaign like prohibited \u201cpublic service announcements.\u201d .... The parties are in need of determination of which construction of the statute is lawful and intended.\nThe former interpretation advocated by plaintiff would support his claim that the Attorney General violated the statute, as he alleged Attorney General Easley, then a declared candidate for Council of State, appeared in public service announcements on or after December 31, 1998. The latter interpretation supports defendants\u2019 position that the Attorney General did not violate section 163-278.16A, because he did not appear in an advertisement after 31 December, prior to election year 2000.\nOur de novo review of section 163-278.16A reveals that plaintiff was not entitled to declaratory relief concerning the statute\u2019s meaning. Section 163-278.16A specifically applies \u201c[a]fter December 31 prior to a general election in which a Council of State office will be on the ballot.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.16A (emphasis added). Although the statute was effective on or after 1 January 1998, it does not denote 31 December 1998 as the specific date after which it perpetually bars all public service announcements by Council of State candidates. Certainly, if the General Assembly intended section 163-278.16A to apply from 31 December 1998 forward, it would have so specified. See In Re Appeal of Bass Income Fund, 115 N.C. App. 703, 706, 446 S.E.2d 594, 596 (1994) (noting that \u201cit would have been a simple matter to include [an] explicit phrase\u201d in statute, thus giving it a certain effect).\nWe hold that section 163-278.16A applies only to prohibit advertisements in years when declared Council of State candidates are on an election ballot. Given that the meaning of section 163-278.16A is plain and clear, we conclude there was no actual controversy between the parties concerning the meaning of section 163-278.16A. See Walker, 268 N.C. at 348, 150 S.E.2d at 495.\nPlaintiff further requested that the trial court determine the nature of the lawsuit proceeds in relation to the Attorney General\u2019s duty to report those proceeds pursuant to section 163-278.36 of our General Statutes. During the pendency of the lawsuits, but prior to the filing of the present action, our General Assembly amended section 163-278.36. Plaintiffs claims concern both section 163-278.36, as it originally appeared and as amended. Prior to May 1999, section 163-278.36 read as follows:\nElected officials to report funds: All contributions to, and all expenditures from any \u201cbooster fund,\u201d \u201csupport fund,\u201d \u201cunofficial office account\u201d or any other similar source which are made to, in behalf of, or used in support of any person holding an elective office for any political purpose whatsoever during his term of office shall be deemed contributions and expenditures as defined in this Article and shall be reported as contributions and expenditures as required by this Article. The annual report shall show the balance of each separate fund or account maintained on behalf of the elected office holder.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.36 (1995). Section 163-278.36 now provides:\nElected officials to report funds: All donations to, and all payments from any \u201cbooster fund,\u201d \u201csupport fund,\u201d \u201cunofficial office account\u201d or any other similar source made or used in support of an individual\u2019s candidacy for elective office, or in support of an individual\u2019s duties and activities while in an elective office shall be deemed contributions and expenditures as defined in this Article and shall be reported as contributions and expenditures as required by this Article. The reports due in January and July of each year shall show the balance of each separate fund or account maintained on behalf of the elected office holder.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.36 (1999) (effective date May 4, 1999).\nAn examination of plaintiff\u2019s complaint, as amended, reveals that he failed to state a claim for declaratory relief concerning the nature of the lawsuit proceeds, as they relate to the alleged violation of section 163-278.36. Although plaintiff claimed that the lawsuit proceeds were disguised campaign contributions, plaintiff also alleged that the lawsuit proceeds were \u201ceither state funds or penal funds [which] should be remitted to either the State Treasurer or local school boards.\u201d State funds do not fall within the purview of either the original or the amended version of section 163-278.36, as \u201cstate funds\u201d are neither \u201ccontributions\u201d or \u201cdonations.\u201d See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.6 (1999) (defining \u201ccontribution\u201d). It follows that plaintiff failed to allege an actual controversy concerning the lawsuit proceeds and consequently failed to state a claim for declaratory relief.\nOther Equitable Relief\nGiven our resolution of the aforementioned issue, we find that plaintiff likewise failed to state claims for other equitable relief under either section 163-278.16A or section 163-278.36. As noted supra, section 163-278.16A prohibits a Council of State candidate from appearing in public service announcements during years when the candidate\u2019s name appears on an election ballot. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.16A. Plaintiff in the case sub judice alleged that Attorney General Easley violated the statute by appearing in public service announcements running in 1999. However, Council of State candidates, including Attorney General Easley, were not on an election ballot in 1999. It follows that section 163-278.16A did not prohibit the advertisements, and thus, plaintiff\u2019s claim to the contrary must fail.\nConcerning plaintiff\u2019s claims brought pursuant to section 163-278.36, because he alleged the lawsuit proceeds were, in fact, \u201cstate funds,\u201d neither version of section 163-278.36 required Attorney General Easley to report the proceeds to the State Board of Elections. We therefore conclude that plaintiff failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted under section 163-278.36.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nJudges CAMPBELL and JOHN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hunter, Johnson, Elam & Benjamin, P.L.L.C., by Robert N. Hunter, Jr. and Jason A. Knight, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by General Counsel Andrew A. Vanore, Jr., and Special Deputy Attorneys General W. Dale Talbert, Norma S. Harrell, and Susan K. Nichols, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CHARLES FRANKLIN FULLER, Plaintiff v. MICHAEL F. EASLEY, individually and in his official capacity as ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA, HARLAN E. BOYLES, in his official capacity as STATE TREASURER OF NORTH CAROLINA, et. al., Defendants\nNo. COA00-922\n(Filed 7 August 2001)\n1. Constitutional Law\u2014 standing \u2014 taxpayer suit \u2014 use of public funds for public service announcements by candidate\nThe trial court did not err by dismissing for lack of standing an action by a taxpayer alleging that the Attorney General had improperly used damages collected for unfair and deceptive trade practices to fund public service messages while running for governor. An individual taxpayer has no standing to bring a suit in the public interest, but may bring a suit if he can demonstrate that a tax is unconstitutional, that the challenged provision will cause him to personally sustain a direct and irreparable injury, or that he is a member of the class prejudiced by the operation of a statute.\n2. Constitutional Law\u2014 standing \u2014 taxpayer suit \u2014 use of lawsuit proceeds by Attorney General\nA taxpayer lacked standing to bring an action under N.C. Const, art. IX, \u00a7 7 against the Attorney General arising from public service announcements while the Attorney General was running for governor where plaintiff failed to allege that any board of education refused to bring an action to recover funds, that he requested a board of education to do so, or that such a request would be futile.\n3. Elections\u2014 standing \u2014 taxpayer suit \u2014 violation of election laws\nA plaintiff did not have taxpayer standing to bring an action alleging violation of election laws in the Attorney General\u2019s use of lawsuit proceeds for public service advertisements the year before he ran for governor where plaintiff failed to allege that the Treasurer or any state entity refused to file suit to recover the proceeds, that he requested a state entity to do so, or that such a demand would have been in vain.\n4. Penalties, Fines and Forfeitures\u2014 taxpayer action \u2014 qui tam\nA taxpayer did not have standing under a qui tam theory to bring an action arising from an attorney general\u2019s public service announcements the year before he ran for governor. Qui tam actions are brought under a statute that allows a private person to sue for a penalty, part of which the government or a specified public institution will receive. There is no statute allowing this plaintiff to sue for a penalty based upon alleged constitutional or election law violations as specified in the complaint.\n5. Elections\u2014 standing \u2014 public service announcements by candidate \u2014 statement of claim\nA taxpayer had standing under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-278.28(a) to bring claims relating to election laws arising from public service announcements by a sitting attorney general who was running for governor where the plaintiff alleged that he was a registered voter of Wake County.\n6. Elections\u2014 declaratory judgment \u2014 use of public funds for public service campaign by candidate \u2014 no actual controversy\nThe trial court properly granted defendants\u2019 Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiffs claim for declaratory relief arising from an attorney general\u2019s use of lawsuit proceeds to fund public service announcements while he was running for governor. There was no actual controversy because the plain and clear language of the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-278.16A prohibits advertisements only in years when the candidate\u2019s name appears on an election ballot and Council of State candidates were not on the ballot when these ads ran in 1999. Furthermore, plaintiff alleged that the lawsuit proceeds were state funds, which the Attorney General is not required to report to the State Board of Elections.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 17 May 2000 by Judge Stafford G. Bullock in Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 May 2001.\nHunter, Johnson, Elam & Benjamin, P.L.L.C., by Robert N. Hunter, Jr. and Jason A. Knight, for plaintiff-appellant.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by General Counsel Andrew A. Vanore, Jr., and Special Deputy Attorneys General W. Dale Talbert, Norma S. Harrell, and Susan K. Nichols, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0391-01", "first_page_order": 421, "last_page_order": 431 }