{ "id": 11438402, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WOODIE LOCKLEAR, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Locklear", "decision_date": "2001-08-07", "docket_number": "No. COA00-875", "first_page": "447", "last_page": "453", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "145 N.C. App. 447" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 223", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560030 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "182" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 S.E.2d 20", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 N.C. App. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550577 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/40/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 L. Ed. 2d 873", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "519 U.S. 1131", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11793861, 11793574, 11793276, 11793162, 11793228, 11793806, 11793456, 11793105, 11793745, 11793397, 11793532, 11793341, 11793630, 11793695 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/519/1131-14", "/us/519/1131-09", "/us/519/1131-04", "/us/519/1131-02", "/us/519/1131-03", "/us/519/1131-13", "/us/519/1131-07", "/us/519/1131-01", "/us/519/1131-12", "/us/519/1131-06", "/us/519/1131-08", "/us/519/1131-05", "/us/519/1131-10", "/us/519/1131-11" ] }, { "cite": "473 S.E.2d 269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798967 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 L. Ed. 2d 782", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "498 U.S. 1051", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6557120, 6556992, 6557378, 6557190, 6557223, 6557256, 6557095, 6557032, 6557292, 6556976, 6557076, 6556952, 6557051 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/498/1051-08", "/us/498/1051-03", "/us/498/1051-13", "/us/498/1051-09", "/us/498/1051-10", "/us/498/1051-11", "/us/498/1051-07", "/us/498/1051-04", "/us/498/1051-12", "/us/498/1051-02", "/us/498/1051-06", "/us/498/1051-01", "/us/498/1051-05" ] }, { "cite": "395 S.E.2d 412", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2495160 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 L. Ed. 2d 153", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "516 U.S. 884", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 324545, 324386, 328131, 323172, 327332, 326430, 327472, 327185, 324946, 328048, 326327, 324376, 328606, 328191 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/516/0884-13", "/us/516/0884-01", "/us/516/0884-11", "/us/516/0884-03", "/us/516/0884-10", "/us/516/0884-09", "/us/516/0884-12", "/us/516/0884-04", "/us/516/0884-06", "/us/516/0884-07", "/us/516/0884-14", "/us/516/0884-08", "/us/516/0884-05", "/us/516/0884-02" ] }, { "cite": "453 S.E.2d 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2557546 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 600", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608", "parenthetical": "\"A ruling on a motion in limine is a preliminary or interlocutory decision which the trial court can change if circumstances develop which make it necessary.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2569966 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649", "parenthetical": "\"A ruling on a motion in limine is a preliminary or interlocutory decision which the trial court can change if circumstances develop which make it necessary.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 L. Ed. 2d 1099", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "523 U.S. 1142", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11562464, 11562529, 11562560, 11562626, 11562501, 11562406, 11562376, 11562665, 11562347, 11562476, 11562444, 11562361, 11562394, 11562427, 11562590 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/523/1142-08", "/us/523/1142-11", "/us/523/1142-12", "/us/523/1142-14", "/us/523/1142-10", "/us/523/1142-05", "/us/523/1142-03", "/us/523/1142-15", "/us/523/1142-01", "/us/523/1142-09", "/us/523/1142-07", "/us/523/1142-02", "/us/523/1142-04", "/us/523/1142-06", "/us/523/1142-13" ] }, { "cite": "486 S.E.2d 219", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139553, 139621, 139351, 139480, 139647 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0185-02", "/nc/346/0185-05", "/nc/346/0185-01", "/nc/346/0185-04", "/nc/346/0185-03" ] }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 347", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348-49" }, { "page": "349" }, { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 N.C. App. 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11870405 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602" }, { "page": "602" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/125/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274", "parenthetical": "quoting T&T Development Co. v. Southern Nat. Bank of S.C., 125 N.C. App. 600, 602, 481 S.E.2d 347, 348-49, disc. review denied, 346 N.C. 185, 486 S.E.2d 219 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551151 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293", "parenthetical": "quoting T&T Development Co. v. Southern Nat. Bank of S.C., 125 N.C. App. 600, 602, 481 S.E.2d 347, 348-49, disc. review denied, 346 N.C. 185, 486 S.E.2d 219 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240", "parenthetical": "defendant deprived of right to peremptory challenge and awarded new trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2496946 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "641", "parenthetical": "defendant deprived of right to peremptory challenge and awarded new trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 743", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "747" }, { "page": "747" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4693655 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 L. Ed. 2d 498", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155877 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504-05" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0481-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 679, "char_count": 15475, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0534161499439269e-07, "percentile": 0.5546902541422299 }, "sha256": "ce85848c7798159c3243471d14f0322131fb57b7c2f8b4bdfa740e12e6bf07db", "simhash": "1:0fe9d0a176ce8d72", "word_count": 2555 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:02:14.256422+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN and HUNTER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WOODIE LOCKLEAR, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUDSON, Judge.\nDefendant was convicted of the first degree murder of his wife, Peggy Locklear, in a capital trial. He contends he was denied the full number of peremptory challenges due to him in jury selection under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1217 (1999). We agree and remand for a new trial on this basis.\nThe State presented evidence tending to show that defendant was seen hanging around a convenience store near the trailer of his estranged wife, Peggy Locklear (Locklear), on 22 October 1998. Locklear left for work at 3:30 p.m. that day and returned after 1:00 a.m., being driven by her co-worker, Kona Scott (Scott). As Locklear exited Scott\u2019s car, defendant ran up and began stabbing Locklear with a knife. Scott honked her car horn and defendant ran away, but Locklear did not survive the attack.\nDefendant was convicted of first degree murder by virtue of lying in wait and premeditation and deliberation. The jury recommended a sentence of life without parole, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. Defendant filed notice of appeal to this Court.\nDefendant contends his first degree murder conviction must be vacated, because the indictment in which he was charged with murder failed to cite the elements of premeditation and deliberation and lying in wait in violation of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal constitution and Article I, \u00a7\u00a7 19, 22, and 23 of the state constitution. Defendant was charged using the short-form indictment authorized by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15-144 (1999). Our Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the use of the short-form indictment based upon this statute is not violative of defendants\u2019 rights under the United States and North Carolina Constitutions. State v. Wallace, 351 N.C. 481, 504-05, 528 S.E.2d 326, 341, cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 148 L. Ed. 2d 498 (2000). Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is without merit.\nDefendant next contends the trial court committed several errors during jury selection. The parties began selecting a jury on 17 August 1999. On August 18, defendant accepted Virginia Slaughter to be a juror. On August 24, defendant challenged prospective juror Hilary Britt for cause, on the grounds that Britt\u2019s daughter had already been seated as a juror and Britt stated on voir dire that he strongly believed family members should not serve together on a jury. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s challenge for cause, and defendant proceeded to exercise a peremptory challenge against Britt. Between August 17 and August 24, defendant used a total of eleven peremptory challenges against prospective jurors for seats one through twelve. On August 25, the parties began selecting two alternate jurors. Defendant used a total of three peremptory challenges against prospective jurors for alternate seat one. By August 26, defendant had accepted two alternate jurors.\nOn the morning of August 27, juror Virginia Slaughter did not report for duty. A court clerk called Slaughter\u2019s daughter to try to locate her, and Slaughter\u2019s daughter allegedly told her that Slaughter had memory problems. The judge said that this surprised him, but recalled that Slaughter had appeared at the courthouse on two occasions when she had not been instructed to come. He then suggested that they move one of the alternates into Slaughter\u2019s position on the jury and select a new alternate. Before this selection took place, Slaughter appeared for jury duty.\nThe judge then asked her a number of questions regarding her reasons for not coming to court earlier that morning and her fitness to serve, and allowed both the prosecutor and defense counsel to question her as well. Slaughter indicated that she had had a light stroke, but that she felt able to serve on the jury. At the close of the questioning, defendant made a motion to excuse Slaughter for cause, which motion was denied.\nDefendant then moved to exercise a peremptory challenge against Slaughter. The trial court stated that defendant had exercised all of his peremptory challenges for the regular jury and that he only had challenges remaining for alternate jurors. Defendant then asked the judge to revisit his ruling refusing to dismiss juror Hilary Britt for cause, in an effort to gain back the peremptory challenge he had exercised to excuse Britt. The court again denied defendant\u2019s challenge to Britt for cause. The jury was then impaneled.\nDefendant contends the trial court erred in denying his challenges for cause against Slaughter and Britt, and in ruling that he had no peremptory challenges remaining with which to excuse Slaughter. We will first address the issue of defendant\u2019s peremptory challenge against Slaughter. The applicable statute, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1214(g) (1999), provides:\nIf at any time after a juror has been accepted by a party, and before the jury is impaneled, it is discovered that the juror has made an incorrect statement during voir dire or that some other good reason exists:\n(1) The judge may examine, or permit counsel to examine, the juror to determine whether there is a basis for challenge for cause.\n(3) If the judge determines there is no basis for challenge for cause, any party who has not exhausted his peremptory challenges may challenge the juror.\nIn the present case, after Slaughter was chosen as a juror but before the jury was impaneled, the judge examined and allowed counsel to examine Slaughter with regard to whether good reason existed to excuse her. When the judge rejected defendant\u2019s challenge for cause, defendant was entitled by statute to exercise a peremptory challenge against Slaughter if he had any remaining. The judge determined he had none remaining. We disagree.\nUnder G.S. \u00a7 15A-1217(a)(l), defendants tried capitally are allowed fourteen peremptory challenges. Furthermore, under G.S. \u00a7 15A-1217(c), \u201c[e]ach party is entitled to one peremptory challenge for each alternate juror in addition to any unused challenges.\u201d In the present case, defendant exercised eleven peremptory challenges in seating the regular jury. He then exercised three peremptory challenges in seating the alternate jurors, for a total of fourteen challenges. He thus used twelve of the peremptory challenges allotted under G.S. \u00a7 15A-1217(a)(l) and two challenges allotted under G.S. \u00a7 15A-1217(c) in seating the jury. As such, he had two peremptory challenges remaining at the time he attempted to exercise a peremptory challenge against Slaughter.\nIt appears from the record that the trial court believed that defendant was required to use the three peremptory challenges he had remaining after seating the regular jury before being able to use the additional challenges allotted for alternate jurors. We do not believe the statute so requires. Defendant was not required to exhaust his supply of peremptory challenges left over from regular jury selection until he had used both of the challenges allotted for alternate jurors in G.S. \u00a7 15A-1217(c). The latter statute specifies that a defendant is entitled to two peremptory challenges for alternate jurors \u201cin addition to any unused challenges\u201d (emphasis added).\nThe decision whether to reopen examination of a juror previously accepted by the parties is within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Freeman, 314 N.C. 432, 437, 333 S.E.2d 743, 747 (1985). However, once the court has decided to reopen the examination, the parties have \u201can absolute right\u201d to exercise any remaining peremptory challenges. Id. at 438, 333 S.E.2d at 747. \u201cThe right to challenge a given number of jurors without showing cause is one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused....\u201d Id. (citation omitted). Thus, defendant was denied his fundamental right to exercise the full number of peremptory challenges allotted to him by statute and must have a new trial. See id.; see also State v. Hightower, 331 N.C. 636, 641, 417 S.E.2d 237, 240 (1992) (defendant deprived of right to peremptory challenge and awarded new trial).\nIn that we have decided defendant was denied full use of his peremptory challenges, we need not address the propriety of the court\u2019s denial of his challenges for cause against jurors Slaughter and Britt.\nDefendant next assigns as error the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to suppress evidence of the oral and written statements he gave to police shortly after Locklear\u2019s death. Because we have determined that defendant is entitled to a new trial, we believe it is in the interest of conserving judicial resources not to address the trial court\u2019s pretrial ruling at this juncture. Rulings by a trial court on motions in limine \u201care merely preliminary and subject to change during the course of trial, depending upon the actual evidence offered at trial.\u201d State v. Hill, 347 N.C. 275, 293, 493 S.E.2d 264, 274 (1997) (quoting T&T Development Co. v. Southern Nat. Bank of S.C., 125 N.C. App. 600, 602, 481 S.E.2d 347, 348-49, disc. review denied, 346 N.C. 185, 486 S.E.2d 219 (1997)), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1142, 140 L. Ed. 2d 1099 (1998); see also State v. Lamb, 321 N.C. 633, 649, 365 S.E.2d 600, 608 (1988) (\u201cA ruling on a motion in limine is a preliminary or interlocutory decision which the trial court can change if circumstances develop which make it necessary.\u201d).\nFurthermore, an objection to an order granting or denying a motion in limine \u201cis insufficient to preserve for appeal the question of the admissibility of evidence.\u201d State v. Conaway, 339 N.C. 487, 521, 453 S.E.2d 824, 845, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 884, 133 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1995). In order to preserve the issue for appeal, \u201c[a] party objecting to an order granting or denying a motion in limine ... is required to object to the evidence at the time it is offered at the trial (where the motion was denied) or attempt to introduce the evidence at the trial (where the motion was granted).\u201d T&T Development Co., 125 N.C. App. at 602, 481 S.E.2d at 349. Thus, when a party purports to appeal the granting or denying of a motion in limine following the entry of a final judgment, the issue on appeal is not actually whether the granting or denying of the motion in limine was error, as that issue is not appealable, but instead \u201cwhether the evidentiary rulings of the trial court, made during the trial, are error.\u201d Id. at 602-03, 481 S.E.2d at 349.\nHere, because we have vacated the judgment and have determined that defendant is entitled to a new trial, the trial court\u2019s ruling on defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to suppress has, once again, become \u201cpreliminary\u201d in nature because (1) the ruling may change during the second trial depending on the evidence offered by the parties, and (2) the ruling may ultimately not be appealable at all if, at trial, the State does not seek to admit the evidence, or if, when the State seeks to admit the evidence, the defendant fails to object. Moreover, not only is it possible that the ruling may change during the second trial, but the defendant (or the State) may request a rehearing on the motion to suppress prior to the second trial based on new evidence, at which time the trial court may modify the ruling made prior to the first trial. See State v. Sanders, 327 N.C. 319, 395 S.E.2d 412 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1051, 112 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1991); see also State v. Bates, 343 N.C. 564, 473 S.E.2d 269 (1996) (implicitly approving the trial court\u2019s denial of the defendant\u2019s motion for a rehearing on his motion to suppress prior to the second trial because the defendant failed to show additional pertinent facts, discovered since the first hearing, which could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence prior to the first hearing), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 136 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1997).\nFinally, we note that the trial court\u2019s ruling on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress prior to the first trial continues to stand following remand for a new trial by this Court, and, provided it is not modified prior to or during the second trial, and provided the issue is properly preserved during the second trial, defendant may appeal that ruling in the event he is convicted at the second trial. See State v. Grogan, 40 N.C. App. 371, 253 S.E.2d 20 (1979).\nDefendant last argues the trial court erred by admitting into evidence as corroborative a statement Kona Scott gave police, in that it did not tend to corroborate the testimony Scott gave at trial. We decline to address this issue, as it will not likely recur on retrial.\nNew trial.\nJudges MARTIN and HUNTER concur.\n. Here, defendant\u2019s motion is both a motion to suppress and a motion in limine; the fact that it is a motion to suppress denotes the type of motion that has been made, while the fact that it is a motion in limine denotes the timing of the motion (prior to trial) regardless of its type. See State v. Tate, 300 N.C. 180, 182, 265 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1980).", "type": "majority", "author": "HUDSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General John F. Maddrey, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defender Danielle M. Carman, for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WOODIE LOCKLEAR, Defendant\nNo. COA00-875\n(Filed 7 August 2001)\n1. Homicide\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 short-form indictment\u2014 constitutionality\nThe use of a short-form indictment in a first-degree murder case was not erroneous even though it failed to cite the elements of premeditation and deliberation and lying in wait, because our Supreme Court has consistently upheld the constitutionality of this indictment.\n2. Jury\u2014 selection \u2014 reopening examination \u2014 number of peremptory challenges\nThe trial court erred in a first-degree murder case by denying defendant the full number of peremptory challenges during jury selection as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1217 when it reopened examination of a juror previously accepted by the parties and ruled that defendant had no peremptory challenges remaining with which to excuse this juror because: (1) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1217(a)(l) allows defendants tried capitally to have fourteen peremptory challenges, and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1217(c) allows each party one peremptory challenge for each alternate juror in addition to any unused challenges; (2) defendant exercised eleven peremptory challenges in seating the regular jury and then exercised three peremptory challenges in seating the two alternate jurors for a total of fourteen challenges, meaning defendant had two peremptory challenges remaining; and (3) defendant was not required to exhaust his supply of peremptory challenges left over from regular jury selection until he had used both of the challenges allotted for alternate jurors.\n3. Evidence\u2014 defendant\u2019s oral and written statements given to police \u2014 pretrial motion to suppress\nAlthough a defendant in a first-degree murder case assigns error to the trial court\u2019s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence of the oral and written statements defendant gave to police shortly after his estranged wife\u2019s death, the ruling will not be addressed because: (1) the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and determined that defendant is entitled to a new trial; (2) rulings on motions in limine are merely preliminary and subject to change during the course of the trial; and (3) defendant may appeal from the ruling in the event he is convicted at the second trial if he properly preserves this issue at the second trial.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 3 September 1999 by Judge James R. Vosburgh in Harnett County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 June 2001.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General John F. Maddrey, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defender Danielle M. Carman, for defendant." }, "file_name": "0447-01", "first_page_order": 477, "last_page_order": 483 }